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AN INQUIRY

INTO THE

COLONIAL POLICY

OF THE

EUROPEAN POWERS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

By HENRY BROUGHAM Jun. Esq. F. R. S.

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172. l. 21. *dele* though.
178. l. 29. *for* Pruſſian, *read* Ruſſian.
333. l. 15. *for* it, *read* its affairs.

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P. 63. l. 9. *for* coaleſce, *read* conſolidate.
162. l. 9. *for* unequality, *read* inequality.
185. - *after* Book III. *inſert* the title of the Book from the Table of Contents.
303. l. 3. from foot, *for* ſimilar, *read* ſunk.
— l. ult. *for* forceed, *read* forced.
499. l. 14. *after* touch, *inſert* upon.

AN INQUIRY

INTO

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE *EUROPEAN POWERS.*

INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

THE colonial policy of a ſtate, is rendered more complex than the other branches of its domeſtic policy, by the circumſtances of local ſituation—the different ſtages of improvement in which the different parts of the empire are generally found to exiſt—and the various relations which naturally ariſe from thoſe diverſities, and which ſubſiſt between the mother country and the colony, ſomewhat in the ſame manner as if they formed ſeparate communities. The policy, both of ancient and modern times, has always more or leſs interfered with thoſe colo-

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nial relations which, in the natural courſe of things, would eſtabliſh themſelves. The nature of theſe relations, and theſe modifications, forms the ſubject of the Firſt Book of this Inquiry.

The policy of every ſtate may be regarded, as it relates either to the domeſtic and independent affairs of that ſtate, or to their connexion with the affairs of foreign nations. Theſe two branches of policy are, however, intimately related to each other. The exertions of a nation, either in defending or enlarging its dominions, muſt, obviouſly, be regulated by the extent and nature of thoſe reſources which its ſituation has beſtowed, and which its domeſtic adminiſtration can draw forth. The deſire of extenſive power, as it is limited by the magnitude and nature of the national reſources, is always more or leſs excited by thoſe circumſtances which facilitate its gratification. *Cui plus licet quam debet, ſemper plus velle quam licet.* In the ſame manner as a ſtate will naturally people up to its reſources, it will naturally extend its dominions as far as thoſe reſources permit. The conſideration of its foreign relations, therefore, depends upon the domeſtic relations of

of the ſtate, and of all the parts which are comprehended in its dominions. This leads us to view, firſt, the relations of the different colonies among themſelves, or the relations of the different members of the colonial commonwealth; and, then, the relations of the members of the European commonwealth, as influenced by the colonial relations. The former of theſe ſubjects is diſcuſſed in the Second Book —the latter is treated of in the Third.

The views of a ſtate are naturally directed, firſt, to the preſervation of its own dominions from the attacks of a foreign power; ſecondly, to the maintenance of ſubordination, and of the political union, againſt the diſtractions of rebellion or civil war; and, laſtly, to the good government of the community, and the increaſe of its reſources. The various arrangements of domeſtic policy ſubſervient to theſe great objects—to the preſervation of colonial relations—the defence of the colonies, and their internal peace and proſperity—form the ſubject of the Fourth and Laſt Book.

In the two firſt Books, I have endeavoured to explain the ſtructure of the colonial ſyſtem, in general, as it exiſts, both with reſpect to in-

INTROD. & PLAN.

ternal and external relations; to trace its progreſs in different ſtages of ſociety; to point out the varieties which it exhibits; and to deſcribe the mutual effects of the connexion, upon the intereſts of the different members which compoſe it. In the two laſt Books, my object has been, to conſider the practical conſequences which may be deduced from the general view; and to appreciate the probable effects of different changes that may be introduced, firſt into the foreign, next into the domeſtic policy of the ſyſtem of federal power, which conſiſts of a ſtate and its colonial poſſeſſions.

BOOK

BOOK I.

OF THE RELATIONS THAT SUBSIST BETWEEN A STATE AND ITS COLONIES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE different political ſects, have held very oppoſite opinions with reſpect to the general advantages of colonial eſtabliſhments. The diſciples of the Mercantile ſyſtem found, in theſe diſtant branches of the ſtate, an unlimited field for the trial of their theory, by impoſing ſuch reſtraints as might render the induſtry of the inhabitants ſubſervient to the wealth of the mother country, and by opening for her produce, a market of growing extent, in which poſitive regulations might ſecure an excluſive preference, or fix a high price. They have, accordingly, viewed ſuch eſtabliſhments with a decided partiality; and have carried into execution, in this branch of policy, the moſt elaborate, and

BOOK I. INTROD.

the moſt violent of their artificial ſchemes, for pouring into the nation an abundance of the precious metals. Colonies have not, indeed, always furniſhed, directly, thoſe precious ſupplies; but they have been uſed as means of obtaining the ſupplies from other markets, and of unlocking the money-cheſts of different nations in Europe: Their produce has been engroſſed, as a weight, by which to procure, in other countries, the great object of the Mercantile ſyſtem—a favourable balance of trade.

The Œconomiſts, on the other hand, have viewed, with more than common jealouſy, thoſe diſtant ſettlements, which are peopled and cultivated at the mother country's expence, and which hold out the temptations of foreign trade, to allure capital and induſtry from the great ſource of national riches—the improvement of the productive powers of the land. Such ſettlements, beſides, were never likely to be made, without views of monopoly and reſtriction. The colonial laws of modern times, had furniſhed the moſt flagrant examples of tyrannical interference with the operations of manufactures and commerce; and the narrow policy which had always preſided over the planting and rearing of new ſettlements, was utterly inconſiſtent with the very liberal and enlightened views of the Œconomical ſyſtem.

While

While the Mercantile theory favoured the eſtabliſhment of colonies by every poſſible means, and viewed them as a certain mine of wealth; that of the Œconomiſts conſidered them as a drain to the reſources, and a diverſion to the force of the mother country. Stateſmen of the former ſchool (as almoſt all ſtateſmen have been), encouraged them, as the ſcene of rich and ſecure monopoly: The converts of the latter doctrine (whoſe influence on public affairs has unfortunately been very ſlender), diſapproved both of the colonies, and of the colonial monopoly.

Between theſe two opinions, Dr SMITH has adopted a middle courſe. He loudly condemns the monopoly; and labours, with his uſual force of reaſoning and illuſtration, to prove, that it has been alike detrimental to the colonies, and to the parent ſtate. But he admits, that a diſtinction ought carefully to be drawn between the trade of the colonies and the monopoly of that trade: The former, he allows to be, in every caſe, beneficial; the latter, he maintains, muſt always be hurtful, even upon the principles of the Mercantile ſyſtem.

I think it muſt ſtrike every one, who attentively examines the very elaborate Treatiſe of this celebrated writer upon the ſubject of Colonies *, that his views have been biaſſed by the

* Wealth of Nations, B. iv. c. 7.

BOOK I INTROD.

events and the temper of the times in which he drew up that part of his Inquiry. His illuſtrations are chiefly drawn from the ſtate of North America; his arguments are frequently deduced from thoſe partial illuſtrations; and the general texture of his reaſonings by no means preſents to us that bold and conſiſtent aſpect which is, for the moſt part, a characteriſtic feature of his work. Had it been compoſed at a more favourable moment, we ſhould certainly have met with an explicit reprobation of all colonies, and colonial policy—inſtead of a cenſure, confined to the abuſes of power, and the monopoly of the colonial trade; unleſs, indeed, a farther examination of the ſubject, in its various relations, political as well as œconomical, had led him to relax ſomewhat of his ſeverity againſt this employment of the national capital and force; and then we might have found him likewiſe abating ſomewhat of his condemnation of the excluſive policy itſelf. It will afterwards appear, from an examination of Dr SMITH's reaſonings, that they do not apply to the monopoly alone; but that the trade itſelf, in every form in which it can be imagined to exiſt, is liable, in a very great degree, to the animadverſions which he has confined to the monopoly. On the other hand, it will probably be found that the monopoly is much more harmleſs than has been ſuppoſed; and that the trade itſelf, when right-

ly

ly conſidered, is, in every reſpect, advantageous to the mother country.

In the following Book, I ſhall endeavour to explain, *firſt*, The political relations that ſubſiſt between the colonies and the mother country; *ſecondly*, Their mutual relations of commerce; and, *thirdly*, The particular relations, whether of policy or trade, which ſubſiſt between the members of the great European commonwealth, and the different parts of the great Colonial community.

SECTION

SECTION I.

OF THE POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A STATE AND ITS COLONIES.

BOOK I.

THE ſtate of manners, the general ſtructure of ſociety, and the relative ſituations of communities, has been ſo extremely different in ancient and modern times, that we ſhould ſearch, in vain, among the records of antiquity, for examples of various inſtitutions which at preſent exiſt in every civilized nation; and ſhould be equally puzzled to explain the political conduct of the ſtateſmen who guided the affairs of thoſe diſtant ages, by the principles of modern ſcience. To argue from the practice of thoſe politicians in the queſtions of modern policy, without the moſt minute examination of circumſtances, and an ample allowance for the diverſities of ſituation and of views, would, in like manner, be the ſureſt road to error.

The leading feature in the picture which the claſſics have left us of ancient policy, is a uniform preference of the warlike, to the peaceful arts. To form a people of ſoldiers, was the grand object of almoſt all the legiſlators and rulers of antiquity, for which they ſacrificed, without feeling their loſs, the advantages of the purſuits

purſuits that embelliſh, and the domeſtic relations that ſweeten civilized life.

Athens was by far the moſt civilized of thoſe communities, the monuments of whoſe genius or power, hiſtory has preſerved: yet, even in Athens, the occupations of peace were deemed unworthy of free citizens; and the fine arts themſelves were generally abandoned to ſlaves, with the exception of thoſe, the tendency of which was to promote military glory, or to direct the reſources of the commonwealth. Carthage appears, from the very imperfect accounts which its enemies have left us, to have ſurpaſſed Athens in the refinements of commercial magnificence. The progreſs of trade and manufactures greatly enhancing the value of population in a territory of vaſt extent, the arts of the citizen could not ſpare a ſufficient ſupply of men to recruit the large army which the republic always kept up. Foreign troops were, therefore, levied from all quarters; and the Carthaginian forces preſented an aſſemblage of needy men from every nation round the Mediterranean Sea, kept together by the pay and ſubſiſtence of their opulent employers. But, extenſive as we have every reaſon to believe the commerce of this people was, when compared with the traffic of the Roman, and even the Greek republics; their love of conqueſt was ſo ſteady, and their careleſſneſs about plunging into a ſtate

of

BOOK I.

of warfare ſo complete, that we may eaſily eſtimate the little progreſs they had made in mercantile affairs, when compared with the attainments of modern times. They paid for their victories, indeed, or for their national defence, not in men, but in money. If, however, their commerce had been very extenſive, the direct loſſes of war would have ſignified little; and they might have found it cheaper and ſafer, in the end, to have paid Carthaginian, than foreign mercenaries. A manufacturing country has always abundance of idle hands, in any emergency of the ſtate: wars provide, in this way, thoſe ſupplies of troops by which they are carried on. But no diminution of direct expenditure could have compenſated for the ruin of trade, by an interruption (in conſequence of war) of the commercial relations with foreign markets. We may always conclude, that a nation is in a comparatively low ſtate of commercial advancement, which finds it cheaper and eaſier to fight, than to purchaſe; and prefers gaining in the field, to gaining in the market. When trade, and the arts of civilized life, have been carried to a certain length, war is the greateſt calamity that can befal a community. Any ſtate in modern Europe would be ſo completely ruined by the conteſts which Athens and Carthage eaſily ſupported, that it would be a matter of total indifference whether the war was

SECT. I.

a ſeries of victories, or of diſaſters. The return of peace to France or England, after half ſo long a conteſt as either the Peloponneſian or the Punic wars, would be cheaply purchaſed by any conqueſt or revolution—any change of dynaſty, or overthrow of government.

The natural multiplication of the ſpecies, however, proceeded rapidly in thoſe ancient ſtates; for if domeſtic occupations did not furniſh bread to all, every one might fight for his ſubſiſtence in the armies of the ſtate. But if, at any time, a general peace laſted for ſome years, the growing population began to be burthenſome; and it either found an iſſue in the territory conquered by ſome new war, preferred, on this account, to a continuance of peace—or ſought for an outlet in deſert provinces, or in diſtricts formerly ſubdued. The ambition and poverty of Rome, led her to the firſt mode of providing for her ſuperfluous inhabitants. Carthage, poſſeſſing a greater territory, and engaged in a conſiderable foreign trade, could eaſily, by extending her agriculture, or by the reſources of her traffic, find employment and ſubſiſtence for all her citizens at home; and the Greek republics, whoſe territories and commerce were both very limited, had recourſe to the method of planting colonies in uncultivated deſerts, or in parts of the world eaſily wreſted from a handful of barbarous natives.

The

BOOK I.

The emigrations from Rome to the conquered towns and lands of Italy, and afterwards of the foreign provinces, were accordingly the operations of war and plunder. A body of diſcontented citizens, indifferent, from bad humour or poverty, about the privileges of a ſtate, generally preſented themſelves, whenever an Agrarian diviſion of conquered territory was proclaimed. But as it was neceſſary to retain the conqueſt at any rate, if a ſufficient number of citizens did not offer to form this legion, which they called a colony, the deficiency was ſupplied from all the tribes by lot. As this ſyſtem of conquering policy, carried on by an extenſion of the free and warlike population of the metropolis, was effected ſlowly, until the whole of Italy had been ſubdued, no emigration ever took place to any tranſmarine or tranſalpine countries. The different ſtates were, during the lapſe of above ſix centuries, gradually conſolidated by the mixture of Romans, whoſe manners and habits nearly reſembled their own. Various privileges were granted to different provinces. Some were only ſubjected to the Roman power. Others had their laws modified, and their territory in part confiſcated. Others, whoſe reſiſtance had been more obſtinate, and whoſe plains were more tempting, found themſelves turned out of all their poſſeſſions. Sometimes, thoſe who had eſcaped butchery, were baniſhed

baniſhed or outlawed, by a general ſentence of the great nation. Sometimes, they were deprived of every remnant of their own conſtitution, and a large portion of their territory. The laws of Rome were introduced with her dominion; and the coloniſts, who were to garriſon the provinces, obtained the vacant lands.

The privileges of the emigrants were, alſo, various in different ſettlements. The *Roman* colonies could reclaim the rights of citizens, whenever they choſe to remove to the capital: the *Latin* coloniſts loſt them for ever. Between all theſe ſettlements and the metropolis, there ſubſiſted the cloſeſt connexion. The form of colonial government was modelled upon that of Rome: The laws, if not changed at once, were gradually moulded by the ſpirit of the Roman juriſprudence: The officers were almoſt all ſent from the capital: The mandates of the republic were more promptly obeyed in the provinces, than in the city itſelf: In a word—the eſtabliſhments which have been called colonies, and compared to thoſe of modern times, or of the Greeks, were military ſtations—garriſons placed in conquered countries—advanced poſts of a great army, of which the commander in chief held his head quarters in Rome, and occaſionally made a progreſs through the different cantonments.

From theſe ſettlements, taxes were levied, according to a cenſus; and, after paying the expences

BOOK I.

expences of their own government, they tranſmitted a revenue to the Roman treaſury. Men were raiſed for the Roman army, according to a muſter-roll. We may eaſily imagine, that thoſe politic rulers and warriors carried on the military operations, whether of conqueſt or defence, in any one quarter, with the troops drawn from the others; and garriſoned the conquered province, rather with Roman troops, than with its own ſoldiers. Both the revenue and the recruits were exacted by requiſitions from Rome; the colonial or provincial quæſtor giving in to the ſenate an atteſted account of the property in his diſtrict, and the men able to bear arms. From a deſire to encourage trade, after the rivalſhip of Carthage had turned the attention of the Romans to this branch of policy, they exempted the maritime colonies from military ſervice, unleſs upon preſſing emergencies: But they ſupplied this deficiency, by requiring their ſervice in the fleets.

When the grandeur of the Roman name extended acroſs the Ocean and the Alps, the rights of citizenſhip became valuable, as the titles to power, honours, and plunder. The allies, or colonial and provincial ſettlements of Italy, then demanded the communication of this privilege; and the refuſal produced that Social war, which may juſtly be deemed the end of the regular republican conſtitution. In conſequence of the Juli-

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an law, which put an end to this war, and of the other laws which were paſſed within a few years after it, all the ſtates of Italy, whether allies, colonies, or præfectures, obtained the full rights of Roman citizens. But they were ſtill governed as before, although the mandates which they were forced to obey, proceeded from a vaſt crowd, compoſed, in part, of their own citizens. Until the year U. C. 620, no colony but one, which never flouriſhed, had been planted beyond the confines of Italy. For the government of diſtant provinces, a Roman general, with his quæſtor, ſuite, and troops, were ſuppoſed to be a more ſure and ſafe eſtabliſhment. The military colonies introduced by Sylla, and much favoured by Auguſtus, were in no way remarkable, but for a form of government more entirely military than that of the other ſettlements. All were equally ſubordinate to the central government, and equally obedient to its decrees.

SECT. I.

In the political relations, then, of thoſe ſettlements with their parent city, there is ſome reſemblance to the political relations of modern colonies with their mother countries. But in the policy of a ſtate ſo neglectful of every thing, except war, we cannot expect to find any parallel to thoſe commercial views, by which the plantation of modern colonies has been undertaken, and their connexion with the

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European governments maintained. The objects of the Romans, in planting their colonies, were conqueſt and plunder. Thus, detachments of emigrants incorporated with, and governed, the old poſſeſſors of the ſoil. In modern times, the objects have been chiefly trade and agriculture: the moſt important ſettlements have been made in deſert countries, or diſtricts whoſe ancient inhabitants were extirpated by the firſt ſettlers. In this reſpect, then, the Roman colonies rather bear a reſemblance to the Aſiatic eſtabliſhments of modern Europe: but they differ from theſe, too, in the ſtructure of their government. The conſtitution of the Italian colonies was formed upon the Roman model, and varied with its changes. The provincial governments of Indoſtan, and the iſlands of the Indian Ocean, very little reſemble thoſe of their European maſters, and are rather allied to the ſpirit of the oriental legiſlation. The provincial governments of the Roman tranſmarine territories bore, in every reſpect, the ſame kind of relation to the metropolis, which the Eaſt Indian eſtabliſhments do to the ſtates of Europe. The inhabitants retained, in a great degree, their own laws; they were ruled and oppreſſed by a Roman magiſtrate, and an army, compoſed partly of Roman, partly of native troops; their country was the ſcene of every criminal exceſs in politics

politics and manners, and the ſource of large ſupplies to the plunderers of the world.

The commerce of Carthage, together with her extenſive continental poſſeſſions, enabled her to provide for her increaſing population at home. The want of an outlet for inhabitants, formed no part of the motives that induced the Carthaginians to ſettle foreign colonies. Indeed, their colonial eſtabliſhments were moſt probably on the ſame footing with the tranſmarine and tranſalpine provinces of the Romans;—conquered countries, retained in ſubjection, from ambition and pride, by means of a Carthaginian governor, and a few followers, prompted by idleneſs, or the love of change, or the deſire of diſtinction to follow in his retinue. The ſmall number of Carthaginians that inliſted in the army, muſt, of courſe, have greatly diminiſhed the proportion of emigrants who reſorted to thoſe provinces from the mother country. It is impoſſible to conceive, that want of cultivated land, or a general deficiency in the means of ſubſiſtence, could have been the motive for maintaining ſuch ſettlements; becauſe the natives were ſo well employed and maintained at home, that they ſeldom thought of entering into the forces of the republic, and could bear an enormous taxation for defraying the expences of large mercenary armies. Men

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who would flock to a conquered country from want of bread, would naturally have flocked to the ſtandards of the general ſent out to make the conqueſt.

But, from whatever motives theſe conqueſts and ſettlements were made, it is clear, that the relations of the new eſtabliſhments with the mother country, were different, in ſeveral reſpects, from the relations which connected the diſtant parts of the Roman dominions with the metropolis. All the information that has reached us upon upon this ſubject, ſcanty as it is, bears the marks of ſuch a diſſimilarity: The colonies were trading correſpondents to the mother country. It is probable that the Carthaginians received the ſurplus of the rude produce of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, which Africa did not yield; and exported thither thoſe manufactures which would naturally be raiſed in a country fully peopled, and long habituated to traffic. From the ſuperiority of their navigation, too, the ſkill of the Carthaginian merchants, their connexions long eſtabliſhed with the Levant, more particularly with the great emporiums of the Eaſt, Tyre, and Smyrna—and from the greater trading capitals of thoſe rich merchants, they would moſt likely furniſh the colonies or provinces with Aſiatic commodities, of which Carthage would be the natural entrepôt for the countries

countries to the weſt of the Mediterranean. Any communication among thoſe ſettlements themſelves, would alſo be carried on by the mother country, partly for the reaſons which I have juſt now mentioned, partly becauſe they lay at conſiderable diſtances from each other, and that Carthage enjoyed a very centrical poſition. The colonial or provincial market, then, would furniſh a very conſiderable, and, from its proximity, a very advantageous object of commercial occupation to the mother country. Accordingly, we find that her rulers were influenced, like other rulers, by the great and intereſted advocates of the mercantile ſyſtem, the rich and monopolizing traders of the country; and were perſuaded to watch over this commerce with an interfering and reſtrictive, not a protecting and foſtering anxiety. And hiſtory has fortunately preſerved two of the moſt intereſting documents that the ſpeculative politician could deſire to examine, two treaties of commerce and navigation between the Carthaginians and Romans, conceived in the true ſpirit of the modern colonial policy *.

SECT. I.

It is remarkable how exactly the hiſtory of the Carthaginian monopoly reſembles that of the European nations who have colonized America. At firſt, the diſtant ſettlement could

* Polyb. Lib. iii. cap. 22.

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admit of no immediate reſtraints, but demanded all the encouragement and protection of the parent ſtate; and the gains of its commerce were neither ſufficiently alluring to the Carthaginian merchant from their own magnitude, nor neceſſary to him from the difficulty of finding employment for his capital in other directions. At this period, the colony was left to itſelf, and was allowed to manage its own affairs in its own way, under the ſuperintendance and care of Carthage, which protected it from foreign invaſion, but neglected its commerce. In this favourable predicament, it ſoon grew into importance: Some of the Carthaginian merchants moſt probably found their way thither, or promoted the colonial ſpeculations by loans; at any rate, by furniſhing a ready demand for the rude produce.

In this ſtage of its progreſs, then, we find the colony trade left free: for, the firſt of the two treaties, prohibiting all Roman ſhips of war to approach within a certain diſtance of the coaſt, allows the trading veſſels free acceſs to all the harbours, both of the continent and the colonies. This intercourſe is even encouraged with the port of Carthage, by a clauſe, freeing the veſſels entering, from almoſt all impoſt duties. The treaty includes the Roman and Carthaginian allies; by which were probably meant their colonies, as well as the friendly powers: and

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the clauſe which expreſsly includes the colony of Sicily, gives the Romans all the privileges in that iſland, which the Carthaginians themſelves enjoyed. At this period, it is probable that the commerce of Rome excited no jealouſy, and the wealth of the colonies little avarice; although a dread of the military proweſs of the former, ſeems to have given riſe to the negotiation.

Some time afterwards, another treaty, conceived in a different ſpirit, and formed exactly upon the principles of the Mercantile ſyſtem, was concluded between thoſe celebrated rival powers. The reſtrictions upon the navigation of the Roman ſhips of war, are here extended and enforced: the freedom of entry into the port of Carthage is continued, and into the ports of Sicily alſo, the Romans granting to the Carthaginians like privileges at Rome. But the Romans are debarred from plundering, trading, or ſettling (a ſingular conjunction) upon the coaſt of Africa Propria (which was peopled by Carthaginian colonies, and furniſhed large ſupplies of proviſions and money to the city). The ſame reſtriction is extended to Sardinia; and trading veſſels are only permitted to enter the harbours of that colony, for the ſpace of five days, to refit, if driven thither by ſtreſs of weather. A ſingular clauſe is inſerted, to which cloſe ana-

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logies may be traced in the modern queſtions of neutral rights and contraband of war:—If any Roman troops ſhall receive ſtores from a Carthaginian port, or a port in the provincial territories of the ſtate, they are bound not to turn them againſt either the republic or her allies *.

The ſubſtance of this very ſingular document will ſuggeſt various reflections to my readers. I ſhall only obſerve, that we find in it the principles of the modern colonial ſyſtem clearly unfolding themſelves; and that we have every reaſon to regret the ſcantineſs of our knowledge of the Carthaginian ſtory, which, in ſo far as relates to the commerce of that people, breaks off here, and leaves us no trace of the farther reſtrictions moſt probably impoſed by ſucceeding ſtateſmen upon the growing trade of the colonies.

But it cannot fail to ſtrike us, as a very ſingular circumſtance, that thoſe firſt reſtrictions upon the traffic of the Carthaginian dominions were impoſed, not by a domeſtic law, but by a treaty with the power againſt whom they were aimed. Shall we ſay, that the Roman name was ſo formidable, as to entitle the ſenate and conſuls to interfere in the internal arrangements of Carthaginian policy, at a time when the Punic flag rode triumphant in every ſea—while the

* Note A.

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the Romans had ſcarcely any thing that could be called a navy? Or ſhall we, admitting ſo improbable a ſuppoſition, farther allow, that the foreign commerce of Rome was of ſufficient conſequence to excite, in her rulers, the moſt vigorous exertions for its defence and extenſion? Or ſhall we maintain, that, in thoſe early times, by a refinement of international juriſprudence, unknown to the coarſer ſtatiſts of modern times, the intereſts of foreign traders were ſo much conſulted in the domeſtic policy of ſtates, that they were admitted to have certain rights of commercial intercourſe, which could only be ſuſpended by voluntary renunciation in a ſolemn treaty? In modern times, an ordinance from the mother country is ſufficient to check almoſt all mercantile intercourſe between her colonies and foreign nations; though the temptations to trade are ſurely greater, when all nations are engaged in this purſuit, and the opportunity of perſiſting in ſuch an intercourſe more conſtant, from the remote ſituation of the colonies, and the near equality of naval power among the ſeveral trading nations. The Romans never conſulted their colonies, or the neighbouring ſtates, in ſuch matters: a decree, not a treaty, arranged all their meaſures, and ſecured the moſt violent and arbitrary reſtrictions, which the ſenate or the people thought proper to impoſe. After the Latin war, which was entirely a diſ-

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pute about the rights of provinces and allies, ſeveral of the ſtates were ſtripped of their lands; ſome baniſhed beyond the confines of their territories; and others prohibited, by a ſenatus-conſultum, from forming relations of commerce, marriage, or councils *. At a ſubſequent period, we find the colony of Cumæ petitioning to be allowed the privilege of uſing the Latin language †. We may conclude, then, that the Carthaginian power was not firmly eſtabliſhed over the colonies or provinces of Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa Propria; probably from the ſtructure of their armies, and that ſome management was requiſite, before any reſtrictions could be laid upon their natural liberty. They furniſhed, indeed, ſupplies of men to the ſervice of the mother country; but it is likely that this was only in the ſame way with other foreign ſtates; that is, the coloniſts or provincials ſerved as mercenary ſoldiers in the forces of the Carthaginians. We may eaſily imagine, that when the lands of the mother country were taxed, to the amount of half their produce, and the towns in proportion, the coloniſts would not eſcape the attempts of the fiſcal ſyſtem, purſued from the neceſſities of the public ſervice. The taxes levied from Sardinia, are accordingly mentioned by Polybius ‡. Thoſe drawn from Sicily were

* Livy, Lib. viii. c. 14. † Ibid. Lib. xl. c. 42.
‡ Hiſt. Lib. i.

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were probably more trifling, and obtained with greater difficulty; as the conqueſt of that iſland was later of being attempted, and was, at laſt, only partially ſucceſsful.

In their origin, and political relations with the mother country, the Greek colonies differed materially from thoſe both of the Romans and Carthaginians. The territories of Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and Argos, were of very limited extent; and the increaſe of population gave riſe to various emigrations from all thoſe ſtates. As ſuch emigrations were undertaken by private individuals, with no authority from the government; as they were generally directed towards diſtant and tranſmarine ſettlements, while the attention of the parent ſtates was fully occupied by the boiſterous politics of Greece; as the exile to which the emigrants ſubmitted, was the conſequence of want and diſcontent at home: it is eaſy to conceive how ſlight the connexion muſt always have been which retained them in friendſhip with their original countries. No ſubſtantial authority was claimed by the latter; and nothing farther than a nominal reſpect and ſubmiſſion yielded by the coloniſts. They remembered the land of their fathers with filial reſpect and affection—they honoured its gods, by offerings of firſt-fruits to their temples—they retained a predilection for its cuſtoms and laws,

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as well as its religion and language—they yielded to its citizens, the place of diſtinction at public games, and to its prieſts, the holy honour of taking the firſt look of the entrails at ſacrifices. In war, they generally followed the fortunes of the metropolis, as allies, upon equal terms: But as they were perfectly independent, received no protection from her, and often equalled her in reſources, they always refuſed to come forward as auxiliaries, when unfair terms were propoſed. Thus, the Sicilian colonies refuſed to admit an Athenian army into their territories, for the purpoſe of reſting, on an expedition; and, in the Perſian war, the republic of Syracuſe, when entreated by the Lacedæmonians to aid the common cauſe, refuſed to ſend any aſſiſtance, unleſs their chief magiſtrate Gelon were allowed to command the united forces.

Sometimes, when the mother country had no other occupation, or felt her ſtrength ſufficient for that purpoſe, ſhe attempted to exact from the colonies, as matter of right, the uſual marks of filial attachment. Thus, Corinth was deſpiſed by her colony at Corcyra, for her inferiority of wealth and trade; and ſhe endeavoured to obtain, by force, the uſual tokens of remembrance; for they amounted to no more. The coloniſts appealed to Athens, who took

took their part, and retained them as uſeful allies, eſpecially during the Peloponneſian war. Potidæa, another Corinthian ſettlement, took the part of Athens, until her impolitic tyranny urged it to throw off the yoke, and appeal to Sparta and Corinth. After a long and ſevere ſtruggle, the Athenians were ſucceſsful; ſent new colonies to occupy the confiſcated and vacant lands; continued their oppreſſive government; and retained their dominion over Potidæa, until the invaſion of Philip.

When the progreſs of Cyrus expoſed the Aſiatic colonies of Greece to extreme danger, they in vain applied to Sparta for aſſiſtance; and, being ſoon conquered by the Perſian monarch, they remained in ſubjection, until the victories of Plateæ and Mycale reſtored them to freedom. But as they deſpaired of being able to retain this independence long againſt the formidable enemy by whom they were ſurrounded on all ſides, they entered into a ſtrict alliance with Athens; and ſhe took the opportunity of the general alarm, to propoſe an univerſal contribution from all her colonies and allies, for the great purpoſe of reſiſting the Perſian power. At firſt, the ſum levied was only 460 talents.* The Athenians were entruſted with the management of it, and were bound to

* 103,500l. Sterling.

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to depoſit it in the temple of Delos. But the grant of voluntary aids always enables the power which receives them, to increaſe their amount, and to turn them into compulſory tributes. And the depoſitaries of the common purſe, for the public ſervice, either in a community of individuals, or a federal union of ſtates, never fail to acquire a predominating influence over all the other members of the league, and to continue the office of receiving ſupplies upon their own private account. So it happened in Greece. From the great depoſit bank of Delos, the treaſure was, on various pretences, removed to the Acropolis of Athens: the ſum of annual contribution was firſt raiſed to 600 *, and afterwards to 1200 †, and 1300 ‡ talents. The allies were originally induced, by intrigue and perſuaſion, to devolve upon the citizens of Athens the command of the united forces: the Piræus was quickly fortified—the Athenian fleet increaſed—and the command in chief became a part of the Athenian prerogative. According to their own exigencies, more than the demands of any common emergency, that ambitious people levied ſupplies in money or in kind, or commuted them for recruits to the military or naval force of the republic. By intriguing with one allied ſtate, they rendered the others tributary and

* 135,000l. † 270,000l. ‡ 292,500l.

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and ſubordinate. When the yoke was firmly eſtabliſhed, they concluded, by extending it to thoſe allies who had aſſiſted in impoſing it. The ſupplies were now exacted as a tribute; a refuſal was puniſhed as diſobedience or treaſon; and any inquiries into the mode of their application, were reſented as an indignity to the Athenian name. With the exception of the Samians, who rebelled in order to change the form of their government, and were puniſhed with exemplary ſeverity, all the colonies remained faithful or enſlaved, from the invaſion of Xerxes until the fifth year of the Peloponneſian war. Even then, when their tyrannical miſtreſs was beſet by every form of difficulty and danger, the Leſbians alone revolted: the reſt continued to furniſh the uſual ſupplies of money and men. The Leſbians, incited by the intolerable oppreſſions to which they were ſubjected, went over to the party of Lacedæmon: they were chaſtiſed with an exceſs of cruelty, more worthy of Sparta or Rome, than of the moſt refined people in ancient times. Towards the end of the war, the Athenian colonies ſubmitted to the unnatural union of Perſia and Sparta: they were finally yielded up to the dominion of the former by the peace of Antalcidas.

A great part of the ſucceſs which attended the colonial policy of Athens, may, without doubt,

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doubt, be aſcribed to the impolitic ſeverity and unbending haughtineſs of her great rival Sparta, towards all who were ſubjected to her, or were willing to eſpouſe her cauſe as allies. The whole hiſtory of the policy of thoſe two celebrated powers, preſents a ſtriking and inſtructive contraſt. On the one hand, we ſee the effects of that inſinuating and intriguing ſyſtem of management, which multiplies the internal reſources of a country, by ſkilfully uſing them; weakens its enemies, by dividing their force, and fighting them one againſt another; conciliates allies, and makes uſe of their reſources, as if they belonged to the ſtate over which its councils preſide; and, in a word, never thinks of puſhing or driving, unleſs when it is impoſſible to lead or to draw. On the other hand, we perceive the impotence of mere force, however ſkilfully directed, or energetically wielded, ſo long as its object is only to puſh or to drive; and we are obliged to confeſs, that an extenſive and highly fertile territory, cultivated by a numerous and ſubmiſſive peaſantry, defended by the moſt martial people that ever brandiſhed a ſword, will ſupport a nation, who may indeed ſubſiſt, in coarſe and ruſtic independence, without the aſſiſtance of foreign allies, or a foreign market; but can neither enjoy the pleaſures of civilized life, nor gratify that ambition which

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was the mainſpring of the unnatural ſyſtem, by the achievement of military glory, and the extenſion of their foreign power.

The colonial eſtabliſhments, which, at different times, were formed by the Greeks, differed widely from thoſe of all other ſtates, ancient and modern, in their want of ſubordination to the mother country. We find, indeed, that the Athenian policy prevailed in eſtabliſhing a colonial or federal dominion; but it was acquired indifferently over the ſettlements of Athens, and of her enemies or rivals: it aroſe in the courſe of many ages after the original emigration. On the other hand, the internal ſtructure of the Greek colonies, eſſentially different from that of the Punic and Roman provinces, more nearly reſembles the conſtitution of the modern ſettlements in the new world.

The motives, too, which led to their eſtabliſhment, were much more nearly allied, than is generally imagined, to thoſe which have extended the European power over the continent and iſlands of America. The great cauſe of emigration, in both caſes, was certainly the ſcarcity of ſubſiſtence at home. This is readily admitted to have operated in the narrow territories of the Greek republics: but hiſtorians have commonly aſſerted, that nothing parallel to ſuch a motive, is to be found in the origin of modern colonies. We

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ought, however, to recollect, that a deficiency in the means of ſubſiſtence, in proportion to population, is not, all at once, felt as a famine, even by the moſt confined ſtates. The cheapneſs of labour, the ſmall profits of ſtock, a love of adventure, and deſire of great wealth, begin to affect the comforts, or diminiſh the contentment of men in every community which has proceeded far in refinement, population, and wealth. The want of enjoyments and conveniences, is the firſt loſs that is felt; and the difficulty of obtaining the uſual ſhare of theſe, is the firſt hint which a nation receives, that its population is increaſing too rapidly. The manufacturing, commercial, or military habits of a people, will not always change with the changes in prices, wages, and profits. The agriculture of the country will not immediately be promoted to its utmoſt extent in the narroweſt, any more than in the moſt extenſive territory. The expedient of foreign ſettlements will ſuggeſt itſelf to men in theſe circumſtances, whether they inhabit a large or a ſmall territory: it will ſuggeſt itſelf as ſoon as the difficulty of continuing the uſual courſe of living begins to be generally felt, and the opportunity of obtaining ſettlements in a new country is preſented. The men who emigrated from Greece to Aſia, Thrace, and Italy, were not in immediate danger

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ger of ſtarving, by remaining at home; but they felt their comforts abridged—their means of earning a ſubſiſtence becoming more difficult—their chance of making great profits, by the labour or ſkill of their ſlaves, curtailed, from the numbers of men who had ſlaves, and the high prices of their purchaſe and maintenance. They ſaw the competition for public honours and employments daily more extended, and their views of individual conſequence contracted, by the increaſing number of candidates for power or fame, and the diviſion of the public ſervice among ſo many hands. They felt their patriotiſm cooled by the ſame ſubdiviſion of reſponſibility and duty which diminiſhed their influence; they willingly quitted the crowded and occupied territories of the republic, and eſcaped from the dominion of its mobs and demagogues, in order to form a more important part of the colonial eſtabliſhment, and to enjoy, in greater abundance, the bleſſings of wealth and eaſe. What other motives have led to the European adventures and emigrations in modern times?

The idea of returning to ſpend the fortune acquired abroad, formed, indeed, no part of the plan which ſeparated the Greek from his native country. In this alone do the caſes differ; and the circumſtances of thoſe colonies,

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which remain connected with the parent ſtates, certainly encourage ſuch views in the inhabitants. The Roman and Carthaginian provincial eſtabliſhments, more than the Grecian colonies, reſembled the modern ſettlements in this reſpect. The names (as Dr SMITH has juſtly remarked *) are different in the different caſes. The Latin, and the modern word (colonia and plantation) expreſſes merely a ſettlement, or cultivation of the territory. The Greek term (ἀποικια) denotes a ſeparation, a leaving of the former habitation. The ſpirit of conqueſt, indeed, and the interference of the public will, although it could not create the extenſive emigrations to the new world, has mingled itſelf with them, and turned them to its own purpoſes; and we are now to attend more particularly to the mutual relations of thoſe modern eſtabliſhments.

The means by which, with a very few exceptions, all the colonial territories of modern Europe have been acquired, are ſuch as reflect no great honour, either upon the honeſty or the humanity of the different nations. The moſt valuable of thoſe diſtant countries were peopled by independent tribes, either united in ſociety under regular governments, and advanced in civilization, or living in a rude, but free ſtate, and

* Wealth of Nations, B. iv. c. 7. pt. 1.

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and connected by the most simple and imperfect ties. As soon as their existence became known to the more powerful communities of the old world, an intercourse was established, which terminated in the subjection or extirpation of the ancient possessors, after a succession of cruelty and fraud; sometimes mingled with ridiculous perversions of casuistry in religion and jurisprudence—sometimes varied by pretexts, still more shameless, of rights by grant, purchase, and conquest.

The title, then, by which the different powers now hold their colonial territories, very much resembles that by which all nations have possessed their dominions in every age and quarter of the globe—the right of the strongest and most crafty, assumed over those who could neither resist nor escape—and admitted by others, who dared not oppose it, or who shared in the spoil.

This extension of power, strikes us as founded in extraordinary violence and injustice; only because it has taken place a few years after the period at which the parent states were themselves established by the very same means, and because the rules, which about that time were beginning to regulate the mutual rights of men, were not immediately extended to the more remote scenes of their enterprises.

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The territory thus acquired, was ſettled, as the mother countries had been, by thoſe who aſſiſted in obtaining the poſſeſſion, and by others whom poverty, or avarice, or diſcontent, or the love of adventure, or of change, induced to leave the place of their birth, and to fix their abode in this new diſtrict of their native country. As the remote provinces of an extenſive ſtate, though lying contiguous, are, in various reſpects, more expoſed to attack on the one hand, and, on the other, leſs eaſily governed by the power ſituated in the centre of the empire; they are uniformly ſubjected to a political regimen, ſomewhat different from that which prevails in the metropolis. The ſame variation extends to the government of thoſe more diſtant communities which are formed in the newly acquired territories; and the adminiſtration of the colony, in general, differs from that of the contiguous provinces, only in proportion to the diſtance, and the recency of the eſtabliſhment. This we ſhall afterwards demonſtrate more fully.

The advantages that tempt men to remove from their country, induce them alſo to ſurrender ſome of the privileges which they enjoyed at home. They are willing to exchange, for the proſpect of wealth and diſtinction in the new ſettlement, that preeminence which

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is attached to their poverty in the old; and their deſcendants, if they continue to prefer the colony before the mother country, are contented to purchaſe the gratification of their taſte, at the expence of whatever benefits they might gain by returning to the ſeat of empire, in order to live under the immediate protection of the government which ſuperintends the whole ſyſtem. The caſe of the coloniſts reſembles that of the inhabitants of the capital, who remove to a provincial town, or to an eſtate upon the frontiers, and give up the various advantages of expenſive and poliſhed ſociety, for other advantages which their circumſtances or taſte render more deſireable.

The feebleneſs of infant colonies has, in general, demanded all the tenderneſs and follicitude of the mother country. Sometimes the felicity of their circumſtances has enabled them, from the beginning, to repay, and has induced the mother country to increaſe, this protecting care. Sometimes their ſlow progreſs in opulence, and their deficiency in natural reſources, has, for a while, abated the attention and anxiety of the parent ſtate, and ſecured to them a profitable, though temporary, freedom and neglect. In either caſe, as ſoon as the growing value of the diſtant ſettlement attracted the notice of the neighbouring pow-

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ers, while its weakneſs expoſed it to their depredations, the care of defending it devolved upon the mother country. After ſecuring it from the danger of foreign invaſion, ſhe was anxious to prevent any voluntary ſeparation by revolt; and to obviate, as much as poſſible, that alienation of ſentiment, which diverſity of local circumſtances has a great tendency to produce. While the colony, then, increaſed in its internal reſources, a more jealous policy began to influence the views of the mother country in adminiſtering its affairs; and ſhe endeavoured, at the ſame time, to repay herſelf for the excluſive care which ſhe had taken of its protection when it was wholly unable to contribute any aſſiſtance to the common cauſe, and for the unequal ſhare which ſhe ſtill continued to take, now that it could, in ſome degree, bear the burthen itſelf. According to the ſyſtem of policy which directed her domeſtic adminiſtration, that is, the government of her nearer provinces, her colonial policy, that is, her treatment of the remote provinces, was invariably regulated. The greater diſtance of the colony expoſing it more conſtantly to the dangers of invaſion and rebellion, and the recent benefits conferred on it while entirely dependent upon the parent ſtate, continued to form the only real difference between its dependance, and

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and that of the other provinces, upon the ſeat of government.

A variety of circumſtances influence the connexion of the different parts of the ſame country with each other, and with the capital. The intercourſe of their inhabitants, and their mutual change of reſidence, by no means depends upon diſtance alone. Political inſtitutions, local peculiarity of manners and of taſte, the particular diſtribution of wealth, and the various nature of the prevailing purſuits, attach men more or leſs firmly to the place of their abode. The metropolis is continually drawing ſupplies of inhabitants from the country, but differently from the different orders of people, and from different diſtricts, ſituated at the ſame diſtance. The circulating maſs of inhabitants—that portion which changes its place, in oppoſition to that portion which remains ſtationary—muſt always conſiſt of thoſe who want employment, and of thoſe who poſſeſs moveable property. An agricultural diſtrict ſeldom changes its inhabitants: one that is engaged in manufactures or trade is perpetually ſhifting its proprietors. An agricultural diſtrict, inhabited by yeomanry, is not ſubject to ſo many variations of this kind, as one which belongs to a few great proprietors, and their tenants or retainers. The moſt rapid and conſtant

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conſtant change of inhabitants, engaged in trade or manufactures, may be expected in a maritime province, where a profitable fiſhery attracts a number of needy adventurers, in ſpite of its various diſadvantages; or an inland diſtrict, where mining projects tempt ſpeculators a while to ſeclude themſelves from poliſhed ſociety, and to riſk their health, along with their fortunes.

In like manner, the circulation of inhabitants between the remoter provinces and the capital, or between the colonies and the mother country, is more or leſs conſtant and general, according to the diverſities of manners, of local circumſtances, and of political inſtitutions. A few remarks will ſerve to illuſtrate the various effects of thoſe diverſities in promoting or retarding the intercourſe of different colonial ſettlements with their parent ſtates in Europe.

The colonies of North America were originally planted by men who had quitted their native country, either from a love of civil and religious liberty; or from a deſire to better their fortunes, by laying out a ſmall capital in the improvement of land; or from the neceſſity of finding employment in a country where labour bore a high price. Anxious only to live in peace and freedom, with a competency for

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for themſelves and their families, theſe men centred all their views in the ſpot to which they removed their fortunes and perſons—they gave up, for ever, the thoughts of returning to the countries which they left behind them—and transferred to their new homes, all thoſe ties which had formerly bound them to Europe. The firſt emigrants conſiſted of whole families; and if, for ſome time afterwards, the new-comers were chiefly men, the diſproportion of ſexes could laſt but for one generation; ſince all the inhabitants remained in the country for life, and the increaſe of population, by the influx of new ſettlers, could bear no proportion to the natural augmentation. The woods of the northern continent, then, were cleared by men of ſmall capital, content with a living profit, attached to the ſoil, and entertaining no ideas of removing from it. The ſmallneſs of their property excited their whole induſtry; and the part of their profits which aroſe from their labour, bore a great proportion to that part which came from their ſtock. They never thought of accumulating, unleſs to extend their improvements; nor of ſeparating themſelves from that immoveable ſubject in which their wealth was veſted. Men ſoon acquire a ſtrong intereſt in the ſoil which owes its cultivation to their labours, and repays their cares

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by its fertility. The ſcene of their property naturally has charms for them; the influence of local attachment binds them to a ſpot, which neceſſity had made them chooſe. And even if, at firſt, they had entertained no proſpects of removing thither for life, or had no ties of family and friendſhip to determine their reſidence: as the ardour of youth abates, the love of change cools, the views of enjoyment contract; and the deſire of depoſiting their bones in a country which had received and cheriſhed them, gradually ſucceeds to the obliterated partiality for the place of their birth.

In this manner, a nation was ſoon formed, of materials tranſported from the old, but belonging to the new—of European extraction, but of American growth; confined, in its views and deſires, to the country of its reſidence, and connected with the parent ſtate, only by political and commercial relations, or by the ties of ſentiments founded on a traditional recollection of its origin.

The cultivation of the Weſt Indian iſlands has been carried on by the employment of large capitals, with ſome riſk, conſiderable hardſhip and danger from the climate, and the chance of enormous profits. Such are the ſacrifices which the buſineſs of a ſugar or coffee-planter requires; and ſuch the temptations which

which it holds out. It is a buſineſs ſuited to a mercantile ſchemer; and appeals much more to the commercial than the agricultural ſpirit; and forms habits, rather of the former, than of the latter kind. The offspring of the one, is local attachment—that of the other, a propenſity to adventure and change. While the farmer, or improver of land, acquires a taſte for rural enjoyments, and takes delight in the ſcenes which his own labour has created, or his taſte adorned; the mercantile adventurer affects a city life, finds the ſame attractions in every exchange where buſineſs is tranſacted, and divides, with a whole community, the attachment to the ſame harbours, wharfs, and docks. The former raiſes, himſelf, moſt of the articles of food and clothing; and he ſpends his money in luxuries or convenience, as he makes it by the ſale of his ſurplus produce:—The latter ſeldom ſees any article of neceſſity or convenience, that he does not directly pay for; and he takes a conſtant delight in ſaving, in order to increaſe his capital. The one is ſupported by the country in which he lives:—The other draws his ſubſiſtence from abroad; and only receives, from the ſpot of his reſidence, the price he muſt pay for his ſupport. The planter of North America cultivates the ground, partly by his own toil, partly by the help of his family;

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family;—partly with the labour of his fellow citizens, whoſe voluntary exertions he in perſon directs, watches, and repays. The Weſt Indian planter raiſes his crops by ſlaves, of a different country and race—whoſe toil he extorts by the laſh, and whoſe exertions are ſuperintended by a deputy. The ground has here few charms for its wretched cultivator, and little hold over its wealthy owner.

Inſtead of chooſing the iſlands, then, as a ſecond home, the adventurers in Weſt India property have only ſubmitted to a reſidence there, as the means of augmenting their capital, or of acquiring a fortune, which they might ſpend in the more elegant luxuries of Europe. A great proportion of thoſe whoſe capital has planted the Weſt Indies, have, in fact, continued in their native country. Such of them as adventured their money in loans to the planters, on the ſecurity of the lands, buildings, and ſlaves, were engaged in other buſineſs, and had no connexion with the property, except that of receiving their intereſt, or ſelling the produce on commiſſion. Such of them as veſted their money in the plantation buſineſs upon their own bottom, often preferred a ſmaller income, enjoyed in eaſe at home, to a larger one, for which they muſt forſake their own country, and expoſe themſelves

themſelves to the dangers of the climate and the voyage. They accordingly employed overſeers on their Weſt Indian eſtates, and reſided conſtantly in Europe. Thus, while the capital employed in trade bears a very ſmall proportion to that employed in planting; the great ſtrength of every country, the landed intereſt, is almoſt wholly wanting in the Weſt Indies. Its place is ſupplied partly by proprietors loaded with debt, who are little more than commiſſioners for the European creditors; partly by factors, properly ſo called, acting for the non-reſident proprietors. Many of theſe men, and almoſt all the reſt of the inhabitants, conſiſt of needy adventurers, tempted, by the hopes of acquiring wealth, to break the ties of kindred—to encounter the dangers of an unpropitious climate—and to exile themſelves from home, in order to gain ſuch a fortune as may enable them afterwards to live independently in their own country. It is accordingly univerſally remarked, that in no part of the civilized world, notwithſtanding the great wealth of the natives, are the comforts and conveniences of life ſo little ſtudied, as in the Weſt Indian colonies. In the French iſlands, where the proprietors have always reſided more conſtantly than in our own, and where the ariſtocratic ſpirit might not be expected to unite

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unite ſo cloſely with the love of gain, we have the following animated picture of the ſtate of ſociety, drawn by one who had a long experience of its likeneſs—'Tel eſt le tableau 'mouvant d'une ville de colonie, d'une ville de 'Saint-Domingue. On n'y voit point d'homme 'aſſis ſur ſon foyer parlant avec intérêt de ſa 'ville, de ſa paroiſſe, de la maiſon de ſes pères. 'On n'y voit que des auberges et des voya-'geurs. Tout correſpond à l'idée que j'ex-'prime. Entrez dans leurs maiſons, elles ne 'ſont ni commodes, ni ornées; *ils n'en ont 'pas le temps, ce n'eſt pas la peine:* voilà leur 'langage. Eſt-il queſtion d'un bâtiment, d'une 'machine, d'une tranſaction, d'un acte de par-'tage, d'un réglement de compte: rien n'eſt 'fini, rien ne porte l'empreinte de la patience 'et de l'attention.' *.

Thus, the objects of emigrants to the Weſt Indies, is, not to live, but to gain—not to enjoy, but to ſave—not to ſubſiſt in the colonies, but to prepare for ſhining in the mother country.—'Ici' (ſays the author I have juſt quoted) 'la ſcène et les acteurs changent en 'moins de dix années: vous avez ſans ceſſe 'des hommes différens; ſans patrie, ſans fa-'mille, ſans projets, ſans moyens déterminés; 'mais

* Malouet, Eſſai ſur St Domingue, Mem. ſur les Col. tom. iv. p. 127.

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'mais prêts à saisir tous les projets, tous les 'moyens.' *

The stock of white inhabitants is not kept up by natural increase. The proportion of the sexes is extremely unequal ‡, and the females are almost entirely of the lower orders. Marriage is held in no repute. A family, which, in North America, is a source of wealth, is, in the West Indies, deemed an expensive incumbrance; and the passions, excited by a warm climate, or favoured by the dissolute state of manners, find an easy and careless gratification in transient connexions with negresses or mulattoes, the objects not of love, but of criminal desire.

As there is no provision, then, for the natural increase of the white inhabitants, the blanks are filled up by new settlers; and the same cause that made room for them, the want of females, and of good society, renders their stay unpleasant, and induces them to make it as short as the acquisition of a fortune will allow. A constant interchange of inhabitants is thus carried on; the numbers do not increase with the rapidity of other new countries, but according to the progress of the community, from the overflowings and offscourings of

 which

* Malouet, Essai sur St Domingue, Mem. sur les Col. tom. iv. p. 128. Note B.

‡ Note C.

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which they are derived. The population circulates through this remote member of the body, with a rapidity ſtill greater than the rate of its motion from many of the parts contiguous to the capital: and a conſtant intercourſe is kept up between the mother country and thoſe diſtant provinces, more powerfully united to her in this manner, than by the effects of political inſtitutions, or even of mercantile connexions.

The circumſtances of name, manners, climate, and of a political conſtitution, expreſsly framed with a view to promote a conſtant intercourſe, and to prevent that tendency to ſeparation which reſults from want of circulation among the inhabitants, have promoted the intercourſe between the European ſtates and their ſettlements in Aſia. This circulation, though conſtant, is confined to a ſmall number, chiefly in the higher ranks of ſociety; partly by the great diſtance, and partly by the reſtrictive policy of the colonial monopoly. But it no doubt produces a conſiderable effect in maintaining the connexion, and in modulating the manners of both parts of the empire.

The colonies of the French and Dutch in Guiana, reſemble the iſlands in every reſpect. The objects of ſpeculation, the nature of the governments, the inducements to change, the habits of the people, the ſtructure of ſociety, and,

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and, of conſequence, the circulation of inhabitants, is the ſame in all thoſe ſettlements.

The poſſeſſions of Spain and Portugal in South America, hold a middle place between the North American colonies and the iſlands, in the formation of their ſociety. They reſemble the iſlands in the mixture of inhabitants, though the diſproportion of whites is much leſs. In the extent of territory, and the cultivation of the ſoil, they bear a greater reſemblance to the ſtates of North America. A great part of the population then is fixed. On the other hand, the mines, and the lands adapted to the more uncertain culture of the coſtly produce, hold out temptations to adventurers, and draw thither all thoſe natives of the Spaniſh peninſula, whoſe fortunes are deſperate; beſides many who poſſeſs capital, and inherit the ſpirit that led to the original diſcovery of the New Continent.

The political inſtitutions of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe ſettlements, tend to promote a circulation of inhabitants. Natives of Europe (*chapetones*) are eſteemed the firſt claſs: they receive the higheſt reſpect from all ranks, and enjoy, by law, many important excluſive privileges. The indolence natural to their character is here thrown off; the acquiſition of a fortune is the ſtudy of all; and they prefer

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returning to their native country, where they may receive the honours attached to wealth, and may leave it to children who are not (as in South America) liable to rank in a lower order than themſelves. Hence, a conſiderable part of the population of theſe colonies, both from national character and poſitive inſtitutions, and from the ſituation of South America, continually circulates between Europe and the new world.

If we examine the portion of inhabitants which circulates between any two countries of Europe, we ſhall find it extremely ſmall, when compared with the circulating maſs of the Weſt Indian and South American colonies. A great intercourſe of travelling, and of viſits on account of trade, has certainly been the reſult of the relative ſituations of thoſe ſtates ſince the overthrow of the Roman empire, and has produced important conſequences upon the national character, and the policy of modern Europe. But various circumſtances prevent this intercourſe from being any other than ſlight and tranſient, when compared with that which connects the different parts of a great empire. The mutual jealouſies of the neareſt ſtates; the perſonal quarrels of their rulers; the difference of language and manners; the tenacious partiality of each people for their own habits

habits and cuſtoms—all contribute to render the effects, even of reſidence in foreign countries, very trifling. If a very ſmall proportion of inhabitants are attracted from one country to another; ſtill leſs effect is produced towards the blending of the different nations. Beſides, the circumſtances of all the ſtates are ſo nearly alike, that no temptations are held out to a change of place. The ſmall number of foreign merchants who reſide in any country, generally aſſociate together, and form a ſort of colony, which returns very few members to the mother country. The Engliſh formerly enjoyed certain immunities at Bergen in Norway, which attracted thither conſiderable numbers from Britain: they ſoon purchaſed factories, warehouſes, and villas: they obtained grants of land, and occupied their diſtrict, retaining little or no connexion with their native iſland. By degrees, they ſunk into the ſurrounding population; and no traces of them are now to be found, but a few Britiſh ſurnames. SECT. I.

Holland is the only country in Europe where the merchants are almoſt all of foreign extraction, or foreigners by birth. The manufacturers, too, are many of them deſcended from ſtrangers. This has ariſen from the peculiar circumſtances of the neighbouring ſtates,

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and the aſylum offered to all the victims of civil or religious perſecution, by the republic. The ſame circumſtances, however, of unlimited toleration, and commercial advantages, which drew men thither, retained them there: and a trader who removes to Holland, in the preſent times, for the purpoſes of his buſineſs, ſeldom thinks of returning to his native country. The laws make no diſtinction between natives and foreigners in the privileges of trade, or in political rights. Every one may be admitted alike to the higheſt offices of the States, and of the federacy, by obtaining the freedom of the cities; and the burgeſs ticket of the capital itſelf coſts ſomething leſs than five pounds Sterling. It is evident, then, that the population attracted to Holland, by its ſituation and policy, generally remains fixed there.

I recollect only two inſtances of any conſiderable interchange of inhabitants among the European nations—the Scots emigrations to Poland, before and after the Acceſſion—and the French, who carry on the retail trade, and ſome of the agricultural labour, in ſeveral parts of Spain. The wanderings of the Gaſcons are chiefly confined to France; of the Swabians to Germany (and indeed they never think of returning home); and of the Gallicians to the more lazy and fertile provinces of the Spaniſh peninſula.

Now,

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Now, the emigrations from Scotland have been vaſtly overrated, as Mr LAING juſtly remarks *. They were, in a great degree, cauſed by the troubles of the times; and muſt chiefly have conſiſted of poor people thrown out of employment, or the higher orders engaged in the political troubles of the day. It is not eaſy to conceive, how either of thoſe claſſes (Scots beggars and nobles) could, all at once, puſh themſelves, as we are told they did, into a large ſhare of the Poliſh trade, engroſſed, for ages, by the moſt ſkilful retail traders in the world, the Poliſh Jews. Such of them as obtained employment, muſt have contented themſelves with the ſubordinate branches; and we cannot imagine that men, gaining a livelihood as a claſs inferior to common pedlars, ſhould return, in great bodies, to their native country, 'enriched by the ſpoils of the Poliſh nobles 'acquired in traffic.' This inſtance, then, may be regarded as of no conſequence; and, at any rate, it was only temporary.

The caſe of the French, in Spain, is of a different deſcription. But thoſe who go thither, are either labourers of the loweſt claſs, from the diſtricts about Perigord and Limouſin, employed annually in the Spaniſh harveſt; or ſmall retail dealers, who, after earning a

* Laing's Hiſtory of Scotland, Vol. i. p. 8.

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competency, from the ignorance and lazineſs of their Spaniſh competitors, return to their native country with their ſmall gains. This claſs of men is evidently extremely trifling. Such an intercourſe muſt diminiſh both with the progreſſive improvement of France and Spain; and indeed I know not, if, ſince the time of Dean Tucker * from whom I quote the fact, the communication has not been relaxed or worn away.

The only conſtant, and regular, and extenſive intercourſe, ariſing from the circulation of inhabitants, is that which is carried on between the different provinces of the ſame empire, either contiguous or remote, between the country and the towns—the provinces, or provincial towns, and the capital—the diſtricts of induſtry and ſelf-denial, and the ſeats of opulence and pleaſure—the mother country and her colonies.

This intercourſe and circulation tends, more than any other thing, to preſerve the connexion of the different component parts of a great and ſcattered empire, and to cement the whole maſs. It is by no means regulated by the reſpective diſtances of the parts from each other; but depends upon a variety of circumſtances in their ſituation. It has always been much more

* Eſſay on Trade, p. 25.

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more rapid and conſtant between the Spaniſh and Portugueſe colonies and the Peninſula, than between the North American colonies and the United kingdoms. It has always been, and is likely to continue, much more rapid and conſtant between the Weſt Indian ſettlements and the European ſtates, than between any of the continental poſſeſſions and their mother countries. In like manner, there can be no doubt, that the mutual exchanges of population between London, Liverpool, and Briſtol, and the Britiſh Weſt Indies, are much more frequent, than between the ſame towns and the counties of Cornwall and Caithneſs—thoſe between the Daniſh iſlands and Copenhagen, than thoſe between that capital and Iceland or Finmark—thoſe between St Bartholomew and Stockholm, than thoſe between Lapland and Stockholm.

It is evident, that the changes which a quick circulation of inhabitants tends to produce upon the manners of the mother country and the colonies, muſt always be very conſiderable. In ſome reſpects, indeed, this will operate more powerfully on the mother country than on the colonies. Men of property and influence have always a greater effect in modulating the habits of their fellow-citizens, than mere adventurers. The perſons who repair to

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a colony, for the purpoſe of living, and acquiring an independency, carry with them, no doubt, the language and manners of their native country: They go, however, with a deſign to accommodate themſelves to the cuſtoms and habits of the colony; to purſue their own intereſt, with freedom from all reſtraint; but to avail themſelves of all the conveniences which reſult from doing at Rome as they do at Rome. They return men of conſequence; and can chooſe a mode for themſelves. They naturally prefer the habits which they have acquired, and which have modified their primitive manners: for men generally retain an affectionate recollection of thoſe ſcenes and labours which have led to proſperity, however diſagreeable both the place and the toil might be at the time. Their example operates in circles more or leſs extenſive, as their fortune or talents are more or leſs ſplendid. The village, or the walk of faſhion in which they move, becomes ſomewhat influenced; and the political habits which they have acquired, may ſtill more directly affect the public affairs of the ſtate. It is, therefore, of ſome conſequence, as it muſt unqueſtionably be extremly entertaining, to conſider what ſort of habits the different ſpecies of colonial eſtabliſhments have a tendency to form; and how they variouſly operate in modifying

fying the manners, and affecting the intereſts of the mother country. SECT. I.

1. The agricultural colonies of North America are, in every reſpect, thoſe, of which the manners have always been the moſt pure and unexceptionable. Three circumſtances deſerve our attention, in contemplating thoſe wonderful ſettlements:—the character of the original ſettlers—the tendency of the circumſtances under which ſubſequent emigrations have been made, to alter the manners of the new-comers—and the tendency of the circumſtances in which thoſe communities have been placed, to form a reſpectable national character.

The firſt ſettlers of all the colonies, were men of irreproachable characters, though not very enlightened in their views, or poliſhed in their manners. Many of them fled from perſecution; others on account of an honourable poverty; and all of them with their expectations limited to the proſpect of a bare ſubſiſtence, in freedom and peace. All idea of wealth or pleaſure was out of the queſtion. The greater part of them viewed their emigration beyond the Atlantic, as a taking up of the Croſs; and bounded their hopes of riches to the gifts of the Spirit—and their ambition, to the deſire of a kingdom beyond the grave. A ſet of men more

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more conſcientious in their doings, or ſimple in their manners, never founded any commonwealth. It is indeed the peculiar glory of North America, that, with a very few exceptions, its empire was originally founded in charity and peace.

The new emigrants who, at various times, continued to flock to this extenſive country, as it became more open and improved, were by no means of the ſame deſcription with the firſt ſettlers. They were a various race, of different ranks, but chiefly needy men; of different ſects, or of no perceptible religion at all; and of different nations—in which, however, the Engliſh greatly predominated. Some of them were the ſcourings of jails, baniſhed for their crimes; many of them perſons of deſperate fortunes, to whom every place was equally uninviting; or men of notoriouſly abandoned lives, to whom any region was acceptable, that offered them a ſhelter from the vengeance of the law, or the voice of public indignation. But a change of ſcene will work ſome improvement upon the moſt diſſolute of characters. It is much, to be removed from the ſcenes with which villany has been conſtantly aſſociated, and the companions who have rendered it agreeable—It is ſomething, to have the leiſure of a long voyage, with its awakening terrors,

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rors, to promote reflection—Beſides, to regain, once more, the privilege of that good name which every unknown man may claim until he is tried, preſents a powerful temptation to reform, and furniſhes an opportunity of amendment, denied in the ſcenes of expoſure and deteſtation. If the convicts in the colony of New Holland, though ſurrounded, on the voyage, and in the ſettlement, by the companions of their iniquities, have, in a great degree, been reclaimed, by the mere change of ſcene; what might not be expected from ſuch a change as that which we are conſidering? But the honeſt acquiſition of a little property, and its attendant importance, is, beyond any other circumſtance, the one moſt calculated to reform the conduct of a needy and profligate man, by inſpiring him with a reſpect for himſelf, and a feeling of his ſtake in the community, and by putting a harmleſs and comfortable life, at leaſt, within the reach of his exertions. If this property is of a nature to require conſtant induſtry, in order to render it of any value; if it calls forth that ſort of induſtry, which devotes the labourer to a ſolitary life, and repays him, not with wealth and luxury, but with ſubſiſtence and eaſe; if, in ſhort, it is property in land, divided into ſmall portions, and peopled by a few inhabitants—no combination

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nation of circumſtances can be figured to contribute more directly to the reformation of the new cultivator's character and manners. This has been preciſely the ſituation of the North American colonies. The mixture of various population was, by the influence of thoſe ſimple and happy manners which are formed by an agricultural life, ſoon blended into one nation of huſbandmen, whoſe character has communicated itſelf, in a great degree, to the moſt profligate of thoſe whom compulſion or deſpair from time to time introduced. While the purity of manners was in this way preſerved, that firmneſs of principles in religion and politics was maintained, which had ſo eminently contributed to the eſtabliſhment of the colonies. Sentiments of freedom might find an aſylum in America, when, even in Switzerland, it ſhould no longer be lawful to think beyond the rules.

Together with thoſe happy effects on the national character, the circumſtances of the North American colonies produced ſome others, not quite ſo favourable, upon the taſte, and what, in common converſation, we call the manners of the people.

The ſolitary nature of agricultural labour, and the ſecluſion of the huſbandman's reſidence, ſurrounded only by his own family and ſervants,

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ſervants, is extremely inimical to all ſorts of refinement—to every ornamental accompliſhment. The ſettlers of the new colonies abhorred reſtraints of all kind; and were eager only to ſubſiſt. They were indeed free from tyranny; but they wanted alſo that elegance which compenſates for a thouſand of the evils that luxury produces. Thus occupied with the uſeful, they neglected the agreeable arts of life; and voluntarily threw themſelves back ſome centuries, in moſt branches of civilization, inſtead of carrying on the improvement of thoſe branches, from the point to which the mother country had brought them at the æra of their emigration. The reaſoning powers of the human mind, from conſtant uſe, were indeed kept in full vigour; but their application was confined to thoſe ſubjects which called them forth—the common affairs of life. Speculation, abſtract inquiry, (unleſs upon ſome points of political and theological controverſy), all the pleaſures of fancy, and recreations of taſte, were neglected, or deſpiſed as uſeleſs, and ſhunned as expenſive. In a country where bodily labour bore a monopoly price, the labour of the mind (coupled with idleneſs of body) could not be afforded. Thus, the Americans have always abounded in grain and timber, and even in the coarſer manufactures; they have imported the finer fabrics,

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fabrics, and, among others, works of genius. The purſuits of agriculture certainly tend to ſtrengthen their intellectual faculties, more than thoſe of manufacturing induſtry; but they fatigue the body more, and leave leſs time for the inactive relaxations of ſtudy. A nation of farmers, is free from the vices of a manufacturing people; but it wants the accumulation of ſtock—the unequal diſtribution of ſurplus wealth, which, among the latter, gives employment to the unproductive labour of literary men. Thus, the Americans have always poſſeſſed a numerous, virtuous, and athletic peaſantry; but they have numbered no fine artiſts among their millions. They have raiſed neceſſaries, but imported ſuperfluities. They have produced theologians and ſtateſmen, becauſe government and religion were neceſſary; but they have not raiſed a ſingle orator in all the courſe of their changes—not even under their preſent conſtitution, ſo favourable to eloquence: and the word American has never yet (ſo far as I know) been coupled with either Poetry, or Painting, or Muſic.

The hiſtory of manners, in North America, is the general hiſtory of manners in every new community, of which agricultural induſtry forms the baſis. The peculiarities (perhaps accidental) which marked the ſituation and habits

habits of the firſt ſettlers, have likewiſe produced ſome effect upon thoſe of their deſcendants, without in the leaſt modifying their character as an agricultural nation. SECT. I.

The love of civil and religious freedom, was connected with an anxious attention to all matters of controverſy, whether in politics or faith; and as the ſettlers were equally incapable of underſtanding either, ſo they were chiefly captivated with the more abſtruſe of the two ſciences; and affected great depth in the things appertaining to grace, ſpirit, incarnation, and all the ſublime myſteries of the Chriſtian diſpenſation. Theſe fruitleſs ſpeculations were the only literary inheritance which they tranſmitted to their children. But although they had left the old world for liberty and conſcience ſake, they ſoon manifeſted what they underſtood by liberty of conſcience. By that term, they meant (like almoſt all advocates of liberty) the propagation of their own peculiar tenets; and they ſhowed, that they only wanted the power to propagate their creed (like their European oppreſſors) by that method of mental perſuaſion, which conſiſts in burning the body. They allowed every man entire liberty of conſcience, provided he uſed that liberty in adopting their own ſtandard of faith. Accordingly, while, in Old England, the ſpirit of fanaticiſm was ope-

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rating the downfal of government, and mingling itſelf with every purſuit of the age, to the univerſal debaſement of manners and ſentiment—in New England, the heterodox were perſecuted by the impulſes of the inward light; or parties were formed, and armies marſhalled, and millions led, by the ſubtle principles of a metaphyſical theology. But the Falklands and Sydneys had no parallels to temper the unclaſſical rage of the American bigots; and even the Cromwells and Bradſhaws found but poor repreſentatives in the ſtupid fanatics of Boſton and Salem. Long after the mother country had relinquiſhed, for ever, the arts of perſecution, they found votaries in the conſtituted authorities of the colonies: and the northern ſtates, at the end of the ſeventeenth century, afforded the diſgraceful example of that ſpiritual tyranny, from which their territories had originally ſerved as an aſylum. The century which has juſt elapſed, moderated this odious ſpirit: but, to this day, the northern ſtates are chiefly diſtinguiſhed from the others, by a taint of religious bigotry,—as the character of the middle ſtates is modified by the greater mixture of different nations, which have contributed to people them—and that of the ſouthern provinces, by the admixture of negro ſlaves. In the middle ſtates, the mercantile ſpirit has gained more ground than in

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in any of the reſt: the diverſities of race have rendered the ſentiments of patriotiſm, and the love of liberty, leſs ardent—while the variety of religions has prevented the introduction of that fanaticiſm, of which we have traced the effects in the north. In the ſouthern ſtates, the contraſt of ſervitude has mingled an ariſtocratical ſpirit with the manners of ſimple huſbandmen; and the climate, by promoting the growth of an article belonging to the claſs of luxuries, has given riſe to a ſpecies of agriculture bordering upon the great gains and uncertain proſpects of commercial ſpeculation.

In all the colonies, however, of the northern continent, a reſpectable national character may be ſaid to prevail. If their intercourſe with the mother country would have had no tendency to civilize or adorn her, it could certainly have in no degree contributed to the corruption, either of her moral or political habits; and the moſt rapid interchange of population could only have tended to embelliſh the American ſociety, and to vary its accompliſhments—while it rendered a ſervice to the Britiſh manners, by the intercourſe of a more ſimple and virtuous people. Unfortunately, the very circumſtances which neceſſarily laid the foundation of thoſe habits and that national character, inſulated the population of the colony from that of the old world.

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The colonies were ſtationary, for the ſame reaſon that they were reſpectable; and the circulation of inhabitants, with all its effects upon both parts of the empire, has been maintained and accelerated in other colonies, placed in circumſtances which rendered thoſe effects unfavourable, at leaſt to the mother country.

2. We have ſeen, that the agriculture of the Weſt Indian ſettlements has always been of a nature nearly allied to mercantile adventure. The perſons who emigrated thither, have accordingly been either thoſe who wiſhed to derive vaſt profits from a large capital, with conſiderable riſk—or thoſe who, without any ſubſtance, and ruined, perhaps, at home, wiſhed to catch, by other arts than laborious induſtry, ſome of the overflowings of the wealth accumulated by the former claſs. The ſpirit of adventure, which has for its object, either the rapid increaſe of ſtock, with proportionate riſk, or the acquiſition of ſome fortune, without the ordinary means of toil and hardſhip, is unfavourable to morals, and to manners. In the claſs which poſſeſſes capital, it is allied to the love of deep play; in the claſs which has nothing to loſe, it gives birth to meanneſs and diſhoneſty.

A colony, compoſed of ſuch adventurers, is peopled by a race of men, all haſtening to grow rich,

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rich, and eager to acquire wealth for the gratification of avarice or voluptuouſneſs. It is an aſſociation formed for one common end, which, in the eyes of all, juſtifies any means: and that indulgence which every one requires, no one is diſpoſed to refuſe. The continuance of the members in this ſociety, is as ſhort as poſſible; and the ſame proſpect of ſoon leaving the ſpot —the ſame views which induce a ſacrifice of preſent eaſe to future luxury, and a neglect of the common conveniences of poliſhed ſociety— leads alſo to an indifference about thoſe higher ornaments, which become the mind, and, when once given up, cannot again be aſſumed. 'Let 'us make money, that we may ſpend in London, 'Amſterdam, or Bourdeaux—*Quærenda pecu-* '*nia primum eſt, virtus poſt nummos.* We are 'now in the mine: though it be unpleaſant and 'unwholeſome, we ſhall ſoon repoſe on beds 'of down: only let us get wherewithal to 'purchaſe them; and the object may juſtify the 'means, as it reconciles us to the toil. What 'though our conduct is incorrect, and our 'manners diſſolute? We ſhall accommodate 'to thoſe of our European countrymen, when 'we return—as we threw off the hampering 'trammels of European maxims, when we 'croſſed the Atlantic. Let us but make mo-'ney now, and we ſhall afterwards have time 'to build churches, and endow hoſpitals.'

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Such, I fear, is the natural language of men in thoſe circumſtances. But their manners are affected alſo by other peculiarities in their ſituation. The want of modeſt female ſociety—the neceſſity of gratifying the deſires engendered by a burning climate—the abundance of unhappy women, whoſe blood boils with ſtill ſtronger paſſions, and renders them, in the European's eyes, only an inferior race, formed for the corporeal convenience of their maſters—theſe are other cauſes of diſſolute morals. The want of female ſociety, while it brutalizes the minds and manners of men, neceſſarily deprives them of all the virtuous pleaſures of domeſtic life, and frees them from thoſe reſtraints, which the preſence of a family always impoſes on the conduct of the moſt profligate men. The witneſſes of the planter's actions, are the companions of his debaucheries, who reek with the ſame luſt, and wallow in the ſame gluttonous mire; or the wretched beings, who tremble at his nod, while they miniſter to the indulgence of his brutal appetite, and impoſe no more check upon his exceſſes, than if they wanted that faculty of ſpeech, which almoſt alone diſtinguiſhes them from the beaſts that ſurround them.

The kind of induſtry which forms the occupation of the lower orders, is of a very different nature from that which clears the foreſts of the continent.

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continent. The unfitneſs of European conſtitutions to endure the heats of a tropical ſun, renders all work in the open air fatal to health. The honeſt exertions of the inferior whites, are therefore confined to ſuperintending the labour of others, by a delegated power over the ſlaves; and to certain details of commerce, which give a very different occupation to the mind from the employments of tillage. The labour of the huſbandman is unremitting and exhauſting;—it leaves no moments, nor ſtrength, nor deſire, for purſuits of vicious indulgence, even if the ſcenes of its exertion were favourable to the gratification of the looſer paſſions. The ſhepherd, whoſe life is more idle and eaſy, has not the opportunities of indulging thoſe paſſions, to which the neighbourhood of a city, and his own idleneſs, would give birth: his ſolitary occupation, therefore, begets habits of contemplation, coupled indeed with indolence, but not unfavourable to purity of mind. The needy adventurer, who ſtrives to grow rich, by ſuperintending herds of human cattle, or by managing the eaſy and ſubordinate branches of a divided buſineſs, without any continued exertion of mind, and with little or no bodily labour, has all the idleneſs of the ſhepherd, without his ſolitude and contentment—all the temptations to vicious exceſs, which conſtant interruptions

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of employment, uniform bodily eaſe, vacancy of thought, and the opportunities of indulgence, can hold out.

But the labour, which is not performed by Europeans, or Creole whites, is devolved upon Africans, from whom the coercion of a maſter's arm can alone extort the neceſſary portion of work. The whites form a claſs of ſuperior men, proud of their palpable diſtinction, and viewing their ſlaves as creatures of a ſubordinate nature, made for their uſe or their pleaſures, and bound to move by the impulſe of their will. Hence ariſes the moſt diſguſting contamination with which the reſidence of the new world ſtains the character of the European—a love of uncontrouled power over individuals—a ſelfiſh reference of their ſituation to his own wants—a diſgraceful careleſſneſs about the happineſs of a race, with whoſe enjoyments he cannot ſympathize—a deteſtable indifference to the ſufferings of his fellow-creatures—and a habit, no leſs odious, of indulging, at their expence, every caprice of temper or deſire. Such ſeem to be the neceſſary effects of that unnatural ſtate of ſociety, which allots the ſweat and duſt to the African, and reſerves to the European, the fruit and the ſhade.

In ſituations far leſs unfavourable, the ſame conſequences appear to have attended the inſti-

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tution of domeſtic ſlavery, among the moſt poliſhed nations of the ancient world; although their minds were cultivated, and their manners embelliſhed, by all thoſe happy combinations of circumſtances which gave ſplendour to the meridian height of the human genius; although the ſlave was of the ſame race with the citizen—his equal in civilization—ſometimes his ſuperior in accompliſhments; although the maſter was ſurrounded by his family, watched by the ſeverities of republican virtue, and either taught the leſſons of wiſdom, or received them from the ſages, whoſe precepts have guided the conduct of ſucceeding ages. This union of profligate and inhuman manners, with the elegance and the general worth of the claſſic times, affords indeed no palliation of the evil; but it may teach us, how inſeparable thoſe conſequences are from the inſtitution itſelf, when all the virtue and accompliſhments of antiquity, however much they may have obſcured, could not counteract them.

If, then, the univerſal prevalence of ſpeculation mingles, with the character of the Weſt Indian coloniſt, that ſpirit of gambling, which forms the juſtly contemptible habits of the horſejockey, and numbers among the unfortunate men who devote themſelves to this occupation, a much greater proportion of ſharpers, than

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than there are to be found unfair traders in any honeſt calling;—the dominion over negro ſlaves, adds to the ſame turn of mind, that odious cruelty, which renders the cockfighter as much an object of deteſtation, as the jockey is of contempt.

To the loweſt orders of the community, the nature of Weſt Indian produce cannot fail to hold out the opportunities of cheap diſſipation. As the peaſants of Europe, in the countries of the vine, are uniformly obſerved to be of a more irritable temperament, and more given to exceſs, than thoſe of corn diſtricts, partly from the fluctuation of their gains, and partly from the abundance of intoxicating liquors: ſo, we may expect the lower orders of the coloniſts to be affected ſomewhat in the ſame way, by the concurrence of the very ſame cauſes—an uncertain profit, and eaſy acceſs to ſpirituous mixtures.

Such, in general, are the modifications which we might ſuppoſe the manners of Europeans to receive from the peculiar ſtructure of ſociety, and the nature of the occupations in the Weſt Indian colonies. It is almoſt unneceſſary to remark, that the picture is a general one, applicable, indeed, to the great bulk of the population, but liable to many individual exceptions; ſo much the more honourable, as the common failings were more natural.

Various

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Various modifications are likewiſe produced, by the original diverſities of the European character, and the ſubordinate varieties in the circumſtances of the different ſettlers. The Spaniards, for example, have a temper more inflexible, and leſs apt to be moulded by the circumſtances of ſituation, than any other people in Europe. Their haughty deportment towards inferiors, and their jealouſy of equals, has generally been ſoftened, by their generoſity and dignity of character, into indifference towards thoſe who are implicitly ſubmiſſive. Thus, the habits of the Spaniards are leſs apt to be changed, and their ſlaves are better treated, than thoſe of the other coloniſts. The great diſtinction, however, in this reſpect, ariſes from the indolence of their character. While they were led over the ſeas and mountains of the new world by the ſpirit of plunder, they certainly did not fall ſhort of other adventurers in cruel treatment of their captives. Now, that an indifference about gain has ſucceeded to their former eagerneſs after all ſorts of booty, we find them no longer the ſame inſatiable maſters either to the Indians or Negroes.

The Dutch, on the other hand, who grovel after every kind of profit, whoſe ſpirit for gain is tempered by no dignity of character, and, prompted by the competition of large capitals, are,

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are, of all the nations in the Weſt Indies, the moſt inhuman maſters, and the moſt pliable in worming themſelves into the various habits of gainful ſpeculation.

Between thoſe extremes, are the French and Engliſh, rather too far removed from the Spaniard, and not excuſed by that neceſſity which ſpurs on the Dutchman to make a living profit. The two nations differ in original character; and, accordingly, we find, that Weſt Indian habits have more power over the verſatile Frenchman, than over the more ſtiff and ſtubborn Iſlander.

We ſhall afterwards have an opportunity of tracing the various effects of character and circumſtances upon the reſources of the different powers in the Weſt Indies; and, more particularly, of viewing the conſequences of that ſyſtem of credit which is peculiar to the commerce and agriculture of thoſe colonies. At preſent, it is ſufficient to point out the general qualities of that maſs, through which there is conſtantly circulating a large portion of the population moſt important in determining the manners of the European nations.

Men of reſpectable characters and accompliſhments remove to theſe ſettlements, and certainly ameliorate, upon the whole, the ſtate of their ſociety. By degrees, however, they partake

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take of the general contamination, and fall, at leaſt to that point to which they raiſe the ſtandard of morals and manners in the new ſcene. Upon their return to their native country, their habits are too deeply rooted, to be ſhaken off; and their influence is not inconſiderable upon the ſociety in which they mingle. Others find in the Weſt Indies, a ſtation congenial to their former lives; but they return ſtill more depraved in principles and taſte, armed with an influence which they did not before poſſeſs, and no longer inſignificant (at leaſt in a trading country) from poverty and meanneſs. Upon the manners of the European nations, then, the circulation of inhabitants to the Weſt Indies, has exerted an influence evidently hurtful: and as this circulation is greater between a mother country and her colonies, than between any ſtate and a foreign province; ſo, the injury to national character, ariſing from this ſource, may be entirely aſcribed to the colonial policy of modern times.

There are, however, ſome circumſtances which may ſerve to balance the bad effects of Weſt Indian manners, and which flow from the very ſame cauſes that have produced the contamination. We ſhall afterwards have occaſion to remark the encouragement which all colonies give to marriage in the mother country, particularly among the middle ranks of life, by holding

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holding out the proſpect of an eaſy proviſion for children. Perhaps no one cauſe contributes more directly to the purity of manners than this. Beſides, the political character formed by the Weſt Indian policy, is extremely favourable to the principles of independence, without any tendency to excite turbulence. The diſtinction of colour is a badge common to all the whites, and lifts them above the great maſs of the community. It is an order inſtituted by the arrangements of nature, and marked by palpable and indelible ſymbols. The arrangements of ſociety ſupport the diſtinction, and confer ſignal privileges on its favoured poſſeſſors. Hence a general ſenſe of equality among all the whites, from the great planter, down to the loweſt mechanic who lives by his employment. When a blackſmith arrives at a plantation to ſhoe the horſes, he approaches his employer, and takes him by the hand; performs his work in the ſtable; returns to the parlour; and thinks himſelf inſulted, if the honour of his company is not requeſted to dinner or coffee.

While this independence, and feeling of individual conſequence, tend to counteract ſome of the bad effects, formerly deſcribed, in the Weſt Indies; it prepares thoſe who have raiſed themſelves in the colonies, and return home in a higher rank, for aſſuming the pomp and circumſtance

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cumſtance of their new ſtation, without any of the conſequences uſually produced by ſudden elevation. It inculcates, too, a certain liberality of mind, and freedom from ſuperſtitious devotion to rank and power; often, indeed, curtailed by new mercantile ſpeculations, but, in ſome inſtances, favourable to the general character of a claſs of men, not the moſt remarkable for liberality of views, or independence of conduct.

Laſtly, it deſerves to be conſidered, that the Weſt Indian adventurers, who have acquired capital in the colonies, return with all the reſtleſs deſire of augmenting it, not by hoarding, but by ſpeculation; and are generally influenced by the vanity of freely ſpending their gains. Compare the ſordid manners of the perſon who has made his money in a ſmall trade, with the profuſion of one, riſen from a lower rank, who has made his fortune by colonial enterpriſe. The latter may indeed encourage luxury and extravagance; but this is neither the exceſs moſt to be dreaded, nor moſt pernicious to a mercantile and poliſhed ſociety. The demand for the productions of the more elegant arts, which ſuch men create, however ridiculous in them, and however indiſcriminate, tends to improve the manners of the community, by encouraging a ſpecies of induſtry, not much favoured in

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in a country merely commercial or agricultural. Theſe men, if they veſt their money in land, commonly introduce a bad ſtate of manners into the neighbourhood; but if their numbers are not very great in any diſtrict, they, upon the whole, do more good than harm, by introducing a ſpirit of active improvement, and a liberality of views, which are not the growth of ancient families, and rural occupations.

The effects produced upon manners, by that circulation which takes place between the ſtates of Europe and their conquered provinces in Aſia, are, in all reſpects, different from thoſe which we have been conſidering; and, in ſeveral points, the very reverſe.

The adventurous ſpirit is peculiar both to the weſtern and eaſtern emigrant; but the general change of character is very different, and much more complete in the latter. A reſidence in the Weſt Indies tends to debaſe the European character. A reſidence (generally much longer) in the Eaſt, mixes it with a character completely different, both in a moral and a political view. The manners of the ſettlers in the Weſt Indies have been formed by the ſituation of Europeans, tranſported to new countries, of which the natives have been long extinct, and were never ſo far advanced in civilization, nor ſo conſiderable in power, as to offer any models for imitation.

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imitation. In the Eaſt, the ſame men found a vaſt empire, or rather many vaſt empires, of ancient grandeur, and extenſive power, inhabited by an immenſe population of men, the moſt refined, if not the moſt enlightened, that have ever exiſted in the world. Among theſe nations, the new ſettlers gradually acquired a footing; and, in the courſe of many generations, extended their power, until they gained, much more by the arts of policy than the force of arms, an influence which they ſtill maintain by ſimilar means. There the European manners have always yielded to the more poliſhed and luxurious manners of the Aſiatics. Their forms of provincial government have been far more deſpotic, than either in the American colonies, or in the mother country. The policy of the Oriental ſtates, eminently ſyſtematic and refined, has mingled itſelf with that of their new allies and ſovereigns, and modified their political habits. The religious ſyſtems of the Eaſt, too, are more ancient, more widely ſpread, and more deeply rooted, than thoſe of the Chriſtian commonwealth. Fanaticiſm has never appeared among the new inhabitants of thoſe parts; and, inſtead of attempting to make proſelytes of the natives, the intercourſe has only tended to weak- or confound the creeds which the Europeans imported with them.

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The manners and character, accordingly, introduced by the return of these men into their native country, have partaken largely of the refinement and corruption peculiar to Oriental society. Their luxurious habits, their love of elegance, and inactive relaxation, have accompanied them to the regions of the temperate zone, and have communicated a distinct tone to the circles in which they afterwards moved. Indolent, yet discontented with the more homely manners of their own country; averse to all laborious exertion of body or of mind; enterprizing only in the pursuit of new pleasures, and ingenious in the arts of ministering to a corrupt and pampered appetite; the Indian grandees of Europe are little calculated to promote the active pursuits of their countrymen, by taking any direct share in their toils. To spend, and to enjoy, not to increase their wealth, is their object; but their expenditure encourages the exertions of others, and their enjoyments polish the manners of that circle in which they scarcely can be said to move. In a political view, the consequences of their Asiatic habits are certainly hurtful, at least to a free country. Their views are ill calculated for the meridian of a government, existing for, and by the people. Thus, although there is little doubt that their influence is, upon the whole, absolutely

lutely hurtful to their country, yet, it can as little admit of diſpute, that the manners introduced by them are infinitely leſs injurious than thoſe which are the growth of the tropical regions in the new world; while the tendency of their political habits is unqueſtionably much more hurtful.

3. The European ſettlements in Guiana, we have already remarked, are in every reſpect ſimilar to thoſe in the iſlands. The habits and manners of the people, and the whole ſtructure of the ſociety, is exactly the ſame. But the Spaniards and Portugueſe vary materially from all the other European nations, in the manners by which they have partly civilized, and partly corrupted, the continent of America. They differ, too, in this reſpect, conſiderably from each other.

The ſpirit of adventure excited by projects of mining, has ariſen, at different times, to an incredible height. The attention paid to cultivation, and the more common manufactures, is trifling in compariſon. The coloniſts of South America are ſupplied with many neceſſaries, and moſt ornamental articles, from Aſia and Europe; whoſe fabrics are their ſtandards of faſhion and taſte. As, however, a greater portion of the community remains ſtationary; as

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domeſtic ſcenes are more frequent and intereſting; as property in land is leſs valuable, and more extenſive; and as the national character of the Peninſula in Europe is diſtinct from that of the other countries, marked by a love of ſolitary enjoyments, and an indifference to the pleaſures of ſocial life; the manners of both nations in South America are, in general, much more pure than thoſe of the Europeans in the iſlands. They are mixed, too, with a ſimple, though an oppreſſed people, whoſe yoke has grown much lighter ſince the improvement of colonial policy, and relaxation of the mercantile and avaricious ſpirit. The proportion of negroes is much ſmaller than in any other of the ſouthern ſettlements: and the Spaniards, both from temper and policy, the Portugueſe, from policy, treat this unfortunate race of men with a mildneſs, unknown in any of the other colonies which are cultivated by African labourers.

Accordingly, the manners of the Spaniards in South America are much leſs contaminated, either by the deſperate ſpirit of hazard, or the unamiable cuelty which marks too generally the Weſt Indian character. In refinement and elegance, they are much ſuperior to the agricultural natives of North America, or to the temporary reſident in the iſlands. The ſhifting population naturally imports the reſpectable, though indolent

lent character of the Caſtilian, which is ſome- SECT. I.
what modified by the general tone of the majo-
rity of the whites. Next to the inhabitants of the Northern continent, we may ſafely place the Spaniſh coloniſts of Mexico and Peru.

The Portugueſe character, in Europe, is much leſs reſpectable than the Spaniſh. The mixture of Jewiſh blood is general, through the whole population of that country; however much it may be held in abhorrence. The Old Duke of Sidonia—when John IV. enacted, that all the perſons tainted with this ſtain, ſhould wear a ſlouched hat, as a mark of diſtinction—preſented that impolitic prince with one hat, and put another on his own head, in the Royal preſence. In the Portugueſe character, the effects of this mixture are very eaſily traced. That extreme avarice which renders the Iſraelite penurious, laborious, and mean, excites the Portugueſe (originally not unlike the Spaniard) to efforts of induſtry—trains him to the habits of the miſer, and the arts of the cheat. In the new world, this mixture is ſtill more prevalent, and its effects are more powerful. It is more prevalent; becauſe the perſecutions drove a number of that wandering and ill-fated race to ſeek an aſylum in the Brazils; whither they carried their ingenuity, their perſeverance, and their thirſt of gain. It is more powerful; becauſe the

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thirſt of gain is more eaſily gratified in the country of gold and diamonds. But the circumſtances which quench this thirſt by large gains, relax the meanneſs of that parſimony, which more moderate profits render neceſſary. Riches are enjoyed when poſſeſſed, and avarice becomes ſubſervient to luxury. The proximity of the mother country affords them the means of gratifying the more elegant taſtes, and of procuring the neceſſaries of life, without drawing away their attention from more gainful purſuits. The neighbourhood of the African coaſt ſupplies the indolence of the rich with vaſt numbers of menial ſervants; and furniſhes the avaricious planter with inſtruments of labour. We ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſee in what manner the peculiar employment of the negroes, together with the policy of the government, in the Portugueſe as well as the Spaniſh colonies, has tended to mitigate the lot of thoſe men. But the town negroes, though emancipated from the ſevere chains with which their countrymen in the iſlands are loaded, have received from their maſters the contamination of diſſolute manners, which the habits of ſlaves eminently fit them for acquiring. The government of Portugal has, by various ſumptuary laws, attempted to reſtrain that ſpirit of luxury, which the wealth and the climate of the Brazils have foſtered. By a refine-

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ment in abſurdity, the uſe of thoſe articles which are moſt peculiarly the growth of the colony, and its moſt valuable produce, has been reſtricted. The money that would naturally have been ſpent in gold and ſilver embroidery, has gone to buy and to maintain ſuch a vaſt number of uſeleſs domeſtic ſlaves, that, in ſeveral parts of greateſt diſſipation and extravagance, they exceed the whites in the proportion of ten to one. Their manners are debaſed by ſervitude, and corrupted by example: their licentiouſneſs is proportioned to the heat of the climate, and the extreme indulgence which their maſters grant them. In ſuch a community do the ſettlers from Europe, who live in the towns, become denizens: in ſuch circles are the children of the more opulent Creoles brought up.

The diſſolute character of the Brazilian towns, is accordingly repreſented by all travellers and hiſtorians in the moſt frightful colours. Without the glorious exertions of genius which covered its vices, St Salvador is polluted by all the moſt criminal parts of the Roman character, in the worſt ages of the empire. 'Tous les vices,' (ſays an author, who may ſafely be quoted, when words only, and not facts, are wanted), 'tous les 'vices qui ſont epars ou raſſemblés dans les

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'pays meridionaux les plus corrompus, forment 'le caractere des Portugais de Bahia.' *

But this character is peculiar to the inhabitants of the great towns. In the villages and country diſtricts, particularly thoſe of the northern captainſhips, the manners may reſemble nearly thoſe of the Weſt Indies. It is, however, through the towns that the population, which returns to Europe, chiefly circulates: and the communication between Portugal and the colonial capital, can have no good effect upon the manners of Oporto and Liſbon.

In point of political ſituation, the Spaniſh and Portugueſe colonies are nearly on a level: In point of religion, they differ materially. The policy of the court of Madrid has uniformly excluded the Papal power and the Inquiſition, from taking any ſhare in the ſpiritual concerns of the colonies;—and the prevalence of ſuperſtition, though certainly much encouraged by the great numbers of monaſteries and eccleſiaſtics, is far leſs remarkable than in the mother country. In Brazil, where the Inquiſition has reigned in full power, fanaticiſm is carried to a height, unknown even on the banks of the Tagus,

* Raynal, Hiſt. Phil. &c. Liv. ix. chap. 53.—Burke's European Settlements, Part iv. chap. 5.—Hiſtory of Brazil, apud Harris, Vol. ii. p. 184.

gus, and forms not the leaſt diſguſting feature in the colonial character.

We have thus ſeen, that the ſame circumſtances (modified by various accidental peculiarities and events) which have promoted the circulation of the inhabitants between the old and new world, and enabled the manners of each part to affect thoſe of the other, have alſo given thoſe colonies the worſt moral and political character, which are moſt conſtantly brought into contact with the mother country by this intercourſe: while, unfortunately, the tribes, whoſe manners were more ſimple, and lives more pure, have, by the nature of that ſituation to which they owed thoſe advantages, always remained, in a great degree, inſulated from the country of their anceſtors; and are now, by the farther operation of the ſame cauſes, entirely ſeparated from their filial connexion.

The political effects of the circulation of inhabitants, between a colony and the mother country, are ſtill more remarkable than its operation upon the national character of the two diſtricts. We have already ſeen in what manner this intercourſe, by affecting the political habits of men, tends to modify the governments of both communities, in ſeveral particular inſtances. But their mutual relations are alſo materially affected by the ſame cauſe. The direct

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direct influence of government—the similarity of manners—the communion of views and interests, will always be stronger in those provinces, however remote, whose circumstances render the mutual exchange of population more constant. In this point of view, distance only operates as one impediment to such an exchange. It is an impediment, however, the effects of which may be varied and counteracted by other circumstances. It may be varied at nearly equal distances; as, in the different kinds of colonies which we have been considering, the agricultural have always less intercourse, and are less dependent on the mother country, than the commercial settlements. It may be counteracted, as in the West Indian colonies—more especially, when navigation has arrived at an advanced state. The inhabitants of an island on the other side of the Atlantic, may be more immediately under the eye of the government—more connected with the people of the metropolis—more intimately blended with the mass of the empire—and, to all intents and purposes, more truly an integral part of its population, than those who cultivate one of its contiguous districts.

In one respect, however, the remote and the contiguous provinces differ from each other: the chance of political separation from the centre of the

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the ſtate, is greater in thoſe parts which are already ſeparated by the hand of nature. The communication between Paris and Ireland, is certainly much cheaper and eaſier, than between Paris and Marſeilles; yet the boundary of the ſea, and the definite form of the land, inculcate into the minds of men, the idea that the north and the ſouth of France are one continuous country; but that France and Ireland are two different territories, the one a continent, the other an iſland. The government may, indeed, diſpatch its orders to both, with equal celerity; but it cannot command the ideas of men, ariſing from a conſtant view of ſenſible objects: and thoſe ideas are the rules of human thought, to which every government muſt ſubmit, in order to command. As, therefore, the firſt object of every nation, is to preſerve its independent exiſtence, and to keep its ſocial union entire; ſo, the firſt object of colonial policy, is to preſerve the union between the near and the diſtant provinces of which the empire is compoſed. The means by which this object is accompliſhed, in the natural courſe of things, are infinitely more powerful, certain, and ſafe, than any which the reſtrictive interference of legiſlation can deviſe. In general, government can do nothing more than aſſiſt the developement of theſe, and remove ſuch obſtacles as are oppoſed

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to their operation, by the ancient errors of ſtateſmen, in leſs enlightened ages, and the unruly paſſions of men, which muſt commonly be directed by a partial ſubmiſſion to their force.

Thoſe natural ties, which tend conſtantly to maintain and ſtrengthen the connexion between the different parts of the empire, next to the circulation of inhabitants, formerly diſcuſſed, are, chiefly, the four following—the circulation of capital; the intercourſe of commerce; the weakneſs of the remoter parts; and the relations of a common origin, ſimilarity of cuſtoms, and identity of language.

1. The circulation of capital ariſes, partly, from the circulation of population, and, partly, from the neceſſity, which all new and underſtocked communities feel, of ſupplying their want of capital, by paying well for the uſe of capitals belonging to the ſtationary inhabitants of older countries. As every ſtockholder feels a repugnance at truſting his capital long out of his ſight; but more eſpecially at confiding it to the honeſty of thoſe who are ſubject to different laws, and expoſed to the juſtice or caprice of a different government, which may, immediately after the loan is concluded, go to war with his own country:—hence, no extenſive loans are ever made to the farmers or merchants of foreign

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foreign countries, or to the planters of foreign colonies. But it is wonderful how large a proportion of the capital, employed in raiſing, as well as of that employed in tranſporting and circulating the commodities of any colony, belongs to the monied intereſt of the mother country. Theſe loans are, in general, obtained from the merchants engaged in the colonial trade; who are tempted, not only by a higher rate of intereſt than is ever given in the home money-market, and by the advantage of having their intereſt, or annuities, paid in kind, according to the colony prices, while they ſell the commodities at the European rates—but chiefly by the profits of commiſſion on conſignments from their debtors, who are bound to give them this advantage, and are, indeed, always their correſpondents in trade.

The conqueſt of any colony, by a foreign power, would not only render men leſs willing to lend their capitals upon equal profits, but might diminiſh the profits by all that part which is made upon conſignments; inaſmuch as the new maſters might, and probably would, impoſe ſuch reſtrictions upon its commerce, as would effectually put an end to the correſpondence which attracts the loans.

The ſame effects, though perhaps in a leſs degree, may be produced by a ſeparation ariſing from

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from rebellion. The natural conſequences of external and civil war, is, that the capital employed in colony loans will ſuddenly be withdrawn; and ſo much of it only return to its former employment, as men may carry over with them, when they are under the neceſſity of repairing thither, to increaſe their incomes. This can only be a very ſmall proportion; becauſe the ſeparation renders men leſs willing to remove thither; and becauſe thoſe from whom loans were obtained, were merchants carrying on extenſive trade in Europe. Beſides, ſuch a uſe of capital cannot aſſiſt thoſe planters, who formerly carried on their buſineſs with it: It does not continue in the form of loans to them; but is veſted in the ſpeculations of the real proprietor, now become a colony merchant, or farmer. We ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſee the extent of credit in the colonial cultivation of every nation: we ſhall ſee how much more of the capital employed in the French, Dutch, and Engliſh ſettlements, belongs to European correſpondents, than to the proprietors and inhabitants of the colonies; and how little finds its way to one ſettlement, from the mother country of another. The nonreſident proprietors, in the event of any political change, naturally endeavour to ſell their property to the reſident coloniſts, or to the inhabitants of the conquering

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conquering nation—unleſs they chooſe to remove to their property themſelves: and ſuch a ſale or removal is always dreaded as unprofitable and diſagreeable. Every ſuch change of political relations, then, is unfavourable in the extreme, both to the colony, and to a large proportion of the commercial and monied intereſt of the mother country. As ſuch, it will always be much dreaded, and as carefully as poſſible avoided, by both. Thus, the great intereſts of both parts of the empire always coincide: and, while the peace of the whole is regarded by the government, it is anxiouſly watched over by the colonial planters and factors, as well as by their correſpondents, creditors, and principals, who reſide in the metropolis.

2. The commercial relations are, in the ſame manner, though in a leſs degree, calculated to promote the union of the different parts of an empire. All change of buſineſs, all ſhifting of capital or induſtry, from one occupation to another, is much to be dreaded, as full of difficulty, attended with ſome riſk, and with much real expence. Such trouble and loſs is indeed very trifling, if divided among the whole years during which the new commercial relations, or the new branches of induſtry, may continue to ſubſiſt;

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ſubſiſt; for it occurs but once. This once, however, is the firſt year; and, in it, all the loſs and labour is accumulated. Where ſo much depends upon credit, it may prove fatal; and where ſo much of that credit is, at the ſame time, withdrawn, it muſt prove fatal in a great number of caſes. The proſpect of expence and difficulty is immediate: it ſtares the planter, merchant, and his dependents, full in the face; and preſents itſelf as the companion of the firſt year, during which, a new order of things ſhall take place. It is to be the inſtantaneous effect of their exertions; and, whatever bad ſpirits may have found their way into the colony, or whatever bias they may have ſucceeded in giving to the ſpeculative opinions of the inhabitants, the proſpect, juſt now alluded to, meets every incentive to active diſobedience, and thruſts itſelf upon the notice of the community, the moment they are called upon to act. Traders, indeed, are the men upon whom ſpeculative notions take the leaſt hold. They are but untractable ſubjects for the attempts of viſionaries and malcontents. To retain their routine of profit, they will ſubmit to many real inconveniences. Inſults to themſelves, when they only touch their honour, without affecting their purſe, are felt with little acuteneſs; and the general injuries or wrongs of the community, are

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are of no more conſequence, in their eyes, than the entries of a neighbour's ledger are in balancing their books.

So long, then, as the exiſting relations of commerce are profitable and convenient, a rupture or ſeparation of any kind, will always be dreaded by the mercantile part of the community, in both quarters of the empire. And, to the purpoſe of our preſent argument, the planters of almoſt all the American ſettlements may be reckoned in this claſs.

It will be dreaded by the mother country, in as much as an independent government in the colonies may deprive her of thoſe preferences which ſhe has ſecured to herſelf during the union; and in as much as treaties of commerce are, in the preſent ſtate of national policy, often granted by the caprice or theories of rulers, without regard to the real intereſt of the community *. It will be dreaded by the colonies, in as much as various privileges which they poſſeſſed during the union, would no longer be continued, after a rupture; and in as much as the extenſive commerce and reſources of the conquering ſtate, could afford a temporary injury, or inconvenience, in order to give the rulers and the people an opportunity of gratifying their revenge. It will be dreaded by both colonies and mother country, if it is effected by foreign

* Note D.

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reign conqueſt; in as much as the new yoke of an enemy is always more ſevere, and the reſtrictions of his monopolizing policy more rigid and excluſive.

3. The two ties, ariſing from circulation of capital and commercial relations, are very much modified, in different colonies, by the circumſtances that ſtrengthen or weaken the third bond of union, which we have mentioned—the dependence of the colony upon the mother country, for defence and public ſupplies.

A colony, engaged entirely in agricultural purſuits, increaſes more rapidly—is leſs expoſed to invaſion from an enemy, or to the military force of the mother country—depends leſs upon the ſupplies of commerce or credit from the metropolis—is compoſed of members more high in their ſpirit, and more impatient of reſtraint, than the ſmaller and more valuable ſettlements, which ſubſiſt by the exportation of their produce, and are peopled by planters and merchants. The market of the former, is the great home market, and exiſts within the colony; that of the latter, is on the other ſide of the ſea, and is neceſſarily in the power of maſters or enemies. The inhabitants of the former, if driven to reſiſtance by oppreſſion or invaſion, can not only arm a greater force in their defence, but, when expoſed to

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to attack from the coaſt, can retire to the woods and wilds of the interior. A propoſal of this ſort was actually dictated by the peculiar circumſtances, and high ſpirit of the New-Englanders, during the critical events which attended the beginning of the American war. The planters of the iſlands, beſides that they are never likely to entertain ſuch a ſpirit, muſt, if driven from one coaſt, retire to another equally expoſed. The agricultural countries of the continent ſupply themſelves with neceſſaries: they can, as indeed they did on one famous occaſion, diſpenſe with thoſe articles of commerce and manufacture which come from abroad. The iſlanders, and the coloniſts in the ſouth, depend on their foreign commerce, for the bread which nouriſhes them, the clothes which cover them, and even the materials for building which ſhelter them from the heat of a burning ſun. In every point of view, then, the independence of the agricultural ſettlements, and their deſire to reſiſt or to ſeparate, is of quicker growth than in the ſouthern colonies; and ſooner attains to maturity in any continental ſettlement, than in any of the iſlands.

In all of them, indeed, we ſhall afterwards ſee, that an emancipation from their dependence upon the parent ſtate, would be moſt conducive to

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the real ſtrength of the colony, partly by creating a radical change in the government, and partly by aſſimilating the ſtructure of the ſociety in the iſlands, to that which prevails upon the continent. But ſuch views, however juſt, are never likely to be imbibed, either by the coloniſts, or by the government at home. The former, accuſtomed to be defended by the mother country, look upon themſelves as abandoned to the firſt foreign plunderers, when ſeparated; the latter, habituated to govern and protect, forgets that the ſame protection may be ſought from other quarters, becauſe it has never ſeen any attempt made to do without its aſſiſtance. We may ſafely aſſert, that the wonderful energies developed by the American States, during their ſtruggle for independence, aſtoniſhed themſelves as much as their enemies; and that, when they paſſed the Rubicon, few, beſides their own ſanguine leaders and their abettors, on either ſide of the Atlantic, expected any other conſequence than abſolute ruin, from a ſtep which was univerſally believed to be the dictate of deſperation.

4. The laſt circumſtance which I mentioned, as influencing the relations of a colonial ſettlement towards its mother country, is the ſimilarity of language, origin, and manners. Beſides

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Beſides the influence of theſe important circumſtances, in promoting the interchange of inhabitants, the circulation of capital, and the relations of commerce, they have a great direct effect in uniting together the two ſocieties, or parts of the ſame community, and in rendering both equally averſe to a civil war. There is a ſentiment of affection, which may, with the greateſt propriety, be termed filial, from the colony towards the parent ſtate. In ancient times, it formed, with a few exceptions, the only link that united them. The names by which ſuch a relationſhip has been denoted, are all founded upon ideas of the ſame endearing and tender connexion. Without any compulſion, colonies have generally followed the fortunes of their mother country in thoſe wars which manifeſtly endangered their own intereſts. The ſentiment of affection to the country of our birth or adoption, is felt by the moſt corrupt and depraved parts of the human ſpecies. In all countries and ages, the inflictions which wound thoſe feelings, have been ranked as the puniſhments, ſecond only to the deprivation of exiſtence. In ſpite of ill uſage, or diſgrace, or new habits, ſo ſtrongly does this propenſity of our nature, implanted in us for the wiſeſt purpoſes, point towards the ſcenes of our birth and childhood, that the re-

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miſſion or expiration of baniſhment, is almoſt univerſally the ſignal for reſuming a connexion, only interrupted by compulſory means; and the return of an exile to his native land, is one of the moſt powerful images which the poet can conjure up, when he would deſcribe the exceſs of human felicity. The ſame feelings, I have ſaid, appear to be excited towards the country of our adoption. The tender affection of the deſcendants of Iſrael, for that country in which they once found an aſylum, has remained unaltered even by the perſecution and contumely, which they have ſince experienced from it. Their love for Portugal is little inferior to that affection for their own Jeruſalem, which ſentiment and religious impreſſion unite in calling forth. It exceeds their predilection for Poland, where they engroſs the trade—are protected and encouraged. The very mention of Portugal, brings the tear into the eye of an Iſraelite. To ſee that land, before he taſtes of death, is the higheſt earthly conſolation; and he contentedly reſigns his ſoul into the boſom of Abraham, amidſt the contempt and injuſtice of Chriſtendom, provided he may lay his bones in a cheſt of earth from thoſe happy plains which are watered by the Douro and the Tagus.

The Weſt Indian ſlave, who has been torn from his country by force, cheriſhes indeed the recollection

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recollection of former ſcenes; but the ſociety of thoſe who have been the companions of his exile and his toils, binds him to his new home in preference to all other foreign lands. The appellation of ſhipmate is, among the negroes, the moſt endearing term that can be uſed; and in every ſlave code that I have ſeen, the penalty of baniſhment is inflicted on crimes of the deepeſt dye, to which death is not awarded. It muſt ſurely be an inſtinct of no common force and univerſality, which can awaken the emotions of ſenſibility, or ſtifle the love of gain in the boſom of a Jew, and give the negro-ſlave a choice in the ſcene of his ſufferings and bondage.

In all colonies, this inſtinct attaches the inhabitants to their own land, and the land of their forefathers. Its influence is naturally ſtronger among men of ſimple lives, like the agricultural coloniſts, than in the ſouthern communities, where manners are much corrupted. But the proſpect of a return, and, in general, the cloſe connexion which ſubſiſts between the commercial ſettlement and the parent ſtate, compenſates, perhaps, the effects of national character. This tie, however, is the only one, of which the ſtrength is not much leſs to bind the agricultural colonies, than the commercial ſettlements to the mother country.

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Such are the natural circumſtances, in the relative ſituation of a ſtate and its colonies, which, without any influence from poſitive inſtitutions, muſt always ſo far counteract the effect of diſtance and local ſeparation, as to render the political diſmemberment a matter of very improbable occurrence at any given period, in which a ſtateſman may be called upon to act. Thoſe ties muſt always render a war between the colony and the mother country much leſs frequent, than between the country and any foreign power. As, however, the ſame ties bind the different contiguous provinces of a ſtate together, without any diminution of their force, from diſtance and local ſeparation; a diſmemberment of thoſe nearer parts is ſtill leſs probable, than a ſeparation of the colonial territories. Of all wars, therefore, in which a ſtate may be engaged, a colonial war is the leaſt to be expected: but, of all civil wars, it is perhaps the moſt to be looked for.

This conſequence of local circumſtances has, accordingly, rendered the relations of colonial policy more complicated than thoſe of domeſtic adminiſtration; and politicians have fallen into their common error, by meeting the extraordinary difficulties of the occaſion, not with unuſual caution, more anxious attention,

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tion, or nicer exertions of political ſkill, but with more violent efforts of legiſlative interference,—with a force of arm, intended to be a ſubſtitute for delicacy of finger. They have, as uſual, ſacrificed all proſpect of governing well and eaſily, to the deſire of ſecuring, with certainty, a government, of whatever ſort; and this certainty, they ſeem to have thought, could be readily obtained by iſſuing decrees, however artificial, and however ill-adapted to the circumſtances of local and colonial relations. The ſyſtem of policy which is founded upon the views of the mercantile theory, has been extended to the branches of government unconnected with commercial arrangements. And as the general intereſts of the community have been ſacrificed, to fill the purſes of a few individuals: ſo, the general intereſts of the empire have frequently been made ſubſervient to the moſt narrow-minded ſort of ambition which can inſpire any cabinet—the preference of exceſſive power over a wretched province, to a moderate dominion over an extenſive and flouriſhing empire. When, in the Second and Fourth Books of this Inquiry, we come to conſider the different political meaſures that have been purſued for the attainment of thoſe ends, and dictated by different views of colonial relations, we ſhall find, that the favourite line of colonial

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colonial policy has not always been better adapted to attain even its own object, than the expedients of the mercantile ſyſtem have been calculated to promote its great end—the paving of the ſtreets with gold. As, however, there can be no doubt that the views of the colonial ſyſtem have been only, comparatively ſpeaking, deficient, while the object of the mercantile ſyſtem, when attained, would be utterly uſeleſs: ſo, it alſo happens, that the means adopted by the former have been much more ſucceſsful than thoſe attempted by the latter.

We have now taken a general view of the circumſtances which influence the political connexions between the different parts of an empire, the effects produced upon the manners of each member by their mutual relations, and the various peculiarities which affect the ſtrictneſs of the union that ſubſiſts between the different parts of a great ſyſtem, compoſed, like the commercial ſtates of modern times, of a mother country and colonies, or of provinces differently ſituated with reſpect to opulence, climate, and terraqueous poſition.

In conſidering the relations of colonial eſtabliſhments to the mother country, and in eſtimating the political advantages derived from them, the ſupporters of the different œconomical

cal ſyſtems have entirely neglected that point of view from which we have been contemplating the ſubject. They have conſidered a colony as a foreign country, held in ſubjection by another ſtate: not as a part of that ſtate, connected with it by various ties, and deprived of the advantages ariſing from proximity of ſituation, in order to enjoy other advantages of greater value. They have conſidered that ſyſtem, which is compoſed of a mother country and diſtant poſſeſſions, as a clumſy and unwieldly maſs; a ſtate, which drained its body, and divided its reſources, in order to preſerve a nominal and empty ſovereignty over a remote people. It appears, on the other hand, more proper to view the eſtabliſhment of diſtant colonies, as an extenſion of a country's dominions, into regions which enjoy a diverſity of climate and of ſoil. An empire, ſo extended, cannot, indeed, enjoy the advantages of compactneſs and ſolidity; but theſe are irreconcileable with variety of ſituation, and are ſacrificed in order to obtain it: in the ſame manner as a nation, by engaging in foreign commerce, ſubjects its reſources to many caſualties, to which thoſe of an inland ſtate are never expoſed, and encumbers its operations with many trammels, from which they would otherwiſe be free.

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Purſuing

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Purſuing the idea, that a colony is a remote and ſubordinate appendage of the mother country, political inquirers have examined the utility of all colonial eſtabliſhments by two criterions,—the military force which they contribute to the defence of the empire—and the reſources which they afford to its treaſury.

If the colonies are conſidered as integral parts of the ſtate, it is not neceſſary, in order to prove their utility, that they ſhould ſupply a ſurplus, either of men or money, to the aſſiſtance of the other parts: it is ſufficient, if they furniſh the means of governing and defending themſelves upon ordinary occaſions. In critical emergencies, any one part of an empire may juſtly claim ſuch aſſiſtance, as all the other parts can ſpare, after allotting to their own defence the neceſſary portion of their reſources. This forms an eſſential part of the idea of a political union. But even if, in times of tranquillity, the colonies generally require ſome aſſiſtance from the mother country, the following conſiderations may ſatisfy us, that, nevertheleſs, they deſerve ſuch care, as well as any other parts of the empire, and as amply repay it.

1. The provinces of a ſtate that lye contiguous, do by no means furniſh ſupplies, either of

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of men or money, in proportion to the benefits of defence and ſecurity which they receive from the government.

It is impoſſible to diſtribute the burdens of the national expence, with ſuch equality, among the different parts of the community, that each ſhall bear exactly the ſhare determined by its intereſt in the purpoſes for which the whole ſupplies are required. One part of the ſtate always contributes more than its protection coſts: the ſurplus goes to protect another part, which contributes leſs. An extent of country (for example) in the ſouthern parts of Great Britain, as Kent, Suffolk, and Eſſex, equal to the extent of Yorkſhire, or a tract of which the income is the ſame, does not contribute more to the revenue of the empire, than that county; yet the ſums required for the defence and government of the two diſtricts are very different. I imagine the Members for Yorkſhire would meet with much leſs attention, than they uſually receive from the Houſe of Commons and the country, were they to complain of this inequality, and to repreſent the defence and government of the ſouthern counties as a burthen upon their conſtituents.

The province of Holland, according to the convention of Utrecht in 1612, paid no leſs than fifty-eight *per cent.* of the whole taxes levied by the

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the federal government upon the United States. This convention, the fundamental law of the union, remained in force upwards of an hundred and eighty years. The direct influence of the provinces was precisely equal. In point of precedence, indeed, Holland was only the second, Guelderland being the first in nominal rank, although it paid but five *per cent.* of the supplies; and the consent of the most trifling, as well as of the largest province was equally required to every act of the government. The money thus raised in so great a proportion from Holland, was expended in the service of all the states; in maintaining the navy and troops; in garrisoning the barrier towns; and in supporting that admirable system of police which each province alike enjoyed. Holland, then, defrayed a very considerable part of the expence required for the defence and government of all the other states.

It may be said, that, in the application of supplies to the purposes of national defence, each district of a country is equally benefited; and that the sums contributed by any one part to the defence of the rest, are expended in preventing a conquest, which would lead immediately to its own ruin. We shall afterwards shew, that the colonies are subservient to the defence of the mother country exactly in the same

ſame manner. But, were we even to admit, that there is a difference between the two applications of the common ſtock againſt an enemy, no ſuch argument can apply to the money employed in the domeſtic affairs of the ſtate. It can never be ſaid, that Yorkſhire has a direct intereſt in the good government of Cornwall or Kent; or, that Holland is immediately benefited by the ſtrict police, which it partly ſupports, in Groningen. Great Britain may be intereſted in defending Ireland, as the conqueſt of that iſland might be dangerous to her own independence. She ſeems, however, to view a ſeparation by revolt, as equally dangerous; although ſuch a neighbour could never be very formidable. And, at any rate, ſhe defrays part of the expence of internal government; although, ſurely, the landed proprietors of Yorkſhire, or Norfolk, are as remotely intereſted in the quietneſs of the counties of Kerry or Sligo, as in that of Jamaica or Barbadoes.

In ſhort, the idea of a political union, involves the neceſſity of a common cauſe. It is neceſſary that the different parts ſhould contribute to each other's ſupport, without conſidering that they are divided by phyſical boundaries, or arbitrary lines. No ſtate ought ever to give up any part of its dominions, without the moſt

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moſt urgent neceſſity. Every ſuch diſmemberment is a diminution of reputation and of name,—a violation of duty to the part ſurrendered, and a ſacrifice of thoſe benefits, by which, in a ſhort time, that part may be enabled to repay all paſt expences. One of the principal diſadvantages of a federal government, is the encouragement which it gives to views of ſeparate political intereſts, and calculations of unequal contribution towards the pecuniary ſupplies.

The ſupplies of troops which a ſtate affords to its colonies, reſemble the unequal proportions, in which different diſtricts of the mother country contribute to the formation of her military and naval force.

Territories of the ſame extent, ſupporting an equal population, and poſſeſſing equal portions of wealth, will ſupply very different numbers of men to the public ſervice, upon any occaſion, which is not ſo urgent as to require compulſory levies; and the peculiar hardſhip of ſuch levies conſiſts, chiefly, in the equal manner in which they affect the different diſtricts. The nature of the prevailing occupations, the rate of the wages of ordinary labour, and the ſtate of manners, have all a powerful influence upon the proportion of looſe and ſuperfluous population, which is conſtantly ſhifting from

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from one ſtation or profeſſion to another; and may always, by the temptation of a trifling bounty, a certain maintenance, a life of idleneſs, and the hope of plunder, be turned into the ſervice of the ſtate. A province chiefly devoted to agriculture, is inhabited by a race of men, ſober, laborious, contented, and averſe to change. It is not among them that an army can be recruited, unleſs in times of political or natural calamity. A diſtrict of country which ſupports a population of ſmall manufacturers, living in ſeparate houſes, or little villages, engaged in ſome branch of buſineſs that is fed by an equable demand, and joining to their principal occupation the culture of a few common articles of conſumption, (ſuch a diſtrict as the Weſt Riding of Yorkſhire, and ſome parts of Switzerland), is nearly as unfavourable to the raiſing of ſoldiers, as a province wholly agricultural. A manufacturing town, where men are produced in abundance, or gradually collected from all parts of the country, and naturalized, habituated to ſociety, and to a life of labour, that requires little variety of mental exertion,—trained to diſſipation, and accuſtomed to change; this is the true depôt of military ſupplies, the natural head-quarters of recruiting parties. Of all ſuch towns, that will furniſh moſt abundant reinforcements, in

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which the ſpirit of ſpeculation, or the varying demand for its ſtaple work, or the unequal proſperity of the inhabitants, from whatever other cauſe, produces frequent variations in the rate of wages, ſuddenly throws idle a number of hands, or reduces the price of common labour below the ordinary pay of the army. Few towns have furniſhed more ſoldiers than Norwich, where the ſtaple is an article for which the demand is very capricious, and the wages vary prodigiouſly in a ſhort ſpace of time. Glaſgow, I have been informed, ſent to the army, during the late war, between twenty and thirty thouſand men,—a large proportion of the whole number raiſed in Scotland; although the peculiar circumſtances of the Highland diſtricts muſt have rendered them more than uſually prolific in ſupplies of men: The population of Glaſgow is not one twenty-ſecond part of the whole Scotiſh population. *

The diverſity of occupations and manners has, of courſe, leſs influence on the militia ſervice, which is not voluntary. All the ſubſtitutes, however, will be drawn from thoſe diſtricts which moſt copiouſly ſupply the regular army: and it is not the leaſt of the many objections to this ſpecies of national force, that it draws, to the occupation and habits of the military profeſſion, a number of men from thoſe

* Note E.

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thoſe claſſes which are naturally leſs adapted and leſs inclined to its purſuits; while every civilized nation contains a fund of idle and profligate men, who can never be ſo well employed as in the ſervice of the ſtate, and have no chance of being reformed by any other regimen.

As for the maritime force of the country, it is almoſt entirely ſupplied from the mercantile navy, and that from the towns and villages along the ſea-coaſt; more eſpecially, from thoſe which are ſituated on ſtations favourable to the fiſheries.

No part of the mother country is ever ſo ill adapted for ſupplying men to the army, as thoſe colonies which have not been long ſettled. They are underſtocked with inhabitants; the price of labour, and the profits of ſtock, are conſtantly high. In many colonies, it is not difficult to become proprietors of land: induſtry and ſobriety prevail there; and thoſe who have emigrated thither, are poſſeſſed with no paſſion leſs than the ardour for military glory. Yet, ſome colonies are leſs unfit than others for recruiting an army. Among theſe, we may reckon the Weſt Indian iſlands, for reaſons which were formerly given; although, indeed, the prevalence of negro ſlavery, by equalizing all diſtinctions, but that of colour, in

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the way before deſcribed, has the effect of inſpiring with a contempt of military duty, many, whom the peculiar circumſtances of thoſe ſettlements would otherwiſe have led into that direction.

In general, therefore, it will be for the intereſt, both of the mother country and the colonies, that troops ſhould be ſent out, and not raiſed upon the ſpot.

It will be for the intereſt of the mother country—becauſe ſhe can raiſe men much cheaper in her own manufacturing diſtricts, among the ſcourings of her jails, and houſes of correction; or in thoſe foreign countries which have a conſtant ſuperabundance of idle hands * —becauſe the troops, thus embodied, will be contented with a pay and ſubſiſtence proportioned to that which they would receive on other ſtations, not to the rate of wages and living in the colonies—and becauſe, even at home, it is always good policy to quarter troops at a diſtance from the province whence they were drawn.

It will be for the intereſt of the colonies; becauſe they are conſtantly in want of hands; becauſe their ſervice is not ſufficiently active or

* A great proportion of the Britiſh forces in the Weſt Indies, viz. the ſix battalions of the 60th regiment, are compoſed of foreigners, chiefly Germans.

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or various, of itſelf, to form a good ſoldiery; becauſe they receive, through the medium of the army, a valuable addition to the more poliſhed part of their ſociety; and becauſe the drain in their population, cauſed by a ſudden draught of men into the garriſons, could not be ſupplied from the mother country, ſo eaſily, as a partial vacancy in a fully peopled territory; more eſpecially in the Weſt Indies, which depend, at any rate, on emigration, for the ſupply of their ordinary vacancies.

In the long run, it ſignifies little, whether colonies are defended by forces ſent out to them, or raiſed among themſelves. If a certain number of troops are neceſſary for this purpoſe, and a certain number of hands are required for the purpoſes of cultivation and trade, this population will be found, while labour bears a monopoly price, as it does in all new countries; and it ſignifies nothing to the population of the mother country, whether ſhe ſends out the ſupply directly in the form of regiments, or as emigrants, to fill the place of the troops which the colonies have raiſed.

While the colonies, then, are only viewed as diſtant provinces of the ſame country, it is abſurd to repreſent their defence and government as a burthen, either to the treaſury, or to the forces of the other provinces. It would ſurely

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be moſt abſurd to ſay, that Norwich, Mancheſter, and Glaſgow, were the bulwarks of Great Britain, and ſupplied her with land forces; or that ſhe owed her navy to Newcaſtle, Liverpool, and Poole. It is cheaper and better for the whole iſland to get ſoldiers and ſailors from thoſe towns, than from among the landholders of Yorkſhire, the corporations of London, or the univerſities of Oxford and Cambridge; as it is cheaper and better for thoſe ſquires, and aldermen, and fellows of Colleges, to get their beef from Scotland and Ireland, than to raiſe oxen upon their prime lands, or in the ſtalls of their ſtables. Nobody, but an Iriſh patriot, or a Highland chieftain, would be vain enough to boaſt, that England is fed by their bounty: it would be as abſurd for the manufacturing and commercial towns, to boaſt that ſhe owes her defence to them. It is no leſs ridiculous for the United kingdom to complain, that ſhe is at the expence of governing and defending her colonial territories.

2. The wars which a ſtate undertakes, apparently for the defence of her colonial dominions, are, in reality, very ſeldom the conſequence of her poſſeſſing thoſe diſtant territories.

While the nature of man remains ſuch as it uniformly has been, we have no reaſon to expect

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expect that he will loſe the characteriſtic mark of his ſpecies, which entitles him to the appellation of a war-making animal. Two nations, who would commence hoſtilities on account of their colonies, would never want occaſions for quarrelling, had they no ſuch poſſeſſions. So long as the affairs of ſtates are directed, and their territories inhabited, by human beings, ſimilarity of purſuits, proximity of ſituation, and equality of power, will conſtantly furniſh the materials of ambition, and jealouſy, and diſcord: nor will the propenſity to diſſenſion be much augmented by the trifling increaſe of intercourſe ariſing from the points of contact being ſomewhat multiplied in a remote quarter of the globe, the intereſts of which muſt be much more frequently ſubſervient to thoſe of the mother country, than the guide of her conduct.

If Ruſſia or Auſtria, indeed, ſhould become poſſeſſed of territory in the Eaſt or Weſt Indies, an interference of intereſts with Great Britain might ſerve to leſſen the ties by which diverſity of purſuit and local diſtance at preſent unite thoſe powers. Yet, we do not find, that France and Spain, or Britain and Portugal, whoſe intereſts in Europe incline them to an alliance, are apt to ſeparate on account of the proximity of their colonies; although no pow-

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ers can be more ſyſtematically jealous in their colonial policy than Portugal and Spain.

In fact, any influence which the circumſtances of the colonies can exert on the diſpoſitions of the parent ſtate, is much more likely to be of a nature favourable to the maintenance of peace. So long as the different nations of Europe continue to view the poſſeſſion of diſtant territories as an advantage to their commerce, and an augmentation of their power, they will be leſs inclined to enter raſhly into any meaſures of aggreſſion in their contiguous dominions. Whether this predilection for colonial eſtabliſhments is well or ill-founded, its effects are the ſame. It did not ſignify much to the temporal affairs of the world, at leaſt, whether the princes of Europe embraced the Romiſh or the Reformed religion, or which of the two ſyſtems was beſt entitled to belief: yet the independence of the States of Chriſtendom was probably ſecured by the diviſion of power which their religious differences occaſioned. Many nations would, perhaps, be more profitably employed in the purſuits of agriculture and internal traffic, than in thoſe of foreign commerce (which indeed all of them have anticipated); yet, from their foreign commerce has been derived an important check to the love of conqueſt, and the ſpirit of

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of diſcord. In like manner, whatever effects may be attributed to the attention which has been paid to colonial policy, it is probable, that, inſtead of increaſing, it has diminiſhed the frequency of wars in modern times.

The matter, it may however be ſaid, appears in a very different light, when we attend to facts. The war of 1739 with Spain, it is alleged, began about the rights of the colony trade; and, in the end, drew France into the diſpute. The war of 1756 is called a colony quarrel. And the American war, undertaken entirely in ſupport of the rights of the mother country, involved her in a warfare with the other ſtates of Europe. Such are the aſſertions of Dr SMITH *, Dr JOHNSON †, M. TURGOT ‡, and all thoſe who maintain the inutility of colonies, or the gratuitous nature of the obligations conferred by the mother country.

The advocates for the coloniſts, on the other hand, aſſert, that the war 1739 was occaſioned by a diſpute between the Britiſh merchants engaged in the Spaniſh contraband trade, and the government of Spain; and they allege,

* Wealth of Nations, B. iv. c. 7. pt. 3.

† Taxation no Tyranny,—Works, vol. x.

‡ Mem. Où l'on rabaiſſe le produit des Colonies à ſucre. —Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, tom. iii, ed. de Segur.

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allege, that the war of 1756 owed its origin to the views of traders engaged in the Indian traffic, and to the claims of the Crown upon the North American territories. *

But whatever circumſtances may have involved Great Britain in a colonial warfare, upon either of thoſe occaſions, a little reflection will ſhew us, whether the conteſts were occaſioned by the poſſeſſion of territories in America, or only broke out in that quarter of the globe, as well as in Europe, in conſequence of the relations of European politics between the different powers poſſeſſing territories on both ſides of the Atlantic.

The policy of Sir Robert Walpole and Cardinal Fleury, had conſiſted in maintaining an amicable intercourſe between the two great maritime powers; and thus ſecuring to both, that tranquillity, of which they ſtood equally in need, after their exertions in the Spaniſh-ſucceſſion war. In conſequence of this ſyſtem, England had given up the alliance of the houſe of Auſtria, and quietly permitted her natural enemy to acquire an extenſion of territory at the expence of her natural ally. The treaty of Vienna (1733), the increaſed reſources of France, and her formidable aſpect towards the reſt of Europe, would have

* Franklin's Examination before the Houſe of Commons in 1766.—Canada Pamphlet, *paſſim*.

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have been ſufficient to awaken the ſalutary jealouſy with which Great Britain is conſtantly inclined to view ſo formidable a neighbour. The pacific ſyſtem, dictated by the exhauſted ſtate of both kingdoms, muſt have terminated with the mutual weakneſs which had excuſed it; and although neither Britain nor Spain had poſſeſſed a foot of territory in America, a rupture between France and Britain would have been the conſequence of the ſituation of Germany; while Spain, inſtead of being the principal, would have been drawn into the quarrel as a ſatellite of France.

While France had attained to a pitch of grandeur unknown ſince the beſt days of Louis XIV, the houſe of Auſtria, her only counterpoiſe on the continent, was weakened by an unſucceſsful war with the Porte, equally ruinous to the finances and the army of the ſtate. At this juncture, the Emperor's death involved his ſucceſſor in a diſpute with Bavaria for the Imperial crown; and the obvious intereſt of France led her to favour the cauſe of Charles VII, in as much as two neighbours of moderate ſtrength are far leſs dangerous than one of great power. The houſe of Brandenburg ſeized this opportunity of proſecuting the ſyſtematic views of unprincipled aggrandiſement, which have preſided over its councils ſince the name of Pruſſia was known

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known in Europe; and, together with the diſputed dutchy of Bergen, ſeized upon the fine province of Sileſia, one of the moſt valuable appendages of the Auſtrian monarchy. When the affairs of Europe were in this ſituation, it is abſurd to ſeek, in the new world, for the origin of a war between Great Britain and the houſe of Bourbon. The ancient ſyſtem of policy muſt have been blotted out from the memory of ſtateſmen; the love of preſent eaſe muſt have prevailed over every rational ſentiment of prudence; and the feelings of national predilection and animoſity muſt have ceaſed to influence the minds of men, if Britain could remain an inactive ſpectator, while France, with the connivance of the Northern crowns, was calling new powers into exiſtence, as counterpoiſes to Auſtria, and dividing among them the territories of her ancient and natural enemy. Nothing ſhort of a political miracle, ſtill more aſtoniſhing than any thing which the end of the century has diſplayed, could have continued, or renewed, the pacific ſyſtem of Walpole and Fleury. The zeal which burſt forth from the whole Engliſh people, at the inſults offered to a few ſmugglers in the Charaibean ſea, was afterwards animated as ſtrongly, and with ſomewhat better reaſon, by the wrongs of the Empreſs-Queen. Although Columbus had never traverſed the Atlantic, the ſame clamours which unjuſtly drove Walpole

Walpole from the helm, and plunged the nation into hoſtilities with Spain, would have forced the ſucceſſors of that miniſter into a continental war, even if ſuch a meaſure had not been called for by the plaineſt views of a ſound and cautious policy. *

The treaty which transferred Sileſia from the houſe of Auſtria to that of Brandenburg, and ſecured to the former the Imperial crown, produced only a truce between the belligerent powers, according to the confeſſion of one of their number, himſelf a principal party both in the war and the treaty †. The Empreſs-Queen was not ſatisfied to ſee her hereditary dominions diſmembered, without a ſtruggle. Thoſe were not the days of Royal humiliation, and eaſy and thoughtleſs change of empire. The views of that high-ſpirited Princeſs were quite independent of the diſputes between Britain and France in Canada.

The cabinet of Verſailles, by a policy ſimilar to that of Sir Robert Walpole, but carried to a very dangerous length, was willing to purchaſe a continuance of tranquillity, by a ſacrifice of the ancient enmity between the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria. The alliance of 1756 was concluded, after many attempts on the part of the latter. Ruſſia and Saxony, with the two Northern powers, warmly ſeconded the views of the Imperial

* Note F.

† Fred. II. Hiſt. de la guerre de Sept-ans, chap. 1.

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Imperial councils; not from the influence of any intrigues, but from a jealouſy of their ambitious and unprincipled neighbour. Frederic was now left in a more deſperate ſituation than Maria Tereſa had been in 1740; and the partition of his dominions among the combined powers (for the operations of ſuch leagues ſeldom ſtop ſhort at retribution) ſeemed altogether inevitable, if Great Britain ſhould leave him to his fate. The ſame views of policy that inclined this country to add a continental war to her colonial diſpute with France, would ſurely have directed her interference in the affairs of the Continent, if no diſtant poſſeſſions had diſtracted her attention. The war would have broken out in Europe a few months later than it actually did in America, and with a greater force on each ſide. The heroiſm of Wolfe and his army, inſtead of conquering on the banks of the St Laurence, would have joined the valour of their countrymen in Germany, and ſhared in reaping the laurels of Minden from a proportionably greater force of the enemy.

Upon one remarkable occaſion, indeed, Great Britain did not interfere to prevent an ancient kingdom from being diſmembered. But the circumſtances of Poland in 1774, and of Pruſſia in 1757, were extremely different in two reſpects. The union of the three partitioning powers, rendered the ſingle interference

of

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of either France or Britain wholly unavailing; and the intereſt of France would have been incalculably promoted, by their joint endeavours to preſerve the independence and integrity of Poland. * In 1756, on the contrary, France was engaged in the combination againſt Pruſſia; while the vigour and reſources of the Electoral houſe, unlike thoſe of the factious and turbulent Poles, were ſufficient to ſave its dominions, with the aſſiſtance of a powerful ally.

The American war was, without doubt, a colonial quarrel: yet, the ſame ſpirit of rivalſhip which led France to interfere in it, contrary to her moſt obvious intereſts †, would, in all likelihood, have broken out in another ſhape, long before the Revolution, if the affairs of the colonies had not furniſhed a pretext for the rupture. The ſhort and harmleſs war between Auſtria and Pruſſia in 1778, (harmleſs and ſhort, becauſe the other powers were occupied with their colonial intereſts in America, and could not attend to it, or blow up the flame by their interference); the Auſtro-Ruſſian war with the Porte; the affairs of Holland in 1787,—would have given ample ſcope for a conteſt between thoſe two great nations, which ſeem fated never to remain in peace, unleſs when completely exhauſted by hoſtilities. We know, that,

* Note F. † Note G.

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that, even without waiting for a pretext, the cabinet of Verſailles had entertained projects directly and indirectly hoſtile to Great Britain; had diſcuſſed the ſubject of invaſion, and planned the acquiſition of Egypt. A quarrel between them, whether ariſing from colonial or European intereſts, would have drawn the other maritime powers into the conteſt. Holland and the Northern ſtates would not have deferred their armed neutrality, becauſe the fundamental matters in diſpute appertained to the affairs of the old world; and Great Britain, by the delay of a few years, would only have been exhauſted at a more critical juncture, when the cauſe of order and of monarchy called for all thoſe gigantic efforts of diſintereſted magnanimity, which the cloſe of the century has witneſſed.

It ſhould ſeem, then, that in aſcribing to the poſſeſſion of colonies, the wars of 1739, 1756, and 1778, philoſophers have been led into an error, not uncommon in any of the departments of ſcience, and in none more frequent than in politics,—the miſtake of the occaſion for the cauſe, and of a collateral effect for a principle of cauſation. They have ſearched, in America, for the origin of misfortunes, of which the ſeeds lay nearer home—in the mutual relations of the European powers, the diverſity of national character, and the belligerent nature of man

man; as their forefathers traverſed the Atlantic in purſuit of riches, which they might have found in their domeſtic reſources—in the exhauſtleſs mines of induſtry and art.

3. The wars which a ſtate carries on in the colonies or remote dominions, are attended with important advantages to the contiguous territories.

While the powers of Europe continue to ſet a high value upon the poſſeſſion of diſtant colonies, a part of their efforts, when engaged in hoſtilities, will always be expended there. As the remote provinces are neceſſarily moſt defenceleſs, they will hold out the greateſt allurements to plunder or conqueſt; and as this colonial warfare muſt be always carried on almoſt entirely by ſupplies received immediately from the mother country, a great deficiency will conſequently be experienced in the reſources deſtined to conduct the other operations of the belligerent powers. The colonies thus occaſion a diverſion in favour of the tranquillity and ſecurity of the parent ſtates. The ſtrength and valour which might otherwiſe be exerted, in committing to the chance of war the independence of the European powers, are diſplayed in the diſtant regions of the new world, and exhauſted without danger to the capitals. 'Whoever' (ſays a Weſt Indian proprietor) 'has made

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'himſelf acquainted with the hiſtory of the 'Weſt Indian iſlands, cannot fail to have ob- 'ſerved, that, whenever the nations of Europe 'are engaged, from whatever cauſe, in war 'with each other, thoſe unhappy countries are 'conſtantly made the theatre of its operations. 'Hither the combatants repair, as to the Are- 'na, to decide their differences; and the miſer- 'able planters, who are never the cauſe, are al- 'ways the victims, of the conteſt.' *

Even although no great danger might ariſe to the independence of nations, from the war which would be confined to Europe, if the great maritime powers poſſeſſed no colonies; yet it muſt be remembered, that the proſperity of a ſtate is ultimately endangered, by a conteſt which ends without any actual ſubjugation. In the preſent ſtate of ſociety, when the arts of peace are cultivated by every people, as the only ſolid foundation of military grandeur—when the exiſtence of each government, and the maintenance of order in every community, depends on the fabric of public credit; an unſucceſsful invaſion is the ſecond calamity that can befal a country: it is only ſurpaſſed in dangerous conſequences by a ſucceſsful invaſion. The ſums which a nation expends

* Edwards, Hiſtory of the war 1793 in the Weſt Indies, cap. 1.

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pends in ſubſidies to foreign powers, the armies which ſhe ſacrifices to the ravages of the climate or the ſword, are well given up, to ſecure the incalculable advantage of domeſtic peace, although every remote enterprize ſhould fail in its immediate object. Great Britain, for example, is happily unacquainted with the real calamities of war. She has ſpent ſome millions of money, which ſuperior induſtry and ſkill ſoon bring back: ſhe has ſuffered, in a part of her population (not certainly the moſt valuable part) a trifling blank, which cannot now be diſcovered: but the battle has never raged at her gates. While ſome of her children have fought in Egypt and America, the reſt have ſowed and reaped in peace, and have gained for the ſtate, by their labour and ingenuity, thoſe ſupplies of treaſure, which its exigencies required. Men are too apt, in eſtimating the evils of war, to conſider actual conqueſt as the only great calamity which can befal a nation. It is not always even the greateſt of evils. But, at any rate, in the preſent ſituation of Great Britain, the evils of a formidable invaſion, not ſpeedily terminated, would be ſo incalculable, that it is needleſs to inquire, whether more ruinous conſequences could follow from any change of dynaſty. From thoſe evils the country has happily been

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ſaved, by the wiſe policy which induces ſome modern ſtates to pay their allies for being defeated, rather than to purchaſe the cheapeſt victories on their own ground; and by the expence of men and money, which has, indeed, enſured ſucceſs in the colonies, but which would have been well beſtowed, although conduct and courage had failed to produce their uſual effects.

While their colonies thus render to the great maritime powers of Europe the important ſervice of determining (as it were) the eruption of hoſtilities, to the extremities where it may ſpend a force that would have proved fatal to the nobler parts of the ſyſtem, the ſtructure of thoſe diſtant communities is, in general, of a leſs delicate nature, and better adapted to ſuſtain the ſhock of military operations. It is rather the maritime ſtations and the iſlands, than the more extenſive agricultural ſettlements, that become the ſcenes of war between their European ſuperiors. The majority of the inhabitants are men of deſperate fortunes, or, at any rate, adventurers accuſtomed to danger and change. Few of them have any families, upon whom the hardſhips of war can fall with an intolerable weight; and little or no wealth is accumulated, beſide what has been laid out upon the improvement of plantations and pens, or is fixed

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fixed in their ſtock. Credit is ſupported by the merchants and proprietors reſiding in Europe. Any devaſtation occaſioned by the war, falls only upon the fortunes of the rich citizens of London, Paris and Amſterdam, who, for their own ſakes, repair the loſſes of their property, and furniſh new credit to their correſpondents. But, in fact, the injuries to private property, occaſioned by colonial warfare, are inconſiderable. Where the campaign, which terminates the fate of a ſettlement, laſts only for a few weeks, and the invaders have always the proſpect of acquiring poſſeſſion in ſo ſhort a time, the conteſt is likely to be carried on almoſt entirely between the European forces engaged on each ſide; and the ſiege of a ſingle garriſon, or the capture of a few ſhips, will generally transfer the quiet dominion of an iſland. It is unneceſſary to remark, how widely the warfare of independent ſtates differs from colonial warfare in all theſe particulars.

4. We have hitherto ſuppoſed, that the burden of defending and governing the colonies falls wholly upon the mother country. If we examine the actual ſituation of almoſt all the European poſſeſſions in the new world, we ſhall find that they contribute eſſentially to both theſe purpoſes—more, perhaps, in proportion, than might be expected from infant communi-

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ties. The diſcuſſion of this ſubject, in its details, will come under the Third Section of this Book. But at preſent we ſhall take a rapid and general ſurvey of the different colonies, in order to ſhew how falſely this part of the queſtion has been often repreſented.

The Spaniſh and Portugueſe ſettlements, after paying all their internal expences, afford a large revenue to the Crown.

The adminiſtration of the French iſlands was all provided for by taxes in the colonies; which, without falling heavy on the planters, left a conſiderable free revenue; and the duties levied upon imported produce (and altogether founded on the colonial monopoly) yielded a great balance, after defraying all the expences of collection. The whole expences of their American colonies, in the time of peace, did not exceed the revenue; and a great part of the colonial ſurplus was expended in public works of mere ornament or magnificence.

The exchequer of Great Britain, after paying out of the colonial fund all that part of the civil adminiſtration in the Weſt Indies, which the colonies themſelves are not obliged to pay directly, derives a conſiderable clear income: and part of the expences of the army are alſo defrayed by the iſlands. Thoſe ſettlements, are, many of them, in their infancy—all of them ſuſceptible of great improvement, and likely,

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likely, without any increaſe of expence to Great Britain, to afford her an additional revenue. They have already raiſed, and paid a large force, from the great bulk of the population, the negroes; and, in no part of the empire, does the militia duty fall ſo generally upon the ſubjects at ſo little expence to government. Every man fit to bear arms is attached to that body; and, even in times of actual ſervice, no pay whatever is received.

The ſettlements, both of England and Holland, in the Eaſt Indies, ſubject to the government of excluſive companies, coſt nothing to the mother country, either for the civil or military ſupplies. On the contrary, thoſe companies pay a premium, from time to time, for the renewal of their excluſive charters: this is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, a clear revenue to the ſtate. The ſame remark extends to the Dutch colonies in the Weſt Indies and South America.

The old colonies of North America, beſides defraying the whole expences of their internal adminiſtration, were enabled, from their ſituation, to render very active aſſiſtance to the mother country, upon ſeveral occaſions not peculiarly intereſting to themſelves. They uniformly aſſerted, that they would never refuſe contributions even for purpoſes ſtrictly imperial, provided theſe were conſtitutionally demanded.

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Nor did they ſtop at mere profeſſions of zeal. During the ſeven years war, they raiſed and paid twenty-five thouſand men, who, upon more than one occaſion, ſaved the Britiſh army. They aſſiſted in the conqueſt of Nova Scotia, and effected the capture of Louiſbourg. In the war 1739, when their population and reſources were very trifling, they ſent three thouſand men to join the expedition to Carthagena: and a detachment of New-England troops, in the ſame war, took Cape Breton, under the command of General Pepperel. The privateers fitted out in the different ports of America, and belonging to the colonies, were, even at that time, both in numbers of men and guns, more powerful than the whole Britiſh navy, at the æra of its victory over the Spaniſh Armada. * Many parts of the colonies have, at all times, furniſhed large ſupplies to the naval force that was deſtined to protect them. The fiſheries of New England, in particular, uſed to contribute a vaſt number of excellent ſeamen to the Britiſh navy.

At the beginning of the troubles in 1775, the united colonies, beſides maintaining their whole internal police, were willing to offer a clear contribution of a hundred thouſand pounds Sterling per

* Franklin, Thoughts on the Peopling of new Countries, Sect. 22.

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per annum, for one hundred years, towards a ſinking fund for extinguiſhing the national debt of the mother country, on condition of being treated like the other parts of the Britiſh empire. The treatment of the colonial agents by the Engliſh government, prevented this memorable propoſal from being formally made: but a ſtate paper is ſtill on record, drawn up by Congreſs, and diſtinctly expreſſive of their ſentiments, to the above effect. *

The Weſt Indian colonies, indeed, and the leſs favoured ſettlements on the St Laurence, have never been able to vie with ſuch liberal offers. But, although the means of the United States were more ample, let it be remembered, that the ſame means would have enabled them to refuſe all terms, and to employ their reſources entirely among themſelves. Indeed, until the raſh, though not unnatural meaſures of the mother country, rallied them againſt her, their deſire to preſerve their relations of unity, and even of filial affection, was ſtrong and unequivocal. Their diſtruſt and animoſities were all confined to their relations with each other. Nothing but the forcible interference of Great Britain could ever effect even a partial union among them, for the purpoſes of defence againſt France, and their Indian neighbours. The great patriarch of the colonies declared,

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* Franklin, Miſcellaneous Pieces, p. 357.

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a few months before the firſt diſſenſions broke out, that it would be impoſſible for any thing ſhort of abſolute deſpotiſm in the government, to overcome their internal jealouſies and contentions, and to unite them againſt the Britiſh name. *

May we preſume to hope, that the colonial ſtory of Great Britain will exhibit to future ſtateſmen, a uſeful picture of the advantages which may fairly be expected from juſt views of provincial government; that it will hold out the proſpect of certain ſucceſs to the enlightened and generous policy which ſhall conſider the parts of an empire, however ſituated, as members of the ſame political body; that it will diſplay the poſſibility of retaining the diſtant provinces in the relations, not of ſubordination, but of union, even after they have become more worthy of bearing the ſame name, by their progreſs in wealth, in arts, and in arms; and teach every nation of Europe, which is happy enough to poſſeſs ſuch ſettlements, how amply their nurturing care muſt finally be recompenſed, even in a political view, by the efforts of their maturer age. 'All colonies,' ſays an eloquent and ſagacious hiſtorian, 'are a kind of political children, and, as ſuch, contribute to the honour, 'ſafety,

* Franklin, Canada Pamphlet, Sect. 5. See alſo Albany Papers, *paſſim*.

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'safety, and riches of their parents, if thoſe 'parents are not wanting to themſelves. It 'is, however, very common for governments, 'as well as private perſons, to fall into many 'great errors upon this head: ſuch as, treating young colonies with vaſt tenderneſs and 'indulgence, forming from thence very ſanguine, and ſometimes very unreaſonable expectations; and, becauſe theſe are not anſwered as ſoon as expected, falling out with, 'and diſregarding, thoſe colonies, at the very 'time when, if they had been attended to, 'they might have more than anſwered their 'expectations. It is likewiſe common with 'them, as well as parents, to grow unreaſonably, I was going to ſay ridiculouſly, jealous of their offspring; and, by this fooliſh 'conduct, actually producing thoſe miſchiefs 'they endeavoured to avoid, and which could 'have been produced only by ſuch endeavours. 'They are apt to fancy, that, becauſe the 'children are ſettled at a diſtance, they forget 'that they are children; and, full of this 'idle fancy, they ſoon forget that they are 'parents, and begin to treat them with an arbitrary authority. Becauſe they live at a diſtance, and ſupport themſelves by their own 'labours, they make it their ſtudy to draw 'from them wherewith to maintain the luxu-

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'ry and prodigality of thoſe children who live 'at home with them, and are thereby be-'come the objects of an irregular affection, 'which very ſoon degenerates into an exceſ-'ſive indulgence. Hence ariſe all thoſe miſ-'chiefs that are ſo warmly deplored by thoſe, 'who, if they would act with proper care 'and ſpirit, might eaſily amend them: for it 'is with colonies, as it is with children; nine 'times, in ten, their errors ſpring from the 'uſage they have met with: and they are 'blamed for their miſcarriages, by thoſe who 'are actually the authors of thoſe miſcarriages, 'and ought therefore to blame themſelves.' *

I now proceed to conſider the commercial relations between ſtates and their colonial poſſeſſions. This is the only part of the ſubject that has been fully treated of by political œconomiſts: and we ſhall find, that the erroneous views which have prevailed upon the former branch of the queſtion, materially affect their ſpeculations in this department alſo.

* Hiſtory of Peru and Chili—Harris's Voyages, vol. ii. p. 165.

SECTION II.

OF THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A STATE AND ITS COLONIES.

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THERE is no more fruitful ſource of error in political ſpeculations, than the forgetting to conſider how much of any plan is practicable, conſiſtently with the nature of men, the neceſſary agents in its execution, and the ſubjects of its operations. The Abbé de St Pierre is not the only projector, who has deſerved the name of viſionary, by omitting the important circumſtance of poſſibility in his ſpeculations.

The views of the œconomiſts are, in many parts, eminently expoſed to this imputation. Admitting that the cultivation of the earth is the only direct ſource of national riches, and that agriculture can never receive too much encouragement from Government, it does not follow, that a demonſtration of the political importance of this branch of induſtry, accompanied by contemptuous expreſſions with reſpect to all the other kinds of labour, will turn the attention of men excluſively to the plough, and and ſeduce, from other purſuits, all that proportion of the community which is required to make

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make the earth yield the greateſt poſſible quantity of ſubſiſtence. It is the buſineſs of a ſtateſman to adapt his plans to the nature of men, the materials on which he has to work. He muſt avail himſelf of their faculties, by yielding to their natural diſpoſitions: he muſt induce them to exertions, from neceſſity or temptation. As the farmer, in order to derive aſſiſtance from the vegetative powers of the earth, or the generative powers of animals, muſt accommodate his meaſures to the qualities of the ſoil, and the deſires of ſex; muſt protect the riſing crop by enclоſures, and ſhelter the female during her pregnancy: ſo muſt the rulers of a ſtate excite the farmer to plant and labour, by accommodating to the wants and deſires of his nature; by throwing in his way temptations to work; and by ſecuring to him the undiſturbed enjoyment of the fruits of his toil. The merchant who, by importing commodities, or the manufacturer who, by working up raw materials, tempts the peaſant to follow his plough, has as great a ſhare in raiſing the crop, as if, inſtead of handling the ropes or the ſhuttle, he had actually held the tail. In order to carry the ſtrict mode of ſpeaking, adopted by the œconomiſts, as far as conſiſtency requires, we muſt confine the appellation of *productive labourer* to nature, or the Deity, excluſively. The farmer

farmer only avails himſelf of certain powers which the Author of nature has beſtowed upon the ſoil, and the brutes, and the tools. The merchant and manufacturer operate, not upon the earth or cattle, but upon powers which the Maker of the world has implanted in the mind of the farmer, and which are as eſſential to its conſtitution, as their vegetative and generative powers are to the field, and the beaſts of the field.

If the œconomiſts could diſcover ſome method of new-moulding the minds of men, or of making them labour the ground, without the proſpect of gratifying certain deſires beyond the mere appetites of hunger and thirſt, they would certainly render an incredible ſervice to agriculture, the real wealth of the ſtate. But the agriculture of the ſtate would be at leaſt as much promoted by other diſcoveries. A method of making barren land yield crops without tillage or manure; or a method of impregnating females without the aſſiſtance of the male, would tend incredibly to augment the productive powers of labour, and the net profits of ſtock. The œconomiſts may probably find the one invention no leſs eaſy than the other. *

Even when the inducements to agricultural labour are furniſhed in abundance, we by no means

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means find, that the taſtes of men lead them always to devote as much of their time and capital to that branch of employment as the intereſts of the community require. While circumſtances of political arrangement hold out no extraordinary inducements to draw hands from the labour of the country to that of the towns, or from the home to the foreign trade, we find, that they by no means follow that order of progreſſion which we ſhould both expect as moſt natural, and deſire as moſt advantageous. In all countries, manufactures and foreign commerce have been anticipated: they have contributed to augment agricultural labour, inſtead of deriving their origin from the highly improved ſtate of rural induſtry, and the conſequent ſuperabundance of rude produce.

This circumſtance has been fully deſcribed by Dr SMITH, in what may perhaps be conſidered as the moſt finiſhed part of the whole work. * If he has omitted any thing in this inquiry, it ſeems to be the influence of caprice, and diverſity of taſte, on the purſuits of men. He has perhaps aſcribed too much to poſitive inſtitutions and political events, in explaining their effects upon the progreſs of national wealth. Independent of all regulations and ſyſtems of policy, the paſſions of men appear to turn their efforts

* Wealth of Nations, Book iii.

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efforts into directions certainly not the moſt conducive to the advancement of the community, and not always the moſt beneficial to themſelves.

The œconomiſts always recommend the direct and immediate encouragement of cultivation, without ſufficiently attending to that law of nature which ſeems to preſcribe gradual and connected meaſures as moſt ſure of attaining ſucceſs, and to prohibit man from flying at once to his object, without making indirect and circuitous approaches. 'Sage et heureuſe ſera la nation,' ſays M. Turgot, in diſcuſſing the queſtion of colonial eſtabliſhments, 'ſage et heureuſe ſera 'la nation, qui, la première, ſera convaincue 'que toute la politique, en fait de commerce, 'conſiſte à employer toutes les terres de la ma-'nière la plus avantageuſe pour les propriétaires 'des terres, tous ſes bras de la manière la plus 'utile à l'individu qui travaille, c'eſt-à-dire de 'la manière dont chacun, guidé par ſon intérêt, 'les emploiera, ſi on le laiſſe faire; que tout le 'reſte n'eſt qu'illuſion et vanité.' * If this is merely the expreſſion of a wiſh, it may have ſome meaning; it may import, that it would be well for any nation, if its inhabitants were ſo conſtituted as to adopt all the views moſt conſiſtent

* Politique des tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, tom. iii. p. 190.

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ſiſtent with the natural order of ſociety, and diſtribute their induſtry in the channel moſt beneficial to their country, without any other impulſe than their natural diſpoſitions. If the paſſage which I have quoted is intended for a diſſuaſive againſt thoſe purſuits which are found neceſſary to every civilized ſociety, as the means of directing into the moſt profitable channels a due proportion of the national induſtry, and for a recommendation to attain that end by neglecting thoſe means; then we may venture to pronounce it a pernicious doctrine—unleſs, indeed, its abſurdity may diſarm it of danger.

M. Turgot, it is true, was not one of the œconomiſts, although he adopted almoſt all their doctrines. But let us hear, upon this ſubject, the great patriarch of the ſect. 'Sommes-nous en 'avances,' ſays Mirabeau-Pere, 'et n'avons-'nous plus de place pour les employer utile-'ment, entreprenons des défrichemens, c'eſt 'bienfait; mais attendons qu'ils ſoient en plein 'rapport, pour qu'ils nous rendent nos avances. 'Avons-nous au contraire beſoin de fonds, de 'produit et de revenu pour vivre au jour le 'jour: ne l'allons pas chercher ſi loin; défri-'chons notre enclos, et laiſſons aux avanturiers 'le ſoin de courir les avantures.' ‡

And

‡ Philoſophie Rurale, tom. iii. p. 240.

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And again, in anfwering the objections which are urged againſt leaving the colony trade to foreigners, he adds, 'Si les conditions, relatives 'à la proſperité de l'agriculture, et que nous 'avons détaillées ailleurs, ſont obſervées chez 'vous, certainement ſe feront vos propres den-'rées que ces colporteurs habitués et hazar-'deux prendront le ſoin de porter dans le nou-'veau monde: car aucune nation n'aura plus 'que vous des récoltes abondantes et à un prix 'raiſonnable et conſtant, et de la meilleure 'qualité.' * Surely, if any human regulations could ſuddenly render a nation ſo rich in all manner of ſurplus produce of greateſt demand, that carriers would invariably give its goods the preference to their own commodities, and to the commodities of all other nations; it ſignifies little whether this happy country engages in commerce or not. We only deny, that any direct legiſlative arrangements can produce ſuch an effect upon a nation of men; and we are only ſpeaking of men as they exiſt. We maintain, that this very commerce is neceſſary to increaſe the ſurplus of valuable produce; that the carrying nation will always endeavour to find it at home, rather than to purchaſe it from, and ſell it to other countries; that, of conſequence, ſuch a trade will be the means of enriching,

* Philoſophie Rurale, tom. iii. p. 242.

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riching, not the people who give it up, but thoſe who fall into it.

Dr SMITH and his followers conſider the colonial trade as advantageous, but impute many evils to the monopoly of that trade. If we examine the matter with the attention it ſo well deſerves, we ſhall find, that moſt of the effects aſcribed to the monopoly, are by no means eſſentially connected with it; and that, although they are the neceſſary conſequences of the nature of the colony trade, yet that moſt of them are highly advantageous, and ſufficient to counterbalance a few others, which, if conſidered by themſelves, might appear detrimental.

This ſection, therefore, naturally divides itſelf into two parts—the relations of free colonial trade, and the effects of thoſe reſtrictions impoſed upon it by the commercial policy of modern Europe.

PART I.

OF THE RELATIONS OF A FREE COLONIAL TRADE.

1. THE commerce which a country carries on with its colonies, is, in every reſpect, a home trade. The ſtock and the induſtry engaged in it,

it, are employed for the purpoſe of circulating the ſurplus produce of the different parts of the ſame extenſive empire, ſubject to one government, inhabited by the ſame people, and ruled, in general, by the ſame ſyſtem of laws.

Every operation of this traffic replaces two capitals, the employment and diſtribution of which, puts in motion, and ſupports the labour of the different members of the ſame ſtate. The trade of London, or Liverpool, with the countries round the Baltic and Mediterranean, replaces, indeed, two capitals; but one of theſe only is Britiſh:—the other puts in motion the induſtry of foreigners; of Spaniards, for example; or of Ruſſians. The trade, on the other hand, which the ſame towns carry on with the Britiſh Weſt Indies, replaces two capitals, both of which are Britiſh; and ſupports the induſtry of Britiſh ſubjects, in the ſame manner with the trade which thoſe towns carry on between themſelves, or with Edinburgh and Dublin.

In like manner, the profits of a colonial trade are all accumulated in the hands of the ſame people, and tend to enrich and aggrandize the ſame nation. The increaſing wealth of Ruſſia or Spain, can never benefit Great Britain, unleſs by the increaſing demand for her produce which it may occaſion. On the contrary, it may, and often is, turned againſt her wealth

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and power. The riches of the colonies have certainly the ſame tendency to widen the market for Britiſh produce, and can never injure the wealth or power of the mother country: on the contrary, ſuch an aggrandizement of the colonies, is, in fact, an increaſe of the Britiſh empire, to whoſe general reſources they will always be made to contribute, like the contiguous diſtricts, when they have ſufficiently acquired the means.

This is, without doubt, true, although there ſhould be a very ſlow circulation of inhabitants between the mother country and the colony. But it holds more remarkably true, in the caſe of thoſe ſettlements to which men reſort for the purpoſe of accumulating a fortune, and with the intention of returning afterwards to their native country. Theſe men, enriched in the colonies, diſtribute their money in ſupporting the induſtry of the parent ſtate, either by their perſonal and family expences, or by engaging in trade, or by the purchaſe and improvement of land. They make way for a ſucceſſion of needy men, who may repair to the colonies for employment and maintenance, whoſe place at home is inſtantly ſupplied, who are certainly never the moſt valuable ſubjects, who are often turbulent ſpirits, dangerous to the peace of old and regular communities, but by no means inconvenient, as Mr Burke

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Burke has well remarked *, in ſocieties conſtituted like almoſt all new and diſtant ſettlements.

This circulation in no way augments the maſs of the national wealth; but it enriches that part of the empire which is of moſt importance: and although it may prevent the remoter branches from being able ſo ſoon to ſupport themſelves, and contribute directly to the ſtrength of the whole body, yet it repays, in the mean time, that part which bears the burden of defending the whole, and tends to conſolidate the different members.

The ſame effects are produced, in a ſtill greater degree, by the number of Weſt Indian proprietors, who reſide in the mother country, and continually draw from their eſtates the funds of their ſubſiſtence, or the ſtock which they may chooſe to employ in ſpeculations of agriculture, manufacture, or trade; while the management of their property gives employment to a ſucceſſion of their poorer countrymen, who by degrees accumulate a competency, and return home, or promote the improvement of the colonies.

The claſs of traders, who, after acquiring fortunes in a foreign country, return to ſpend them at home, is far from numerous in any part

* European Settlements, vol. ii.

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of Europe, as I have before obſerved. * But ſtill ſmaller is the number of proprietors reſiding at a diſtance from their eſtates, and in a different country. There is not perhaps ſo much as one thouſand pounds Sterling *per annum* drawn by Britiſh ſubjects in rents from the continent of Europe. But the rents of Weſt Indian proprietors, who have never in their lives been acroſs the Atlantic, may, without any exaggeration, be computed by millions.

Although this nonreſidence is certainly hurtful to the colonies, as the reſidence of landholders in the metropolis is hurtful to the contiguous provinces; yet it increaſes the reſources of the empire more immediately, by bringing a large portion of the colonial wealth under the immediate power of that government which defends the whole, and by nouriſhing the induſtry of that part of the ſyſtem, which, during the infancy of the diſtant ſettlements, bears the largeſt ſhare of the Imperial burdens.

In order to form a diſtinct notion of the advantages which a ſtate draws from the wealth of its colonies, and from the riches accumulated by its ſubjects during a temporary reſidence in thoſe parts, let us only conſider the caſe of a great Weſt Indian proprietor reſiding in Europe. The poſſeſſor of an eſtate in Barbadoes, for example,

* Section 1.

ample, living in London, pays taxes for his ſlaves, houſes, &c. to ſupport the government in defence of the iſland. This groſs produce is then diminiſhed by about a twenty-third part, which goes to the Imperial treaſury. Out of the neat produce which he receives, he pays all manner of Britiſh taxes, and perhaps forms one of the monied intereſt who ſupport government by loans, or contributions, in the various emergencies of public affairs. A proprietor of St Domingo, in like manner, reſiding in Paris or Bourdeaux, pays, firſt, the poll taxes and duties upon exportation from the iſland; then, the duties upon importation to the *domaine d'occident*; next, the various taxes laid on by the French government; and, laſtly, he offers to the neceſſities of the ſtate, a ready opportunity of borrowing; or, if the new method of finance ſhould be perſiſted in, he is an eaſy prey to its rapacity. Although the county of Cornwall were not to pay a farthing of taxes to the treaſury of Great Britain, nor to ſend a ſingle man to the ſtanding army; yet, if all its great proprietors reſided in London and Briſtol, paying taxes there to the ſtate; if men from other parts of England reſorted thither to accumulate property by the mines and fiſheries, and returned home to ſpend their gains; if the Corniſhmen paid the whole, or the greater part of the expence attending

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attending the civil government of the county, and ſerved in the militia, without pay, as long as they were able to bear arms: we ſhould certainly be entitled to call it an integral part of the empire, of great value to the Imperial concern as a ſource of wealth; and to denominate that traffic a home trade, which is employed in exchanging againſt its minerals the cloths of Yorkſhire, or the hardware of Warwickſhire.

2. The commerce which a country carries on between its different colonies, is not a carrying trade, but a home trade; the commerce which it carries on between foreign countries and its colonies, is not a carrying trade, but a foreign trade of conſumption; and that which it carries on between its colonies and foreign countries, in order to ſupply the home, from the foreign market, is not a roundabout, but a direct foreign trade of conſumption.

The African ſlave-trade, for example, is a direct foreign trade of conſumption. It conſiſts of carrying abroad, from one part of the empire, a capital, replaced to foreigners in the firſt inſtance, and then replaced to another part of the empire. It is there joined to the home trade, or that between the colonies and the mother country, replacing, in the mother country, the capital originally employed. Such a traffic

is

is no more roundabout, than the trade which conſiſts of importing Portugueze wines in London veſſels to Liverpool, and returns the profit to London in a cargo of Mancheſter ſtuffs. The capital, thus employed, puts in motion, firſt, the induſtry of London or the neighbourhood, by the articles required for the Portugueze market; ſecondly, the induſtry of the Portugueze, by the demand for the produce of their vineyards; thirdly, the induſtry of Mancheſter or Liverpool, by the cargo required for London, in return for the wines received from the London trade to Portugal. In like manner, does that branch of the colonial traffic, which has been called a roundabout foreign trade of conſumption, put in motion the induſtry of ſome foreign people, and that of two different parts of the ſtate to which it belongs, viz. the mother country and the colony.

3. As the different ſituation and circumſtances of different parts of the mother country, renders one agricultural, and another commercial or manufacturing: ſo, the ſtate of new ſettlements, which are always underſtocked in hands, and rich in land, renders them rather markets for the manufactured produce of the mother country, and cauſes them to make their returns in rude produce. Part of this rude produce

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duce wrought up, is uſed at home; part exported; and part ſent back to the colonies.

The price of labour is always ſo high in thoſe ſettlements, that their manufactures could never bear the competition of countries better ſtocked with inhabitants, unleſs in goods which admit not of carriage. Land, on the contrary, is cheap and fertile: and though the price of labour, of courſe, affects that of agricultural, as well as manufactured produce; yet there is no competition in this caſe: and the ſoil of countries that are better peopled, not producing the ſame commodities, there is never wanting a market for the ſurplus.

The greater part of the new ſettlers in the North American colonies, were artificers; but thoſe who continued for a ſhort time their former employments, ſoon gave them up, and either turned planters, or retailed imported goods, of the ſame kind with what they had formerly manufactured. This has been particularly remarkable in Pennſylvania, which contained a great proportion of German artizans. * In New-England, the abundance of furs encouraged a manufacture of hats. When that article grew ſcarce, the manufacture diſappeared. It was more profitable, it ſeems, to pay for the beaver which had croſſed the Atlantic twice, and been wrought up in England, than to

* Franklin, Canada pamphlet, § 4.

to ſend to the neighbouring province of Canada for the fur, and make it up on the ſpot. Braziers, cutlers, &c. frequently come to ſettle in all parts of North America. They continue, indeed, ſometimes, to ſell braſs and cutlery wares; but they import them all from Europe. *

Although the population of thoſe countries is increaſing with wonderful rapidity, it does not appear that the wages are falling in proportion. Labour was no cheaper in Pennſylvania in 1751, than it had been in 1721. † Yet, the induſtrious and frugal manners of this province, were ſo favourable to population, that the numbers during the period in queſtion doubled in ſixteen years. ‡ Between 1721 and 1751, then, the population muſt have nearly quadrupled; ſo that an augmentation of numbers, in the proportion of four to one, had no ſenſible effect on the rate of wages.

The colonies where the labour of ſlaves is employed, are ſtill leſs able to undertake any manufacture which can be procured in, and carried from, Europe or Aſia. The labour of ſlaves is always dearer than that of free men. As ſome free men muſt always mingle their work with the ſlaves, they are likewiſe to be paid;

* Franklin, Canada Pamphlet, § 4.

† Id. Thoughts on Peopling of new Countries, § 8.

‡ Id. Canada Pamphlet, § 4.

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paid; and their labour is uniformly dearer, when part of the community is in a ſtate of ſervitude. Such colonies, however, do not furniſh ſo wide a market for the produce of the mother country, as thoſe which are peopled entirely by free men. The gains being accumulated in a few hands, and the bulk of the people being ill fed and clothed, and deprived of almoſt all enjoyments and conveniences, great fortunes are perhaps hoarded up, but not many are ſpent. This is, in a great meaſure, counterbalanced by the other indirect advantages which I have pointed out—by the circulation of people, and the non-reſidence of proprietors, natural to colonies in ſuch circumſtances.

In general, we may conclude, that new countries furniſh a much more extenſive market for the manufactured produce of other nations, than countries well ſtocked with hands; and that, of conſequence, the ſtate whoſe empire extends over ſuch riſing provinces, poſſeſſes, within its own boſom, a much more extenſive market for the produce of the induſtry of its other provinces, than it could obtain in any of its more contiguous diſtricts. The diſadvantage of remoteneſs, is thus counterbalanced by the ſmall number of hands belonging to the new ſettlement, which, in a fertile ſoil, and favourable climate, can indeed raiſe a moſt valuable ſupply of uſeful or deſireable produce, but muſt truſt

to

to the better peopled diſtricts for thoſe articles, to the formation of which, nature contributes little. The natives of the old provinces are thus directly made partakers of the benefits of ſoil and climate excluſively enjoyed by the inhabitants of the new; while the latter, by increaſe of wealth, contribute eſſentially to the power and reſources of the whole empire, and often add immediately to its opulence, by diffuſing, over its central parts, that fortune which their temporary reſidence at its extremities has enabled them to acquire.

4. The market, afforded by countries newly ſettled under favourable circumſtances, is not only extenſive and advantageous to the induſtry of the older provinces, but it continually and rapidly increaſes.

The market afforded by almoſt every country, at leaſt, in Europe, is gradually extended, but ſo ſlowly, that any one country, whoſe induſtry and frugality is great, and whoſe progreſſive opulence in ſurplus commodities, of conſequence, is quickly augmenting, will find the demand of the European market very little greater this year than the laſt; not at all ſufficient to continue the ſame inducements to new induſtry which were held out before; and ſtill leſs calculated to accelerate the movements of labour and ſkill.

But

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But the greateſt advantage that a nation can acquire from any trade, is, that the demand ſhall always be ſomewhat beyond the ſupply, that there may always be an inducement to activity and exertion. As the abſolute number of inhabitants in a country is of leſs importance than the conſtant ſuperiority of its reſources to its population; and as the actual price of labour is of leſs conſequence than its being always upon the riſe: ſo, the extent of the market, whoſe demands call forth the induſtry, and employ the capital of a country, is of leſs importance than its progreſſive ſtate. When the demand is ſtationary, the profits muſt diminiſh, unleſs the country declines; for, with equal induſtry, ſtock will always continue to be accumulated. The price of the labour, then, of that great labourer, a whole nation, will diminiſh likewiſe, and its wealth and induſtry decline. So long as the diminution of the rate of profits is only occaſioned by the accumulation of capital, the ſymptom is favourable: the whole nation may be gaining, although individuals are not making ſuch rapid and extenſive fortunes. But if the diminiſhed profit ariſes from a want of demand, it is not merely the rate, but the amount of the nation's gain, that is affected, and its whole wealth is diminiſhed.

It

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It is indeed true, that a man who poſſeſſes wealth, is almoſt always ſure to employ his ſtock in the manner moſt profitable to himſelf. But it is no leſs true, that he may often find it extremely difficult to diſcover a profitable employment. He may be employing it as well as poſſible, and gaining much more than if he were to follow the directions of government upon the matter, and may yet not find his profit ſufficient, nor his gains ſuch as they would be, were a new field opened. The ſettlement of a new country opens new ſources of profit, creates an iſſue for capital which was ill employed, and renders that eaſy which was before difficult.

The diſcovery of America was, in this way, of as much advantage to Europe, as the introduction of foreign commerce would be to China. It opened a large market for the produce of European induſtry, and conſtantly provided a new employment for that ſtock which this induſtry accumulated.

Each nation, however, derives greater benefit from having this increaſing market in one of its own provinces, than if it were ſituated in a foreign country. The benefit, in this caſe, is reciprocal: the mother country forms an increaſing market for the colony, as the colony does for the mother country: and be-

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ſides other advantages, before explained, when this reaction ſhall have augmented to a certain length the reſources of the colony, it furniſhes direct aſſiſtance to the common government. Beſides, all traders find it more agreeable and advantageous, to deal with a ſtate inhabited by the ſame people, and ſubject to the ſame laws: they are better acquainted with the character, manners, and language of their cuſtomers: they have a greater confidence in their debtors; and can more certainly obtain juſtice, when injured. They will always prefer frequenting a part of the ſame empire, though more diſtant, and leſs agreeably ſituated in point of climate: and ſuch perſonal viſits are often requiſite in the courſe of mercantile tranſactions. The chances of interruption by wars, or of loſſes by public injuſtice, almoſt vaniſh; ſince nothing but rebellion, or civil war, or foreign conqueſt, can produce any conſequences of this ſort. Speculations can thus be undertaken with greater ſafety, and capital inveſted in a colonial trade with much leſs danger of any event that may render a change in the direction of it neceſſary. While, then, the new ſettlement remains in the ſituation of a colony, the merchants of the mother country will find it more profitable to employ their ſtock in trading with it, than if it

it were either an independent ſtate, or a colony belonging to ſome other power. The advantages of the increaſing market, which it ſupplies, will therefore be much greater in the former, than in the latter caſe.

5. We have already conſidered the direct effects which the intercourſe of a ſtate with its colonies produces on the wealth of its inhabitants by the circulation of people. The conſequence of this circulation muſt be an increaſe of numbers. But, by directly favouring the increaſe of their numbers, colonial eſtabliſhments produce indirectly the ſame effect, of increaſing the wealth of their parent ſtates.

The colony being underſtocked in hands, is conſtantly affording a demand, not merely for the labour, but for the people alſo of the mother country. The cheapneſs and fertility of the land, and the high rate of wages, which promote the population of the colony in ſo rapid a manner, have ſome effect alſo on the population of the mother country. That claſs of the community who cannot afford to rear a family during the firſt ſtages of infancy, will not, indeed, be aſſiſted by this outlet. Some of them, however, may be tempted to emigrate, and make way for others, or to ſtruggle with the difficulties of their ſituation, in the

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proſpect of emigrating, ſhould no change of circumſtances happen. But there is a great claſs in every ſociety poſſeſſing the means of rearing children, and yet deterred from marriage, by their want of ſtock to ſettle their family, when grown up, in a way ſuitable to their ſtation.

In civilized ſociety, when a variety of fictitious wants and prejudices are introduced, and the ideas of a competency raiſed; more particularly, where the force of political inſtitutions tends to favour pride of rank and external diſtinction; one of the greateſt obſtacles to marriage in the claſs of which I ſpeak, is this fear of bringing into the world children, who may be left unprovided with the means of maintaining that rank which their parents held in ſociety. The ſtock which ſupports them during childhood, will not, when ſubdivided, be ſufficient to maintain them in a reſpectable ſtation, that is, in a rank which does not require the aſſiſtance of manual labour: but the proſpect of an eaſy proviſion for a certain number of the family in the colonies, ſmooths many of thoſe difficulties, and removes the chief obſtacles to that ſtate which ſo many paſſions concur in recommending.

Any one may convince himſelf of the effect which ſuch proſpects have upon the marriages of the

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the country, by obſerving how many families, of different ranks, both in Britain and France, provide for one or more of their children in the diſtant ſettlements of the Eaſt and Weſt Indies. If ſuch a mode of proviſion is common, it muſt have an effect in determining the marriages of many, who would otherwiſe be deterred by the fear of begetting day-labourers. It muſt have the ſame effect with thoſe barbarous practices of expoſure, &c. allowed in ſome countries of the Eaſt, whoſe population has no outlet by colonies. It will not always happen, indeed, that the iſſue of marriages induced by ſuch views, are actually obliged to emigrate. They may not be too numerous for the funds of the family. Accidental circumſtances, or the developement of rare talents, may detain them at home; or the deſire of keeping them, may excite the exertions of the parents. But, at any rate, the population of the mother country gains all thoſe members of the family who are not provided for in the colonies, beſides ſuch a proportion of the latter as return. The happineſs of the mother country gains incalculably by the gratification which is thus afforded to the ſtrongeſt of the human paſſions, without any exceſs hurtful to manners, and by that ſobriety of conduct which the prevalence of the matrimonial ſtate always promotes.

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The ſame effects by no means follow from the power of emigrating to foreign countries, in different circumſtances—to a new ſettlement, for inſtance, belonging to another power, or independent of its parent ſtate. The ſimilarity of manners, of government, above all, of language, offers many inducements to change of reſidence. With the bulk of mankind, the opening to capital, induſtry, or talents, afforded by a foreign country, never enters into the calculation; while the difference of language preſents an obſtacle ſcarcely to be ſurmounted. Even if the language is the ſame, the difference of government is of vaſt importance to the views, more eſpecially of capitaliſts, and almoſt equally of men who look forward to the acquiſition of ſtock: and although the ſecurity afforded may be equal, perhaps ſuperior, to what their own government holds out, the chance of a rupture is a conſideration of great weight with men who mean only to change their abode, in order to reviſit that country to which their hearts cling. The poſſeſſion, then, of remote territories, underſtocked with capital and hands, is the only thing which can ſecure to the population of a country, thoſe advantages derived from an eaſy outlet, or proſpect of outlet, to thoſe perſons who may be ill provided for at home.

Colonial

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Colonial eſtabliſhments have been often repreſented as hurtful, by the drain which they occaſion to the population of the mother country. The obſervations which we have already made on this ſubject, may ſerve to remove ſo very abſurd a prejudice. But as the fact is frequently exaggerated, we ſhall add, that the population of a colony, however extenſive, is never, in any conſiderable degree, indebted to the ſupplies of emigrants, unleſs in caſes where the planting of the ſettlement is occaſioned by an overgrown population in the parent ſtate, as happened in ſome of the ancient colonies. There were, in North America, in the year 1751, above a million of Engliſh inhabitants: yet, not eighty thouſand had come over from England during the number of ages that elapſed between the diſcovery of North America and the period in queſtion. * Greater numbers have, perhaps, reſorted to the Weſt Indies; but, of theſe, a ſtill greater proportion have returned home with their wealth.

6. The commerce which a ſtate carries on with its colonies, replaces the capital employed in it more ſlowly, than either the trade between the contiguous provinces, or that which they carry on with neighbouring countries. Although

* Franklin, Thoughts on Peopling of New Colonies, § 22.

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though the profits, then, may be greater, and the merchant more benefited, the total gain to the community is leſs; in as much as a trade, with ſmaller profits and quicker returns, would put in motion, and ſupport a far greater proportion of induſtry. Hence, the colony trade has been reckoned, by ſome excellent writers, a much leſs profitable employment of the national ſtock, than the foreign trade with the countries in the immediate neighbourhood.

But, it muſt be remembered, that the colonial trade has all the advantages of a home trade, except the quickneſs of the returns. It replaces two capitals; both of which ſupport the induſtry, and ultimately augment the reſources of the ſame community. In comparing, then, the quantities of labour ſeverally put in motion by a foreign trade of conſumption, and by a colonial trade, it is extremely inaccurate to take into conſideration only the quickneſs of the returns, and to contraſt the two traffics, as foreign trades differing in this circumſtance alone. The former, however quickly it may return the ſtock that ſupports it, with the ordinary profits, replaces but one capital to each nation—one, for example, to the Britiſh ſeller, another to the French buyer. The latter, on the contrary, although the returns are more ſlow, replaces two capitals in the body

body of the ſame people—one to the Britiſh ſeller in Europe, another to the Britiſh buyer in America. Although, then, the foreign trade with Europe ſhould be twice as quick in its returns, it puts in motion only the ſame proportion of induſtry with the colonial trade; and the latter affording, beſides, higher profits, increaſes more the national ſtock. *

The ſlowneſs of returns in the colonial trade ariſes from two cauſes:—the want of ſtock in new ſettlements; and their diſtance from the mother country.

The want of ſtock occaſions a great demand for capital, and prevents the intereſt of money, and the rate of profits, in general, from ſinking to the level at which they are found to ſtand in old countries. In America, at the time when Franklin wrote his '*Thoughts on the 'peopling of countries*,' the intereſt of money was from ſix to ten *per cent.* † In England, the market rate was from three to five; in France, ſomewhat higher; and in Holland, from two to four. We may be aſſured, that the coloniſts do not give ſuch high intereſt, or run ſo long in arrears to their European correſpondents, for nothing. They pay, either directly or indirectly, a higher premium for this long credit, than the traders of European nations: and

* Note K. † 1751. *Vide* Sect. 12.

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and they can afford to pay it: for they employ their ſtock to much greater advantage, either in the agricultural or commercial branches of colonial induſtry, than the merchants of the mother country can poſſibly do. The delay in the returns, then, which ariſes from the underſtocking of the colonies, is not a loſs to the whole empire, compoſed of European and American territories. The capital, ſo retained, affords, in the end, greater profit to the mother country; and, in the mean time, it is putting in motion a greater portion of induſtry, and accumulating a greater ſtock, which is either directly transferred to the metropolis, or centres in it by the circulation of inhabitants, or aggrandizes a remote and growing branch of the imperial dominions. Every ſuch aggrandizement enlarges the demand for the produce of the mother country's labour; and if the returns have, for a while, been withheld, it is only that the market may be immediately increaſed, and the returns of the next year be both greater and quicker.

Long credit, and, in conſequence, ſlow returns, are the effects of a large capital. The metropolis is always a creditor to the country; and a rich to a poor trading nation, in the ſame manner as the mother country is to the colonies. It is the practice of the merchants in

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in Ruſſia, to inſiſt upon receiving at leaſt half the price paid down in ready money, for goods which they have bought up by contract; and to demand a year's credit (or longer) for all the goods which they purchaſe from abroad. * The merchant of the richer country, in this manner, ſupplies the Ruſſian market upon credit, and pays ready money for a great part of what he buys from it: yet England finds the trade ſo uſeful to her, that ſhe takes off nearly five times as much of the great ſtaples, as all the other nations in Europe put together. † In fact, another trade might give quicker returns, and put in motion a greater quantity of Britiſh labour: but by giving up the Baltic commerce, it does not follow, that England would find another ſource, from whence the ſame commodities might be obtained, or another market to take off her ſurplus produce. The countries producing thoſe commodities, are not infinite in variety; nor are the nations infinite in number, who furniſh the demand for hardware and woollens. The amputation of a ſmall limb from the body, does not much injure the general œconomy: its functions may be performed

* Tooke's View of the Ruſſian Empire, vol. i. p. 339. La Richeſſe de la Hollande, tom. ii. p. 59.

† Tooke's View.—Hunter's Obſervations on the Armed Neutrality.

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formed by an increaſe in the ſtrength of the reſt. An abraſion of a muſcle, or a ſlight evacuation of blood, may be replaced by the healing power of nature, without any injury to the general maſs. But the place of one of the nobler parts cannot be ſupplied, nor its loſs compenſated. A great effuſion of the vital fluid will induce irremediable debility: and the infant will in vain look for the reproduction of the part from which its nouriſhment flows, if the Amazonian mother has ſacrificed it to her love of activity, and her impatience of a uſeful incumbrance.

Long credits, in fact, and ſlow returns, like ſmall profits and ſlow accumulation of ſtock, are the neceſſary conſequences of great national wealth. A colonial trade ought not ſurely to excite diſcontent on this account, any more than a great capital ought to be deemed a national misfortune. Though ſlow returns are, however, as we have ſeen, by no means peculiar to the colonial trade, the ſame circumſtance is to be found in many of thoſe very branches of commerce, for the ſake of which we are adviſed to abandon the colony trade. If, then, ſuch counſels ſhould be followed, we ſhould only exchange all the advantages of a home trade, for all the diſadvantages of a foreign trade, without gaining any thing in quickneſs of return.

The

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The effects of their being underſtocked, would be preciſely the ſame although the colonies were contiguous to the mother country. Whatever part of the ſlowneſs of returns can be aſcribed to this cauſe, would equally attend the trade with thoſe provinces, however near the capital, which are behind the reſt in mercantile or agricultural improvement.

The diſtance of the colonies from the great body of the empire, would render the returns of their trade ſlower, even if they were equally well ſtocked with the older countries. This difference has, however, been always conſiderably overrated. It only operates in the compariſon with the trade of thoſe markets which lye at conſiderably leſs than one half the diſtance of the colonies. The returns of the trade, for example, which Portugal carries on with the Brazils, are much quicker than thoſe of the trade which ſhe carries on with Ruſſia, ſo far as the mere diſtance is concerned. Each American voyage, then, replaces a Portugueſe capital in Europe, and one in the colony, in about the ſame time that a Baltic voyage replaces a Portugueſe capital only. The Britiſh veſſels take nearly as long to make a voyage to the Levant as to the Weſt Indies: the latter replaces two; the former, only one Britiſh capital. But, if the voyage to St Peterſburg,

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terſburg, or Revel, is only half the length of a Weſt Indian voyage in point of time, including the influence of the trade-winds outwards, and the gulph-ſtream homewards, and ſetting off the dangerous voyage of the Cattegat againſt the riſk of tropical ſtorms; then it is evident, that the former, replacing only one Britiſh capital, while the latter replaces two, is, in this point of view, equally profitable. Beſides, we muſt take into account, the expence required, and the time conſumed, by a double loading and diſcharging of the cargoes, and the additional profits of the longer voyage: ſo that the colonial voyage is as beneficial to the empire as any other to a foreign country which is not conſiderably leſs than half the diſtance.

Now, the long voyage has another, and a very material advantage. Whether the diſtant market be a home or a foreign one; and whether it be more or leſs remote than twice the diſtance of the other markets with the profits of which we may compare its returns, it encourages a breed of men eſſentially neceſſary to every member of the European commonwealth, which would engage in an extenſive foreign traffic of any deſcription whatever—I mean, the breed of ſeamen. The coaſting trade is, indeed, an excellent nurſery: but it is in no country ſufficient

ficient to form a navy, not even in Great Britain, however extenſive her ſea-coaſt, and her internal commerce may be. The commerce of the nearer countries in Europe, however enlarged, although the whole capital employed in the colonial trade were turned into it, would ſtill be inadequate; and that, for the five following reaſons.

In the firſt place, a ſmaller number of ſailors could man the veſſels which would be neceſſary for the ſame bulk of traffic; conſequently, a ſmaller number would be employed. The owners and maſter of a veſſel, in calculating the crew which he may require, conſiders the length of time during which he is to remain at ſea, removed from all human aſſiſtance, and neceſſarily dependent on his hands: he conſiders, that in a voyage of ſix or eight weeks, more accidents may happen, and more natural deaths take place among his men, than in a paſſage of eight or ten days: he remembers, too, that, in the one caſe, he cannot ſave himſelf, as in the other, by running into a neighbouring harbour, upon any emergency; and that the probability of his meeting with a friendly veſſel in his diſtreſs, is ſo ſmall, as not to enter into the calculation. While, therefore, he adapts the ſtrength of his veſſel, and the fullneſs of his ſtores, to the caſualties of his long navigation;

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vigation; he proportions, in like manner, the numbers of his crew: and the extraordinary profits of the trade, admit of that increaſed equipment and complement. Although, then, the ſame number of weeks in a year were actually to be ſpent at ſea, by the veſſel engaged in the European, and the veſſel engaged in the American trade, a greater proportion of men would be given, and could be afforded, to the tonnage required in the latter.

But it is by no means true, that the ſame time would be ſpent at ſea in both caſes: more time muſt always be paſſed in port, when the trips are more numerous. A Weſt Indiaman, for example, will, in ſix months, take in her cargo, ſail acroſs the Atlantic, ſell her goods, and take in a Weſt India cargo, with which ſhe will return, and, unloading, will be ready for a ſecond voyage. During this time her crew will have been four months at ſea, and two in port. In the ſame time, a Bourdeaux trader of the ſame bulk, may have made more than two voyages: but theſe only laſt, altogether, two months; and the remaining four months have been ſpent in port. The time required to load proviſions for a long voyage, may, indeed, be ſomewhat greater; but it bears no proportion to the time required for loading the cargo: and the difference is much more

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more than counterbalanced by a circumſtance which I have not taken into account, the abundance of all colonial produce, the readineſs with which a cargo may conſtantly be obtained, and the ſhort time required for chuſing an aſſortment, from the ſimple qualities of the goods, always of the ſame kind, and in the firſt ſtages of manufacture.

If we compare the tonnage employed in the diſtant trade of any of the European nations, with the number of ſeamen allotted to the management of it, we ſhall be convinced that the proportion is much greater than in the trade of the neighbourhood. In forming this comparative eſtimate, however, we muſt attend to the proportion of tons in each veſſel; for, by this, the proportion of the crew to the tonnage is almoſt entirely determined, in voyages of equal duration.

The average proportion of ſeamen in the Weſt India trade of England during 1798, 1799, and 1800, was that of one man to fourteen tons; but the veſſels meaſured, at an average, two hundred and ninety-two tons each. The veſſels trading to France, at an average of 1791 and 1792, were of eighty-one tons only, and the proportion of ſeamen was only that of one to a little more than thirteen tons. As about three and a half times

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the number of the Weſt India captains, muſt be reckoned in this difference, and they do not increaſe the number of ſeamen for the exigencies of the ſtate; it will be found, that the Weſt India trade yields, in proportion to its tonnage, ſomewhat more ſeamen than the trade with France, although the veſſels are between three and four times as large. The veſſels in the Flanders trade have a higher average of tonnage, and a lower proportion of ſeamen. The proportion of their bulk to that of the Weſt India veſſels, is ſtill very ſmall; yet they do not furniſh, by any means, ſo many ſeamen.

But if we take our inſtance from a traffic in which the bulk of the veſſels approaches nearer to that of the Weſt Indiamen, we ſhall be able, more exactly, to appreciate the effects of the long voyage. The average tonnage of German traders for 1798, 1799, and 1800, was one hundred and ſixty-five tons; the men, only one to nineteen tons. The average tonnage of Dutch traders in 1791 and 1792, was one hundred and thirty-two tons to a veſſel; the men, one to nineteen tons nearly. The Pruſſian tonnage, for the ſame years, was two hundred and five to a veſſel; the men, one to twenty tons two-thirds: the Pruſſian tonnage two hundred and fifty; the men, only one to twenty-one tons five-ſeventhſ. Thus, the Baltic trade furniſhes leſs than two

thirds

thirds of the ſeamen ſupplied by the Weſt Indian trade, in proportion to the tonnage.

But the Weſt Indian trade is by no means the moſt diſtant in which veſſels engage. The Eaſt Indiamen, although their tonnage is above three times greater than that of the Baltic ſhips, employ, in proportion to their tonnage, between two and three times as many ſeamen. The whale fiſhery, which requires veſſels of nearly the bulk of Weſt Indiamen, furniſhes between four and five times as many ſeamen as the Baltic trade, in proportion to the bulk of the veſſels.

The foreign veſſels are manned in the ſame manner. Thoſe from the Weſt Indies to Britain, in 1800, meaſured, at an average, one hundred and fifty-eight tons, and allotted ſixteen tons eight-ninths to a man, after having made their long voyage. We may reckon the proportion, that of fifteen tons one half, before their numbers were diminiſhed by ſea riſk, climate, &c. The foreigners from the Baltic, though of two hundred and forty-five tons, had, at an average, only one man to twenty-one tons. The Danes calculate the complement according to a certain ratio with the tonnage, diminiſhing as the tonnage increaſes. They add one fourth to the crew of the veſſels engaged in the near trade, in order to fit them for the long voyages. *

* Ricard, tom. iii. p. 4. 4to edit.

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The larger ſize of the veſſels employed in the diſtant trade, is alſo an advantage to the navy of the ſtate, although it prevents the diſproportion of the crews from being ſo great, in the compariſon with the ſmall veſſels employed in a nearer traffic. The tranſport and victualling ſervice derives from thoſe kinds of commerce eaſy and important advantages. Beſides, the large merchantmen are always ready for being armed in war: ſome of them may be equipped as frigates, and a few of them even taken into the line. We may therefore reſt aſſured, that the commerce with diſtant countries employs more ſeamen and veſſels fit for the ſervice of the ſtate, in proportion to the tonnage, than the trade with countries leſs remote.

In the ſecond place, the proportion of the ſeamen to the value of the capital which employs them, depends upon the nature of the commodities in which the trade is carried on. Thoſe goods which are moſt bulky in proportion to their value, will, of courſe, require the largeſt tonnage, and the greateſt number of men to tranſport them, the diſtance being equal.

In order to leſſen the expence of the freight for ſuch commodities, larger veſſels will be employed, as theſe require ſomewhat fewer men in proportion to their tonnage. This will, in one

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one reſpect, diminiſh the proportion of ſeamen, although not ſo much as may at firſt ſight appear, ſince the diminiſhed number of captains required for the ſame tonnage diſtributed in bulky veſſels, is no real diminution of the number of ſailors who may be uſeful to the public ſervice. At any rate, the ſmall value of the cargo, in proportion to its bulk, muſt increaſe that part of the price which goes to pay the freight, and augment the fund for the ſupport of ſeamen.

All new colonies, from the fertility of their ſoil, and their extent of unoccupied territory, raiſe a great quantity of raw produce; but, from the want of hands, they ſeldom work it up into any form beyond the firſt ſtages of manufacture. They export the ſurplus in this rude ſtate, and receive from older countries, ſupplies of the finer manufactures. The veſſels, then, in which the mother country tranſports her own produce to the colony, carry a greater value, in proportion to their tonnage, than thoſe in which ſhe imports the colonial produce; and, in general, the bulk of the colonial imports, in proportion to their value, is greater than that of the imports from moſt of the European and Aſiatic nations.

Thus, the goods exported from Britain to the Britiſh colonies in North America during the year 1800, were worth, at an average, 32l. 15s.

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Sterling *per* ton, while the goods imported from thence were valued at only 16l. Sterling *per* ton. The goods imported from the United States during the ſame year, were worth 16l. 14s. Sterling *per* ton; thoſe exported thither, were worth 54l. 4s. *per* ton. The imports from Spain, during that year, exceeded the exports, and were valued at nearly 19l. *per* ton.

The Weſt Indian exported commodities having a longer voyage to make, are rather dearer than thoſe of North America, but far cheaper than the finer manufactures, in the circulation of which the European trade conſiſts. The imports from the Britiſh Weſt Indies, during the year 1800, were worth a little more than 31l. Sterling *per* ton; and, during 1791, the average was about 26l. 15s. Sterling. In the former year, the exports from Britain to the Straits were worth 43l. Sterling *per* ton; to Turkey 35l. *per* ton; to France and Germany 76l.; to Holland 178l.; and to Flanders 180l. *per* ton. In years of peace, the finer manufactures are not exported in the ſame proportion; and the countries round the Baltic, exporting at all times chiefly unmanufactured produce, of ſmall value in proportion to its bulk, the Baltic trade employs a greater tonnage, in proportion to the capital engaged in it, than any other. But it muſt be remembered, that the veſſels engaged

in

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in the importation of colonial produce, are almoſt altogether the property either of the colonies or the mother country, and that, of courſe, the ſeamen are always ready to enter the ſervice of the Empire. Thus, the Britiſh imports from the North American colonies, in the year 1800, amounted to 558,037l. Sterling. The tonnage employed in this importation meaſured 35,072 tons, of which only 219 were foreign property. During the ſame year, the ſame value of exports from Britain to Germany, employed only 7,474 tons, of which not more than 3,986 were Britiſh property. Although, then, the difference between the bulk of the commodities, in proportion to their value, had been much leſs conſiderable; nay, though a greater difference had lain on the oppoſite ſide; the North American trade would ſtill have given far more employment to Britiſh ſhipping, and, of courſe, employed a greater number of ſeamen than the German.

Although the very long voyages employ a great number of men in proportion to their tonnage; for this reaſon, among others, they are only adapted to the more coſtly ſorts of merchandize, and employ fewer men in proportion to the capital that carries on the traffic. The exports to the Eaſt Indies, during the year 1800, were worth about 55l. 16s. *per* ton; the imports worth 98l. *per* ton. The articles brought

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home from Aſia by this conveyance, are chiefly the finer manufactures of the Eaſt, with ſome of the rude produce, as, gums and ſpiceries. Some ſugar and ſaltpetre is alſo imported; but never, I believe, unleſs for ballaſt.

The whale fiſheries, as they employ more ſeamen in proportion to the tonnage of the veſſels than any other trade, ſo it happens that they require more tons, and, conſequently, more ſeamen in proportion to the capital embarked in them. The ſhips employed in the Greenland and Davis's Straits fiſheries, in the year 1800, returned with cargoes, of which the value was only 6l. 17s. Sterling *per* ton; and the importation from the ſouthern fiſheries was only 12l. 12s. Sterling *per* ton. Of this tonnage, the whole was Britiſh property.

In eſtimating the proportion of the bulk to the value of commodities imported by any country, we cannot, in all caſes, depend upon the cuſtomhouſe accounts and other public returns, chiefly for the four following reaſons.—

(1.) The frauds that traders and ſhipmaſters are conſtantly endeavouring to commit upon the revenue, are much more eaſily concealed, and more ſtrongly recommended, in the more coſtly articles. The tonnage, for inſtance, of a Weſt Indian, or North American veſſel, and of a Flanders ſmack, will be always taken with equal

equal accuracy by the public officers. But it is much more eaſy, as well as more profitable, to ſecrete a quantity of lace or trinkets, than a hogſhead of ſugar or a log of timber. Hence, the cuſtomhouſe returns will always make the proportion of the tonnage to the value of the cargo, that is, of the bulk to the value of the articles, greater than the truth in the trade of the nearer European markets, and nearer the truth in the accounts of the American trade.

(2.) It is well known, that, with reſpect to Great Britain at leaſt, the cuſtomhouſe rates, by which the value of commodities is calculated for all public returns, are of a very old date; that many of the articles, particularly almoſt all European commodities, are eſtimated one third below their preſent prices, and that many of the Weſt Indian articles are valued at their full prices. The error ariſing from this ſource, operates exactly in the ſame direction with that laſt mentioned. *

(3.) We can only compare the bulk with the value of cargoes, by comparing the tonnage entry with the official value of imports, and the tonnage clearing out with the official value of exports. But it may, and indeed often does happen, that a part only of the tonnage entering or clearing out, is employed in the actual

* Note L.

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actual import or export of the value returned: the reſt may have been occupied only with ballaſt. Almoſt all the Britiſh ſhips, for inſtance, which clear outwards for the Baltic, ſail in ballaſt: many of thoſe which carry cargoes to Flanders, diſpoſe of them for money or bills, and return in ballaſt: and many of thoſe which take in another cargo, ſail with it to ſome foreign port, from whence they return to Britain in ballaſt. It is evident, that the returns can only inform us of the number and value of the tons actually arriving at, or departing from the iſland. This, like the former ſource of miſtake, will chiefly affect the ſhort voyages. Veſſels from the diſtant ports of America and the Weſt Indies, muſt always make the moſt of their voyages: they never can afford to return without a cargo: and the monopoly prevents the greater part of them from ſailing to any foreign port, without firſt landing in the United kingdom.

(4.) A very large part of the bulky articles, exported from the different nations poſſeſſed of colonies, conſiſts of colonial produce, re-exported to ſuch nations as have not thoſe foreign ſettlements. The colony trade thus increaſes indirectly the tonnage for the foreign trade, and occaſions a greater proportion of ſeamen to be employed in it, than would otherwiſe be neceſſary. Thus, the effects of the

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the colony trade, in employing ſeamen, are much underrated, if they are merely eſtimated by the returns of the cuſtomhouſe: and yet we have ſeen, that, even by thoſe returns, the difference in the powers of a given capital to raiſe ſeamen, when employed in the colony trade, and of the ſame capital veſted in the greater part of the foreign commerce of a country, is ſufficiently remarkable.

But, in the third place, beſides increaſing the number of the ſeamen more than any other equally extenſive traffic, the colony trade raiſes a breed of a better quality, than the trade which conſiſts of ſhort voyages. The coaſting trade is certainly a nurſery of excellent ſailors. In no other, is the riſk ſo conſtant, and the ſkill acquired, in the ſteady management of rigging and anchors ſo extenſive. But, in general, it is carried on in ſmall veſſels: ſo that the crews are neither accuſtomed to the diſcipline of a numerous body of men, nor ſufficiently practiſed in the management of large ſhips, ſo different, in many reſpects, from the manœuvring of ſmall craft, and ſo eſſentially neceſſary to the public ſervice.

The ſhort voyages to the nearer foreign countries, have, in a great meaſure, the ſame diſadvantages of ſmall veſſels, and want the peculiar circumſtances of inceſſant riſk which attend

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attend the coaſting trade. But neither the one nor the other is calculated to ſecure ſeveral very important advantages, which the education of ſeamen derives from long voyages. The proportion of time ſpent in port, is always greater in repeated voyages, during the ſame number of months, than in one or two voyages exhauſting the whole of the period. The longer that ſailors are together, and the more they are kept ſeparate from all other orders of men, the better will thoſe peculiar habits be formed which are eſſentially neceſſary to that ſingular and amphibious profeſſion. Long voyages have various dangers and hardſhips peculiar to themſelves, while they participate, though in a ſmaller ſhare, of the ſame riſk and difficulty which attend the coaſting voyages. The greater the numbers of ſailors, too, that compoſe the crews of the veſſels, the more will they be accuſtomed to act together in a body, to divide among them the different occupations of navigation, and to preſerve the ſubordination required in naval ſervice, but almoſt unknown in the ſmaller veſſels, where the ſkipper and two or three men form the whole complement.

The Eaſt India ſervice enjoys ſome of thoſe advantages in a much higher degree than any other; but the ſervice is ſo regular, and ſo little

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little attended with riſk and hard labour, that ſeamen bred in it would be unaccuſtomed to active exertion, and far inferior, upon the whole, to thoſe obtained, either from the fiſheries, or American trade. Hence, in fact, ſeamen are not bred in the Eaſt India ſervice, but are draughted into it from the other maritime nurſeries.

In the fourth place, the colony trade has this very great advantage, in common with the coaſting trade, that the ſailors which it employs are ſeldom or never in a foreign port. They are, of conſequence, much leſs expoſed to the danger of deſerting into foreign ſervice; vacancies in their number are more eaſily, and better filled up, not by foreigners, but by other inhabitants of the ſame country; and they are always in ſome part of the empire, where their ſervices may be needed for the military operations of the ſtate. The ſeamen required for the navy, upon any emergency, cannot be procured from the veſſels engaged in a trade that requires them to remain in a foreign country—in the Gulph of Finland, for example, or the Levant. In this caſe, government muſt wait for their return. But thoſe employed in the colony trade are either in ſome port of the mother country, or of the colonies; on both of which ſtations their ſervices may be required for the ſhips of war.

In

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In the laſt place, long voyages, by requiring larger veſſels, and more numerous crews, can admit of draughts being made from them upon any emergency. A ſhip which is commonly navigated by three or four hands, can neither ſpare one of them, nor ſupply the blank by a landſman. A ſhip which is commonly navigated by eighteen or twenty men, can eaſily ſacrifice two or three, and ſail with the remainder: ſhe can even ſacrifice two or three more, and ſupply their places with raw hands. The Eaſt India ſervice, inſtead of breeding ſeamen, requires ready bred ſailors from the other trades. The fiſheries, the American trade, and the Baltic trade, furniſh the great ſupplies to the Britiſh navy; chiefly the American trade, which is the moſt numerous of the three, and which does not, like fiſheries, require the ſeamen to remain for a length of time out of the country.

It is, in ſome, or in all of theſe five ways, that the colony trade becomes the beſt nurſery for ſeamen, and chiefly from that very circumſtance of diſtance which has been reckoned its great drawback.

A navy is neceſſary, either for the defence of a maritime country, and the military operations which it may carry on againſt other ſtates; or for the protection of its commerce. Without the poſſeſſion of an extenſive foreign commerce,

merce, indeed, no nation can ſupport a powerful navy, unleſs it remains in a ſtate of perpetual war, or ſubmits to an expence which none but a commercial nation can ſuſtain. But, like moſt other political reagents, the ſervices rendered by the trade and the navy are reciprocal, and the effects of their progreſſive improvement are mutual.

To undervalue a particular branch of commerce, which is calculated to increaſe the maritime power of the ſtate more directly than the other branches, and thus tends to favour the progreſs of thoſe branches, is ſurely to take a ſhort-ſighted view of the importance of this ſpecies of force, both to the defence and wealth of the nation. Yet many politicians have denied the importance of thoſe very purſuits which tend to promote naval power; becauſe, according to them, naval power muſt always be the conſequence, and not the cauſe, of commercial proſperity. They ſeem to forget, that commercial proſperity muſt operate in a particular way, in order to produce this effect; and that, if its agency is obſtructed in that particular direction, the trade and wealth of the nation may flouriſh, and no navy ever ariſe from it; any more than the richneſs of the ſoil will raiſe plentiful crops, if the genial warmth and moiſture of the ſeaſon be withheld, or the natural effects of fertility obſtructed

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obſtructed by the preſſure of an incumbent maſs.

When the capital of a country is accumulating, and its commercial relations are extending, ſome part of the ſtock and induſtry of its inhabitants will be directed to the cultivation of the ſoil; another part to the internal circulation of its produce; and another part to the exchange of its ſurplus for the ſurplus of foreign ſtates. This laſt part muſt operate by the ſupport of a ſpecies of labour and ſkill, which tends directly to augment the military power of the nation; to increaſe its influence in negociation with neighbouring ſtates; and to ſecure, immediately, that branch of wealth out of which it aroſe. That part of the ſtock which is employed in the more diſtant and extenſive traffic, has this tendency more than any other: and it is by giving birth to this traffic, by enabling the nation to acquire this branch of induſtry, that the accumulation of riches, and the improvement of internal reſources, inſures the poſſeſſion of maritime power.

The eſtabliſhment of a naval force, then, is the conſequence, no doubt, of commercial improvement. A government would, indeed, be juſtly blameable which ſhould anticipate this progreſs, and attempt to lay the foundations of naval power, by ordering a certain number of veſſels to be conſtructed, and draining the coaſting trade of hands, in order to man them.

But

But a government would be as blameable if it ſhould diſcourage that ſort of induſtry, the direct tendency of which is to accelerate the progreſs of naval power, and ſhould neglect thoſe advantages, which the poſſeſſion of diſtant and fertile territories preſents for the accompliſhment of this object.

We have endeavoured to ſhew in what manner the colonial trade is peculiarly adapted to favour theſe views, and to furniſh this ſpecies of force, without any injury to the ſtate in its other relations, either of policy or commerce.

7. We have now conſidered the conſequences of the colony trade to the wealth of the mother country, in ſo far as its returns are ſuppoſed to be ſlower than thoſe of the commerce with neighbouring, but foreign ſtates; and we have ſeen how far its peculiar tendency to furniſh a uſeful ſpecies of national force counterbalances any loſs which may ariſe from the ſlowneſs of the returns. It muſt however be remarked, that a particular part only of the ſtock of any country can ever be drawn into this diſtant traffic.

Men poſſeſſing ſmall capitals, and living upon the profits of them, with little or ſlow accumulation of wealth, muſt engage in ſuch adventures as expoſe their all to few riſks, and re-

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turn, in a ſhort time, thoſe profits, upon which the owner's ſubſiſtence, and that of his family, depends. Theſe men either engage in the retail trade, or, if their ſtock be ſomewhat larger, they employ it in the home traffic; or, if they have acquired a ſtill greater capital, they adventure it in the nearer foreign trade of conſumption. Quick returns are to them of more importance than great profits. They muſt live upon their returns from day to day. The ſmall profits of a confined capital, after paying their neceſſary expences, leave them at the end of the year no ſurplus upon which they may ſubſiſt during the next year, while their capital is ſeeking new employment. If they can do more than make the two ends meet, they immediately inveſt their little accumulation in the line of buſineſs in which it was gathered; a buſineſs always more eaſy to them than any other, and always offering a greater opening than they can fill up. All men, indeed, but eſpecially thoſe of ſmall capitals, naturally prefer enlarging their former trade, if they acquire the means of doing ſo, rather than engaging in new adventures of a different kind. Even with rich traders, what is called ſpeculation, more frequently conſiſts in ſuddenly increaſing the degree, than in varying the nature of their labour and riſk.

Men of ſmall capitals have a greater degree of

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of timidity in their proceedings, and leſs enlargement in their views: they have little to loſe; but that little is their all; and they do not like to let it remain long out of their ſight. A great capitaliſt may collect from the ruins of an expenſive ſcheme ſufficient funds to carry on ſome of the more limited branches of trade. The ruin of a ſmall capitaliſt reduces him to beggary, or to the ſtate of a labourer, ſcarcely leſs humiliating to a trader. A man of large capital alone can afford to engage in the traffics of ſlow return. Although he endeavours to keep as little of his ſtock as poſſible unemployed, yet he has always a ſufficient ſurplus of one year to ſupport him during the next, becauſe his expences bear a ſmall proportion to his whole gains. He has credit with his neighbours and dependents; while the poor man muſt, in general, pay ready money for what he conſumes. The views of the former are more extenſive, his attention to ſmall ſavings leſs rigid, his boldneſs in ſpeculating greater, and his fear of loſing ſight of his ſtock leſs hampering. In fact, he never loſes ſight of it all, at any one time; which a man of ſmall property muſt frequently do. Nor does he, like him, riſk his whole ſtock in one adventure. He may loſe by this ſpeculation; and more than compenſate his loſs, by extraordinary gain in that. The

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poor man either loſes all, or gains all. The trade of a great capitaliſt, too, is not confined to his actual property. He may often go beyond it, and ſpeculate upon credit. All traffic, or adventure of this kind, is out of the queſtion with the proprietor of a ſmall ſtock.

Thus, the ſort of capitals which are naturally drawn to the colony trade, and the more diſtant foreign trades of conſumption, are not thoſe which naturally prefer the home trade, and the traffic with the near neighbourhood: and a diſtinction between the tendency of the great and the ſmall capitals, is clearly marked in the habits and circumſtances of their poſſeſſors.

But the nature of the more remote trade itſelf, independently of other conſiderations, provides a limitation, of exactly the ſame kind, to the capitals which it employs. The profits are great, but they muſt be gained by a great expence; and the expence does not riſe in the ſame proportion with the capital engaged. We have already ſeen the manner in which the expence of ſeamen, that is, the chief part of the freight, is not proportioned to the bulk of the cargo; and how it bears a greater proportion to the value of a ſmall, than to the value of a great cargo. The prime coſt of the ſhip, and the tear and wear and charges of refitting, are exactly in the ſame

ſame predicament: and the ſame number of clerks and ſervants may aſſiſt the merchant importer to land and diſpoſe of a large cargo, that are required for the care and management of a ſmall one.

Thus, the expence of employing a capital in thoſe kinds of trade, bears not an exact proportion to the extent of the capital, while the groſs profits bear an exact proportion to its extent: conſequently, the neat profits are not proportioned to its extent; and a ſmall ſtock employed in it would be replaced with an inadequate profit, while a large one would be returned with a handſome gain. Hence, even if proprietors of ſmall ſtocks could afford to lye long out of their money, or choſe to venture it in diſtant ſpeculations, it would not repay them for their pains and riſk. Beſides, the merchant engaged in colonial trade, muſt not only give long credit; he muſt often depend upon getting long credit himſelf: a facility only in the power of great capitaliſts. It is the tendency of great capitals, to drive out of the trade which is favourable to them all the ſmall capitals that may happen to be adventured in it. The proprietors of ſuch ſtocks are generally actuated by the ſpirit of monopoliſts; and as they can afford to trade on much ſmaller profits, they underſell and get rid of

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their more humble competitors, who muſt have a greater profit, as their ſtock is leſs. In the near markets, ſmall capitaliſts have many advantages. They are conſtantly attending to every part of their buſineſs: their whole ſtock is always in view. They do every thing at the leaſt expence, are attentive to the moſt trifling ſavings, and avail themſelves of the moſt inconſiderable gains. The ſubdiviſion of capitals, produces many of the good effects which attend the diviſion of labour; and the ſmall capitaliſts enjoy many of the advantages over their richer neighbours, which a private trader of any kind enjoys over a public body engaged in trade, and which even a public body enjoys over the prince, or the government of the State, when thoſe great and unwieldy corporations are ſo blind to their own intereſts as to become manufacturers or merchants. It is by advantages of this kind, that the nearer markets are kept open to ſmall capitals, although larger ones may be employed there at the ſame time; and the advantages of diſtant markets, being more ſuited to the latter, without danger of competition from the former, the richer ſtockholders naturally reſort to the colony trade, of which they poſſeſs a kind of monopoly.

Of this power which large capitals poſſeſs of engroſſing a trade, it is almoſt ſuperfluous to give

give inſtances. The hiſtory of moſt mercantile companies abound in ſuch examples. In general, they have managed their affairs ſo badly, that private capitals have overcome them; but, in thoſe inſtances in which a contrary ſyſtem was purſued, the private traders have yielded. Thus, the Hudſon's Bay Company, without any monopoly, has prevented any private merchants from interfering. And while the South Sea Company (the greateſt in extent of capital that ever was formed in any country)* purſued the whale fiſhery, although it was a loſing concern, after all, in conſequence of extreme bad management, yet, in the mean time, they prevented any ſhare of the fiſhery from falling to other adventurers. In the nearer markets, no ſuch monopoly could ever have ſubſiſted for any length of time: the Company would have been forced from them, by the better management of private traders, in as many days, as they retained their monopoly for years in America.

There appear to be only two ways in which the colony trade can be opened to ſmall capitals, in thoſe few caſes in which the circumſtances of their poſſeſſors, preſent no obſtacle to ſuch an employment of ſtock.

(1.) They may be given to ſome large trader, in loan, at the market rate of intereſt; and employed

* Its capital amounted to above thirty-three millions Sterling.

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ployed by him, in colonial ſpeculations, at his own riſk. When ſuch ſpeculations hold out ſtrong temptations to merchants, it is probable that they will always endeavour, in this manner, to trade beyond their capital; and, to a certain extent, they will no doubt ſucceed. But the claſs of people from whom they obtain loans, are not of a mercantile deſcription; otherwiſe, they would never trade by deputy, and loſe money. They are chiefly perſons who poſſeſs a little ſtock for which they have no immediate uſe, and who prefer the greater intereſt given by traders, to the better ſecurity afforded by the government, or by landholders. That part of the national capital which is thus drawn to colonial ſpeculations, can never bear any conſiderable proportion to the whole, and would never be veſted directly in any other trade by its proprietors. The nature of ſuch proprietors is not ſpeculative and venturous: they riſk more by giving to the trader, than by lending to the government or landholder, although, perhaps, not ſo much as by directly engaging in trade. Only a few of them, then, will give their money to the merchant; and thoſe few will have little to lend: becauſe, perſons poſſeſſed of conſiderable capitals, naturally inveſt them in land, or engage in trade themſelves.

The

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The little, however, it may be ſaid, which is thus drawn into the colony trade, is taken from a ſtock which would either go to cultivate the land, or to raiſe the rents and price of land. But the ſame objection may be urged againſt all foreign trade. Men are tempted, by higher profits, to prefer the riſks of commercial to the certainty of agricultural purſuits; and every new market that is opened, however near, would have preciſely the ſame effect of raiſing the price paid by the landholder for money, and keeping down the rent and the cultivation of the land. The diſtance of the colonies, indeed, has the effect only of carrying away the largeſt of the capitals, which would otherwiſe be employed directly in trade. The opening of a nearer commerce, would draw thither many of the ſmaller capitals, at preſent employed in cultivation. Upon the whole, then, the diſtance of the colonial market more than compenſates the loſs of that ſmall quantity of the national ſtock, which its high profits carry off from the cultivation of land; in as much as other capitals are thereby prevented from being veſted in the trade, by that more numerous body of ſmall proprietors, who cannot afford to live upon the common intereſt of their ſtock, and to allow others to gain by its profitable employment.

If, indeed, the colonial trade were ſuddenly annihilated, and no other channel opened for the

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the national ſtock, the rate of profits and intereſt would, no doubt, fall. All thoſe ſmall capitals employed in the trade by loan to the merchants, would ſeek a new channel; and a great part of it would probably go to the cultivation of the land. But a far more ſerious evil would, at the ſame time, counterbalance this advantage: the market for the produce of land would be contracted, and thoſe equivalents deſtroyed, which had formerly excited agricultural, as well as commercial and manufacturing labour.

It is, indeed, idle to propoſe any ſuch ſacrifice of the colonial trade, for the purpoſe of turning to the improvement of land the very ſmall part of the national ſtock which is drawn from the ſervice of the landholder, to that of the merchant, in the form of loans; whilſt, in every country of Europe, various pernicious inſtitutions are ſuffered to exiſt, which have the moſt direct tendency to check agricultural improvement, by impoſing reſtrictions upon the commerce of land. When the abolition of entails, and the modification of the law of primogeniture, ſhall have reduced the exorbitant price of land, and raiſed the profits of ſtock employed in its purchaſe to a level with the profits of manufacturing capital, much leſs of the capital, now employed in trade, will be driven or drawn from the purpoſes

poſes of cultivation. The landlord will be able to pay a higher premium for money; and a number even of thoſe ſmaller capitals, which, in the preſent ſtate of things, are indirectly attracted to the colony trade, and other branches of the more diſtant foreign commerce, in the form of loans, will, from the circumſtances and habits of their proprietors, be allured to the ſervice of the cultivator, by the greater punctuality of his payments, and the higher ſecurity which he can afford for the principal. While the manners, the conſtitutions, and the laws of ſtates, obſtruct, in ſo many ways, the employment of the great, as well as of the ſmall capitals, in agriculture, it is ſurely abſurd to go further in ſearch of the cauſes of its neglect or ſlow progreſs. And to begin by condemning thoſe branches of commerce which draw a moſt trifling part of the ſtock from the improvement of land, while the great and radical obſtacles to its commerce and ſubdiviſion remain, would be as prepoſterous, as if a ſurgeon were to exhauſt his ſkill, and waſte his time, upon a blotch in the finger of his patient, while a ſtoppage in the heart or the brain was deranging the whole œconomy of the ſyſtem.

(2.) The only other way in which ſmall capitals can be drawn into the colonial trade, is, by the formation

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formation of joint-ſtock companies. Where theſe aſſociations have been endowed with excluſive privileges, they have rather injured the colony, than the mother country; and where they are left open, their tendency is only to draw into the diſtant trade the ſmall capitals of thoſe who would not otherwiſe trade themſelves. In this reſpect, they have nearly the ſame effect with the demands of ſpeculative merchants. For although the holder of ſhares in the company's ſtock receives a dividend proportioned to the profits of the trade, and runs the riſk in his own perſon; yet the labour of employing his capital and drawing his gains, being delegated, he ſacrifices, for his eaſe, his proportion of the ſalaries paid to the company's active ſervants. He, in fact, then, does not directly engage in trade; and ſeldom can receive more profit, than if he lent his money to a merchant. He muſt, therefore, be a perſon not inclined to trouble himſelf with turning his capital to the greateſt advantage, and one who can afford to pay for an eaſy annuity.

Joint-ſtock companies are, of all trading ſchemes, the moſt unprofitable; they are quite unfit for the management of any commerce that requires active exertion, minute attention to trifling ſavings and ſmall profits, and full knowledge of a complicated detail.

Accordingly,

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Accordingly, in all ſpeculations of diſtant commerce, they have uniformly failed, unleſs when confined to ſmall numbers, and a narrow capital. The ſhares of their ſtock generally ſell below par, unleſs when ſome other purpoſe than profit is the object of the purchaſer. With all the advantages of vaſt capital, they are almoſt always ſooner or later defeated, or driven from the market, by the ingenuity, induſtry, ſuperior knowledge, and more rigid œconomy of private traders. A monopoly alone can ſave them from ruin; and the neceſſities of modern governments, or their connexion with the proprietors, or their falſe views of the ſimpleſt ſubject in commercial philoſophy, have generally ſeconded thoſe ſelfiſh and hurtful deſigns. Where no ſuch excluſive privileges have been conſtituted in their favour, they have held out no temptations to capitaliſts, after a very ſhort trial of their mercantile powers. The depreciation of their ſtock, and, in ſome caſes, their total ruin, has prevented many of that narrow claſs of men from being tempted by their offers, who poſſeſs ſmall capitals, and are not under the neceſſity of employing them in the moſt profitable way. Beſides, in all countries where ſuch companies have ever exiſted, the debts of the State have preſented a more agreeable and ſecure mode of inveſtment

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ment to this deſcription of ſtock: a mode, by which the annuity may be drawn with ſafety and eaſe, and the chance of extraordinary profit, by fluctuations, may be obtained. *

Upon the whole, we may conclude, that this part of the national ſtock, at all events very confined, is not likely to be drawn, in any great degree, into the colonial trade, either by the demands of mercantile adventurers, or the temptations of free trading companies. The trifling effects of the former are moſt likely to take place, when the colonial ſyſtem has attained a high degree of proſperity: thoſe of the latter, ſtill leſs important, have moſt commonly been produced during the firſt ſtages of colonial policy, and have been uniformly increaſed by the mercantile views of the European powers in their domeſtic government.

The circumſtances in the more diſtant branches of trade, which render a large capital neceſſary for carrying them on with the ordinary profits, might admit of adventures, by limited and private ſocieties of partners, each poſſeſſing a ſmall ſtock, and depending for ſubſiſtence on his attentive and induſtrious employment of it. Copartneries of this kind might, indeed, carry on the colonial, and other diſtant trades, with almoſt every advantage which common

* Note M.

mon mercantile companies poſſeſs. But the circumſtances of their own ſituation prevents ſuch capitaliſts from entering at all into a trade of ſlow returns, as we have formerly explained. Thoſe circumſtances effectually confine them to the other branches of commerce, although an aſſociation might enable them to overcome the obſtacles preſented by the circumſtances of the diſtant trade itſelf. Were their capitals ſomewhat larger, though inſufficient to allow of ſeparate adventures, the union of ſtocks, in ſpite of certain ſerious diſadvantages that attend it, might enable them to ſhare the large profits of a ſlowly returning capital. It is this which, in fact, unites ſo many merchants in all the branches of trade, and moſt in thoſe which require the greateſt ſtocks; never in agriculture; ſeldom in the retail trade, where the wages of the labour bear ſo great a proportion to the profits of the ſtock in every return of capital; much more frequently in manufactures, and in wholeſale trade. But it does not appear that the proportion is accurately carried on. The union of ſtocks ſeems to be always as frequent, in thoſe branches of foreign trade where ſmall capitals are ſufficient, as in thoſe which are within the reach of great capitals alone; with this difference, that, in the former caſe, the ſmaller ſtocks are united to form a moderately

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derately large capital; while, in the latter, the large ſtocks are combined in order to form an extenſive one. The union of the ſmaller ſtocks ſeems rather intended to oppoſe thoſe large ſtocks which are embarked in the ſame line, than to force admiſſion into the channels more peculiarly appropriated by the larger capitals. The conſequence is, that we find no proportion between the average extent of the capitals employed in the ſmaller branches of the retail trade, where copartneries are ſeldom found; and the average extent of capital in the wholeſale trade, the more important branches of the retail trade, and the different foreign trades. The capitals in all theſe, though extremely various, are much more nearly upon a level than thoſe in any one of them when compared with the ſtocks uſually employed in the ſmaller retail trade. Copartneries are found in every branch of the one claſs; ſeldom or never in any part of the other. The aſſociation of partners, and union of ſtocks, is ſeldom employed to remove the obſtacles in the way of the colony trade, which are preſented by the circumſtances of the trade itſelf, and by the circumſtances in the ſituation of the ſmall capitaliſts themſelves.

There appears, then, to be a diviſion of capital, founded in the nature of things, which, partly

ly from the circumſtances of the ſtockholders, partly from the nature of the colonial traffic, marks out one claſs of capitals as adapted to this employment, and prevents the other claſs from entering into it.

When the ſtock of a nation is diſtributed in an unequal manner, as that of every wealthy community muſt be, this difference of employment muſt always take place. The loſs of colonies to a ſtate in thoſe circumſtances, would only turn into a diſtant foreign trade that claſs of capitals which naturally ſeeks great profits, but ſlow returns; and the acquiſition of colonies would only draw the ſame ſet of capitals from thoſe diſtant foreign trades.

We ſee, then, that this natural tendency of great capitals towards thoſe quarters whence great profits may be expected, and of ſmall capitals towards thoſe parts where quick returns are to be obtained, diſtributes the ſtock of the nation in a certain way, independent of colonial poſſeſſions; and, unleſs cramped by the reſtrictive interference of governments, it muſt continue to do ſo, as long as all the earth is not equally fertile, peopled, and cultivated, and all the inhabitants equally rich and induſtrious: nay, the ſame diſtribution muſt take place, ſo long as all ſoils do not yield the ſame plants, all rivers and ſeas the ſame fiſhes, and all mines the ſame metals—ſo long

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as men are endued with different taſtes, and live under different climates. What may happen in a ſtate of univerſal aſſimilation, I do not now ſtop to inquire. It may be preſumed, that when a change of this ſort ſhall take place, the millennium cannot be far diſtant. And I take the liberty of leaving the further proſecution of this inquiry to thoſe ingenious, but ſpeculative men, who have amuſed themſelves with inveſtigating that ſublime ſubject.

8. It is not the commerce only of the colonies, but their agriculture alſo, that attracts the capital of the mother country, and diverts part of the national ſtock from the improvement and cultivation of the ſoil in the contiguous provinces, and from the trade of the home market, and of the nearer foreign markets, to the cultivation and improvement of the land in the diſtant ſettlements. Many of the remarks which we have made upon the effects produced by capital diſtributed in the colony trade, apply alſo to the conſequences reſulting from this ſimilar employment of capital, in the agriculture of the colonies. Admitting that the ſtaple ſo diſtributed is directly withdrawn from the agriculture of the mother country, it is not withdrawn from the empire: it continues to ſupport the productive part of the community; and, beſides improving an integral though remote part of the ſtate, it directly employs and maintains

maintains part of the home population tranſplanted thither: it enriches the non-reſident members of the colonies: it circulates its gains with thoſe who return to the mother country. The produce, too, which ariſes from this employment of capital, gives direct employment to the farmers and peaſantry of the mother country: they muſt labour to ſupport the ſailors who circulate it; the merchants who deal in it; the manufacturers who work it up, and who create equivalents wherewith to purchaſe it; and, in ſome caſes, too, the colonial labourers who are employed in raiſing it. The capital veſted in the colonial agriculture, encourages the agriculture of the mother country, as much as the capital employed in domeſtic manufactures and trade does; as much as the capitals employed in different branches of domeſtic agriculture (ſtock-farming, and corn-farming, for example) encourage the operations of each other.

It is not, however, from the agriculture, ſo much as from the manufactures and commerce of a country, that colonial ſpeculations withdraw part of the national ſtock. As the agriculture of the colonies, in general, reſembles the mercantile and ſpeculative occupations of induſtry and capital; and as the extent of capital required for ſuch concerns, renders them inacceſſible to ſmall ſtocks; we may be aſſured, that the men who engage in them are thoſe

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who would otherwiſe have been merchants and great manufacturers; and that the capitals which they employ in the planting trade, are thoſe which would naturally have ſought the greater branches of foreign commerce, the more diſtant operations of traffic, the trades of great profits and ſlow returns.

The agricultural colonies of the American continent, have never drawn to their cultivation any thing but part of the induſtry of the mother country. North American ſpeculations are ſcarcely known among monied men. I believe, Sir William Pulteney is one of the very few Europeans who poſſeſs large tracts of American property; and large tracts alone can abſorb much capital.* Thoſe who ſettled in the continental parts, are men who had no capital, or a very ſmall capital at home. They got good land for little or nothing; and turned it to account by their labour, and that of their families. Nor was the induſtry of the coloniſts withdrawn from a profitable employment in the mother

* See the very intereſting account of this great concern, and of Captain Williamſon's management, in the Duke de Rochefoucault Liancourt's Travels in North America, vol. i. By referring to this work, my readers will perceive the difficulties attending ſuch agricultural ſpeculations. If ſuch capitaliſts as Sir William Pulteney are ſeldom to be found, ſtill more rarely do we meet with ſtewards like Captain Williamſon.

mother country. The motives of emigration ſufficiently evinced, that there was no want of population at home; ſince almoſt all thoſe who were driven to ſeek a livelihood in the colonies, excepting the perſons whom political or religious convulſions had forced thither, were men who could not gain their bread by labouring the land of their native country; or ſuch as were obliged to quit it from deſperate fortunes; and whoſe loſs could not be reckoned a great calamity. If this overflowing, or rotten part of the ſtate's population, had not found a vent in the diſtant parts of the empire, they would have emigrated to the colonies of ſome foreign ſtate, or to the foreign country itſelf; and would thus have transferred to an enemy, or a rival, the benefits of their induſtry and force.

It is to the cultivation and improvement of the iſlands, and of thoſe continental ſettlements which reſemble the iſlands in their produce and the ſtructure of their ſociety, that the capital withdrawn from the manufactures and commerce of the mother country has been attracted; and chiefly from the more diſtant branches of commerce, the trade, for example, of the colonies themſelves. This employment of ſtock, indeed, may properly be conſidered as a branch of the colony trade, to which it is ſubſervient, and from which it derives its exiſtence. The capital thus withdrawn, and inveſted in colonial ſpeculation, is chiefly a

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part which cannot find profitable employment at home. When a nation has ſo greatly increaſed in wealth and induſtry, that its trading profits are extremely ſmall, its capital will ſeek every ſort of outlet, in order to purſue more profitable employments. It will firſt go to the foreign trades of ſlow returns; then to the loans required by the colonies; then to the immediate cultivation of the colonies, by the emigration of its proprietors: and, if the ſtate poſſeſſes no ſuch colonies, this capital will overflow into foreign colonies, by loan or emigration; into foreign countries, by emigration; into the ſervice of foreign traders, by inſurance or loan; and into that of foreign governments, by loan upon bond or pledge. A country in this ſituation can evidently receive no benefit from wanting colonial eſtabliſhments; on the contrary, its ſtock will be transferred to enrich foreign nations: and, ſurely, the ſecurity of a capital employed in colonial ſpeculation, is infinitely greater than that of a capital lent to the merchants or princes of foreign ſtates. We ſhall afterwards have an opportunity of viewing the effects of an overflowing capital, when we come to conſider the colonial policy of Holland, a country exactly in the ſituation which is moſt favourable to colonial ſpeculations, or diſtant foreign commerce. If that country had, like Venice, poſſeſſed no colonies, its wealth would not have been confined

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to the home market, or agriculture of the ſtate: it would have ſought an iſſue, like the wealth of Venice, partly in foreign loans, and partly by carrying away its proprietors to foreign countries; or rather we ought to ſay, that more of it would have gone in this way, than actually has: for, notwithſtanding the extent of colonial adventures among the Dutch, no people in the world ever lent ſo much money to foreign colonies, foreign ſtates, and foreign governments, as the Dutch; or carried on ſo great a trade of foreign brokerage and inſurance.

The wealth of Great Britain appears, from ſeveral ſymptoms, to be arriving at the ſame ſtate of overgrown magnificence; and, of courſe, to require more and more the outlet of new colonies. Not to mention the great portion of capital which is daily poured into our own ſettlements, let us only recollect the eagerneſs of traders and capitaliſts, during the late war, to engage in ſpeculations, of which the ſcene was laid in diſputed ground, ſurrounded by rebels, or enemies, or both; and held by the precarious tenure of the ſword. The ſpeculations carried on in St Domingo, during the moſt turbulent periods of negro warfare and French invaſion, are of themſelves a ſufficient proof of this poſition. But the immenſe capital poured into the Dutch ſettlements, during the ſhort period of the late war that they remained in our power, is ſtill more ſtrongly

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demonſtrative of the ſame fact. The author of the 'Criſis' eſtimates this at eighteen millions Sterling *; and I have heard it rated almoſt as high by other perſons of good information. Even if we ſhould admit this account to be greatly exaggerated, it muſt have been an enormous ſum indeed that could admit of ſuch exaggerations from well informed people.

It appears, then, that the want of colonies would only turn the overflowing capitals, or the larger ſtocks of a nation, into a foreign commerce of a different kind; into the more diſtant branches of foreign commerce; into the ſervice of foreign merchants, farmers, or princes; or the direct cultivation of foreign ſtates, or their colonies.

The colonial monopoly of modern times, may prevent this part of the national ſtock from finding employment in direct commerce with foreign colonies; but no reſtrictions have ever yet been invented upon loans to foreign merchants or coloniſts. In almoſt all colonies, perfect liberty of reſidence and purchaſe is given to capitaliſts from every nation: and no nation but China prevents foreigners from reſiding, and farming, and trading, within the bounds of its contiguous provinces. Even if the policy of ſtates poſſeſſing colonies were to prevent the direct transference of foreign capitals

* Criſis of the Sugar Colonies in 1802, Letter IV.

pitals to the cultivation of thoſe colonies, as they have been excluded from the colonial trade, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that any reſtraint would ever be impoſed upon transference by way of loan. At any rate, the market of land, money, and trade, in the foreign mother countries, would be quite open to thoſe wealthy capitaliſts, of whatever nation they might be; and the exigencies of the different governments would always furniſh an opening of the ſame kind. The utmoſt, then, that the colonial monopoly could ever effect, would be, the confining the overflowing capital of the nations deſtitute of colonies, to the European market of land, money, and trade; and the want of colonies would then, inſtead of forcing a country to enrich and aggrandize the colonies of her neighbours, compel her to enrich and aggrandize, more directly, the contiguous provinces of the neighbouring ſtates. The capital, therefore, which has been withdrawn from the mother country to the inſular colonies of the different European ſtates, like the induſtry which has been withdrawn to their continental colonies, was, in general, the ſuperabundant part, deſtined by its nature for the operations of the diſtant commerce; and would have found an outlet, either in foreign countries, or their colonies, by loan or otherwiſe, if the ſtates to which it

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it naturally belonged had not poſſeſſed colonies of their own.

There is, indeed, a ſtriking analogy between the emigration of men, and the transference or ſhifting of ſtock in modern ſtates. As an increaſing population is of the utmoſt advantage to every country, while the means of ſubſiſtence are always augmenting, and always keeping ſomewhat ahead of the increaſing numbers of inhabitants; ſo, the increaſe of ſtock in a country is of the utmoſt importance, both as a ſymptom and cauſe of proſperity and power, particularly if the employments for this ſtock are likewiſe increaſing, and a new opening is always to be found for the accumulated ſtock. When the population of a community has become very great in proportion to its means of ſubſiſtence, the price of labour is diminiſhed, and a large accumulation of inhabitants is always to be found floating, as it were, in the country; ready to ſhift from one profeſſion to another; often inclined, in their idleneſs and exigencies, to adopt vicious means of procuring relief; and always prepared to ſerve the ſtate in the army or navy. In like manner, when the wealth of a country has greatly increaſed, and the lines of employment for ſtock are not multiplied at the ſame time; the profits are diminiſhed, and a great part of the national capital

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capital floats about, ſhifting from one occupation to another, in order to obtain higher profits. A ſort of revulſion often takes place. Inſtead of each channel retaining a ſeparate portion of capital conſtantly in it, all the channels overflow; and ſome capital comes from each, into a ſhifting maſs ready for any ſpeculation of trade or loans, or loans to the ſtate.

If the population is ſtill farther increaſed, men find their comforts abridged, and the procuring of ſubſiſtence rendered more difficult. Diſcontent, love of change, high prices, low wages, induce them to emigrate, long before actual want has compelled them to abandon their home. So, when the national ſtock is farther augmented, traders find their profits more and more diminiſhed, and the means of employing the ſtock to any advantage rendered daily more difficult. Long before they have ceaſed to make any profit, and begun to encroach on their capitals, they endeavour to continue or increaſe their former profits by foreign ſpeculations.

As men are naturally averſe to breaking off all connexion with the place of their birth, they firſt endeavour to engage in the foreign ſervice of their own country, in war or trade. When this avenue, too, is blocked up, they prefer the colonies of their own nation. After thoſe, the

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the preference is uſually given to foreign colonies, from their ſimilarity to their own ſettlements, and their want of inhabitants. Laſt of all, they think of removing to the neighbouring foreign countries. Of all colonies, thoſe are preferred which afford the chance of ſoon returning enriched. The idea of complete ſeparation, by emigrating to the continental colonies of North America, is never admitted, unleſs when no cheap opening can be found in the iſlands: nor do men emigrate to foreign countries of Europe, without the idea of again ſettling at home. In this manner it is, that the emigration to the neighbouring ſtates is extremely trifling, compared with the emigration to the colonies.

The diſtribution of an overflowing capital follows nearly the ſame rules. Men do not wiſh to have their ſtock long out of ſight; and, if they poſſibly can obtain any employment which returns it to them now and then, they prefer this to one which never returns more than the profits or intereſt. Thus, they firſt endeavour to place their capitals in the moſt diſtant branches of foreign commerce. When theſe channels, too, are full, they adventure it in loans to the coloniſts of their own nation. Then they follow it, and become planters themſelves. After that, the preference is given to the cultivators

tivators of foreign colonies; becauſe, there, the profits are likely to be higher than in the nearer money market. Laſt of all, they turn it into loans to foreign merchants, governments, or farmers, in the near countries; and ſometimes follow it thither alſo, in order to farm, or manufacture, or trade, in countries leſs abounding in wealth than their own. The portion of capital poured into the foreign ſtates of Europe is always very trifling, in compariſon of that which the colonies receive. The colonies where the ſpirit of mercantile ſpeculation prevails, are always preferred to thoſe in which agriculture is the ſtaple occupation. But much more of the population of Europe has been poured into the continental colonies, than of the national capital; becauſe the prevalence of negro ſlavery in the iſlands has proportioned the labouring population to the demand ariſing from the capital employed; becauſe the greater part of the work required is ill adapted to the conſtitution of men coming from a temperate climate; becauſe the demand is chiefly for ſtock in thoſe colonies; and becauſe the continental colonies furniſh a demand for labour adapted to all conſtitutions, and open a field for men who have no ſtock at all.

If, then, the colonies offer no outlet to the abundant population of a country, and to its over-

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overflowing ſtock, both the one and the other will naturally ſeek employment in foreign countries or foreign colonies which are underſtocked in hands and in capital. The ſurrender of colonial poſſeſſions, either to the coloniſts as an independent power, or to a foreign ſtate in order to keep the people and capital at home, would be much more abſurd than any reſtrictive laws that could be deviſed for the accompliſhment of thoſe purpoſes. Nay, were the colonies at once annihilated, an outlet would ſtill be found, leſs advantageous to the emigrants or ſtockholders, and more dangerous to the ſtate, in the territories of its hoſtile or rival neighbours.

The emigration of inhabitants, from the overflowing of their numbers, was the cauſe of many of the colonial ſchemes in ancient times. None of the ancient nations appear to have reached ſuch a pitch of wealth, as to give riſe to the emigration of an overflowing capital. Indeed, if we except Tyre and Carthage, none of them ſeem to have had ſufficient ſtock to engage in the more diſtant trades. The political conſtitutions of the ancient republics certainly concurred with their want of commerce, to prevent the growth of thoſe larger capitals which naturally ſeek for employment in the more diſtant branches of foreign commerce.

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9. From the peculiar nature of almoſt all the colonial exported produce, the diſtance of thoſe parts of the world, where almoſt all the European colonies are ſituated, is of much leſs diſadvantage, even to the ſeparate commercial intereſts of the mother country, than may at firſt ſight appear. Thoſe exports conſiſt, chiefly, of the rude produce of annual crops, as grain, cotton, ſpices, coffee; or of articles in the very firſt ſtages of manufacture, as ſugar, chocolate, and cochineal. The quantity of ſuch articles, as indigo, rum, liqueurs, which require greater preparation, is very ſmall, and forms a very inconſiderable proportion of the whole exports. In general, therefore, the Weſt Indian commodities are the annual produce of the crops, either in the ſtate in which they are gathered, or in a ſtate of preparation analogous to the reſult of thoſe operations which, in Europe, are performed by the farmer himſelf.

While the demand for this ſort of produce continues to be great and increaſing, no conſiderable ſtock of it is ever likely to be accumulated in the countries of its production. It is in the countries of its manufacture, and in thoſe of its conſumption, that a quantity is always to be found on hand, collected for the purpoſe of being wrought up and retailed. The trade of planting, too, in the American colonies,

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colonies, and the different occupations of agriculture, are so tempting to people of all ranks, that few men engage in the pursuits of commerce. The mercantile inhabitants of the towns, are merely the attornies, clerks, or agents of the inhabitants of the country; and do not, like the merchants in England, France, or Portugal, collect a stock of commodities for sale or exportation. Excepting in the Dutch and Danish islands, which, from their barrenness and free trade, have become a sort of entrepôt to the other colonies, the immediate order of men between the producer and consumer, the class of merchants exporters, is wanting. The articles must be purchased at first hand; and an accumulated stock is as little to be expected, as a stock of corn would be, in Europe, if no such thing as the corn trade had ever existed. This situation of things is not accidental, or peculiar to America: it is derived essentially from the circumstances of all newly established communities, understocked in hands, and abounding in fertile territory.

Now, if the distance of such settlements were no greater from their mother countries, or from their customers, than that of the different states of Europe from each other, the immense capital engaged in circulating their commodities could only find employment at one season

ſeaſon of the year. If the Weſt Indies, for example, were no farther from the weſt of Europe, than England or France are from the countries round the Baltic and Mediterranean ſeas, the Engliſh and French traders could only obtain cargoes at one ſeaſon—namely, after crop time; and could make no more than two ſhort Weſt Indian voyayes in the year.

The exported produce of many countries of Europe, indeed, is of annual growth; but it is always wrought up conſiderably in the country of its production, or collected from a conſiderable diſtance inland, by merchants and dealers on commiſſion, who always accumulate a ſtock ſufficient to meet any fluctuation in the demand, either of the home manufactures and retail market, or of the foreign market. The produce of the Baltic countries is partly annual, as flax and grain; partly ſuch as may be had at all times—minerals, timber, and tallow. The articles of the latter claſs are exported in a ſtate of manufacture, though not much wrought up. The flax and grain are exported almoſt in the ſtate in which they are reaped. But all the produce, whether annual or perennial (except grain), is collected in the country of its production, by the merchants of Chriſtiania, Memel, Revel, Riga, St Peterſburg,

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Gottenburg, &c. Hence, the Baltic trader can at any time ſend out his veſſels, and reckon, with certainty, on their eaſily getting a cargo. His ſtock may always be employed in the ſame way, unleſs during a few weeks of Winter, when he may export Baltic produce to the countries round the Mediterranean; and import from thence ſuch articles as ſalt, wines, &c. which are in great demand in the Baltic.

The trade to the Mediterranean is in the ſame predicament. The articles of annual produce to be found there, are either much manufactured, and perhaps capable of being improved merely by keeping, as wines—or at any rate collected by traders reſiding on the ſpots moſt convenient for ſhipping to touch at. The trade with Germany is chiefly carried on for the finer manufactures, of which a ſufficient quantity may always be had in the hands either of the manufacturer or the wholeſale merchant.

But if the American colonies were ſituated where thoſe countries are, or at a moderate diſtance to the weſtward in the Atlantic, the returns of the trade would, indeed, be as quick as thoſe of the European commerce, in ſo far as length of voyage influences the rapidity of the returns. But the capital engaged in the trade muſt conſtantly ſeek a new

new employment during the period of the year when the planters are occupied with preparing their land, or ſowing and weeding their crops. For three fourths of the year it could find no employment in the Weſt Indian trade: it muſt be ſhifted into ſome other channel, and then ſhifted back again at crop time.

This change is, in the firſt inſtance, a great real loſs to the trade. It is ſeldom that the ſame veſſels, implements, apparatus of all kinds, and eſtabliſhment of clerks, agents, and warehouſes, which are required by one extenſive trade, are adapted to others alſo. Beſides, what is of more conſequence, every change of capital is a delay to the poſſeſſor; and produces the anxiety attendant upon new and expenſive ſchemes. It requires a different ſort of knowledge; it is a new buſineſs to learn. To the country, the trade of ſpeculators or general merchants is ſeldom very profitable; and would always be extremely hurtful, if it were not confined to a very ſmall part of the mercantile order. The interloping ſpeculations of ſuch adventurers in the different branches of trade, tend very much to reduce the rate of profits; becauſe thoſe adventurers can ſcarcely ever be influenced by the ſame engroſſing and monopolizing views which the regular traders in each line ſeldom fail to acquire; and

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cannot engage in thoſe combinations which the latter have frequently an opportunity, as they have always the wiſh, of attempting with ſucceſs. But a great body of the community employing an immenſe capital in ſuch deſultory and adventurous ſpeculations, and becoming, in fact, general merchants, could anſwer no good end; would certainly diminiſh the number of careful traders; and, by impairing the commercial ſkill of the nation, would undoubtedly diminiſh its annual revenue. It is as much for the intereſt of every country, that its capital ſhould be diſtributed in the different branches of trade by men attached each to his own branch, as it is for the country's intereſt that the labour ſhould be ſubdivided among the members of different crafts. The poſſeſſion of a few ſpeculators in trade, and a few mechanics who confine themſelves to no particular handicraft, but ſtudy the improvement of all, is certainly an advantage to the community. They form a claſs by themſelves, and occupy, in ſome ſort, a ſeparate department, that of diſcovery and invention. They are the ſcouts and partizans of the army, who may be of excellent uſe in finding out roads and paſſes, or engaging in deſperate ſervice; but they are only ſubſervient to the great maſs of military force behind, and muſt leave the day to be carried by the

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the artillery and the phalanx, by the compact body of horſe or of infantry, ſupporting each other, and advancing more ſlowly to the charge.

Thus, the neighbourhood of colonies, by dividing the efforts of traders, and obſtructing the ſeparation of employments, would prevent the whole capital of the country from obtaining its moſt advantageous channel; as any thing that prevents the labour of a community from being accurately divided, diminiſhes its productive powers.

That the colonies, ſo long as the preſent taſtes and faſhions continue in Europe, and the preſent qualities remain in the American ſoil, would attract a vaſt capital to their agriculture and commerce, as well if near as when remote, there can be no doubt; unleſs the cheapneſs of the commodities would diminiſh their conſumption, or the nearneſs of the market would prevent ſmaller capitals from embarking in its trade. If we deſire an inſtance of the trade of ſpeculation, or that of the general merchant, being promoted by the demand for the commodities of which the production is confined to one time of the year, we may look to that branch of the foreign trade which conſiſts in importing grain for home conſumption. It never happens that any man confines himſelf to

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this branch alone: it is therefore found in the hands of the general merchant. Some of the great corn markets, indeed, are ſituated in places where other commodities may be had at all times, and the corn trade of importation may be more eaſily united with the home corn trade, than it could be with other and different ſorts of traffic. But neither of thoſe circumſtances would attend the Weſt India trade, in the caſe which we are ſuppoſing: The commodities would be produced in a country where others could not at all times be found; and the European merchants trading thither, could never find the ſame articles in any proportion at home. They would therefore become, in a great meaſure, ſpeculative or general merchants.

Having ſketched, in general, the commercial advantages which a ſtate derives from its colonies, and explained the neceſſary conſequences, in a mercantile point of view, which follow from ſuch an intercourſe as would naturally ariſe between the different parts of the empire, if things were left to themſelves; we ſhall now conſider thoſe modifications which the foregoing propoſitions may appear to receive from the colonial monopoly eſtabliſhed by the policy of modern Europe. We ſhall begin by examining the arguments of Dr SMITH, by far the moſt

moſt formidable that have been urged againſt this branch of national policy, and often repeated by men who are very unfit to appreciate their force, or undertake their defence. SECT. II.

PART II.

OF THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A STATE AND ITS COLONIES, AS MODIFIED BY THE POLICY OF MODERN EUROPE.

Dr Smith's * arguments are apparently confined to the colonial monopoly; they are ſtated for the caſe of Great Britain, and may be compriſed in the three following propoſitions.

I. The monopoly of the colony trade has partly drawn, by the attraction of ſuperior profit, and partly driven, by the riſe of the average rate of Britiſh profit, and the increaſed competition of foreign capitals in the nearer markets, a greater portion of Britiſh capital into the colonial commerce, than would otherwiſe have gone to it. Britain has thus been ſubjected both to an abſolute and to a relative diſadvantage, in

* See Wealth of Nations, Book iv. chap. 7. part 3.

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thoſe markets in which ſhe had not a monopoly.

II. The trade to which ſo much capital has thus been driven and drawn, is leſs advantageous than that which it has quitted; in as much as part of it has exchanged a foreign trade of conſumption with a neighbouring, for one with a more diſtant country; in as much as another part of it has exchanged a direct, for a round-about foreign trade of conſumption; and in as much as a third portion has exchanged all foreign trade of conſumption, for a carrying trade.

III. The monopoly of the colony trade has rendered the whole commerce of Britain leſs ſecure, by directing it into one great channel, and withdrawing it from a variety of ſmaller channels in which it would have otherwiſe been diſtributed.

Theſe propoſitions appear to exhauſt all that has ever been urged upon the ſubject, and all that it is neceſſary to conſider with regard to the general policy of the reſtrictive ſyſtem. They apply, for the moſt part, to all the nations poſſeſſing colonies in America. But we ſhall, at preſent, attend more particularly to the application which has been made of them to the Britiſh colonies, that we may not too much anticipate

ticipate the ſubject of the next Section; and may, at the ſame time, examine them in their relation to thoſe ſpecific inſtances, by the conſideration of which, they appear to have been ſuggeſted. I ſhall, accordingly, in this manner, conſider the propoſitions in their order. SECT. II.

I. Although there can be no doubt that the monopoly eſtabliſhed by the Navigation act, and by the ſyſtem of reſtrictive laws, of which that celebrated ſtatute was the foundation, had the effect of preventing as great a capital from being employed in the colonial trade as would otherwiſe have been devoted to it; yet Dr SMITH appears greatly to overrate the degree in which this effect was produced. At the epoch of the law in queſtion, other nations, as well as Great Britain, poſſeſſed valuable and extenſive colonies in America, and in the Weſt Indies. Their common policy was, to exclude, as much as poſſible, from their colony trade, every foreign competitor; and thus to conſtitute monopolies in favour of their own ſubjects. If thoſe monopolies had been equally favourable to the whole ſubjects of the nations reſpectively, it is impoſſible that any conſiderable portion of their capital would ever have been directed to the trade of thoſe colonies, the Britiſh, for example, which ſhould have remained unſhackled by any reſtrictions;

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reſtrictions; and the monopoly eſtabliſhed by England, would have had very little effect in excluding the competition of foreigners.

But moſt of the European powers who poſſeſſed the American colonies, carried the ſyſtem further, and confined the benefits of the trade to a particular part of their ſubjects. Thus, the Spaniards and Portugueſe allowed no veſſels to ſail for America, but from certain ports of the Peninſula. The Dutch and Danes erected excluſive Weſt India companies; and the French occaſionally inſtituted ſuch companies alſo. Such of the Spaniards and Portugueſe as wiſhed to embark in the American trade, could remove to Seville or Cadiz, which were, at different times, privileged cities, and became accordingly the richeſt and moſt ſplendid parts of the Spaniſh dominions. The Navigation act, it is probable, did not turn away 1000l. Sterling of Spaniſh or Portugueſe capital from the traffic of the Britiſh colonies. The Dutch company found its advantage in laying the trade open, upon payment of a ſmall compromiſe; and the French companies were not of conſtant duration. Thoſe two nations, however, were to a certain degree excluded from the Britiſh colonies; and a part of their capital, formerly employed in that trade, was turned to the improvement of their own colonies, or to the trade of the European market.

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It is evident, however, that, although the Engliſh act had never been paſſed, long before this time (a century ago at leaſt) both the French and Dutch ſettlements would have been ſufficiently extenſive to have occupied all that part of the national capital which could be ſpared to colonial commerce. This is more eſpecially true, if we confine our compariſon to thoſe colonies which the three ſtates at preſent poſſeſs. The French iſlands, in particular, are ſo much more extenſive than the Britiſh, and their ſoil is, for the moſt part, ſo much more favourable to the raiſing of Weſt India produce, that although no monopoly had been eſtabliſhed by either the French or Britiſh governments, the trade with them would have drawn off all the French capital employed in the traffic with the Britiſh poſſeſſions. It would beſides have drawn part of the Britiſh capital from its natural employment, and would have perhaps occaſioned a greater portion of the joint ſtock of the two nations to be veſted in Weſt Indian commerce and cultivation. We have frequently had occaſion to remark, that, under equal, or nearly equal advantages, men prefer trading to thoſe parts which are ſubject to the ſame government with themſelves, and peopled by the ſame race of inhabitants. If no reſtrictive policy had ever been adopted by the three great commercial nations of

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of Europe, it is probable, that, at this day, their colonial trade would have exiſted nearly in the ſame ſtate of diſtribution in which the monopolies have kept it; ſo long, at leaſt, as each of them poſſeſſed a ſufficiently extenſive colonial dominion to occupy all its ſurplus ſtock—to employ all thoſe larger capitals which naturally ſeek the more diſtant branches of commerce.

When the eſtabliſhment of the Britiſh monopoly excluded from the colonies a certain portion of foreign capital, and replaced it by an equal portion of Britiſh capital, drawn from the European markets, there was evidently an exchange of capitals: the European market gained as much of Dutch and French, as it loſt of Britiſh ſtock. It could certainly not gain more; becauſe the ſurplus of France and Holland could never be increaſed by the loſs of the American demand; and the removal of the Britiſh ſtock from the European market, could only create a demand for ſuch a quantity of French and Dutch produce, as would have been employed in the Britiſh colonies, had the monopoly never been eſtabliſhed. The colonial market was perhaps underſtocked more than formerly, for a ſhort time; but the European market remained as before; and the foreign colonies received ſo much of the foreign capital, as could not be veſted in the European trade with the profit

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profit which it had before yielded. If France and Holland had poſſeſſed no colonies, the rate of profit might, for a time, have fallen in the European trade, from more capital being poured into the market than the new monopoly drew from it: but the immediate effect of this would have been, to drive ſtill more capital from the European market, than the monopoly could of itſelf have drawn; and the level of profit would thus have been reſtored. The larger capitals would have been driven off immediately, by the diminution of profits; ſome of the ſmaller ones would have been forced back into the home market; and the new ſtocks, accumulated either in the home trade or the nearer foreign trade, would have been partly attracted to that of the colonies.

As the other countries which enter into competition with Britain, in the European markets, have moſt of them colonies under the ſame ſyſtem of monopoly, it is evident, that the ordinary rate of profit, in all, muſt be affected by the colonial trade in the ſame manner: ſo that the Britiſh monopoly cannot be ſaid to have ſubjected her commerce to a relative diſadvantage in thoſe markets, either by keeping the ordinary rate of profits more above, or bringing it leſs below, that of other nations than it naturally would have been. The country, indeed, which poſſeſſes the moſt extenſive

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ſive and thriving colonies, will in the firſt inſtance enjoy the greateſt gains from an excluſive commerce with them; but ſhe will, in conſequence, accumulate more ſtock; and this will ſoon bring the rate of profit lower. If one country abandons the monopoly, unleſs her example is followed by the reſt, either her colonies will receive no capital from the other countries, or they will. In the former caſe, the abandonment of the monopoly has no effect; in the latter, it reduces both the rate of gain and the total gain of the country which gives up the monopoly. In conſequence of the diminiſhed gain, ſhe is rendered ſomewhat poorer; and in conſequence of the reduced rate of profit, ſhe may, in the firſt inſtance, be able to obtain a ſuperiority in the European market: but as her ſtock is not increaſing, ſome part of the capital employed in the colonies muſt be transferred to the European market, until the colonial profits and the ordinary rate of gain are raiſed; and, in like manner, ſome part of the foreign capitals will be transferred to the ſame market: ſo that things will ſpeedily regain their former level. It muſt always be remembered, that a high rate of profit, ariſing from a great demand, tends, by the accumulation of gain, to reduce itſelf; whereas, a low rate of profit, occaſioned

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ed by a diminution of demand, tends, much more ſlowly, to enrich a country; and deprives it, in the mean time, of a great ſhare of wealth.

In the diſcuſſion of this queſtion, we are at preſent only conſidering the intereſts of the mother country, with reſpect to the advancement of the colonies, and its effects in ultimately benefiting the mother country. There can be no doubt, that the monopoly is prejudicial to them, though much leſs ſo than has generally been imagined.

The reſtrictions impoſed upon the American ſettlements, by the policy of modern Europe, have conſiſted in the monopoly of trade, and the monopoly of labour. By the former, England, France, Spain, &c. have ſecured to their European ſubjects, the excluſive ſupply of their colonial markets, and the excluſive purchaſe of their colonial produce. By the latter, they have, in ſeveral inſtances, turned the induſtry of their colonial ſubjects away from thoſe occupations in which their European ſubjects are engaged. The one monopoly is eſtabliſhed againſt all foreigners; the other is conſtituted in favour of a certain claſs of the community itſelf to the prejudice of all the reſt. So long as the different nations who would employ their capitals in ſupplying the colonies of any one

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one ſtate, or in taking off their ſurplus produce, are themſelves poſſeſſed of colonies, the colonies of this ſtate ſuffer little from the reſtriction, for the ſame reaſon that the mother country itſelf is little affected by the regulations.

The prohibitions or diſcouragements given to certain kinds of colonial induſtry, have rather been ſuperfluous than burdenſome. They have generally been framed with a view to prevent that which was never likely to happen. Without any ſuch prohibitions or diſcouragements, the line of employment moſt profitable to the inhabitants of all new ſettlements, is one, in which the labour of the mother country, or of any old and populous ſtate, can never interfere with them—the raiſing of rude produce.

We have already ſeen, that, even articles of common uſe, are always imported, rather than manufactured, in new countries ſubject to no reſtrictive laws. The hat manufacture of New England was an object of jealouſy to the Britiſh Legiſlature. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that any laws could have prevented the coloniſts from making hats, even for the uſe of the neighbouring ſettlements, ſo long as it continued to be very convenient and profitable. But in a very ſhort time, the manufacture diſappeared, even in ſo far as it was permitted: and now, without any

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any laws whatever, Great Britain ſupplies the United States with this article, to a much greater extent than ever ſhe did during the exiſtence of the colonial government.

A monopoly of a different complexion ſtill ſubſiſts in the Britiſh Weſt Indies, in conſequence of the high duties upon the exportation of clayed ſugars. This is one of the very few manufactures which it would be cheaper for the planters to make than to buy. They could make it, with very conſiderable profit, for exportation. The proceſs adds greatly to the value and convenience of the raw commodity, and is yet extremely ſimple: it may be carried on by a very cheap and ſimple addition to the machinery neceſſary for boiling the cane juice: and the duty upon the exportation of it, is exactly like a tax upon the flour of one corn diſtrict which has abundance of water-mills, in order that another, which has only wind-mills, may reap the profits of grinding. It is ſaid, that the only perſons in the Britiſh empire who profit by this abſurd, unjuſt reſtriction, are about fifty families of foreigners, who practiſe the trade of ſugar-refiners in England. The French iſlands have always been free from this oppreſſion; and owed a conſiderable ſhare of their former proſperity to ſo eminent an advantage.

In return for ſome of thoſe monopolizing regulations, Great Britain has favoured the colonial

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produce, by firſt diſcouraging, and then prohibiting the growth of certain articles, which are ſtaples of the colonies. Conſiſtently with the ſpirit which dictated the prohibitions of ſome of the finer manufactures in America, ſhe ought to have laid a heavy duty upon the cultivation of the cotton plant and ſugar cane in England. The revenue would have profited; the induſtry of the colonies would have been favoured; and that of the mother country diſcouraged, by ſuch a law, exactly in the ſame degree in which the induſtry of the mother country is favoured, and that of the colonies reſtrained, by the laws to which I have alluded. But the growth of one colonial ſtaple in Britain, was, it ſeems, dreaded with more appearance of reaſon, by the friends of the coloniſts. The cultivation of tobacco was rapidly increaſing; and, leſt the planters of Maryland and Virginia might be forced to turn their induſtry from this to ſome other line of employment, the ſtatute 15. Car. II. cap. 7. commonly called the Navigation act, conferred and increaſed the penalties which had been impoſed upon this culture, by the 12. Car. II. cap. 34. In ſpite of the tax of ten pounds Sterling *per* rood, the trade of tobacco planting was found to be ſufficiently profitable: ſo the Legiſlature, in order to ſhow clearly that the law was intended to be prohibitory and not fiſcal,

fiſcal, gave to the Juſtices of Peace power to 'pluck up and utterly deſtroy' all tobacco plant- in England and Ireland by 22. & 23. Car. II. cap. 26. This monopoly of rude produce in favour of the colonies, is exactly the counterpart, in ſpirit at leaſt, to the monopoly of manufacture given to the mother country in the article of ſugar, although it has not had any of the bad effects to the mother country which the latter has had to the colonies.

The ſtatute 21. Geo. II. c. 30. granted a bounty on the importation of indigo raiſed in the colonies, while the ſtatutes 23. Geo. II. c. 29. and 30. Geo. II. c. 16. prohibited the coloniſts from erecting ſlit-mills and furnaces, which, amongſt other bad effects, diminiſhed the price of timber, and impeded the clearing of lands. To ſecure the planters againſt any competition that might ariſe from the ſuperior fertility and lighter taxes of ſome foreign iſlands, a duty is impoſed on the importation of foreign muſcovado ſugar, amounting to nearly double of that which is laid on Britiſh muſcovadoes; and on foreign clayed ſugars, there is laid a duty of ſomewhat more than three times the duty on Britiſh muſcovadoes. This amounts to a monopoly in favour of the great colonial ſtaple, which has, however, free acceſs to the foreign, as well as the Britiſh markets. Dr SMITH ſeems to inſinuate, that the

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privileges granted to Britiſh ſugar have all the effects of enumeration. * They have only the effect of tempting the commodity to the Britiſh market, whereas the enumeration drives it thither.

All theſe laws of encouragement, as they are called, prove only the good intentions of the Legiſlature towards a certain claſs of the community. A trade can never be profitable to the community, and not often to that claſs which carries it on, if it cannot be ſupported without bounties and excluſive privileges.

In many important particulars, the Britiſh colonies feel no reſtrictions from the operations of the monopoly: the utmoſt freedom of trade is allowed them with each other; and, before the American revolution, the continent and iſlands formed a large internal market. Since that unfortunate event, the commerce between the United States and the Britiſh colonies has been leſs free: but the mutual advantages of trade with ſuch near neighbours, and with ſuch good cuſtomers, has induced both nations to relax the ſtrictneſs of their Navigation laws; and the commercial treaty of 1795 † allows American veſſels, not exceeding ſeventy tons, to trade between the continent and the iſlands, upon

* Wealth of Nations, Book iv. cap. 7. part 2.

† Art. XII.

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upon the ſame footing on which Britiſh veſſels were allowed to engage in that trade by the ſtatute 23. Geo. III. cap. 39.; by the conſolidation act, 27. Geo. III. cap. 13.; and by the annual orders of Council. This important article ſtill continues in force; and, although temporary, like moſt abatements of reſtrictive laws, it contains a clauſe of renewal after the peace, of which there can be little doubt that both the powers will avail themſelves.

The excluſion of foreign ſhipping is relaxed in ſome of the principal ports of Jamaica, Grenada, Dominica, and New Providence, by the Free-port law, 27. Geo. III. cap. 27.; by the ſtatutes 30. Geo. III. cap. 29. and 31. Geo. III. cap. 38.; made perpetual by the 32. Geo. III. cap. 37.; and amended by 33. Geo. III. cap. 50.: and thoſe iſlands are thus permitted to carry on a free trade with all foreign colonies, by receiving foreign veſſels of one deck for the purpoſes of importation and exportation. The inland trade of the North American colonies (except the territories in the charter of the Hudſon's Bay Company) with the United States, or the trade which is carried on by roads, rivers, lakes, and canals, is thrown perfectly open by the commercial treaty of 1795. *

* Art. III.

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The enumerated commodities do not comprehend the great Weſt India ſtaple, ſugar, which may be exported directly in Britiſh veſſels to any foreign country; and the non-enumerated articles may be carried to all countries ſouth of Cape Finiſterre: ſo that, to thoſe, the whole market of the Mediterranean and Levant is open. It will be obſerved, that thoſe are the countries in the ſouth, which poſſeſs no means of obtaining, directly, the ſupplies of colonial produce; and that the ſupply of the north is provided for as profitably to the colonies, through the medium of the mother country, whoſe ſituation renders her the natural entrepôt between America and the Baltic. Here then, again, the reſtrictive policy has only ſecured, by a ſuperfluous and harmleſs anxiety, that arrangement which would of itſelf have taken place if things had been left to their natural courſe.

The ſhips of the colonies enjoy, in every reſpect, the ſame privileges, under the monopoly, with veſſels belonging to the European parts of the empire. And how little injurious the effect of the reſtriction has been, by preventing a competition of foreign ſhipping; or, rather, how much the monopoly, by turning many Britiſh capitals into the colony trade, according to the opinions of ſome, and at any rate

rate by augmenting her mercantile navy, has favoured the tranſport of colonial produce, may be perceived from the comparative freight in the Engliſh and French colonies. The freight of ſugar from the French Windward Iſlands was, in 1788 and 1789, eighteen and one fourth *per cent.* higher than the Engliſh; and the freight from St Domingo was twenty-five *per cent.* higher than from the French Windward Iſlands.

Without entering further into this very extenſive ſubject, we may conclude, from the foregoing details, that the bad effects of the monopoly, even to the colonies, have been extremely overrated; that the excluſive privileges are in ſome caſes quite nugatory and ſuperfluous; that they are in many inſtances reciprocal; and that the intereſts of thoſe remote parts of the Empire, though certainly leſs conſulted than they would have been by the liberal and enlightened policy which is at preſent beginning to influence the commercial views of the European ſtates, are nevertheleſs, except in a few particulars, not very grievouſly reſtrained.

The ſyſtem of colonial monopoly, adopted by all the European nations, and diſtinctly ſtated in the preamble to the Navigation act as the model upon which Great Britain purpoſed to arrange her plan, appears to have been the reſult of a wiſh, that the moſt diſ-

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tant provinces of the ſtate ſhould have the ſame commercial relations with the mother country, as if they had formed an integral part of her body like the contiguous provinces. The proximity of the different diſtricts which form one compact territory renders their mutual commerce to a certain extent more profitable than any other foreign trade, either of conſumption or of exportation. They only import all thoſe articles which they cannot get from each other; and they only export their ſurplus produce, that is, thoſe commodities which they cannot ſell to each other. But the diſtance of a colony renders it as profitable to trade with thoſe foreign countries which are at the ſame diſtance with the parent ſtate, and more profitable to trade with ſuch as are nearer. In order to prevent this, and to counterbalance, by force, the effects of natural circumſtances; to complete, in this particular, the connexion of the colony with the mother country as an integral part; and to reconcile what in the nature of things is a contradiction —greater diſtance with more briſk and conſtant commercial intercourſe, the ſyſtem of monopoly appears to have been invented. Its arrangements have been modified by the character of the nations and governments which have adopted it. Thoſe, whoſe internal poli-

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cy was moſt liberal and enlightened, have always adopted the policy moſt favourable to the colonies, and moſt univerſally beneficial to the different claſſes of their European dominion. Some ſtates, in order to ſupply themſelves with the produce of their own territories, and to afford the means of enriching the towns at a cheap rate, have ultimately diminiſhed thoſe ſupplies by preventing the exportation. By a ſingular contradiction, the ſame ſtates have endeavoured to prevent foreign nations from ſupplying them with various commodities, and thus immediately rendered thoſe articles ſcarcer and dearer to themſelves. It is in the policy of ſuch ſtates that we muſt look for the moſt rigid and fooliſh ſyſtem of police extended over their diſtant territories. We find them, accordingly, granting to a particular claſs of their own ſubjects the privileges of ſupplying all the reſt with colonial produce, and of providing the colonies with the produce of the mother country. The firſt effect of more enlightened political views has always been the abolition of ſuch partial reſtraints, while the total excluſion of foreigners remained in force.

Excluſive companies have, at different times, obtained the management of colonial trade, in every country of Europe. At firſt, Spain and Portugal, inſtead of companies, adopted a policy

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licy preciſely analogous in its ſpirit, and ſomewhat ſimilar, though far leſs injurious, in its effects—that of confining the colonial trade to certain ports of the mother country and of the colonies. In the courſe of the laſt century, both of thoſe nations have ſurrendered to excluſive companies the commerce of certain provinces; but the Portugueſe companies are by much the moſt extenſive and hurtful. The excluſive privileges of Cadiz have been withdrawn, and the policy of Spain has become daily more liberal, ſince the acceſſion of the Bourbons not only relieved the colonies from the grievous reſtrictions upon their trade with each other, but granted them a market in all the provinces of the mother country, and even a communication with foreigners, for certain articles of primary uſe.

In the Engliſh ſyſtem, very little harm was ever done by the management of American companies; their privileges were not of a very hurtful nature, and their duration was very ſhort. The proprietary rights had much more injurious effects, and laſted till a far later period.

The French have occaſionally adopted the expedient of companies. Towards the end of the ſeventeenth century, the government bought up the Weſt India Company's ſtock, and laid open

open the trade, under the ſuperintendance of the great Indian Company. It was afterwards put into the hands of the famous Miſſiſſippi Company, the laſt inſtitution of the kind known in France. Since the downfall of that celebrated adventure, the American trade has been open to all France; and the general ſyſtem of monopoly has reſembled that adopted by Great Britain.

The Dutch Company, like the Plymouth Company in England, has always exerciſed the political, as well as mercantile government of the colonies comprehended within its charter. In this department, the Spaniſh and Portugueſe governments have never permitted any interference. The Dutch Company, for many years, retained only the African trade. And the eſtabliſhment of free ports in their moſt important iſland, rendered that ſettlement (little favoured by nature) extremely flouriſhing. The Daniſh government, after throwing open the trade of their ſmall but thriving ſettlements to all the European provinces of the mother country, proceeded a ſtep further, and, like the Dutch, gave their iſlands the benefit of free ports.

Thus has the reſtrictive ſpirit of all the European powers, in their views of colonial policy, gradually relaxed, in proportion as more enlightened views of policy gained ground.

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We ſhall afterwards attend more particularly to the hiſtory of thoſe important changes. At preſent, it is ſufficient to remark, that a ſudden relaxation of the monopoly ſyſtem by one power, England for example, would have anſwered no good purpoſe, while ſhe was ſurrounded, in her colonial dominions by the poſſeſſions of the other ſtates, ſubject to the reſtrictive policy common to every one of the nations who poſſeſſed American territory.

II. The colonial monopoly is alleged to be diſadvantageous to the mother country, by drawing into a foreign trade of conſumption with a remote country, a capital formerly employed in a foreign trade of conſumption with a neighbouring one; by turning part of the capital from a direct to a roundabout foreign trade of conſumption, and part from all foreign trade of conſumption to the carrying trade.

I have already ſhewn, at great length, how erroneous it is to conſider the colony trade as a foreign commerce. The monopoly of the colony trade, if it does attract any ſtock from its natural employment, only draws capital from a near foreign market to a diſtant part of the home market; or, from carrying on the trade between one part of the country and a neighbouring ſtate, to carry on the trade between

tween a remote part of the country and a neighbouring ſtate, in order to benefit either the near or the remote part. Whatever diſadvantages might ariſe to Great Britain from the eſtabliſhment of a monopoly in favour of the ſouthern counties, at the markets of Yorkſhire, it could ſcarcely be ſaid that it would injure the nation, by drawing capital from the trade carried on with the ſouth ſide of the channel to the inland or coaſting trade; or from carrying on the trade between Kent and Calais, to carry on that between Hull and Kent, for commodities needed both in Kent and Calais; or from carrying on any trade between Kent and Calais, to carry on any one between Hull and Kent.

I have alſo examined the conſequences of ſlow returns in the colony trade, and compared it, in this reſpect, with the foreign trade of conſumption. But, independent of all other conſiderations, it muſt appear evident to every one who conſiders this ſecond objection to the excluſive ſyſtem, that it is fundamentally levelled, not only againſt the monopoly, but againſt the trade itſelf, even in the freeſt ſtate in which it can be conceived to exiſt. Dr SMITH, indeed, diſclaims all objections to the colony trade; but he ſtates, under the form of objections to the monopoly, an argument which applies directly to

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to the free trade: it is the principal one, and forms the baſis of all the others. If, as he contends, a diſtant commerce is always leſs advantageous to a country, than a trade with neighbouring ſtates; if the capital which it employs is replaced more ſlowly, and puts into motion a ſmaller portion of productive labour: then we muſt allow, that this traffic, even when free, is hurtful; and that this employment of capital, when neither the effect of compulſion nor of ſeduction, is leſs advantageous than other employments. The monopoly, it is ſaid, draws or drives into the diſadvantageous employment, more than would otherwiſe go. But, even were we to admit this, it would only prove, that a colonial trade monopolized, is a greater evil (though of the very ſame kind) than a colonial trade left free. The following conſiderations may lead us to appreciate the real effects of the colonial monopoly, in producing this increaſe of the evil, as it is called, or in rendering the returns of a portion of the national ſtock ſlower than they would otherwiſe be.

1. The intereſts of traders, in the employment of their capitals, are by no means the ſame, in all caſes, with the intereſts of the community to which they belong.

That trade, of which the profits are moderate, but the returns frequent, is, in the general,

general, much more advantageous to the bulk of the ſociety, than that trade, of which the returns are ſlow, and the profits great. More induſtrious people gain by the former, than by the latter operation; ſince large fortunes are accumulated, but a much greater number of moderate ones are made; and the whole ſtock of the nation receives a much more important and better diſtributed addition.

But the poſſeſſors of trading capital naturally ſeek for that employment of it which may ſecure to themſelves the greateſt accumulation of profits. They feel no intereſt in the total income or ſavings of the country: their own intereſt leads them to conſider how they may moſt rapidly acquire a fortune to themſelves. The intereſt of the country points to the trade of quick returns, and ſmall profits: the intereſt of the merchant points to large profits; and only to quick returns, as the means of increaſing the profits, if his capital is ſufficiently extenſive to enable him to afford to lye long out of his money. A trader will certainly prefer a commerce which returns his ſtock twice a year with a profit of five *per cent.*, to one which replaces it yearly with a profit of ten *per cent.*; but he will prefer a trade which replaces the capital at the year's end with a profit of fifteen or twenty *per cent.*, to one which

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which only gives the profit of five or ſeven *per cent.* at the end of ſix months. Without any other inducement, therefore, than the great profit, he will employ his ſtock in the way leaſt beneficial to the reſt of the community.

A monopoly can only create or increaſe this diſadvantage, by creating or increaſing the ſuperiority of the profits in the diſtant trade over thoſe in the nearer trade. The natural diſadvantages of a diſtant market muſt always be compenſated by increaſe of profits; otherwiſe, no capital would ever find its way thither. If all colonial monopoly, for inſtance, were at an end, and, the trade being thrown open, a competition were to reduce its profits to a level, or nearly to a level, with thoſe of the European market, ſome capital from each country would be withdrawn to the latter market, until the profits of the colony trade roſe again. They muſt always ſtand conſiderably higher than the profits of the European market, otherwiſe no capital would follow them. The monopoly, then, cannot be ſaid to create the ſuperiority of colonial profits, or to draw thither all the capital which that ſuperiority attracts.

2. When the competition reduces the profits of colonial trade, it is very eaſy to perceive what capitals will be the laſt to leave it. The merchants

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merchants of foreign countries, who had been attracted by the abolition of the monopoly, but whose countries have no more connexion with the colonies than with the parent-ſtates in Europe, will much more eaſily be driven from a trade, in which they had much leſs inducement to engage, even at equal profits. Britiſh ſtock (for example) will be much more eaſily drawn from the trade of the Dutch and French ſettlements, than Dutch or French ſtock. Traders have a real advantage in dealing with thoſe who ſpeak the ſame language as themſelves, obey the ſame laws, and follow the fates of the ſame government. This is a circumſtance wholly unconnected with the monopoly, and is eſſential to the nature of colonial relations. It is the advantage which draws capital to the diſtant and leſs profitable coaſting trade of any country, in preference to a more profitable traffic with a nearer part of ſome foreign ſtate. While, therefore, the free trade drives off to other markets a great part of the foreign capitals veſted in the colony trade, the great proportion of the capital that remains in it will belong to the mother country; a proportion rendered ſtill greater by the increaſed competition of the diſplaced foreign capitals in the nearer markets. This muſt happen in the caſe of one nation poſſeſſing all the colonies in

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the world; but it will happen ſtill more if each trading nation has colonies, and, moſt of all, in the actual caſe of each nation poſſeſſing colonies of the very ſame kind, ſituated in the very ſame parts of the world. A diſtribution will thus take place, regulated entirely by the circumſtances of colonial, and independent of any partial reſtrictions or excluſive privileges.

3. If, by any change in the colonial policy of Europe, the colony trade were thrown open to all nations, with equal, or not very unequal advantages, the ſtock formerly employed in any particular branch of it, would naturally remain there, in preference to all other employments. A conſiderable difficulty, ſome anxiety, and great temporary expence, attends all changes of ſtock from trade to trade, and from place to place in the ſame trade. The ſtock, too, not immediately engaged in colonial trade, and the induſtry which that trade puts in motion, become adapted to the particular demands of the diſtant market. Certain branches of manufacture, as well as the art of conſtructing veſſels of a certain deſcription; the raiſing of certain kinds of produce; the eſtabliſhment of certain branches of commerce with neighbouring countries, as ſubſervient to, or ſpringing from, the colonial trade; the education of men

men in a particular line of buſineſs, and the acquiſition of certain kinds of knowledge—all riſe to perfection from a long habit of engaging in the trade with the colonies as a ſeparate and peculiar profeſſion. A change in thoſe important particulars, is both diſagreeable and expenſive: it is attended with great anxiety, and much actual loſs.

Whether, then, the monopoly, or the natural circumſtances of the colonies, independent of poſitive inſtitution, have ſettled in different channels the capital of different trading nations, the eſtabliſhment of a free trade would with difficulty change the courſe of the ſtream, although ſome diminution of its force, or beneficial influence, ſhould take place; nearly the ſame quantity as before would continue to flow in the accuſtomed channels, with the ſame rapidity, and towards the ſame reſervoir. The capitals of each nation would retain a bias towards that direction into which long habit had drawn them, although the new arrangements might vary the proportions of each in the diviſion.

4. We have already examined thoſe circumſtances which influence the diſtribution of the capitals of any nation, and incline capitals of a particular deſcription to follow the more

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diſtant employments, while they confine others to the contiguous markets. Thoſe cauſes, too, are altogether unconnected with, and beyond the influence of monopolies or reſtrictive laws of any ſort. No monopoly can carry to America that ſtock which is engaged in the ſmaller retail trade of a country, any more than the natural ſuperiority of colonial profits can draw ſuch a ſtock to that remote employment. The larger capitals, then, of any country, will generally find their way to the colonies in preference to the home market, or the nearer foreign markets, and to the colonies of that country in preference to the foreign colonies—after an entire freedom of trade ſhall have opened every branch of the home trade, and European trade, to all orders of men, and to all countries—and after an entire freedom of colonial commerce ſhall have admitted all nations to ſuch a ſhare in its profits, as their circumſtances may enable them, or induce them to ſeek.

5. The increaſe of new colonies is much more rapid than that of old countries: the demands for capital in the former, are far more urgent and progreſſive than the accumulation of ſtock in the latter. Although a ſyſtem of perfect freedom were to be adopted in the colonial policy of all the European nations, as certain

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tain capitals only in each nation can enter into the diſtant commerce, it is not probable that ſufficient ſtock could ever be employed to reduce the profits nearly to the level of other trades: they would certainly be ſomewhat reduced, but the trade would ſtill be ſufficiently wide to receive all the capital which each commercial nation could pour into it. At any rate, the whole large capitals of a country poſſeſſing colonies would find their way thither. The rapid increaſe of the colonies would outſtrip the augmentation of ſupply occaſioned by the accumulation of the mother country. If any capitals had not at firſt been veſted in the trade, or been driven from it by the competition, they would now be drawn to it, as the whole accumulation of the European capitals would be inſufficient. The profits of the European trader would be rendered ſomewhat lower, though not much, as the prices would ſtill be monopoly prices, both to the European buyer and ſeller, from the increaſing demand for European commodities, and the increaſing ſupply of colonial produce. Any diminution of profits would only be a real loſs to the mother country (though perhaps an advantage to the colonies), without tending to confine any of the larger capitals to the home trade, or the nearer foreign trade of conſumption. Beſides, ſuch a diminution would tend to correct itſelf: for it

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would retard the accumulation of the ſtock deſtined to carry on the colonial commerce, while the rapidly increaſing market would require more and more ſupplies daily.

The hiſtory of the Britiſh commerce with the United States of North America, furniſhes ample proofs of the foregoing reflections, and enables us to judge of the effects produced by a much ſtricter, and more extenſive monopoly, than any now poſſeſſed by the Britiſh merchants, upon the diſtribution of their capital.

It appears from the Cuſtomhouſe books, that the average exportation to the colonies now forming the United States, in the years 1771, 1772, and 1773, amounted to 3,064,843l.; and in 1784, it was 3,359,864l. Yet the Americans imported conſiderably more than their uſual quantity during the years immediately preceding the rebellion, becauſe they were preparing themſelves for their nonimportation agreements; and, during the firſt years of peace, we cannot ſuppoſe that the Britiſh capital, which had been ſeeking different employments while the war laſted, ſhould all at once find its way into the old channel. Nor did any diminution take place in the fiſheries, and other diſtant traffics, which had been increaſed during the war. On the contrary, the tonnage employed in the Newfoundland fiſhery, had been augmented by above one half between 1765 and 1785. The exports

exports to the United States ſince the peace of Verſailles, have been rapidly increaſing. The average of 1790, 1791, and 1792 (the laſt three years of peace) was 3,976,211l.; and of 1798, 1799, & 1800 (the laſt years of war) 6,507,478l. In ſpite of the free trade, then, more capital was poured into the American commerce, immediately after the independence of the States, than had been employed there during the exiſtence of the colonial ſyſtem; and, in fifteen years of free trade, the amount of the capital employed had nearly doubled.

The imports, indeed, have not been continued in the ſame way. The average for 1771, 1772, and 1773, was 1,322,532l.; in 1784, it had fallen to 701,189l. In 1790, 1791, and 1792, the average roſe to 1,141,337l.; and in 1798, 1799, and 1800, it was 1,986,528l.: being nearly in proportion to the exports as one to 3.26; whereas, before the war, it was as one to 2.3.

Upon this deficiency in the imports (which, after all, is not conſiderable), we may obſerve, in the *firſt* place, that it is no proof of a ſmaller capital being employed: it only ſhows, that the trade with the United States has become leſs a trade of barter than it formerly was; that, inſtead of ſomewhat leſs than one half of the returns being made in goods, there is now ſomewhat leſs than one third made in

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that form; and that the capital employed in the trade, is replaced more in money and bills than it formerly was. This would even be a great conſolation to certain politicians: it is what they are pleaſed to call a favourable balance of trade. Although there is evidently no advantage in ſuch a trade, as little is there any proof that it employed a ſmaller capital; for we cannot imagine that any veſſels cleared out from Britain to America (at either of the periods which we are comparing) with goods, and returned in ballaſt.

But, in the *ſecond* place, the difference in the amount of the imports is not altogether the conſequence of the free trade. It is in part, no doubt, the conſequence of the competition, which prevents Britiſh veſſels from monopolizing the carrying trade between North America and Europe; but it is, in a great part alſo, the conſequence of that ſyſtem of reſtrictions which has ſucceeded to the colonial intercourſe between Britain and North America. From abſurd ideas concerning a balance of trade, the exportation is allowed to be perfectly free, but the importation is hampered with reſtrictions. Formerly, it was not only free, but monopolized; now, it is not even free. Always to ſell and never to buy—all trade, and no barter—is the grand maxim of the mercantile ſyſtem. The United States are now conſidered

conſidered as foreign countries, whoſe money it becomes Great Britain, as much as poſſible, to drain. The limitations previous to the commercial treaty of 1795, were numerous and ſtrict; and, even by the ſtipulations of that treaty, the American goods imported into Great Britain have only the ſame freedom with thoſe of other foreign nations. We may conclude, then, that an entire freedom of the American trade would neither have prevented nor diminiſhed the influx of Britiſh capital into that channel; and that the monopoly, by raiſing the profits, was, on the whole, rather an advantage to the diſtant branch of the national commerce.

The ſimilarity of manners, language, and laws, which continued to unite the mother country with her former colonies, in ſpite of their rebellion, continued to draw a greater proportion of Britiſh capital and induſtry to that quarter, than of capital or induſtry belonging to any foreign nation. The colonial relations were indeed at an end; but almoſt all thoſe circumſtances continued to connect the two people, from which colonial relations derive their power of promoting commercial intercourſe.

6. We have hitherto conſidered all the nations engaged in the diſtant trade as on a level,

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in the competition for the advantages which the abolition of colonial monopoly would throw open to all. But three circumſtances muſt always create, more or leſs, a difference between the trading nations in their powers of turning ſuch an opening to their advantage.

In the firſt place, their capitals may be of different extent. One nation may poſſeſs more of thoſe capitals which are fitted for the colony trade; another may employ in it all the larger capitals which it poſſeſſes, and yet leave a blank, which the former, the richer country, will fill up. The capitals, of the proper extent for ſuch a trade, may be of different ſtandards in the two nations; and although each may poſſeſs a ſufficient number to take its ſhare, thoſe of the one may be greater than thoſe of the other which are ſuited to the colonial commerce.

In this caſe, the traders whoſe capitals are largeſt, will underſell all the others, and thus make way for a much greater proportion of the capitals of their countrymen, than foreigners could afford to employ in this manner.

In the ſecond place, the commodities of one nation may be better and cheaper, from the richer quality of the ſoil, the greater extent of manufacturing capital, and the ſuperior ſkill or induſtry of its workmen. The trading capital deſtined to carry thoſe commodities to the colonies,

lonies, will naturally come chiefly from the nation that poſſeſſes them at firſt hand. Britiſh veſſels can ſell Yorkſhire woollens to the coloniſt in America, cheaper than French or Dutch veſſels can. Such a direct trade is more advantageous to Britain, than ſuch a carrying trade would be to Holland or France. But,

Laſtly, the nation which poſſeſſes the greateſt number of good dock-yards, and ſhip-carpenters, and the largeſt body of ſkilful ſeamen, will be able to afford carrying on the trade of ſupplying the colonies at a ſmaller expence of freight, and ſomewhat ſmaller charge of inſurance, than any other nation.

The poſſeſſion of a good mercantile navy depends partly on the natural ſituation of the country, and partly on its wealth. A nation inhabiting a maritime territory, interſected by navigable rivers, and poſſeſſed of a large portion of wealth, from phyſical reſources, or induſtry and ſkill, will preſent a greater demand for ſeamen; and, by internal navigation and the coaſting trade, will breed a numerous body of men fit for diſtant voyages. Such a nation will be able to carry goods much cheaper, and conſiderably ſafer, to remote parts of the world. It will partly carry for other ſtates, leſs favourably circumſtanced in this reſpect; and it will underſell them in the diſtant market, by the cheapneſs

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cheapneſs of freight and inſurance, although, in the home market, the articles were no cheaper nor better than thoſe of its neighbours.

It has been the policy of moſt of the nations poſſeſſing colonies, to encourage the breed of ſeamen, and the building of ſhips, by impoſing particular reſtrictions upon the employment of foreign veſſels and crews. No nation has adopted this plan more ſteadily or ſucceſsfully than England. Her ſyſtem of Navigation laws, though at firſt they may have been prejudicial to the intereſt of her colonies, and to the progreſs of her own opulence, was very ſoon known only by its good effects. It muſt have made freight and inſurance dearer at firſt; but it ſoon rendered them cheap and profitable to the mother country, by drawing into that ſpecies of employment a vaſt number of hands, who would otherwiſe have formed, certainly, not the moſt valuable part of the population, and whoſe loſs, if at all felt, would be ſpeedily ſupplied; becauſe, although the demand for ſeamen was increaſed, the demand for manufacturing labour was not diminiſhed nor retarded in its progreſſive increaſe. This department of the monopoly, though dictated by a moſt illiberal ſpirit of mercantile jealouſy, has been allowed by all writers, even by Dr SMITH himſelf, to be profitable.* That author admits the propriety of encouraging

* Wealth of Nations, Book iv. cap. 2.

encouraging a particular branch of induſtry, in conſideration of its political utility; and ſtates this as a ſufficient reaſon for introducing an exception to the general cenſure which he paſſes upon the reſtrictive policy of the mercantile ſyſtem. It muſt be obſerved, however, that there cannot be a greater error, than to endeavour, by any ſuch line of policy, to force into the ſituation of a maritime power, a nation whoſe reſources and progreſs are not naturally favourable to this ſpecies of opulence or of force. The Navigation laws of England operated upon the diſtribution of wealth and induſtry already in the country, or upon the direction of reſources and capacities which the nation poſſeſſed. Perhaps it only anticipated, by a ſhort period, that ſtate of things which the courſe of national proſperity might afterwards have eſtabliſhed of its own accord.

To propoſe ſimilar meaſures to a poor or an indolent community, or a ſtate poſſeſſing little ſea-coaſt, would ſurely be to begin at the wrong end of the work, and to miſtake, for the original cauſe of mercantile or political grandeur, that which is only an effect of it, though an effect whoſe reaction, at a certain period of the ſtate's growth, may ſerve to accelerate the progreſs of that developement from which it ſprung. It would be a miſtake, beſides, hurtful in the extreme

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extreme to a nation in ſuch circumſtances: it would divert from uſeful employment part of a capital eſſentially neceſſary to an underſtocked country, and drain, at once, that ſoil, from which, in the progreſs of time, the plant would itſelf riſe, for the fooliſh purpoſe of haſtening its growth before the ſoil could ſupport or bring it into maturity. *

Of theſe three circumſtances, ſuperiority of capital, excellence of natural produce or manufacturing ſkill, and naval expertneſs, different nations may poſſeſs an advantage in one, and be deficient in the reſt. If no abſurd regulations interfere, and no natural impediment interrupt the progreſs of opulence, there is a connexion between the whole three, which renders it certain that a nation will obtain the ſuperiority in all. A maritime country, which poſſeſſes the advantages of ſkill and capital, is ſure to acquire naval induſtry; a country, wherever ſituated, which poſſeſſes induſtry and ſkill, is ſure to acquire capital; but another nation, without the ſame advantages of wealth and ſkill, may engroſs the trade of carrying for an inland neighbour of greater natural and acquired reſources.

In the firſt part of the ſeventeenth century, the Dutch, whoſe capital was greater, and who from want

* Note N.

want of territory had applied themſelves to naval affairs, were the carriers even of Great Britain; and, during the whole of that century, they engroſſed the carrying trade of all the reſt of Europe. But the advantages of ſituation, aſſiſted, no doubt, by the Navigation law, have ſecured to Britain, ſince that period, a general ſuperiority in all the three circumſtances of capital, induſtry, and marine. If the colonial trade, then, had been laid perfectly open at any time ſince the ſyſtem of colonial relations occupied the attention of the European powers, Great Britain would have been able, upon ſmaller profits, and at a longer credit, to ſupply the American market, in general, with better commodities. Much more of her capital would have gone thither, than of any other capital; and, in particular, the advantages of colonial connexion would have drawn into the commerce of her own ſettlements, as many of the Britiſh capitals fitted for the operations of the diſtant trade, as the colonial commerce could receive. Independently, then, of the monopoly, the ſame quantity of the national ſtock would have been drawn to a trade of ſlow returns, as is now engaged in it; and the ſame quantity taken from the operations of the home trade, or of the trade of the neighbouring nations of Europe.

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It appears, therefore, that the effects of the monopoly, which the colonial policy of modern Europe has adopted as the baſis of its ſyſtem, have been much overrated; and that political inquirers have aſcribed to this ſyſtem, various events and changes which the operation of other cauſes prepared, and the natural courſe of things would have brought about, even if no interference or reſtriction of colonial trade had ever formed a part of the mercantile theory, and the foundation of that ſupremacy which the mother country exerciſed over her diſtant provinces.

III. It has been ſaid, that the colonial ſyſtem, by adapting the induſtry of the mother country to one large market, inſtead of ſuiting it to a variety of ſmaller ones, renders it, on the whole, leſs ſecure. This argument, from the illuſtrations which it has received by many appoſite ſimiles drawn from the functions of the animal ſyſtem, has appeared in an extremely ſpecious and ſeductive ſhape. If we examine it a little more attentively, we ſhall be convinced, that it owes much of its force to falſe analogy, and to the peculiar circumſtances of the time and country in which it was brought forward.* The only evil that can

* Note O.

can arife from the determination of much of the induſtry and capital of a country towards one point, or from what is called the derangement of the balance that ought to ſubſiſt in the labour and trade of a country, conſiſts in the chance of that part being removed, or the connexion with it deſtroyed.

A great proportion of the vital fluid has been made to circulate in a particular artery or limb; and an obſtruction in the one, or an amputation of the other, muſt be fatal; while the deſtruction or ſtoppage of the ſmaller arteries is ſcarcely felt. In the animal ſyſtem, we know this balance to be neceſſary, though we cannot tell why. In the political ſyſtem, it ſeems altogether fanciful, and founded on analogy. The only danger of deſtroying this equilibrium, ariſes from the chance that a great calamity may take place—the diſmemberment of the empire. This is, indeed, an excellent reaſon for dreading ſuch a misfortune, though it can ſcarcely be ſaid to furniſh any argument againſt thoſe operations which have been the natural reſult of the union of the parts, and which we have ſhown to depend upon the relations between them, and not on the monopoly, or any other artificial cauſe. The induſtry or capital employed in the internal commerce of any country, in carrying on the trade between the country and the towns,

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is beyond all compariſon greater and more important, in every reſpect, than the moſt overgrown branch of foreign commerce: it is indeed greater than all the foreign commerce of a people the moſt deeply engaged in mercantile affairs. Any domeſtic broil, then, any civil war, revolution, or diſmemberment of the country, is much more to be dreaded, than any rupture with a neighbouring ſtate. This reaſon is a very ſtrong one for avoiding all meaſures, the tendency of which is to produce anarchy or convulſion: it is no reaſon for diſcouraging that ſpecies of induſtry, and that employment of ſtock, which renders ſuch change or confuſion formidable. Beſides, the very circumſtances of ſuch events being dreadful, and the intercourſe which makes them ſo much to be deprecated, naturally prevents their occurrence. A perſon would be extremely fooliſh, who ſhould depoſit half of his fortune in a crazy box, and ſend it to his banker by the waggon: but, having once entruſted his property to a repoſitory, he will naturally endeavour to make it ſtrong, to ſecure it a ſafe conveyance, and to inſure it againſt riſk. The danger conſiſts, not in placing his money in a box becauſe it may be inſecure, but in neglecting to chooſe a ſtrong box. The event to be dreaded, is, not that which makes him truſt his caſh to an imperfect conveyance, (for every thing human

man is imperfect) but that which may render the conveyance unſafe, becauſe he has entruſted his caſh to it.

The colonial commerce, which, when rightly underſtood, is an important branch of the home trade, naturally produces relations between the different parts of the empire, which render any diſmemberment or civil war the event moſt of all to be deprecated, after a war amongſt the contiguous provinces. On this very account, both parties are almoſt equally anxious to avoid it; and, conſequently, a colonial war, is, next to a civil war, the moſt unlikely of all events. The enemies of all colonial trade (for we have ſeen that the monopoly does not materially increaſe the danger) ſtrongly recommend the employment of capital in the commerce of the nearer countries. Yet a rupture, at any time, with theſe, is beyond all calculation more probable than a rebellion of the diſtant provinces. It is above three centuries ſince the ſyſtem of colonial eſtabliſhments has been adopted; yet a ſingle inſtance only has occurred of a colonial diſpute that deſerved notice, as having terminated in the ſucceſs of the colonies. But, during that time, the different mother countries have been oftener at war with each other, than in a ſtate of peaceable intercourſe. Let it be remembered, that, both

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during the colonial war and the late conteſt, Great Britain was in a ſtate of violent hoſtility with almoſt all her cuſtomers in the nearer market, and in a ſtate of diſcontent, bordering upon a rupture, with thoſe of the more remote parts of Europe. Had her trade been confined to the operations of the European market—to the intercourſe with Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and the Baltic; each of thoſe wars would have been exactly that obſtruction in a great artery—that amputation of an overgrown limb, which we are taught to dread as fatal.

The ſame remark may apply, in a greater or leſs degree, to all the European wars. By the political relations of the different ſtates, the nations formed, by their ſituation and circumſtances, to be the beſt cuſtomers to each other in the market, are thoſe, whom every change of dominion, every popular quarrel, every freak of princes, every theory or caprice of ſtateſmen, draws into the field as enemies. The colonies always follow the fortunes of their parent ſtates; and ages of friendly attachment, or filial ſubmiſſion, may elapſe, before the blind injuſtice and violence of the mother country, or the factious and rebellious ſpirit of her children, ſhall diſturb an intercourſe mutually beneficial. The conteſt then impending with America ſeems to have intimidated all the political reaſoners of that

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that day, and to have inſpired them with a diſguſt at all colonial poſſeſſions. They ſaw brought about, by the moſt glaring impolicy, and the moſt ſingular concurrence of circumſtances, an event, which was dreadful in proportion as it was novel. They apprehended the immediate derangement of a ſyſtem, whoſe internal œconomy and operations had rendered each part dependent upon the reſt. The limb was about to be amputated, in which ſo much of the juices and aliments had been ſecreted; and ſuch a cataſtrophe was apprehended, as the natural evil of that copious ſecretion—as a diſeaſe which might be expected to recur, like any of thoſe ſtoppages that frequently interrupt the circulation and other functions of the ſyſtem. The ſtate doctors, therefore, preſcribed for their healthy patients, with the terrors of this new malady before their eyes. They adapted their medicines to the belief that this uncommon diſeaſe would conſtantly recur. They ordered a regimen, calculated to prevent it from proving dangerous; but forgot the more common accidents and complaints which every day attack the ſyſtem. To leſſen the dangers of an internal combuſtion, or ſome ſuch rare caſuality, they expoſed, to the attacks of fever or catarrh, a body, reduced by their theories to a ſtate of debility which muſt render the ſlighteſt conſequences of the latter maladies fatal.

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Nor ſhould it be forgotten, that the ſame cauſes, which render a diſmemberment of empire dangerous, and tend to prevent it from happening, tend alſo to reſtore order to the ſyſtem, after a derangement has unfortunately taken place. Theſe conſtitute that *vis medicatrix*, by which the political body conſtantly reunites its broken parts, and fills up thoſe accidental loſſes which it may have experienced. A few months after the civil wars of England and France, and the ſtill more fatal civil wars of theſe latter days, that internal communication of commerce, which had with difficulty been interrupted by the troubles of a ſeaſon, was eaſily reſtored to its former regularity and vigour. After the unhappy cataſtrophe which attended the colonial war of 1776, we have ſeen how the former intercourſe was reſumed with mutual avidity, and carried to a greater extent than ever. In like manner have the various relations, political as well as commercial, between the mother country and the colonies, been ſpeedily reſtored, after the extinction of thoſe leſs fatal rebellions to which the French and Dutch ſettlements have been at different times a prey. The colonial diſſenſions of other nations have never worn a formidable aſpect ſince the days of Gaſca and the Pizarros.

No commercial intercourſe can ever be valuable, which does not contribute greatly, and almoſt

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almoſt equally, to the advantage of thoſe who are engaged in it. The reciprocity of intereſts which firſt eſtabliſhed the connexion, and which rendered the ſuſpenſion of it mutually hurtful, will always render the reſtoration of the tie mutually deſirable, and ſmooth the way to a reconciliation; while the experience of the inconvenience and injuries attending the interruption, will render the recurrence of the evil ſtill more an object of dread, and ſtrengthen the connexion for the future. The mutual benefits of the union, form at once the pledge of its durability; the ſecurity for its re-eſtabliſhment, if caſually ſuſpended or broken; and the confirmation of its ſtrength, when reſtored.

I have now ſtated every thing that appears neceſſary, in order to form a clear idea, not only of that commerce which a ſtate naturally carries on with its colonies or remote provinces, but of the effects which the policy of modern Europe has produced upon the operations of this intercourſe.

I ſhall proceed to explain, more particularly, the colonial relations of the different European powers, and the circumſtances in their hiſtory and preſent ſtate, which may enable us to appreciate the relative importance of their colonial ſyſtems, whether in a political or commer-

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cial view. As the principles upon which a comparative eſtimate muſt be founded, have been already fully detailed, the remaining part of the Inquiry will be reduced to a narrow compaſs: it will conſiſt entirely in an application of thoſe principles to the facts.

SEC-

SECTION III.

OF THE PARTICULAR RELATIONS OF THE COLONIES OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS TO THEIR MOTHER COUNTRIES.

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In conſidering this very extenſive ſubject, I ſhall begin with deſcribing the colonial policy of the Dutch; I ſhall then proceed to that of Spain and Portugal, Denmark and Sweden; and ſhall conclude with that of Britain and France. My reaſon for adopting this arrangement, will be ſufficiently obvious to every one who has attended to the principles laid down in the foregoing Sections.

From various circumſtances, which I ſhall minutely conſider, the colonial ſyſtem is more neceſſary to Holland, and occupies a greater ſpace in her national polity, than in that of any other country of Europe. Spain and Portugal, with the two northern powers, different as the circumſtances of thoſe ſtates may at firſt appear to be, are exactly in that ſituation, with reſpect to colonial relations, which forms the extreme caſe oppoſite to the ſituation of Holland. England and France are in the intermediate place between the two extremes. I ſhall therefore conſider them in the laſt place.

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It will be neceſſary to enter more minutely into the diſcuſſion of the Dutch policy, both becauſe the circumſtances of the republic preſent us with conſtant and ſtriking illuſtrations of almoſt all the general principles formerly laid down, and becauſe the Dutch have long attained that ſituation, towards which, every commercial people are advancing with a rapidity proportioned to their natural advantages and mercantile proſperity. In this way, it will happen, that many diſquiſitions may be comprehended under the firſt part of this Section, which we ſhall have no occaſion to repeat in the courſe of the remaining parts.

PART I.

OF THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

THE mercantile ſplendour of Holland * has been the conſequence, not of any natural advantages, but of a great variety of defects in climate and ſituation. A number of inhabitants, crowded together in a very ſmall territory, not remarkable in any part for fertility, and

* Where the word '*Holland*' is uſed, I follow the common form of ſpeech, by which that province is put for the whole federacy. Where the particular part of the federacy, ſtrictly ſo called, is meant, I prefix '*the Province*.'

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and in many places abſolutely barren, ſoon found themſelves forced to repair, for the neceſſaries of life, to the ports of more fruitful and leſs populous countries. The ſea, too, afforded them ſupplies neglected by thoſe nations which abound in the produce of the ſoil. This ſpecies of agriculture, as it has been called, turned the attention of the Dutch to a ſeafaring life, and improved their ſkill and boldneſs in naval affairs, juſt in the ſame manner as the arts of land-carriage always reach their higheſt perfection among nations abounding in land and cattle, or cut off from the market by extenſive deſerts. * The want, and conſequent dearneſs of land, then, by turning the attention of the Dutch to the purſuits of foreign commerce, and the improvement of their fiſheries, encouraged their manufacturing and mercantile induſtry on the one hand; and trained, on the other, to that ſpecies of employment which is ſubſervient to the intercourſe of diſtant nations—the induſtry of the navigator. As they excelled all other nations in this branch of ſkill, they found new encouragement to cultivate it for a ſeparate profeſſion, ſubſervient not only to the ſupply of their own wants, but to the uſe of other ſtates, who wiſhed to trade with their neighbours in articles either of rude, or of manufactured produce. The Dutch, too, excelled the people of foreign

* Note P.

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foreign ſtates much more in this ſpecies of induſtry than in any other. It became, therefore, their favourite profeſſion. Inſtead of confining themſelves to the exchange of their manufactures for the rude produce, or the manufactures of other nations, they circulated the produce and manufactures of other countries; and, attending much more to this occupation than to the arts of working up the produce which they imported or raiſed, they became a nation, not of farmers or manufacturers, but of fiſhermen, merchants, and ſailors.

It was not only againſt want of territory, and the perpetual encroachments of the ſea upon the little territory which they poſſeſſed, that the Dutch had to ſtruggle. They were entirely deſtitute of thoſe very conveniences which are moſt eſſential to the occupations of a ſeafaring life. Their ſoil produced not one of the articles required in ſhipbuilding, in the buſineſs of the fiſheries, or in the arts of preſerving fiſh and ſea ſtores. Their harbours were few, and extremely bad; requiring, beſides, conſtant attention and labour to preſerve them from utter deſtruction.

The political circumſtances of the United Provinces, were as perplexing during the firſt ages of their independence, as thoſe of any political community that ever exiſted. While they were laying the foundations of their naval

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val power, and watching over the ſafety and increaſe of their commerce, they had to ſupport a civil war, of unequalled length, againſt the moſt powerful monarchy in Europe, of which they formed an appendage. The influence of their Spaniſh maſters was exerted, not only to cruſh them, by the help of the fineſt army in the world, and all the wealth of the Indies; but to exclude them from connexions with other nations, their beſt cuſtomers and providers. But theſe evils only concurred with the natural diſadvantages of their ſituation, to draw forth new efforts of fortitude and perſeverance. By thoſe induſtrious and frugal habits which their manifold neceſſities tended to form at an early period, and by that ſteady and patient labour which is particularly requiſite in all the occupations of the mariner and fiſherman, this wonderful people not only ſoon outſtripped all their contemporaries in riches and naval ſkill, but amaſſed a much greater ſhare of wealth, and gained a more formidable influence over the deſtinies of the world, than ſo ſmall a tribe ever acquired in any age.

The civil and religious liberty of the United Provinces has always been ſtated as the grand cauſe of their mercantile greatneſs. I am, however, inclined to view it only as a proximate cauſe; and without, in the ſlighteſt degree, detracting from the glory which the Dutch have univerſally

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univerſally acquired by their ſteady attachment to the principles of freedom and toleration, I am diſpoſed to rank theſe among the many good effects that may be aſcribed to the peculiar difficulties of their ſituation. The want of land, which rendered the Dutch, of neceſſity, a trading nation, gave them a more clear perception of their intereſts as a people of merchants; and rendered the promotion of thoſe intereſts, at all times, the paramount conſideration. Men whoſe ſubſiſtence depended on foreign ſupplies, knew that equivalents muſt be found to purchaſe theſe. The acquiſition of ſkilful and induſtrious hands from other countries, was, for this purpoſe, of all things the moſt deſirable; and the protection afforded to ſuch ingenious and induſtrious foreigners, was amply repaid by the ſervices which their exertions rendered to the community. To riſk the loſs of any of their natural ſubjects, would have been the height of madneſs. The ſtateſman who propoſed an intolerant or oppreſſive law, was ſure to ſuffer for his folly, by the check which it muſt give to the labour that ſupported him and his family. The perception of ſuch intereſts is by no means ſo clear in other ſtates. In Holland, neceſſity conſtantly preſented and enforced it. Thus, we find, that the influx of new ſubjects, and the prevention of emigration, was always

ways favoured by every liberal conceſſion of rights and privileges to new-comers, and by all manner of tenderneſs to the perſons, properties and liberties of every inhabitant, whether native or foreigner. Holland, indeed, was not in the ſituation of more favoured countries, who poſſeſſed natural advantages of climate, ſoil, and harbours, which rendered them independent of hard labour, and of which national avarice might covet the excluſive enjoyment. The life of the Dutchman, which he willingly participated with every ſtranger, was a life of indefatigable toil; a laborious exiſtence, chequered with unremitted hardſhips and riſks; a conſtant ſtruggle againſt natural poverty; a perpetual conflict with the elements themſelves, from whoſe fury not even their land afforded a ſhelter. Thus, we find, that foreigners and citizens were always put upon the ſame footing in every reſpect. The commercial advantages, ſuch as they were, lay open to all who choſe to ſettle, for however ſhort a time, in the republic; the higheſt offices of the ſtates, and of the federal union, were open to every burgeſs; and the freedom of Amſterdam itſelf could be purchaſed by men of all religions and nations, for a ſum not exceeding fifty florins.

The ſame natural want of ſubſiſtence, and conſequent dependence upon foreign ſtates, rendered

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dered the government and people of the United Provinces much more averſe to engage in the quarrels of the Continent, than any other nation in the world. A ſtate of warfare, which only diminiſhed the opulence of other countries, might cut off the ſupplies on which the Dutch depended for ſubſiſtence. They could not afford to be nice about points of honour and metaphyſical diſputes, which muſt be ſettled or ſupported at the riſk of a famine. When forced into a war, they could not fail to abate much of that ſqueamiſhneſs of principle, and irritability of temper, which regulates the conduct of nations placed in eaſier circumſtances: and, whenever they ſaw their neighbours in difficulties, they clearly perceived how much it was their intereſt, by cautious conduct, to preſerve a ſtrict neutrality, and to profit by all the diſaſters in which a ſtate of warfare was involving other countries. That this conduct, no leſs liberal than prudent, has produced its full effect, and been rewarded by the ſucceſs which it deſerved, no one can entertain a doubt, who attends at all to the hiſtory of the United Provinces. To enumerate all the benefits which they have derived from the diſputes and calamities of their leſs politic neighbours, would be to write the hiſtory of the greater part of modern European wars. But the

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the beneficial effects of the enlightened ſyſtem of civil and religious toleration, uniformly adopted by them, are no leſs ſtriking. Every European perſecution, ariſing from the zeal of thoſe ghoſtly counſellors who have ſo often carried the bigotted ſpirit of the cloiſter into the cabinets of princes; every tyrannical abuſe of civil power, which the ambition or avarice of ſtateſmen has produced; every revolution in affairs, ariſing from the contentions of factious men, or the violence of popular tumult, or the ſucceſs of foreign invaſion, has poured into the aſylum afforded by the United Provinces to all emigrants, large bodies of wealthy capitaliſts, or of ſkilful and induſtrious mechanics. Gratitude to their new protectors; habits and attachments formed during their exile; and the certainty of ſecurity in their new home, have almoſt univerſally retained thoſe men in the territories of the republic, even after the oppreſſion or confuſion was terminated which had driven them from their native country. 'On ne connoit' (ſays the accurate and philoſophical author of *La Richeſſe de la Hollande*) 'aucune 'branche de l'induſtrie Européenne, que l'e-'ſprit de perſecution n'ait fait paſſer en Hol-'lande, ou que la liberté n'y ait attirée dans 'ces temps où la Hollande étoit regardée

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'comme un aſyle aſſuré contre la tyrannie et 'l'oppreſſion.' * The Monarchs of the houſe of Brandenburgh have, during the eighteenth century, endeavoured to raiſe the commercial importance of their dominions, by following the example of their republican neighbours. They have invited, by premiums of various ſorts, the oppreſſed ſubjects of other ſtates to take refuge in the Pruſſian territories. A few of the pooreſt of thoſe unfortunate perſons, chiefly the peaſantry, have at different times reſorted thither. † The more wealthy and ſkilful of their number have always preferred Holland; and the very encouragements held out by Pruſſia, demonſtrate the ſuperiority of thoſe natural inducements preſented by the United Provinces, in the mild form of their government, the general freedom of trade, and the uniform predilection of their rulers for the peaceful purſuits of commerce. It may farther be remarked, that emigrants to the territories of the United Provinces, are never known to return home; whereas, many of thoſe who have at different times taken refuge in Pruſſia and other States, have returned, after the troubles that drove them away were at an end. ‡

The

* Tom. i. p. 73.

† Hertſberg, Memoires, tom. i. p. 256.

‡ Mirabeau, Monarchie Pruſſienne, tom. i. p. 20. 4to ed.

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The liberal and enlightened policy of the Dutch, important as its effects have been upon their commercial prosperity, has evidently been the result of the natural situation and necessities of the community, which, from the earliest times, turned the habits of the people to the pursuits of a mercantile and seafaring life. Their conflict with the Spanish Monarchy, originating, indeed, in the same peculiarity of habits, had the effect of rooting still more deeply their aversion to all restraint and intolerance, and of rendering them certainly too jealous of that executive power which is absolutely necessary in every government. From all those circumstances, thus united together, has resulted the unparalleled prosperity of the Dutch people; an accumulation of more inhabitants in the same space than is known in any other part of Europe—of more industry in the same bulk of population than was ever found in any other country—and of far more wealth in the hands of the nation, than was ever possessed elsewhere by the same number of men.

As far back as the expedition of Julius Cæsar to the North, the Batavians were remarkable for their industry and their skill in trade and maritime affairs. Even at that early period, when the manufacturing and commercial industry of every nation bore so small a proportion to the labour bestowed on the cultivation of

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land and feeding of cattle, and when we ſhould not expect to find any ſuch national ſubdiviſion of employment; it is certain that the Dutch were noted for the extent of the trade which they carried on between foreign nations, and were in ſome meaſure, what they afterwards became almoſt entirely, the carriers of Europe. When the progreſs of commercial induſtry, and the conſequent advancement of agricultural improvement, was accelerated by the encouragements given to the towns towards the end of the dark ages, the aſſiſtance of ſuch ſkilful navigators and tradeſmen as the Dutch and Flemings became ſtill more eſſential to the other ſtates of Europe; and the progreſs of opulence was greatly haſtened in the Low countries. In many parts of the Continent, the Dutch enjoyed excluſive privileges of trade: in all, they were favourably received. As no nation was jealous of a people devoted to commerce and peaceful induſtry, and ſcarcely poſſeſſing a ſmall and unfruitful territory; almoſt every power allowed them the benefit of favourable treaties of commerce and navigation. The middle of the ſeventeenth century was the period of the greateſt ſplendour to which the Dutch attained: and they had at this æra acquired, by their opulence, ſuch a predominating political influence in the affairs of Europe, as excited the jealouſy of the other

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ther powers. Their capital was ſo large, that they could afford to trade on the ſmalleſt profits. They could ſupport the heavieſt burdens, and oppoſe the moſt powerful foreign ſtates. They paid with eaſe, in one year, an extraordinary contribution of nearly four millions Sterling, beſides the annual revenue of nearly two millions; kept up an army of ſixty thouſand mercenaries, and ſent to ſea a fleet of one hundred ſail. * Even after the jealouſy of rival nations, more particularly of England, had, by various arrangements of domeſtic policy, and by meaſures of open hoſtility, greatly diminiſhed the wealth of the United Provinces; they ſtill retained the firſt place among the trading nations of Europe. The two maritime provinces alone had more ſhipping than all the reſt of Europe together, without poſſeſſing a ſingle commodity fit for traffic, except milk and earthen ware. The higheſt profits of their trade were three in the hundred; the ordinary revenue of the ſtate was two millions Sterling; the peace eſtabliſhment, both of land and ſea forces, was powerful and expenſive. †

* Temple's Obſervations on the United Netherlands, cap. vi. Works, i. 143.

† The Dutch army was compoſed of 26,200 men, and the navy of between thirty and forty ſhips of war. The expence of this force was 1,200,000l. Sterling *per annum*.—Temple's Obſervations, cap. v. vi. and vii. Works, i. 118, 138, 142.

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The neceſſary conſequence of increaſing population, while the territories and the commerce of the country remain the ſame, is, that the means of ſubſiſtence will become more ſcanty; the augmentation of numbers will be rendered ſlower; and the comforts of all claſſes will be abridged.

The neceſſary conſequence of extenſive opulence, acquired by a people who have not a proportionably great territory, is, that the means of advantageouſly employing this capital will become more and more difficult; the profits of its employment more confined, and its accumulation more ſlow. While the increaſed population renders the extenſion of cultivation and of commerce more eſſentially requiſite; the accumulation of capital renders the proportion of thoſe advantages which falls to the ſhare of each individual more trifling, and increaſes the difficulty of procuring either profits or employment. The competition of ſtocks diminiſhes the profits: and, although high wages are one cauſe of ſmall profits, yet, if the competition of capitals diminiſhes the profit, the wages muſt fall with the profits, and not riſe with the extent of capital. The high price of labour in Holland, has indeed been ſtated by all political writers as the grand cauſe of the declining opulence of the Republic. But this is only an apparent rate of wages, occaſioned by

by the ſeverity of the taxes. The workman actually enjoys leſs than in any other free ſtate, although he nominally receives more.

When a nation has reached the ſituation that I have now deſcribed, and has cultivated its territories, improved its manufactures, and extended its commerce to the uttermoſt, ſome new opening muſt evidently be found, either by augmenting its territory, or by acquiring territory in a diſtant quarter of the globe. If ſuch an opportunity is not found of employing the capital of the ſtate, of drawing off the larger capitals to a diſtant traffic or employment of any kind, and making way, in the nearer markets, for the ſmaller ſtocks that are daily accumulated; the overflowing wealth of the nation muſt infallibly emigrate, as it were, into the ſervice of foreign countries, where the profits are greater than at home. Any opening by foreign conqueſt; the acquiſition of new territory; the ſettlement of diſtant colonies; the ſudden improvement of any art, or the diſcovery of a new branch of induſtry and ſkill, will be ſpeedily ſeized, and will quickly receive as much capital as it can employ with the uſual profits. Through the whole hiſtory of the United Provinces, we perceive the conſtant effects of the extreme wealth and low profits of Dutch merchants; the unceaſing ef-

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forts of the heaped-up capital to make an opening for itſelf, by flowing into channels that lead to competent profits. Every ſort of ſpeculation has been tried with eagerneſs—in manufacture and trade; in foreign and domeſtic commerce; in colonial purchaſes, loans and traffic; in the trade and manufactures of foreign ſtates; in loans to foreign governments and merchants; in mere gambling and ſtock-jobbing.

The Venetians having acquired vaſt wealth, by the monopoly of the Eaſtern commerce, were deprived of the means of profitably employing it, by the diſcovery of the Cape paſſage to India. Their territories being extremely confined, and other nations getting the ſtart of them in the ſcience of navigation, they had only one means of inveſting the money which they had heaped together; they lent it to foreign countries for a premium, and became, as it were, the brokers of Europe. Had they been poſſeſſed of colonies, it would have been employed there in raiſing or circulating the produce of their own land, and ſupporting the induſtry of their own ſubjects.

When the Dutch had acquired immenſe wealth, by engroſſing the carrying trade of Europe, the progreſs of naval ſkill, and the accumulation of ſtock in other nations, deprived

prived them of a great part of this employment, and forced their overgrown capital into various ſpeculations in the moſt remote branches of foreign trade; in loans to foreign governments; and to individuals in foreign countries. All political writers agree in repreſenting the ſums lent by the Dutch to foreign ſtates and their ſubjects, as enormous; although, as might be expected, they differ in their accounts of the preciſe amount. M. Demeunier, in his elaborate ſyſtem of Political Economy, (a work, at leaſt as remarkable for the minuteneſs of the detail as the extent of the general views), ſtates the amount of the capital lent by the Dutch to foreign governments alone, without reckoning the large ſums lent to France ſince the year 1777, at ſeventy-three millions Sterling, ſo late as the year 1780, when the ſurplus capital of the Dutch was certainly leſs than it had formerly been. * The well-informed author of *La Richeſſe de la Hollande* eſtimates the ſame capital at a milliard and a half; † but he afterwards reckons the ſum lent to France and England alone at a milliard and a half of livres tournois: ‡ ſo that it

* Econ. Pol. (in Encyc. Method.) tom. iii. p. 729.

† Tom. i. p. 367.

‡ Tom. ii. p. 236. & 292.

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it is probable he reckoned the firſt mentioned ſum in florins, of which a milliard and a half would be about one hundred and thirty-five millions Sterling. The Abbé Raynal ſtates this ſum at ſixteen hundred millions livres tournois, or ſixty-ſix millions and a half Sterling; * quoting, moſt probably, from ſome author who ſtated the fact in the ſame manner with the laſt mentioned paſſage of '*La Richeſſe :*' for, in making what he is pleaſed to call his Philoſophical Hiſtory, the Abbé was by no means a curious obſerver of facts. At any rate, we may infer, that the ſums veſted in loans to foreign governments are enormous. Beſides, great ſums are lent to private individuals of foreign countries, both regularly in loans at intereſt, and in the form of goods : for the long credit on open accounts given by wealthy traders, is in fact a bribe for their cuſtom ; and the obtaining this cuſtom at the ordinary rate of profits, is actually a premium which the capitaliſt is willing to take for the uſe of his ſtock. All the money thus veſted, is independent of the firſt ſums lent to the governments of the different ſtates, and to that of the federacy ; indeed, we may ſay, to that of each town and community : for all the towns have ſeparate debts, beſides contributing to the intereſt of the common burthens. Raynal ſtates

* Hiſt. Phil. & Pol. &c. tom. iv. p. 278.

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ſtates the whole debt at two milliards; * and the author of the treatiſe on Finance (Encyc. Meth.) eſtimates it at two milliards one hundred millions livres tournois, or eighty-ſeven millions five hundred thouſand pounds Sterling, in the year 1785. † The particular debt of the province of Holland, in 1748, was one hundred and forty millions florins, or above twelve millions and a half Sterling. It is probable, that the whole national debts cannot be eſtimated at leſs than the ſums lent to foreign governments. No foreigners have ever had any property in the Dutch funds. So eager have the natives always been to place their money there, for the ſake of an intereſt higher than the ordinary profits of trade, that a ſhare in any loan has always been received as a moſt valuable benefit, and the payment of any part of the principal uniformly dreaded as a certain loſs. 'They receive it,' ſays Temple, 'with tears, 'not knowing how to diſpoſe of it to intereſt 'with ſuch ſafety and eaſe.' ‡

It is probable that the Dutch have frequently been creditors, at one time, to the amount of greatly above three hundred millions Sterling

* Hiſt. Phil. & Pol. tom. iv.

† Finances, tom. i. p. 486.

‡ Temple's works, I. 142.

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ling to their own government, and to foreign ſtates, of which we may reckon two thirds in foreign loan:—An immenſe ſum of ſurplus capital to have been accumulated by a nation poſſeſſed of no greater territory than the principality of Wales, without any good harbours, or any natural produce fit for exportation; a territory, one hundred and twenty times leſs extenſive than the European dominions of Ruſſia, which is conſtantly running in debt with all the world!

Skilful as the Dutch have always been in trade, and enlightened as their policy has in general been, with reſpect to matters of government, they have at times departed from the uſual ſpirit of their regulations in commercial affairs. While their jealouſy of the Oſtend Eaſt India Company made them raiſe an outcry which proved fatal to that aſſociation, they prohibited, under high penalties, all the natives of the United Provinces from purchaſing its ſtock; and, at different periods, they have prohibited all loans to foreign nations. But thoſe laws were very harmleſs; and did not, in all likelihood, prevent a thouſand florins from being embarked in foreign loans. How, in fact, could any reſtriction be deviſed, ſufficiently powerful to prevent a Dutchman from making ſix *per cent.*, by ſimply lending his capital to Great Britain, on the ſecurity of her whole

whole trade; while, by his utmoſt labour, toil, and riſk at home, he could not clear above half as much? Thoſe foreign loans have, in fact, proved the beſt reſource of the Dutch in their adverſity.

A people poſſeſſed of ſuch an overflowing capital, was, of all others, the very one that ſtood moſt in need of foreign colonies; and this for two reaſons—in order to obtain a new opening, of whatever kind, for the ſtock which could not be employed at home, or which, for want of this employment, was drawn, as we have ſeen, into the ſervice of foreigners—and in order to ſecure the poſſeſſion of this opening at all times under its own command.

Had the colonies of the Dutch always been as extenſive as they were during the firſt half of the ſeventeenth century, little of the national capital would have found its way to foreign countries; and the opulence of the United Provinces would now have been incalculably great. The loſs of the Brazils forced a great portion of their ſtock into foreign loans; and not a little of this was drawn to the cultivation of foreign colonies. The Engliſh and French colonies were much indebted to the wealthy merchants of Holland, at their firſt eſtabliſhments; and the Daniſh colonies owed their foundation entirely to Dutch capital.

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capital. * Thoſe foreign colonies, and their mother countries, afforded, indeed, an opening for capital; but it was neither the opening moſt advantageous for the ſtate, nor moſt ſecurely eſtabliſhed for the ſtockholders.

It was certainly leſs advantageous to the ſtate, than the colonial cultivation or commerce would have been; becauſe the profits only of the capital thus inveſted, were returned, to put in motion Dutch induſtry; becauſe the political circumſtances of the country, and its trifling extent of European territory, rendered an extenſion of dominion, in whatever part of the globe, highly advantageous, on account of its relations towards the other powers in Europe, poſſeſſed of American territories; and becauſe no nation ſtood ſo much in need, as Holland, of the various other political advantages, which we have formerly ſhown † to reſult from the poſſeſſion of diſtant provinces.

It was an opening for capital, too, much leſs ſecurely eſtabliſhed, and much more liable to be abridged and endangered, than any employment of ſtock could have been, either in the agriculture or the trade of the Dutch colonies. And, here, I am not merely talking of thoſe

* La Rich. de la Hol. II. 437.

† Sect. I.

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thoſe temporary dangers which ariſe to the capital of a ſtate employed in foreign ſervice, from the intervention of hoſtilities, or of political confuſion; I allude to the conſtant and neceſſary progreſs of foreign nations, as dangerous to the commercial proſperity of Holland, from the circumſtances of her ſituation in Europe.

It is now the univerſally received opinion among all men of enlightened political views, that the intereſts of trading nations are mutual; and that the celebrated prayer of Mr Hume, * for the proſperity of Spain, Italy, Germany, and even France herſelf, as ſubſervient to the proſperity of Great Britain, ought to be adopted by every true patriot. It muſt, however, be remembered, that Mr Hume expreſsly mentions the caſe of the Dutch, as an exception which may occur to his rule; though one which he ſeems to think too far diſtant, to be much dreaded by any country, in the actual ſtate of affairs.

It is nevertheleſs certain, that the Dutch have actually reached this period of their progreſs long ago; and that this very circumſtance has, for many years, been regularly and conſtantly working the downfal of their commerce. It is indeed true, as Mr Hume remarks,

* Eſſay VI. On the Jealouſy of Trade.

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marks, that a nation need never dread another's interference with its ſtaple; becauſe a ſtaple manufacture preſuppoſes ſome natural advantages peculiar to one people, for raiſing or working up a particular ſort of produce; and becauſe the demand for this produce may be enlarged by the growth of other nations, whoſe ſtaples may all the while be interfering with it in ſome reſpects. But the ſtaple of Holland is of a kind not peculiar to one country: it belongs to one ſtate of ſociety in every country: it is extent of capital and mercantile ſkill. While the other nations of Europe were ignorant of trade and navigation, they found it more profitable to employ the Dutch ſhips, than to build veſſels of their own. While their capital was low, they could not afford to engage in many branches of trade, without loans from the more wealthy Hollanders; or to engage, themſelves, in the trade of inſurance. Their wealth conſiſted in land, which they cultivated, to pay the Dutch for the uſe of their money and ſhips. But, in the courſe of time, their own population increaſed, their wealth augmented, and their naval ſkill was alſo improved. As the cultivation of the land has in no country ever been carried to its utmoſt improvement, had things been left to themſelves, all nations might, for a time, have found

found it more profitable to till the ground as before, and continue to employ the Dutch failors, and a little of the Dutch capital. Part of the Dutch capital, however, would ſtill have been thrown out of employment, and muſt have been encroached on, or diſſipated, for the ſupport of the proprietors, unleſs the colonies of the foreign countries had extended the opening, and kept up the demand for it: in which caſe, it would have remained in this channel, until a ſufficient accumulation of foreign ſtocks again excluded it, and threw it back upon the hands of the Dutch proprietors. Indeed, it is probable, that, in all countries, the formation of a mercantile navy would have taken place, independently of thoſe poſitive inſtitutions, which have perhaps only haſtened it by a few years in each. Navigation acts cannot create failors, and ſhips, and traders; they can only encourage their production, and haſten their appearance in a ſtate otherwiſe about to produce them. We have already ſeen, how all nations, at a certain period of their progreſs, naturally divide their induſtry and ſtock into various parts, ſuited to different channels; and we may be aſſured, that the taſtes and caprices of individuals have only been ſomewhat aided by reſtrictive and encouraging regulations, in leading men of all nations to an em-

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ployment of their labour and capital, often not the moſt beneficial to the community, and not always the moſt profitable to the individual. * It is not eaſy to ſee, why thoſe taſtes and caprices ſhould not be reckoned natural parts of the human character, and circumſtances to be conſidered in political calculations, as much as the deſire of bettering our conditions, the care of our offspring, the jealouſy of rivals, or any other of the principles, which are the foundation of all ſpeculations in the ſcience of political œconomy. Long before all the land in any ſtate was cultivated, or the cultivated part made to yield as much as good huſbandry could extract from it, there can be no doubt, that the influence of thoſe principles would have led men to employ their induſtry and ſtock in foreign commerce. The example of the Dutch or Venetians, or whoever elſe had hitherto been employed as carriers, brokers, and merchants, would always ſeduce abundance of hands, and of capital, from agriculture, as ſoon as hands and capitals were ſufficiently numerous; and the policy of modern Europe, influenced partly by abſurd jealouſy of thoſe common carriers, brokers, and merchants—partly by more ſolid views of the neceſſity, under which a maritime country lies, of acquiring the

* Sect. II. Introd.

the ſort of induſtry that forms the baſis of a navy—has only ſomewhat anticipated an event, which muſt ſoon have happened in the natural courſe of human affairs.

As the Dutch, then, poſſeſſed no natural advantages for the protection of commerce—as their ſea coaſt was more dangerous, their harbours fewer and more incommodious, their produce leſs various, valuable, and abundant, than thoſe of any other maritime people in Europe; it is manifeſt, that the great extent of their capital, and their naval ſuperiority, could only ſecure them a temporary advantage in the commercial intercourſe of nations. Although no jealouſy, or impolitic views of rivalry, had ever induced the violent meaſures of legiſlation and hoſtility, that were purſued againſt the intereſts of the United Provinces in the latter part of the ſeventeenth century; it is evident, that the fall of their commerce was ſlowly preparing, by the increaſed proſperity of their employers and cuſtomers. No ſuch national ſubdiviſion of labour and capital, as that which gave Holland the carrying and brokerage trade of Europe, would have ſubſiſted, after the neceſſity had ceaſed, to which this diviſion owed its origin. The diviſion would indeed have continued in each nation; and the employment formerly given to Dutch capital and ſeamen

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would now have ſupported the ſtockholders and ſailors of the different countries which required the aſſiſtance of their money and labour. The land of the different countries of Europe (of France and England, for example) was formerly cultivated, partly to ſupport French and Engliſh huſbandmen and manufacturers—partly to ſupport a claſs of merchants, brokers, and ſailors in Holland. The natural increaſe of French and Engliſh capital, and the conſequent introduction of mercantile and ſeafaring purſuits, accelerated by certain poſitive regulations of the two governments, have withdrawn that ſupport from the Dutch ſtockholders and mariners formerly employed; and the land of thoſe two countries is now cultivated, in order to ſupport Frenchmen and Engliſhmen alone. If other openings had not been found for the capital and induſtry of the Dutch, formerly employed by England and France, and ſupported by their harveſts; that capital could no longer be employed at all, and that labour would ceaſe to find ſupport. The money would be diſſipated, the men would emigrate, the capital of Holland would be diminiſhed, and her population would not be reproduced; or the former would only be accumulated, in order to be diſſipated; and the latter would only be reproduced, in order to emigrate.

emigrate. In a word, that ſingular ſtate of things would be at an end—in conſequence of which, part of the natural inhabitants of France and England were formerly ſettled in Holland; and thoſe inhabitants would now be transferred to the countries which ſupported and employed them.

That this decline of the Dutch commerce has actually been coming on for near a century and a half, there can be no manner of doubt. The nations of Europe have been recalling that part of their natural wealth and population, which they had formerly allowed to reſide in Holland; and the ſame circumſtances of natural ſituation—the ſame want of land, which formerly gave riſe to the ſplendour of the Republic, has, for ſome ages, been operating its downfal, and will unqueſtionably reduce its overgrown bulk, to that ſize for which the mediocrity of its reſources have adapted its ſtrength.

A few particulars will illuſtrate the fatal effects of the increaſed opulence of other nations, (formed for greater wealth and power, by the poſſeſſion of land), upon the commerce, and, in general, upon the reſources of Holland. The value of the goods exported from France, in Dutch bottoms, in the year 1658, was above forty-three millions. The tonnage

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duty, impoſed by Louis XIV. (in imitation of the Engliſh navigation act), deprived the Dutch of almoſt all this carriage. The commerce of England with the Low countries, in 1562, was valued at twenty-four millions of livres tournois *per annum*, almoſt entirely carried on in Dutch and Flemiſh veſſels; and, at the æra of the navigation act (a century after), it was prodigiouſly increaſed. It is needleſs to add, that this branch of the Dutch trade, likewiſe, was lopped off in the latter half of the ſeventeenth century.

By the ſtatement laid before their High Mightineſſes, in 1771, (uſually called the Prince of Orange's propoſitions), it appears that, of the Weſt India produce exported from Nantz, the great French colony emporium, one fourth only went to Holland, and three fourths to Hamburgh: whereas, formerly, three fourths had gone to Holland, and one fourth to Hamburgh. The fiſheries, from time immemorial, have ſupplied the Dutch with that rude produce, which their want of ſoil denied them. But not even thoſe fiſheries are properly their own. And, the moment that other nations, particularly Great Britain, began to claim their profits, the Dutch fiſheries began to decay. The number of herring buſſes, fitted out annually from the Provinces,

vinces, was formerly from 1500 to 1800; in 1764, it had fallen to 150; and in 1788, it was 200 at an average. * The average number of veſſels returning from the Greenland fiſhery, during the years from 1670 to 1700, was a little more than 139; from 1700 to 1730, it had riſen to 145; and from 1749 to 1779, it had fallen to 120. The average number of veſſels returning from the Davis's Straits fiſhery, from 1719 to 1739, was 89; from 1759 to 1779, it was only 35. † A falling off in the whole whale fiſhery of nearly one third; ‡ merely from the effects of competition, and the loſs of the carrying trade; for no nation could ſeize upon a preferable ſhare of this, as England did of the herring fiſhery. The New-Englanders have, in like manner, from the advantages of their ſituation, carried off a great part of the Northern cod fiſhery.

During the ſame period, the whole trade with the north of Europe, the moſt profitable and convenient of any that the Dutch enjoyed, had fallen off nearly one half. § And the Mediterranean

* Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) III. 709.—La Richeſſe de la Hollande, II. 54.

† Commerce, (Encyc. Method.) II. 552.

‡ The author of *La Richeſſe de la Hollande* ſtates the falling off at two fifths, II. 56.

§ La Richeſſe de la Hollande, II. 57.

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diterranean trade, which was as it were the other wing of the Baltic trade, muſt have decayed in proportion. Beſides, the interior carrying trade of the Mediterranean has likewiſe been greatly diminiſhed. It conſiſted chiefly in carrying Weſt Indian produce from Marſeilles to the Levant, a commerce now almoſt entirely occupied by the French themſelves. In a word, the perſons beſt acquainted with the Dutch commerce have aſſerted (and there is no reaſon whatever to doubt the truth of their opinion), that no branch of it has retained its former vigour, except the American and African trade, and that of the Rhine and the Maeſe, which are all independent of foreign power and competition. The other branches have been conſtantly and rapidly decaying. *

Nor will it be ſufficient to ſay, that the capital and induſtry, forced out of all thoſe branches of commerce, have found an opening elſewhere. We know that, during the latter part of the laſt century, the Dutch ſtock had filled every crevice of the market, where it could find admittance: for the profits were as low as poſſible; and the loans upon low intereſt, were extenſive and eaſily made. Sir William

* La Richeſſe de la Hollande, II. 349.—Econ. Pol. (Encyc. Method.) III. 709.

William Temple was informed, when in Holland (1669-70), that almoſt all the foreign trades of the Dutch were loſing ones, except the Indian; and that none gave a profit of above two or three *per cent.* * The rent of land was then never higher than two *per cent.*, and was deemed the leaſt gainful employment of ſtock. † A diviſion of trade had taken place; perhaps the laſt refinement of a flouriſhing commercial people. Each town applied almoſt excluſively to one branch; as, Middleburg to the wine trade, Fluſhing to the Weſt Indian trade, &c. ‡ Every article was taxed up to the higheſt; and one fiſh ſauce was in common uſe, which directly paid no leſs than thirty different duties of exciſe. §

All theſe are ſure ſymptoms of an overflowing capital, which, if thrown out of one trade, cannot poſſibly find employment in any other. If we look to the forces and population of the United Provinces, we ſhall find a correſponding decline. John De Wit (1669) computes the number of inhabitants, fed by the fiſheries, and the trades connected with them, at 450,000, in Holland and Weſt Friezeland. ¶ The whole

* Obſervations, VI.—Works, I. 138.

† Ibid. I. 92.

‡ Ibid. I. 128.

§ Ibid. I. 140.

¶ Intereſt of Holland, Part I. c. 9.

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whole of this clafs, in the Seven Provinces, in 1788, was reduced to 80,000. * John De Wit gives 2,400,000, as the whole population of Holland and Weſt Friezeland; † in 1778, 2,000,000 was reckoned the whole population of the Seven Provinces; ‡ and in 1790, it was eſtimated at about 2,750,000, including the county of Drenthe, and the lands of the Generality, which contain half a million of inhabitants. §

The army of the Republic, which, in former times, conſiſted of 60,000 men, was, in 1784, only 37,000 ſtrong; ‖ and ſince that time, it fell ſtill lower. And the navy, from 100 ſail had been diminiſhed, in 1781, to 69. ¶

We ſee, then, that from the peculiar circumſtances of Holland, there is not a ſufficient ſecurity for the continuance of its mercantile proſperity and political importance in the commerce which it has for ſome centuries carried on in Europe. The opening which the vaſt capital

* Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) III. 709.

† Intereſt of Holland, I. 9.

‡ La Richeſſe de la Hollande, II. 349.

§ Bœtticher's Statiſtical Tables, No. VII.

‖ Temple, I. 143.—Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) III. 720.

¶ Ibid.

capital of the Dutch has found in this quarter of the world, is inſecure, and muſt be cloſed, in the natural courſe of things, by the ordinary progreſs of improvement in other nations. The Republic, which does not raiſe two months ſubſiſtence for itſelf, muſt then be gradually reduced to a trifling province, and be ſwallowed up by any ambitious neighbour, whoſe territories may be incalculably improved by the acquiſition of ſea coaſt, and of a race of men eminently fitted for the purſuits of commerce and navigation.

The acquiſition of colonial poſſeſſions is the only means by which the United Provinces can poſſibly avoid ſuch a cataſtrophe, and ſupply their natural deficiency of territory, the cauſe of their inſtability, as it was the cauſe of their riſe and progreſs. An opening for capital may thus be obtained always under the command of the ſtate. For ages, the intereſts of the new ſettlements muſt be ſo cloſely connected with thoſe of the mother country, that no ſeparation can poſſibly happen. The habits of connexion or of dependence will then be firmly rooted, and the reſources of the European branch of the empire ſo much exalted by the mutual benefits of their union, that the connexion may be preſerved long after it has ceaſed to be neceſſary for the colony. Even after the

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the growth of the diſtant ſettlements ſhall make the ſcale preponderate to their ſide, the ſeat of empire may be transferred acroſs the Atlantic, if the jealouſy of rulers, and the factious ſpirit of demagogues, ſhall not interfere with thoſe plain views of mutual intereſts, which the different branches of an empire of traders are likely always to entertain. In the mean time, beſides enabling the Dutch to command a large ſhare of European commerce, to obtain, for example, grain and iron from the Baltic, in exchange for Weſt Indian produce; the commerce between thoſe parts of the ſtate, the diſtant and the contiguous, will be infinitely more advantageous than any which the provinces could poſſibly carry on in Europe, even although they could retain their former ſhare of this European trade. For, the higheſt commercial proſperity of a country like Holland, whoſe territory is on the ſea, conſiſts in circulating the commodities of the nations poſſeſſing land; and the profits only of this carrying trade are brought home to ſupport domeſtic induſtry. But the colony trade is, in fact, as we have * formerly ſhown, a home trade; ſo that the capital driven or drawn thither from the carrying trade, exchanges the leaſt advantageous

* Sect. 2. Part 1.

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tageous for the moſt advantageous line of employment. But even if we ſhould conſider the colony trade only a foreign trade of conſumption, it would ſtill be infinitely more advantageous than the carrying trade, to which, if deprived of colonies, the trading capital of the Dutch muſt of neceſſity be confined.

The poſſeſſion of colonies, then, muſt be as advantageous to the community of the United Provinces, as agreeable to individual capitaliſts and adventurers. It has certainly preſerved the commercial exiſtence of the Republic for a length of years, and enabled this ancient ſtate to retain its place among the great powers of Europe, inſtead of being ſwallowed up by its neighbours, or reduced to a few fiſhing villages. No nation of Europe depends ſo much upon colonial policy as Holland. None is ſo liable to be affected, in every member, by the ſlighteſt variation of colonial affairs. At all periods of the Dutch hiſtory, then, we may believe that the colonies have excited conſtant attention; and we ſhall now take a view of the different relations which have at various times ſubſiſted between the mother country and her diſtant provinces. We ſhall begin with the policy of the Dutch towards their Eaſt Indian colonies.

I.

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I. It may often happen in a commercial ſtate, that a few large capitals only are for ſome time acquired; and the proprietors of them naturally look for thoſe diſtant employments, which ſlowly return large profits. If an open market can be found already eſtabliſhed and tolerably well frequented, the large capitals will naturally be attracted by it as they are accumulated. But if all the markets of this kind are ſhut up by the monopolizing policy of other nations, then a new channel muſt be ſought for, and a market not formerly frequented, and, of courſe not regularly ſupplied, muſt be reſorted to. The irregular ſupply muſt render ſuch adventures extremely dangerous, and cannot fail, in the end, to make them ruinous, from the certainty of very great delay in the returns, and the chance of making repeated voyages, without any returns at all. If the number of the large capitals were ſufficiently great, this inconvenience would be immediately remedied; for ſome of theſe would be drawn permanently to the operations of this market, and employed excluſively in the taſks of collecting and aſſorting cargoes, which the other capitals might circulate and tranſport. Hence the eſtabliſhment of factories in diſtant countries, the nations of which are little occupied by trade. But before a ſufficient number of

of capitals have been turned into this trade, ſuch a diviſion of ſtocks can never take place; and the larger capitals, for want of it, cannot ſafely and profitably be employed in this way, any more than a few men would find their advantage in applying themſelves excluſively to particular branches of employments that require a co-operation of many hands—to the manufacture of watch-caſes, for example, before any watchmaker had appeared.

The eſtabliſhment of ſuch factories has been the primary object of all trading companies with joint ſtocks. The neceſſary effect of their inſtitution has been, to draw more capital to the diſtant trade than would otherwiſe have gone thither, in order to open a channel for thoſe which would have gone, ſomewhat ſooner than the ſame channel would have been opened in the natural courſe of things. And another conſequence of the commercial ſettlements, ſcarcely leſs neceſſary, has always been, the acquiſition of territorial power; the conqueſt of part of the diſtant country; the change of the trading company into a political body. When the inattention natural to great bodies engaged in a rich trade, and joining the character of governors to that of merchants, had reduced their affairs to an unproſperous condition (as generally happened in a ſhort time) by their influence with the government, their ſplendid promiſes

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miſes of pecuniary aſſiſtance, and the temptation of a little money paid down, they have generally ſucceeded in ſaving themſelves from ruin, by obtaining excluſive privileges. Thus, the inſtitution of the company, at firſt, drew to the diſtant trade more capital than would naturally have gone thither, in order to benefit a ſmall claſs of ſtockholders. The addition of the monopoly kept out capitals that would have gone thither, in order to preſerve the exiſtence of the company: and the acquiſition of political power was often prejudicial to the mother country; generally ruinous to the aſſociation itſelf; and always fatal to the diſtant provinces over which its dominion was ſuffered to extend.

Such has been exactly the hiſtory of the Dutch Eaſt India Company. When a few Dutch merchants, in the ſixteenth century, availed themſelves of the Portugueſe diſcoveries, and followed the new route to the rich market of Aſia; the chance of extraordinary profits, tempted them to run the riſk of returning without any cargo. But this riſk was ſoon found to be very great; and when the danger was realized, the ruin of the adventurer, who had embarked his whole ſtock in the ſpeculation, was the almoſt inevitable conſequence. Beſides, the veſſels were expoſed to the

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the jealouſy and cruelties of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe, at that time the moſt powerful of all the nations who frequented the diſtant ſeas. To form a fund which might provide, both for the protection of the Eaſt India trade, and for the collection and aſſortment of cargoes at all times in the Indian markets, a number of merchants aſſociated, publicly agreed to act in concert againſt the common enemy, and tacitly reſolved to act againſt the reſt of their fellow citizens. They obtained a charter of incorporation from the States-General; and prevailed upon that body, by adminiſtering to its preſſing exigencies in the Spaniſh war, to grant them the excluſive privilege of trading to the ſouthern parts of Aſia, for a ſhort term of years. It is probable that this monopoly did not at firſt keep out any trader from that rich commerce, who would otherwiſe have embarked in it. On the contrary, it certainly drew many capitals into it, which would otherwiſe have been employed in the carrying trade of Europe. For the Company's capital of 6,500,000 * florins, was divided into transferable ſhares, or *actions*, † of 3000 ‡ florins each,

* About 541,833l. Sterling.

† This is a term common over all the Continent, and is derived from the *action at law*, of which the poſſeſſion of a ſhare may be made the foundation.

‡ About 250l. Sterling.

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which were all ſpeedily bought up. But the whole capitaliſts, engaged in this trade being aſſociated, and acting in concert with the ſame intereſts, they fixed the prices of their merchandiſe to all conſumers, at the higheſt which thoſe conſumers could afford to pay. The ſuperiority of their trading capital, too, with their greater ſkill in commerce and navigation, enabled them to underſell all other nations, even in the foreign markets of Europe. For ſome years, the profits made by this concern were enormous; the greateſt, perhaps, ever yielded in any trade, except that of the Spaniards in South America. The annual dividends for the ſix years ending 1610, were as high as thirty-ſix *per cent.*; beſides the various political advantages that attended the poſſeſſion of the Company's ſtock. As the ordinary profits of ſtock were certainly not above one fifth of this, including the wages of the trader's labour, it is eaſy to perceive how high the price of the ſhares muſt ſoon have riſen. In a ſhort time, the actions roſe from 3,000 to 15,000, and at one time they ſtood as high as 24,000 florins, eight times the amount of their prime coſt. *

The

* La Richeſſe de la Hollande, I. 154.—Commerce, (Encyc. Method.) II. 535.—Dictionnaire de l' Homme d' Etat, par Robinet, XXVII. 117.—Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) III. 769.

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The charter, firſt granted to the Company in 1602, and ſince renewed from time to time, conferred upon them, beſides the excluſive right of trading to the Eaſt, the ſovereignty (under ſuperintendance of the States-General) of all the territories which they might acquire in that part of the world, by purchaſe, treaty, or conqueſt, with the full power of appointing their own ſervants; of raiſing whatever force they might deem neceſſary for the defence of their territories; and of making whatever laws they might think proper for the internal adminiſtration of their dominions. In conſequence of this charter, the moſt extenſive that ever was granted to any trading corporation, the Company proceeded to arrange their eſtabliſhment, both in Europe and the Eaſt Indies. The great commercial cities of the republic, intereſted in the joint ſtock, named each of them a certain number of the ſixty directors, to whom the Company's affairs were committed in the firſt inſtance. Seventeen of theſe were entruſted with the ordinary management of the common concern, and received good ſalaries, beſides the patronage annexed to their places.

Whenever any ſettlement was added to the Company's dominions, the government of it was placed in the hands of a captain-general, who commanded the forces, and preſided in

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the council; a director-general, entrusted with the management of the Company's stock, and the superintendance of their commercial interests; a major-general, the second in council; and five select councillors. The union of these eight officers formed the grand council, invested with full deliberative and executive powers in all matters of government, war, negotiation, and trade. The dangers to which the Company were exposed, from their ambition, and their jealous policy, rendered a great military establishment necessary in those distant settlements. So early as the year 1616, they had no less than forty-five large vessels engaged in war and trade, with 10,000 soldiers and sailors in their service, and 4,000 pieces of artillery. *

This flourishing state of affairs was of short duration. The directors in Europe, and the Company's servants in the settlements, were careless about the management of affairs, in which they had only a small share. The great and rich proprietors of stock alone were much concerned; but they divided their anxiety with thousands, and the interests of the Company were attended to by none. The office bearers in Europe were only anxious for patronage and gain

* La Richesse de la Hollande, I. 155, 175, & 485.—Commerce, (Encyc. Method.) II. 539.—Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) II. 542.

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gain by their places: the ſervants in the colonies had often an intereſt directly the reverſe of the Company's: they were tempted to ſettle for a while in exceedingly unwholeſome climates, in order to make a fortune; and the care of acquiring this as rapidly as poſſible engroſſed all their attention. Where all were bent on the ſame object, mutual indulgence and connivance would be granted by every one. Any ſtrict laws could only give the more powerful a pretext for oppreſſing the weaker, and for pillaging the Company and the natives, to the amount both of their own ſhare, and that of their inferiors. Thus, the miſmanagement and plunder of the Company's ſervants, and the diſputes in which their cruelties, avarice, and imprudence involved them with the native powers during the ſeventeenth century, greatly reduced the trade, wealth, and power of the inſtitution. To this may be added, the diſſenſions ariſing among the different chambers of the general direction, which had all a ſhare in the ſuperintendance of the concern, and, like the various parts of the great federal union—the provinces themſelves—were continually at variance, by the jealouſy of the rival towns, and the factious or intriguing ſpirit of the men that obtained an influence in the management. Meanwhile, the expence and magnitude of the military eſta-

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bliſhment was increaſed. At the end of the eighteenth century, it amounted to eighty veſſels, carrying from thirty to ſixty guns, and twenty-five thouſand men, ſoldiers included; while the whole dominions in Java, and its dependencies, were farmed for 361,260 dollars. In the beginning of the ſeventeenth century, the eſtabliſhment was only forty-five veſſels, and ten thouſand men. * The navigation of the Company appears to have been little better attended to. During the ſpace of forty-nine years, above one hundred and fifty of their veſſels were loſt by ſhipwreck in the ſeas of Europe; and the directors acknowledged, in 1780, that their loſs in the war had exceeded ten millions of florins, nearly twice the amount of their original capital. The conſequence of bad management, and loſſes of every kind, has been, a great diminution of ſtock. In 1751, the clear funds, including debts due to the Company, amounted to 62,480,000 florins. Of this, only 38,060,000 conſiſted of good debts and trading ſtock, the reſt being made up either of deſperate claims, or of capital veſted in buildings, forts, &c. The whole revenue was only 7,480,000 florins; out of which the expence of the European eſtabliſhment had to be paid. Since this, with the exception

* Econ. Pol. & Dip. (Encyc. Method.) III. 769.—Dict. de Robinet, XXVII. 117.

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ception of the declaration in 1780, a profound ſilence has been preſerved on the Company's affairs, by all the office-bearers of the Company, who are ſtrictly ſworn to ſecrecy. A more compendious and convincing method of exhibiting the ruinous ſtate of the concern, could not, it is probable, have been deviſed, if every document relating to the ſubject had been laid before the public.

As the Company's affairs declined, and the profits of the trade were diminiſhed, the proprietors became more tenacious of their privileges, and more eager to have them extended. The cruelties exerciſed upon the Engliſh interlopers at Amboyna, are coupled with the bare mention of the Dutch ſettlements in the Eaſt. The meaſures taken to prevent a larger ſupply of Indian goods from being ſhipped for Europe, than the narrow market of the high bidders can conſume, are equally well known, and ſcarcely leſs ſhameful. They made a conſtant practice of burning in the ſpice iſlands all the overplus of the ſpices, in order to prevent the contraband trade of the Dutch, or the interference of other nations. They entered into treaties with the native princes, to prevent the culture of more than a certain part of their lands. They appointed perſons to make progreſſes round the iſlands in ſpring time, and deſtroy the greater part of the buds and bloſſoms, with which an

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indulgent climate and genial ſoil ſo richly adorns the aromatic groves of India. Laws have repeatedly been obtained from the States-General by the Company, to prevent the encouragement of the foreign Eaſt Indian trade, by loan or emigration. Some Dutch ſailors and merchants having entered into the ſervice of the Engliſh, in their eſtabliſhments on the Coromandel coaſt, during the firſt part of the ſeventeenth century, the States publiſhed an ordinance, prohibiting all the ſubjects of the republic from engaging in any foreign Eaſt Indian ſervice, under pain of baniſhment, and confiſcation of goods. In the eighteenth century, the Oſtend Eaſt India Company excited the jealouſy of the Dutch Company. In 1721, a law was paſſed by the States, prohibiting their ſubjects from ſailing under the Oſtend colours, upon pain of death. And, in 1731, this unfortunate aſſociation was diſſolved, in conſequence of repreſentations from the different European States intereſted in the Eaſt Indian trade; among whom, Holland, that is, the Dutch Company, took the lead.

The meaſures taken to check the contraband trade of their own countrymen, have been no leſs ſevere. John De Wit gives us, in his invaluable work on the intereſt of Holland, a copy of the proclamation

proclamation iſſued annually by the government of Batavia, * (to which all the ſettlements are ſubordinate), for the regulation of all the Dutch ſubjects in thoſe parts. Among other oppreſſive articles, it is thereby ordained, that no bullion or coin ſhall be imported by any perſon to Europe, from the colonies, on pain of forfeiture; that all claims on the Company ſhall be preferred to the boards in India, and determined by the Company's own ſervants, on pain of loſing all right of action in the mother country; and that all houſehold furniture carried between Europe and the ſettlements, ſhall pay, per advance, two thouſand florins the laſt, or about ninety pounds Sterling per ton to the Company. ‡

Notwithſtanding the ſcarcity of employments for induſtry and capital in all parts of the Dutch dominions, the Company have always diſcouraged ſettlers and ſpeculations in the moſt extenſive, perhaps the moſt valuable, of the noble territories ſubject to their power —the Cape of Good Hope. They have, for a

* Part I. cap. 26.

‡ La Richeſſ. de la Hol. I. 175. 220.—De Wit, Int. of Hol. part I. c. 19.—Arnould, Syſteme Mar. & Pol. p. 127.—Anderſon's Hiſt. of Com. III. 128.—Commerce, (Encyc. Meth.) II. 543.—Econ. Pol. & Dip. (ibid.) III. 769. *et ſeq.*—Wadſtrom on African Colonization, part I. p. 65.

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a long time paſt, refuſed to grant the lands of that vaſt tract of country in private property, and have prohibited the farmers from fixing their habitations at more than a mile's diſtance from each other, although many diſtricts are ſo barren, that leſs than a ſquare mile would not make a proper grazing farm. † Their ſole object, the profitable trade from India, and the profitable traffic of neceſſaries to that quarter, is, it ſeems, much better accompliſhed by ſtunting, than by permitting the growth, either of the ſettlements themſelves, or of the ſubſidiary colony at the Cape.

Thus, while the expences of the Company have been increaſing; while their profits have been falling off; and the Indian trade has been declining every day: all poſſible means have been tried by the managers, aſſiſted by the States-General, in order to prevent the reſt of the Dutch capitaliſts from engaging in the traffic with thoſe advantages which they certainly would have reaped from it. In the mean time, the ſhares of the Company, notwithſtanding all thoſe precautions ſo oppreſſive to the country, have continued to fall in value with increaſed rapidity.

The

† Sparman's travels, vol. I.—Wadſtrom, part I. p. 182. The laſt mentioned author ſays, '*within* a mile of each other;' but he adds the remark which follows, as I have ſtated in the text: and it proves that the firſt expreſſion is wrong.

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The Dutch capital and ſkill were daily driven from ſome part of the European carrying trade; yet no means were purſued to open a vent for it in the colonies, which were always under command, and yielded abundant ſupplies of the produce moſt in demand, moſt eaſily exchangeable in Europe, moſt calculated to give the traders who poſſeſſed them a command of the European markets.

The fall of the dividends, and the conſequent diminution in the price of Eaſt India ſtock, will ſhew us how much the circumſtances that we have mentioned, as operating the ruin of the country, have tended to injure the Company themſelves, and how very little the evils ariſing both to the Dutch and to other nations, from the meaſures purſued with a view to ſave the Company, have in fact tended to the particular advantage even of that hurtful inſtitution.

In the period from 1605 to 1779, the dividends have varied from ſeventy-five to ten *per cent.*; and in many years no dividend at all was iſſued. From 1605 to 1610 (both inclusive), the dividend was (as we have before ſtated) thirty-ſix *per cent.* at an average. From 1610 to 1648, the average was only twenty-one; and from 1771 to 1780, it was no more than twelve and a half *per cent.* The price of the actions, which had at firſt riſen to five hundred,

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dred, and even eight hundred *per cent.* of the prime coſt, fell, in the period from 1770 to 1780, to about three hundred and forty *per cent.*, and continued during that time regularly to fall.

The gain, therefore, upon the capital veſted in the Eaſt India ſtocks, which, to the original ſubſcribers was at firſt thirty-ſix *per cent.*, had now fallen to two and three fourths *per cent.*: a ſmaller profit than is afforded by trade in any other country of Europe, and not one half the profit which private traders gain in the leaſt advantageous of the diſtant branches of commerce. We may eaſily imagine, then, how few capitals the hopes of ſuch a trifling gain allure to the ſervice of the Dutch Eaſt India Company. That inſtitution has, in fact, for many years, been ſupported chiefly by the number of thoſe who wiſh to acquire a political influence in its affairs, and are contented to take a ſmaller profit on their purchaſe-money, in order to obtain the chance, either of patronage in the Eaſt Indian eſtabliſhment, or gain and influence in the European direction.

Thus, inſtead of profiting by their poſſeſſions in the Eaſt, to ſecure an opening for that immenſe capital which has for a long time been overflowing into every channel of foreign employment, by loans, commerce, and ſtockjobbing, and

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and which will very ſoon be left without any employment at all, the United Provinces have, by means of their Eaſt India Company, almoſt entirely ruined the Eaſt India trade, ſtunted the growth of their ſettlements, alienated many of the native powers, and, at the expence of all the great capitaliſts and induſtrious adventurers in the republic, have obtained, for the indolence of ſome petty ſtockholders, a paltry annuity, and for the avarice of ſome great adventurers immenſe fortunes. It is not eaſy, then, to perceive the origin of thoſe encomiums which have been laviſhed on this inſtitution, unleſs indeed they came from men directly concerned in it. M. Robinet ſcruples not to aſcribe the commercial and political importance of Holland almoſt entirely to this cauſe. 'La Compagnie des In-' des Orientales (ſays he) c'eſt la cauſe la plus ' ſenſible et le principal ſoutien de la puiſſance ' des Hollandois.' *

It is probable that many years will not elapſe before the Dutch may find it abſolutely neceſſary to give vent to their overflowing capital, by throwing open the Eaſt India trade, and taking from the Company, if not the government which they have groſsly abuſed, at leaſt the trade which they have ſyſtematically miſmanaged. But the ill effects of the monopoly

* Dict. XXVII. 117. de l'homme d'etat.

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nopoly and the Company government, will long continue to operate againſt the Republic and her Aſiatic colonies. To ſay nothing of the ſtate of languor into which thoſe ſettlements have been thrown, and the dangers to which they have been expoſed from the native powers by the oppreſſive government of the Company, the monopoly has raiſed a formidable competition againſt the Dutch, more eſpecially in the Engliſh and French colonies. The French, for example, formerly ſent only five or ſix veſſels yearly to India, and purchaſed Dutch Eaſt India goods to the amount of ten or twelve millions of florins. Above twenty years ago, they ſent eighteen or twenty veſſels to the Eaſt, and ſold to Holland as much Eaſt India merchandiſe as they formerly bought from her. The political folly of the Republic, then, has ſubjected her Aſiatic trade to preciſely the ſame evils from foreign competition, to which the unavoidable diſadvantages of her natural ſituation in Europe ſubject the other branches of her traffic.

The States-General, and the body of the Dutch people have been reconciled to that grand nuiſance, of which we have now traced the hiſtory, by its conſtant ability to ſupport itſelf, without any direct aid from the public treaſury, and by certain evident advantages which it has, from time to time, been able to afford

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afford the community and the government. The charter was granted for the eighth time in 1762; and the average premium paid for thoſe renewals, was about two hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds Sterling, or three millions of florins. The Company have uniformly paid a compoſition of ſixteen thouſand florins *per annum* in lieu of cuſtoms on exports; and the amount of the cuſtoms on Eaſt Indian imports, is four hundred and twenty-five thouſand florins at an average. The Company have, beſides, often aſſiſted the ſtate with loans at very critical emergencies; and as the æras of the Republic's moſt preſſing occaſions during the Spaniſh war, and of the higheſt proſperity of Indian affairs, happened fortunately to coincide, the Company had an opportunity of rendering very eſſential ſervices, and of acquiring a very great name in the ſtate. They have frequently, too, ſupported the declining manufactures in ſeveral of the chief towns of the provinces; they have always allotted a conſiderable yearly revenue to the Stadtholder, which ſecured the favourable influence of that officer; and they have uſually granted to the government a percentage on the prime coſt of the actions, beſides furniſhing at a low price abundance of ſaltpetre for the ſervice of the army and navy. Although ſome of theſe interpoſitions are far from being beneficial, or even harmleſs

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to the ſtate, while none of them are of any material conſequence; yet all of them are of that plain and palpable deſcription which generally attracts both rulers and people. The proſperity of the Dutch Eaſt India Company, therefore, by far the moſt hurtful commercial inſtitution that ever aroſe among men, has been always an object of equal favour with the government, which it did not much aſſiſt even in the mean time; and with the people, whom it was, both in the mean time, and at the long-run, bringing to poverty and ruin.

II. The hiſtory of the Weſt Indian colonies of Holland, has been in all reſpects extremely different. Long before the Dutch had acquired any ſettlements in America, they were in the habit of trading thither as individuals, or in ſmall copartneries. The voyage being much ſhorter, and the temptations offered by the Spaniſh and Portugueſe contraband being greater than any which the Eaſt Indian commerce held out, many more capitals muſt have been drawn to the Weſtern, than went at firſt to the Eaſtern traffic. But the deſire of acting in concert againſt Spain during the war, and the monopolizing views which traders conſtantly engaged in the ſame branch of commerce never fail to acquire, induced the ſeveral individuals and copartneries

partneries carrying on this trade, to apply, in the year 1621, for an incorporating and excluſive charter. The States-General, expecting the ſame aſſiſtance from the New Aſſociation that they had received from the Eaſt India Company, and believing that no means could be deviſed more effectual for annoying the Spaniards, acceded to the demand, and granted to the New Corporation an excluſive right to all the African and American commerce; taking upon themſelves, in this manner, the right of limiting, not merely the traffic of thoſe ſettlements which they might acquire, but of other ſtates and colonies placed beyond the juriſdiction of the Republic. Beſides theſe commercial privileges, the States conferred upon the Corporation the right of governing and defending any new colonies which it might acquire; and made it a preſent of ſeveral large veſſels, well manned. They retained to themſelves, however, the nomination of the Company's Governor-General abroad.

The original capital of this Aſſociation amounted to ſeventy-two thouſand florins, in transferable ſhares or actions, of ſix thouſand florins each. The European adminiſtration was committed to five Chambers in the great mercantile towns, conſiſting of ſeventy-four directors, of whom eighteen, with a deputy appointed by the States, were

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inveſted with the general management of affairs. At firſt, the concerns of the Aſſociation proſpered. The æra of its formation was the moſt brilliant period of the opulence, as well as the heroiſm and patriotic zeal of the United Provinces. The antipathy with which all ranks were animated againſt the Spaniſh name, engaged univerſal favour and aſſiſtance to every project inimical to the intereſts of the Crown of Caſtile. The Company's charter happened to comprehend that very part of the world where the moſt valuable parts of the Spaniſh dominions were moſt expoſed to invaſion. Thither the whole efforts of the Dutch were bent; and, while the armies of the Republic were conquering the fine provinces of Brazil, the navy, under the banners of the Weſt India Company, was deſtroying the rich commerce of Mexico and Peru.

The affairs of the Company, during this ſplendid period, ſeem to have attracted ſo much attention, that they were extremely well managed. The whole expence of adminiſtration and of war, from 1623 to 1636, amounted to thirty-five millions; and, during thoſe thirteen years, prizes, to the amount of no leſs than thirty millions, were taken from the Spaniſh and Portugueſe. Eight hundred veſſels were conſtantly employed in the commercial and military operations

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operations of the Weſt Indies; and the Company, with a wiſdom and liberality very unuſual in ſuch Corporations, allowed all their fellow citizens to trade freely to Brazil, provided they uſed their veſſels, and did not interfere with the timber trade, of which they retained the monopoly. But that commercial proſperity muſt always be inſecure which is ſubject to the viciſſitudes of military operations, and depends upon the poſſeſſion of war-monopoly or plunder. A trading company is, if poſſible, more unfit to conquer and defend, than to traffic and govern. The Portugueſe no ſooner threw off the Spaniſh yoke, than they turned their attention to thoſe rich colonies, the loſs of which they owed, in a great meaſure, to the neglect of the Spaniſh government during the union of the kingdoms; and the Dutch Company, with that inconſiſtent parſimony which marks the operations of mercantile bodies engaged in political or military affairs, had retrenched ſo much of the expence required for defending their poſſeſſions, and rendered uſeleſs ſo many of their beſt officers, by ſubjecting their meaſures to the controul of men taken from behind the counter, that the colonies were left utterly defenceleſs, and fell a ſacrifice to the firſt attack of the Portugueſe *.

* Note Q.

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From this time, as might eaſily be expected, the affairs of the Company rapidly declined. Bad management in every quarter; diſputes among the ſervants of the Company abroad, and the directors at home; loſſes in war, and by every ſort of peculation—all the uſual attendants of company government—conſpired to ruin a concern which had only been ſupported by the aſtoniſhing ſucceſſes of a war carried on againſt the richeſt territories of the moſt opulent nations in Europe. The amount of the dividends ſoon fell to nothing; the value of ſhares quickly decreaſed; and the Company, being overwhelmed with debt, actually loſt by the trade. In 1674, therefore, the Corporation was diſſolved; and, as if the bad effects of ſuch a ſyſtem had not already been ſufficiently experienced, a new Society was immediately chartered, though upon a plan ſomewhat different. It was to undertake the burden of the old Company's debt, amounting to ſix millions, but reduced to thirty *per cent.*, and was to accredit in its books the proprietors of the old Company ſtock, at the rate of fifteen *per cent.* The creditors, on their part, were to advance an addition of eight *per cent.* on their loans, and the ſtockholders were to advance four *per cent.* on their ſhares. The new capital, thus ſcraped together, amounted only to ſix hundred and thirty thouſand florins. The excluſive

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cluſive commerce of the Company was limited to a certain part of the African coaſt, beſides the conqueſts they ſhould make. The reſt of the trade monopolized by the former Company, was now thrown open to all the ſubjects of the Republic. In 1730, when the charter was renewed, the African ſlave-trade was made free, on condition of a certain laſtage being paid to the Company; and in 1734, the whole African trade was laid open upon the ſame terms.

It muſt be acknowledged, that, even previous to 1730, the privileges of this Corporation were ſuch as could give but little umbrage to the body of the Dutch merchants, when compared with the rights enjoyed by the firſt inſtitution of the ſame kind. But as the united privileges of the Company were not ſufficient to counterbalance the various diſadvantages under which all ſuch inſtitutions labour, they obtained, in 1682, the excluſive management of the colony of Surinam, for the trifling ſum of two hundred and ſixty thouſand florins paid to the States-General. This grant was accompanied by certain conditions, evidently ſuggeſted by the hiſtory of the Eaſt India and old Weſt India companies, and framed with the manifeſt view of preventing the abuſes common to trading corporations. They were to ſerve as the fundamental rules of the Company in the poſſeſſion of the new territory; and the altera-

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tion or infringement of any of them was to incur an immediate forfeiture of the grant.

By article IV. of this important charter, certain duties on exports and imports are eſtabliſhed, and certain taxes fixed on the coloniſts. By articles VI. and VII., the Company is bound to furniſh annually a ſufficient number of ſlaves to the colony. Theſe reſtrictions and obligations are in their own nature nugatory and abſurd. It is ridiculous to prevent any authority, conſtituted for the purpoſes of government, from varying the impoſts according to the circumſtances that may occur; and no criterion is given in the charter, by which to eſtimate what number of ſlaves may be ſufficient for the ſervice of the coloniſts. The planters muſt, of courſe, always demand a greater ſupply—the Company muſt be inclined to give a ſmaller ſupply than is neceſſary. But there were other articles added to the above clauſes, and neceſſarily productive of the happieſt effects to this fine colony, by remedying moſt of the evils that uſually attend Company government.

By articles XIII. XIV. and XV., free commerce and ſettlement in the new colonies are permitted to all Dutch ſubjects, on condition of their ſailing ſtraight thither, and returning ſtraight therefrom, neither interfering with the Company's African monopoly, nor touching at any foreign port. By article VIII. (one of the moſt remarkable

remarkable in any charter of this kind, and by far the wifeſt that we meet with in the hiſtory of trading corporations), the Company are abſolutely prohibited from ever ſending a ſingle veſſel to the colony for the purpoſes of trade, and are only permitted to carry thither ſlaves from Africa, and to reload the ſlave ſhips with the produce of the taxes paid in kind, and the price received for the ſlaves ſold. Beſides theſe important limitations, although the Company are allowed to name the governor, and to bind him by inſtructions, the States-General muſt always ratify both the appointment and the inſtructions. The governor is to take the oaths of allegiance to the States and Stadtholder, as well as to the Company; he is to be guided by a colonial council, ſelected by himſelf, from a double number choſen by the free inhabitants. The Company are bound to defray all expences out of the funds aſſigned in the charter, and to lay no tax whatever upon the ſettlement, without the conſent of the States. *

The privileges of the Company, thus reſtricted, were not ſufficient to defray the expence of the original purchaſe money paid for the charter. Accordingly, in the next year, they ſold one third ſhare to the city of Amſterdam,

* Articles XVII. XVIII. XXI. and XXVII.

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dam, and another to the rich family of Sommelſdyk, reſerving the remaining third to themſelves. Thoſe three co-proprietors have ſince continued to form a ſociety or partnerſhip under the name of the Surinam Company, regulated by the charter originally granted to the Weſt India Company. The affairs of the inſtitution are adminiſtered at Amſterdam, by a congreſs compoſed of as many deputies as each partner chuſes to ſend: but each partner has one vote only, and pays the ſalary and expences of his own commiſſioner. A concern, managed in this way, poſſeſſes many advantages over the common adminiſtration of chartered companies—from the diviſion of intereſts, and the mutual checks of the three parts on each other, and from one of the parties being, not a corporation, but a private individual. In vigour and deciſion of operations, ſuch a government muſt be proportionably deficient; and hence the territories of the Company have been expoſed to many ſerious dangers from invaſions and inſurrections, without poſſeſſing ſufficient vigour to meet the exigencies of the occaſion. Except in the government of Surinam, this Aſſociation has no connexion with the Weſt India Company, which, of conſequence, continued to furniſh negroes to the ſettlement, in its capacity of African Company, until the year 1730.

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A view of the progreſs of the dividends and prices of Weſt India ſtock, will enable us to judge concerning the proſperity, not only of the Surinam Society, but alſo of the concerns of the Weſt India Company. The average dividend in ten years, ending 1690, was $2\frac{3}{7}$ *per cent.* In ten years, ending 1772, it was 1 *per cent.*; and from 1773 to 1779 incluſive, nothing at all was divided. The actions, as may eaſily be imagined, have never been at par; their price has varied from $92\frac{1}{2}$ to 18 *per cent.* ſince the year 1723. The average price during ten years, ending 1732, was about $81\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* During ten years, ending 1779, it had fallen to $32\frac{4}{7}$ *per cent.*

The ſettlements of Eſſequibo, or Iſſequibo, and Demerary, have been always under the charter of the Weſt India Company, as well as Surinam, and governed in the ſame manner.

Berbice, or Berbiche, though within the Company's charter, owed its origin to the mercantile ſpeculations of the family of Van Peere; and all the cultivated part of the colony belonged to them. In 1678, they obtained a perpetual grant of it from the Company, which was confirmed in 1703; and when the French attacked it in 1712, the colony bought them off with a conſiderable compoſition, paid, partly in goods and money, partly in a bill of exchange drawn

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drawn upon the houſe of Van Peere in Holland. For the acceptance of this, the French took two hoſtages of rank; and as theſe happened ſoon after to die, the proprietors refuſed to honour the draught. The money was paid by three great mercantile houſes, and one fourth of it by the Van Peeres, who thus transferred three fourth ſhares of the colony to the other merchants as co-proprietors: and the four houſes together, formed a copartnery or company at Berbice, adminiſtered exactly in the ſame manner with the Surinam Society.

Thus did the ſpirit of mercantile adventure, which has ever diſtinguiſhed the Dutch from all other nations, give riſe to a ſpecies of private property and delegated government, perhaps the moſt ſingular that has been known among civilized nations. If the colony of Berbice had remained under the ſame ſyſtem of proprietary management, and continued to proſper as it did at firſt, we might have now ſeen a country of much greater extent, fertility and population, than the United Provinces, ſubject to the hereditary adminiſtration of four private merchants, in conſequence of a ſpeculation undertaken by their anceſtors. The proprietary governments of North America differed from the Company adminiſtrations of Guiana, in many important particulars. They were the conſequence,

quence, not of mercantile adventures, when the colonies had attained a conſiderable pitch of proſperity, but of large and thoughtleſs grants, made by the Crown to favourites, of waſte and uninhabited lands. The proprietor had only the right to the lands which remained unalienated, and had the power of naming to certain offices, which conferred a ſhare of the ſupreme power, extremely trifling, when compared to that which the Dutch governors enjoyed. The Britiſh colonies were ſubſervient to the Legiſlature of the mother country;—the Dutch colonies owed the ſame allegiance, not to the States-General, but to the proprietors.

But the exiſtence of this moſt anomalous ſpecies of colonial government and property, was terminated by that rage for ſtockjobbing and mercantile gambling of every kind, which broke out over all the trading part of the European commonwealth in the year 1720. Berbice opened a large field of ſpeculation to the proprietors. They reſolved to extend their aſſociation, by forming a capital of 3,200,000 florins, divided into transferable ſhares, the property of which communicated the colonial rights formerly enjoyed by the four aſſociates. Theſe ſhares were never bought up. In 1774 only 941 had been diſpoſed of, at the price of 1,882,000 florins; and the price, originally

2000

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2000 florins, fell, in a few years after that period, to 200; notwithſtanding the large dividends which the proprietors moſt imprudently cauſed to be made from a fund wholly inadequate to the demand.

The African trade, the other great branch of the Weſt India Company's property, had been rapidly declining long before it was, we may preſume from neceſſity, abandoned. The Company were bound to furniſh, annually, to ſome of the colonies a certain number of ſlaves at a ſpecified price;—to others, ſuch a number as might be required. They were, however, utterly unable to fulfil any of thoſe conditions; and ſo long as the excluſive privileges of the ſlave trade were retained, the deficiency was ſupplied by ſmuggling directly from Africa, or by underhand dealing with the French and Engliſh ſettlements.

Such has been the fate of the Weſt India Company of Holland; by far the moſt harmleſs inſtitution of the ſort, ſince its revival in 1674, that has ever been erected, whether we regard its mercantile privileges or its political power. The former were ſo limited, that they could impoſe little or no reſtraint upon the general commerce of the colonies. The latter was ſo narrowly watched by the government, and ſo much checked by the privileges of the coloniſts,

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coloniſts, that it never gave the Company any opportunity of greatly miſmanaging the political affairs of the ſettlements. The intereſt of a few individuals in a large part of the Company's ſtock, may alſo be conſidered as an additional circumſtance in favour of the inſtitution. Nothing but this has tended to preſerve its exiſtence, languiſhing as it now is, and probably drawing faſt to a cloſe.

The ill ſucceſs which this Aſſociation has experienced, furniſhes a uſeful example of the manifold evils of Company government. If the only corporation of this kind which has never enjoyed the power of miſmanaging the political affairs, ſtunting the growth, and cramping the trade of the colonies ſubmitted to its inſpection, fell into a rapid decay almoſt immediately after its erection, and only preſerved its exiſtence by deviating from the nature of chartered companies; ſurely, it is fair to conclude, that all thoſe companies which have proſpered with more ample grants of political and commercial rights, have owed their ſucceſs entirely to the ruin of the government and trade of the community entruſted to their care.

We ſhall now ſhortly conſider the advantages which the United Provinces have derived from the poſſeſſion of their South American colonies,

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nies, and endeavour to eſtimate the ſtill greater benefits, which a better ſyſtem of colonial policy may hereafter derive from thoſe noble provinces.

1. The avidity with which Dutch capitaliſts have uniformly ſeized all opportunities of embarking their ſtock in Weſt Indian ſpeculations, far exceeds any thing of the kind which has appeared in the other leſs wealthy and adventurous countries of Europe. No part of the Dutch commerce, indeed, gives us ſuch an idea of the vaſt extent to which the accumulation and diſtribution of capital has been carried by the frugal and induſtrious inhabitants of the Low Countries, and of the neceſſity under which they labour, of finding ſome certain opening for their ſurplus ſtock, by the acquiſition of new territory.

We have formerly had occaſion to remark, that the circumſtances in the ſituation of ſmall capitaliſts, and the nature of the diſtant trades, or of colonial ſpeculations in general, prevent ſuch ſmall proprietors from engaging directly in thoſe branches of commerce and agriculture. In proportion to the extent of their numbers and wealth, the Dutch have among them fewer large capitals, than are to be met with in nations leſs opulent, induſtrious and free. Their magnificent reſources chiefly conſiſt

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ſiſt in the vaſt number of ſmall capitals every where diffuſed. An extreme refinement in the commerce of Holland, has opened the diſtant traffic and agriculture to thoſe ſmaller ſtocks, as well as to the larger ones, which naturally reſort thither; and this has been merely an improvement of thoſe two ways which I formerly pointed out *, as the only means of drawing the ſmaller capitals into the colony trade.

The temptations of an intereſt, double that of the Dutch money market, and much exceeding the ordinary gains of Dutch commerce, are ſufficient to induce great capitaliſts to riſk their money in loans, more eſpecially if thoſe men are engaged in the colony trade as merchants (which is generally the caſe); for then they receive the conſignments of Weſt India goods for the European market; and the whole commiſſion, amounting to $2\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* on the receipts, and the ſame on all furniſhings, is a clear profit, without any riſk, and with very little outlay of capital. As, however, the larger capitaliſts in general prefer to employ their ſtocks directly in the colonies, and either to reſide there or keep a ſteward, the merchants, after expending all their capitals in ſo tempting an employment, often find themſelves unable to ſatisfy the demands continually

* Sect. II. Part I.

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ly made by their Weſt Indian correſpondents for more capital, to extend their ſpeculations, or to obtain a living profit on their former outlays. If the aſſiſtance of the Dutch merchants ends here, they run the riſk of loſing the conſignments; and if the planter fails for want of ſuch additional ſupplies, his creditors are ſure to ſuffer, beſides loſing the conſignments of the new proprietor who may purchaſe the ſtock of the bankrupt. Thus, the great Weſt India houſes often ſtrain themſelves much beyond their power, to ſerve, or to ſave their debtors, and all to no purpoſe; contracting debts, in order to lend to their colonial debtors, till at laſt the ruin which has thus been delayed, falls on their own heads in the firſt inſtance.

The circumſtances in the ſituation of ſmall capitaliſts, which prevent them from engaging in colonial ſpeculations, are chiefly their timidity about loſing ſight of their ſtocks, and their need for quick returns. The circumſtance in the nature of the trade itſelf, which produces the ſame effect, is the neceſſity of large ſtocks to bring in tolerable profits *. Both the one and the other of thoſe obſtacles have been removed by the fertile invention of the Hollanders.

The

* Sect. II. Part I.

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The merchant who receives an appointment as agent and conſignee of a planter, gives public notice, that, at a certain time, a certain ſum will be required for the plantation, by way of loan; that the documents of the valuation and produce are depoſited with him; that he has received credentials as director of the affair, and alſo the neceſſary number of acts of hypothecation, by which the planter, as well as himſelf, become bound, perſonally, and to the utmoſt extent of their property, to repay, within a certain time, the loans advanced in the form of purchaſe money, and to diſcharge the intereſt of theſe at certain terms. The public are thus invited to purchaſe theſe bonds or actions, bearing intereſt, and transferable from hand to hand. The holders are allowed to meet, and chooſe ſeveral reſpectable perſons of their own number, as commiſſioners, to whom the director is obliged, annually, to give an account of his management, and to exhibit documents of the ſtate of the plantation, and the progreſs of the loan. The affair is, in this way, organized preciſely after the manner of a public loan, or the ſtock of a trading corporation. The temptation of a higher intereſt balancing the inferior ſecurity, the monied men eagerly buy up the actions of ſuch private co-

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partneries, and give them a currency like that of the Britiſh Navy and Exchequer bills.

When this mercantile experiment was firſt tried, it is inconceivable with what rapidity the ſhares were ſeized by all, and how many new loans, on ſimilar terms, were immediately opened, with the expectation of a ſimilar ſucceſs. The ſmalleſt capitaliſts did not ſcruple to riſk part of their ſtock in each of thoſe adventures—a hundred florins in one, five hundred in another, and a thouſand in a third; ſince, by dividing the riſk, they diminiſhed the chance of great loſs, or total ruin, and were conſtantly receiving the returns. Indeed, as the actions bore intereſt at all times, the holder of them, if the fixed term of payment did not return often enough, might ſell his proportion at any time, and receive from the purchaſer the intereſt due ſince the laſt dividend, deducting a trifling conſideration for the advance. The conſtant poſſeſſion of his capital, under the fictitious form of actions, and the recourſe afforded againſt the merchant-director of the ſcheme conſtantly in his view, gave the purchaſer the idea of having his capital always in his ſight; and ſo far this idea was well-founded, that he always poſſeſſed a ſaleable or exchangeable commodity within his reach. * Beſides, no active ſpirit of adventure

* Note R.

venture was required; the debtors alone were the puſhing people; the creditors had nothing to do, but to purchaſe their ſhares, and draw their dividends. The capitals of perſons unfit for buſineſs—of children, aged people, and women—might find their way into ſuch loans; and the ſtockholder, who could exert himſelf, had time left to employ his talents and induſtry in other gainful occupations. The ſmalleſt gain or ſaving might thus be laid out, at any moment, and for any length of time, while his main ſtock was carrying on his main buſineſs; and, in a country ſo overſtocked as Holland, where the openings for capital were daily contracted, it was a matter of infinite moment to poſſeſs ſome ſuch vent for ſurplus ſtock, which, in leſs opulent and more extenſive countries, would inſtantly have been abſorbed in the ſame lines of employment that had led to its accumulation.

Thus, the ſmaller capitals in Holland were attracted to the colonial cultivation; and the mother country afforded the colonies all that aſſiſtance of which they ſtood ſo much in need, by turning into their ſervice the overflowing capital of her own traders and proprietors. The amount of the colonial debts is accordingly ſtated to have been enormous. We are

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told, that, about twenty-five years ago, the debts of Surinam amounted to ſixty millions of florins, and thoſe of the other colonies to forty millions, † without including thoſe on open account, which, though tranſacted at ſhorter dates, muſt have been very great. M. Malouet (an author extremely well-informed as to all colonial affairs) ſays, that the debts of Surinam alone amounted, while he was there, (1776), to eighty millions. He eſtimates the portion of the net produce which comes to the planters, at one tenth only: one fifth goes to government; two fifths to inſurance, freight and commiſſion; three tenths to the intereſt of debts, and to caſualties. Of four hundred houſes of proprietors in the colony, in 1776, only twenty were free from debt, and enormouſly wealthy; one hundred had debts amounting to between one third and one fourth of their value; one hundred and fifty owed one half, and the remaining hundred and thirty owed from three fourths to the whole, or upwards. ‡ This exceſſive load of debt, aroſe from the great eaſe of borrowing. The avidity of all money-holders in the mother country, to engage in colonial loans, induced the planters,

† La Rich. de la Hol. II. 201.

‡ Mem. ſur les Col. tom. III. p. 87.

ers, who wiſhed to overtrade or relieve their deſperate circumſtances, to tranſmit to Europe eſtimates of their property higher than the truth. We are told, that it was uſual to ſend about the ſame ſlaves and cattle from one plantation to another, at the time of making up the inventories and valuations; and the produce was often ſmuggled out of the ſettlement in foreign ſhips, to the prejudice of the director-conſignee in Holland,* who, on his part, during ſeaſons of misfortune, exhauſted his own funds and credit in advancing to the ſtockholders the intereſt due from the coloniſts, and was ſometimes entirely bankrupt, while the actions were all the while ſelling at a premium. The failure of a great Weſt India houſe has frequently ſhook the whole 'Change at Amſterdam, and been felt over the Republic like the ſhock of a national bankruptcy. On the other hand, evils frequently ariſe to the planters, from the harſh treatment of ſome creditors, who, obſerving the ſtrict letter of the law, have agents ready upon the ſpot, to force a ſale of the plantation, on the failure of payments, the moment they are due. In this caſe, the creditor or a friend is generally the purchaſer, and always buys at a very low price.

* La Rich. de la Hol. II. 201.

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The capital attracted to the colonies in this manner, cannot, by any means, be ſaid to be taken from more uſeful employment. For all that ſyſtem of credit which we have been contemplating, is founded, not on the poſſeſſion of colonies, but on the abundance of the national capital. It is the effect of a vaſt accumulation of ſtock in a country without internal reſources, and depending for employment on thoſe deficiencies of its neighbours which they are every day ſupplying. If Holland poſſeſſed no colonies, the ſurplus capital would ſtill find a vent in loans to foreign governments, or foreign individuals, or foreign colonies. In fact, the very ſame ſyſtem of credit has, in part, grown up, in thoſe tranſactions alſo, from the limited extent of the colonies, the reſtraints impoſed by the excluſive privileges of corporations, and the checks which colonial adventures receive from the abuſes of the ſlave ſyſtem. The numerous loans of the Dutch to foreign ſtates, are negociated in the very way that we have already deſcribed. The loſs of the colonial eſtabliſhments would only multiply thoſe foreign loans, and deprive the ſtate, not only of all the political advantages of ſuch dominions, but alſo of the ſecurity and gain reſulting from the poſſeſſion of that opening for ſurplus capital, which the colonies at preſent afford.

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2. Several other circumſtances have contributed to the aſtoniſhing increaſe of the Dutch ſettlements, beſides the immenſe reſources of credit, ſo much wanted in all other colonies. They have, like the mother country, afforded an aſylum to perſecuted men of every deſcription. The revocation of the edict of Nantz ſent thither many reſpectable French families, both from the colonies and from Europe. The Jews have found the ſame hoſpitable reception in Dutch Guiana as at Amſterdam: they form a conſiderable part of the white population, enjoy all civil privileges, and participate in ſome important political rights. * The climate of Guiana, although not very favourable to health, is much more favourable to opulence, than that of the iſlands; and the robuſt conſtitution of the negroes is not at all affected by the diſeaſes ariſing from heat and dampneſs. The crops are never laid waſte by thoſe hurricanes, which ſo often blaſt the hopes of the Weſt Indian planters in the tropical ſettlements. The ſoil is abundantly productive, and all ſorts of Weſt Indian produce have flouriſhed there, that have ever been tried.

* La Rich. de la Hol. I. 295.—Malouet, Mem. ſur les Col. III. 190.—Morſe, American Geography, p. 155.

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From all theſe cauſes has ariſen a degree of induſtry and agricultural wealth quite unknown even in the other colonies of European nations. The Dutch, in South America, are diſtinguiſhed by the ſame perſevering ſpirit of labour, that marks their character in Europe; by the ſame neceſſity of ſtruggling againſt the encroachments of the ſea; and by the ſame ſplendid reward of their toils, in aſtoniſhing opulence.

In the year 1764, Demerary and Iſſequibo had one hundred and thirty plantations on a ſmall ſcale. The average produce of Surinam, in the year 1775, was eſtimated at from twenty to twenty-two millions—the growth of four hundred and thirty large plantations, tranſported to the mother country in ſeventy great veſſels. Berbice, which has never recovered the effects of the fatal inſurrection in 1760, had only (in 1775) one hundred and four plantations, and ſent home, in four or five veſſels, from ten to twelve hundred thouſand florins worth of produce. * Since that time, the cultivation of every article, except cotton and cacao, has been diminiſhed; but the returns of the former of thoſe

* Morſe, Amer. Geog. p. 154.—Ricard, Traité du Commerce, III. 676.—Malouet, III. 190.—La Rich. de la Hol. I. 334.—Raynal, IV. 262.—Commerce (Encyc. Method.) II. 548.—Econ. Pol. (Encyc. Method.) II. 54.

thoſe valuable articles (eſteemed the fineſt in the world) have increaſed above eightfold, and the culture of the latter has been entirely begun during the ſame period. The number of plantations, in 1796, was reckoned at five hundred and fifty; and we are told, that the produce of the ſugar and coffee grounds had fallen off one third in the courſe of fifteen years.

The whole returns of the Dutch colonies, above twenty years ago, were calculated at twenty-four millions florins—exported in one hundred and fifty veſſels, navigated by four thouſand men—and paying, in freight, four millions five hundred thouſand florins—in commiſſion and inſurance, two millions and a half. The Dutch merchants exported to them merchandize (including negro ſlaves) to the value of ſix millions.

3. The moſt unfortunate circumſtance in the colonial policy of the Dutch, has always been their bad treatment of the ſlaves. I have already pointed out, * in general, the cauſes of this cruelty; and I ſhall now ſhortly take notice of the manner in which it operates. Laws are not wanting here, as in the other colonies, for checking the ſevere treatment of the negroes. But

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But the evidence of a negro being inadmiſſible againſt a white man, the maſter has only to remove from the ſpot all European and Creole whites (never very numerous, at any rate, upon the grounds), and then he may, without reſtraint, carry his cruelty to any length. We are informed, that it is common for the planters or their ſtewards in Dutch Guiana, to put to death their ſlaves, on the ſlighteſt ſuſpicion of a fault, and only to take care that no white perſon is preſent.* All authors, even the Dutch writers themſelves, agree in giving the ſame horrid accounts of the cruelties exerciſed over this unhappy race of men; and in remarking the total inſufficiency of the laws to check ſo great an enormity —to counteract the effects of diſſolute manners, natural to men placed in the ſituation of the planters and their agents—or to conſtrain that eagerneſs after profit, which is excited by the cravings of creditors, and the competition of rival capitals. 'Il n'y a point de bete de 'ſomme' (ſays the author of the *Voyage à la Guiane et à Cayenne*) 'dont la condition ſoit 'auſſi triſte que celle de ces eſclaves. Ils etaient 'obligés de travailler ſans relache, et on les 'traitait ſans miſericorde. Ces rudes traité-'mens les portaient ſouvent au deſeſpoir, et à 'chercher

* Econ. Pol. (Encyc. Method.) IV. 297.

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'chercher les moyens de ſe mettre en liberté; 'et quand ils craignaient d'être pris, ou de ne 'point obtenir leur pardon, ils ſe detruiſaient 'eux-memes.' † The author of '*La Richeſſe 'de la Hollande*' admits the charge, and aſcribes the fact to the diſſolute manners of the new-comers. ‡

Accordingly, the Dutch have been the firſt to reap the fruits of a conduct equally impolitic and unprincipled. The exiſtence of their power in South America has been repeatedly endangered by the attacks of the revolted ſlaves, who have formed themſelves into an independent community, under leaders of their own; and, increaſing rapidly in numbers, have not only held out continual temptations to deſertion and diſaffection among their brethren in a ſtate of ſervitude, but have compelled their former maſters, by force of arms, to yield to the moſt humiliating conditions. The reduction of theſe Maroons (as they are called), the defence of the colony againſt their encroachments, and the prevention of farther diſaffection, have been the grand objects of the Dutch government for near a century paſt, in South America. At laſt a bulwark was erected

† P. 226. ‡ II. 197.

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ed againſt the Maroons in 1773, by ſurrounding the whole colony with a cordon, and forts at ſmall intervals. This has rendered a large force always neceſſary in thoſe parts. The uſual peace eſtabliſhment is one hundred and fifty regulars in Surinam, and two hundred and fifty in Berbice, all in the Company's ſervice; with one battalion provided by the States-General. The critical circumſtances of the ſettlement, render all the whites able to bear arms, members of the militia, which is compoſed of two thouſand men. Every ſort of pains is taken to conciliate the native Charaibes, to employ their aſſiſtance againſt the Maroons, and to alienate them from all connexion with the negroes of whatever deſcription. This policy has, in part, ſucceeded. But the great root of all the evil remains untouched—the maltreatment of the ſlaves. And all authors and travellers agree in ſtating, that revolt is quite unknown upon thoſe plantations where the blacks have been well treated.

4. The colonies of Holland have ſuffered, in general, from the importation of negroes being too ſcanty to anſwer the demands of the proprietors. The Weſt Indian Company could never ſupply a ſufficient number; and ever ſince their

their African trade was thrown open, the laſtage duty has been ſo heavy, and the free ſlave-trade of Britain has given the Engliſh ſuch ſuperiority in this branch of commerce, that the Dutch coloniſts find it much more profitable to ſmuggle the article from the Britiſh iſlands; from whence, after all, the ſupply is far too confined.

In no colony is the diſproportion of colours more ſtriking than in Dutch Guiana. Some authors repreſent the whites as four thouſand in number, the ſlaves as ninety thouſand. Others, with greater appearance of truth, eſtimate the former at from three to four thouſand, the latter at forty-four thouſand. * We ſhall afterwards ſee how unfavourable it is to the proſperity of the ſettlements, that a preference is univerſally given to Gold Coaſt negroes in all purchaſes.

The circumſtances of the Dutch continental colonies are, in every way, unfavourable to reſidence. Only eighty of the proprietors are ſaid to live on their eſtates; and, in general, there are more ſtrangers than Dutch in the ſettlements. The nonreſidence, however, muſt augment the revenue derived by the mother country from thoſe poſſeſſions.

5.

* Note S.

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5. The Dutch iſlands are in a very peculiar ſituation—a ſituation, with reſpect to the other European colonies, ſtrongly reſembling that of the mother country with reſpect to the other ſtates of Europe. The limited extent and barrenneſs of their ſoil, renders them quite unfit for the operations of agriculture which enrich the other iſlands. This want they have ſupplied, by availing themſelves of their poſition, extremely convenient for ſmuggling. They have accordingly almoſt monopolized the rich contraband trade of Spaniſh America, and have become, for fair traffic alſo, the great emporium of the Weſt Indies. They are, indeed, the only ſettlements in this part of the world, of which the inhabitants have ever devoted themſelves to mercantile purſuits. The liberal ſpirit which uſually attends extenſive commerce, has alſo been diſplayed here; and the ports of one of the iſlands have been thrown open to all the world. The conſequence of this circumſtance has been, an aſtoniſhing acquiſition of wealth, and a great population of white inhabitants, more particularly in St Euſtatius, where the free trade is allowed. In the port of this iſland, Lord Rodney at one time (in 1780) captured prizes valued at above three millions Sterling. If the Dutch are neutral in any war, the trade of their iſlands receives a vaſt

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vaſt addition, and they furniſh all the belligerent powers with ſupplies of every kind, regardleſs of any political conſiderations, and looking entirely to their profits. 'The 'Dutch' (ſays the compiler of Harris's Voyages) 'are in perpetual alliance with ready 'money, let it be Engliſh, French or Spaniſh, 'as appeared clearly in our late expedition to 'Laguna and Porto Cavallo, where they fur-'niſhed us with cables, ammunition, and even 'men, for attacking the Spaniards, whom they 'had before furniſhed with powder and ball 'ſufficient to render that attack ineffectual; 'and, but for the neighbourhood of this Dutch 'ſettlement, the Spaniſh fortreſſes, beforemen-'tioned, had been infallibly reduced, and in 'our poſſeſſion.' *

The uſual conſequences of commerce and manufactures, a greater refinement of manners, and more ſtudied elegance of dreſs and luxury, are apparent in thoſe iſlands. The good treatment of the ſlaves, who are chiefly uſed as domeſtics, and not required for field work, has prevented any tendency to revolt; and the number of reſident capitaliſts with their families, is almoſt as great as in equally populous diſtricts of Europe.

* Harris's Collection, vol. II. p. 371.

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I have already ſtated, that, many years ago, the whole export from the Dutch colonies in America to the mother country, was about twenty-two millions of florins. It is probable, that this is now increaſed to nearly thirty millions, or two millions ſeven hundred thouſand pounds Sterling. The importation of the colonial produce employed, in 1779, above one hundred and ſeventy large veſſels in time of war, and one hundred and forty in time of peace. It is probable, that, now, this number may be eſtimated at two hundred ſail in war, and, in peace, at one hundred and ſeventy. The uſual entries at Amſterdam, from the North, in 1778 and 1779, were one thouſand five hundred and ſixty; from the South, ſix hundred and ſixty; from the Mediterranean, one hundred and five; from the Eaſt Indies, between twelve and thirteen; from the whale fiſheries, one hundred and ſeven; and from the foreign American ſettlements, ten. The average bulk of the European traders was probably not above one half that of the colony ſhips. We ſee, then, what a proportion of the whole Dutch tonnage is occupied with the colonial commerce.

It is, beſides, a trade always increaſing, and capable of indefinite augmentation, while the other branches of traffic are, of neceſſity, on the wane. It is beneficial to Holland as a home trade,

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trade, while the reſt are chiefly carrying trades. It throws a large balance of valuable commodities into the market of the States, by the number of colonial proprietors who reſide in the mother country, or remove thither with their families and fortunes. It furniſhes equivalents whereby the reſt of the Dutch commerce may be ſupported. It is the only branch of trade that Holland poſſeſſes ſecurely, as other countries poſſeſs their commerce.

The demand for colonial produce, in the home market, is not nearly ſatisfied by the returns of the Dutch ſettlements. The ſugar and tobacco works of Amſterdam conſume about double the quantity of ſugar and tobacco imported from the colonies, although we include the large quantities imported in Dutch veſſels from the mercantile iſlands, and raiſed in foreign ſettlements. I do not ſay that this is for home conſumption; but it is for the ſupport of manufacturing induſtry, the chief part of the domeſtic induſtry of Holland, and for the preſervation of its foreign commercial relations with Europe. Unlike the other branches of Dutch traffic, then, this might naturally be extended at the expence of foreigners; and while the growth of capital, and of naval reſources in the reſt of Europe, is neceſſarily diminiſhing the great ſtaple of Dutch induſtry, the acquiſition

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of new colonies might eaſily puſh from the Dutch market a large quantity of foreign produce, that now gains admittance there, in conſequence of the Dutch colonies being ſo limited in their extent or productive powers.

In no country, therefore, is there ſo great a demand for new colonies as in the United Provinces. To no part of Europe are colonial poſſeſſions ſo valuable. None would be ſo irretrievably ruined by their loſs: none would be ſo much benefited by their extenſion.

PART II.

OF THE COLONIAL POLICY OF SPAIN.

No country of Europe preſents ſo ſtriking a contraſt to the United Provinces as the kingdom of Spain. Whether we conſider the phyſical, or the moral and political circumſtances of the two ſtates, or attend to the annals of their hiſtory, and compare the train of thoſe events which may be viewed as of accidental occurrence, we ſhall be convinced, by a very ſuperficial ſurvey, that in every material particular the diverſity is complete.

It

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It has already been ſhewn how the want of territory ſtimulates the laborious exertions of the Dutch, to make the moſt of their little ſpot of ground; and to ſupply the deficiencies of their natural reſources, by interfering with the wealth, and reſiſting the attacks of every other people. The Spaniards poſſeſs a country fifteen times more extenſive than Holland, of incalculably greater fertility, enjoying all the benefits of the fineſt climate in the world, ſurrounded with natural barriers of defence, and bleſſed with every advantage of ſituation which can facilitate commercial intercourſe. Yet this noble territory ſupports, in proportion, not much more than one fourth of the Dutch population. Its natives are lazy and poor; its government is perpetually reduced to the utmoſt pecuniary difficulties, and ſubjected to a mean dependence upon foreign powers; and its whole trade is not nearly equal to that of a ſingle Dutch province. As abundance of fertile land has rendered great exertions of induſtry ſuperfluous, and ſuperſeded all neceſſity of aſſiſtance from foreign purſuits: ſo have the ſame advantages of natural ſituation removed that check upon the paſſions and narrow prejudices, both of the rulers and the people, which in Holland has exerciſed a moſt ſtriking and uſeful controul. The policy of Spain in every department, but more particularly in the affairs of trade, has been as uni-

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formly blind and illiberal, as the policy of the Dutch has been enlightened and extenſive. While the States-General were by every encouragement attracting foreigners from all countries, to enrich the republic by their capitals and labour, the Court of Madrid was expelling from every corner of the peninſula that numerous race of men who poſſeſſed the whole induſtry and ſkill of the community. While unbounded religious tolerance, and ample enjoyment of civil rights, promoted the rapid improvement of the Hollanders in refinement and in wealth, and gave their rulers the full uſe of all the national reſources, the Spaniards groaned under a bigotted tyrrany, and a deſpotic ſuperſtition, which, after depopulating the fineſt plains of the kingdom, damped every effort of the remaining inhabitants, and ſtunted the growth of the national power. To compare the European policy of Holland and Spain, only in a ſingle particular—One of the largeſt proportional revenues in the world is raiſed from the Dutch, without any conſiderable inconvenience; while the Spaniards, to pay the moſt trifling proportional revenue, are more oppreſſed by ruinous and abſurd fiſcal laws than any other community that ever exiſted. It has thus happened, that the people, of all others the leaſt favoured by nature, have become in proportion the wealthieſt and moſt powerful, while the nation upon whom every gift

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gift of various felicity was laviſhed, has ſunk into poverty and degradation.

The æras, too, of the Spaniſh decline, and the Dutch exaltation, have exactly coincided. For while the United Provinces belonged to the Crown of Caſtile, the affairs of the Spaniſh monarchy proſpered; and during the whole of the Auſtrian dynaſty, when the Dutch were riſing to the higheſt pitch of their grandeur, Spain was rapidly falling from that ſtation which once rendered her the terror of the world. It is remarkable, that the eighteenth century, which has witneſſed the gradual revival of commercial proſperity and political wiſdom in Spain, ſhould have been marked by the decline of Holland, both in wealth and independence.

In the natural circumſtances of their colonial poſſeſſions, and in the policy which has regulated their conduct towards their colonies, the two nations ſtill preſent the ſame remarkable contraſt. The territories of Spain on the continent of America are far more extenſive, and infinitely richer in every reſource of natural wealth, than thoſe of any other European power. Holland poſſeſſes the moſt limited portion of that continent, under all the diſadvantages of the worſt climate and moſt difficult ſoil. In the Weſt Indian Archipelago, the largeſt and moſt fertile iſlands belong to Spain: while Holland

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has only two bare rocks, utterly unfit for cultivation, if they were of unbounded extent; and ſo ſmall, that they could derive little or no advantage from infinite fertility. While the Spaniſh government has uniformly turned the attention of its ſubjects to the leaſt profitable purſuits, ſtunted their induſtry by every ſpecies of impolitic oppreſſion, and exhibited in its colonial meaſures the moſt glaring inſtances of injuſtice and blindneſs, the colonial hiſtory of the Dutch has preſented the feweſt examples of illiberality and tyranny, with almoſt all the ſpecimens of ſound and enlightened policy which are to be found in the annals of the New World. It has thus happened, in the colonial as in the European ſyſtem, that a few barren and marſhy acres of unhealthy territory have rewarded the invincible induſtry of the Hollander with greater wealth, more extenſive political influence, and a larger ſhare of private happineſs, than the indolent, oppreſſed, and needy Spaniard has derived from a domain of greater extent, and of infinitely larger reſources than the whole continent of Europe.

A country ſo rich in territory as Spain, with a population ſo limited in proportion to its extent, is evidently independent of colonial poſſeſſions. All the induſtry, ſkill, and capital of the natives, may find ample employment in raiſ-

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ing, manufacturing, and circulating the produce of the ſoil, or in exchanging the ſuperfluous part of that produce for the commodities which abound in other countries. The Spaniards are neither obliged to have recourſe to the carrying trade, nor the fiſheries, nor the occupation of brokers, nor the employment of capital in foreign agriculture and manufactures, nor the extenſion of trade and huſbandry which the acquiſition of new and diſtant provinces affords. Until the peninſula is as much improved as it is poſſible to improve a hundred and fifty thouſand ſquare miles of rich and various ſoil; until its inhabitants are as numerous as this ſoil can ſupport—as ſkillful and as induſtrious as the natives of Holland; colonial eſtabliſhments will never form ſo important an object of attention to a wiſe government entruſted with the management of Spaniſh affairs, as we have ſeen that ſuch eſtabliſhments neceſſarily preſent to the government of Holland. Accordingly, if it were poſſible by an edict to mould the taſtes and deſigns of men, it would be of infinite advantage to the Spaniards at once to reform all their domeſtic abuſes, relinquiſh their colonial dominions, and apply themſelves vigorouſly to the cultivation of their European dominions. But then, if we are to wiſh, let us build ourſelves the ſtrongeſt and

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choiceſt caſtles; let us fancy edicts equally poſſible, which may at once regenerate Spain and improve her colonies. As, however, we are now engaged in a practical inquiry, it may be more uſeful to reflect, that the love of foreign trade, and of diſtant adventures, ſprings up in every community long before the land, manufactures, and home trade are ſufficiently improved; and ſince it is in vain to think of checking or directing this taſte, a wiſe legiſlator will conſider how it may be rendered ſubſervient to the general intereſts of the ſtate, to the increaſe of the imperial reſources, that is, of the domeſtic and colonial proſperity. However unneceſſary the extenſion of the home market may be to a country which, independent of all colonies, poſſeſſes within itſelf, from the great variety of its territories and productions, a very large home market, no one will deny, that every acquiſition which increaſes this home market is a benefit to the whole empire. However unneceſſary the multiplication of demands for raw produce and manufactures, in the diſtant provinces, may be to promote the raiſing of the one and preparation of the other, when the demands of the contiguous provinces are ſufficient to excite much more induſtry, and reward far greater ſkill than have ever appeared in the peninſula, ſurely it cannot be affirmed

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firmed that the ceſſation of the demands which ariſe from the colonies, would create a greater alacrity to furniſh the ſupply, or that the induſtry and ſkill which the united demands of the remote and contiguous provinces have failed to call forth, would be ſet in motion by the demands of the contiguous provinces alone. However little the government of Spain has made of the noble reſources which the fineſt territories, both in Europe and America, place within its reach, we cannot ſuppoſe that, if Cortez and Pizarro had never conquered, more would have been made of the European dominions alone, although without doubt much more might have been made of any one province in either part of the world, than has actually been made of the whole empire.

To deny, then, that Spain has received very great benefits from her colonial poſſeſſions, appears, even upon a general view of the ſubject, extremely abſurd. Yet many enlightened men have gone ſtill farther, and maintained, that the downfal of the Spaniſh power has, in a great meaſure, been owing to the extenſion of dominion which followed the diſcovery of America. This is one of thoſe vague topics which we may eaſily expect to find adopted by declaimers and ſpeculatiſts. But, unfortunately, that claſs of writers have received ſome countenance

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nance from the remarks of the philoſophical and ſober-minded author of the Wealth of Nations. 'That the monopoly' he obſerves, 'of 'the trade of populous and thriving colonies is 'not alone ſufficient to eſtabliſh, or even to 'maintain manufactures in any country, the 'examples of Spain and Portugal ſufficiently 'demonſtrate. Spain and Portugal were ma-'nufacturing countries before they had any 'conſiderable colonies. Since they had the 'richeſt and moſt fertile in the world, they have 'both ceaſed to be ſo.' * The tenor of this remark, indeed, is confined to the ſtatement of a fact, which cannot be denied, that the period of the decline which the Spaniſh and Portugueſe manufactures have experienced, coincided with the period of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe colonial greatneſs. But, beſides that the ſtatement is given in ſuch a manner as to imply ſome connexion between the two circumſtances, the whole argument which precedes and follows this remark, and of which this remark itſelf forms a part, proceeds upon a view of the ſubject formerly † diſcuſſed, that colonial monopolies in general have been hurtful, from their effects on the wealth of the mother country. Thus, inſtead of making the very obvious diſtinction

* Book IV. chap. VII.

† Sect. II. Part II.

ſtinction between the Spaniſh and Britiſh colonial monopolies, (which are in fact as completely different from each other, as if they were known by different appellations), Dr Smith argues upon the ſame principles againſt both; concluding that they have differed only in the degree of their miſchiefs, and that the effects of the one counterbalance, while thoſe of the other are counterbalanced by, the natural advantages of the colonial trade. I have endeavoured to ſhew, in the Second Section of this Book, that the general arguments of Dr Smith apply not only to the monopoly, but to the colony trade itſelf. The diverſity in the effects of the Spaniſh and Britiſh ſyſtems of monopoly, muſt be deduced from the different natures of thoſe ſyſtems. The connexion which Dr Smith only inſinuates between the decline of Spain and the influence of her colonial acquiſitions, is by almoſt all other writers upon Spaniſh affairs broadly affirmed. *

Let us inquire, then, in what manner the proſperity of Spain has been influenced by the diſcovery of America; whether the acquiſition of rich and extenſive colonies can be charged with having cauſed the decline of the mother country; whether, in ſhort, any bad conſequence whatever is imputable to this augmentation of empire.

* Note T.

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1. The only evil which can ariſe from the immoderate extenſion of territory, is the neglect of the territory formerly poſſeſſed. It may ſo happen, that the government prefers the care and improvement of the new dominion to the attentive management of the old; that the intereſts of the two poſſeſſions are irreconcileable, and that the one is ſacrificed to the other; or that the adminiſtration of the whole is too vaſt for a ſingle dynaſty, and that both are neglected. In ſome, perhaps in all of thoſe ways, Spain itſelf, and Portugal, have ſeverely ſuffered. The dominion of the Houſe of Auſtria over Spain during the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth centuries, and over Portugal previous to the revolution of 1640, was marked with manifold proofs, that an empire may be too extenſive for the proſperity of any of its parts.

But from the nature of colonial power, it is ſeldom, if ever, that any ſuch conſequences can ariſe to the mother country from the poſſeſſion of the moſt widely-ſpread colonial dominions. The extenſion of the colonies may be hurtful to their proſperity, in the very ſame way that the extenſion of the contiguous provinces may be hurtful to the intereſts of the mother country. But as all colonies, of whatever magnitude, muſt be ruled by a delegated power, and as the taſk of government muſt thus be ſubdivided,

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vided, it is impoſſible that the adminiſtration of the colony can ever claſh with that of the mother country; and I have formerly examined the probability of their other intereſts ever interfering. However ruinous, then, the exiſtence of an unwieldy colonial empire may prove to the parts that compoſe it, that is, to the colonies, the acquiſition of ſuch an empire can never injure the mother country; and, in the caſe of Spain, whatever neglect there may have been in the management both of the mother country and the colonies, it is evident, that the maladminiſtration of both thoſe parts of the empire muſt have ariſen from other cauſes than their being united under one crown. The Council of the Indies has, from the beginning, had the whole ſuperintendance of American affairs, aſſiſted by the Caſa de Contratacion in matters of trade. It is abſurd to ſuppoſe that the Sovereign's attention, or the attention of his miniſters, is diſtracted from the other deliberations of his cabinet, by their duty in the colonial councils. All the meaſures diſcuſſed there, muſt of neceſſity be extremely general. The viceroys and audiences are entruſted with the details of executive adminiſtration, thoſe parts of public duty which can alone engroſs the attention of a government. The affairs of the other colonies, in themſelves very limited, were

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were formerly managed by the council of the Indies and the Caſa: they are now ſubject, partly to the council, partly to an excluſive company. However ill, therefore, the colonies may be governed, either in conſequence of their unwieldy ſize, or from other cauſes, the mother country cannot be ſuppoſed to ſuffer in her adminiſtration from any of thoſe circumſtances; and, defective as her government may be, it is difficult to perceive how it would be improved by the loſs of America and the Philippines. The argument, then, which is adduced againſt the Spaniſh colonies, from the unwieldy ſize of the whole empire, appears, when examined with the ſlighteſt attention, to have no ſort of weight. It conſiſts, like many other general aſſertions in politics, entirely of propoſitions couched in ſounding words, and proceeding on falſe analogies. If there is any truth in the general obſervations which have been made in the Firſt Section of this Inquiry, thoſe colonies may be highly advantageous to Spain in a political point of view, notwithſtanding the great, and at preſent uſeleſs extent of all the Spaniſh provinces.

2. The vaſt outlet to population which the Spaniſh colonies afford, has been thought by many to be detrimental to the mother country. The population of Spain is ſaid to have been drained,

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drained, by the demands and temptations for men which the colonies afford. A little reflection will convince us how abſurd all ſuch fears are, even admitting that every perſon who removes his permanent reſidence from the contiguous to the remote provinces, is loſt to the mother country.

The emigrations of the Spaniards have never been great and ſudden. At the firſt diſcovery of the New World, the ſpirit of adventure was indeed excited, and led conſiderable numbers to thoſe regions where gold and ſilver were ſuppoſed to abound. This deſcription of perſons, however, neither formed a very great nor a very valuable part of the community in the parent ſtate. As the expence of the voyage was in itſelf conſiderable, and as the reſtraints laid upon the intercourſe between the Old and New World rendered that expence much greater, it is obvious that the bulk of the induſtrious Spaniards were excluded from any ſhare in American adventures. The nature of the purſuits, too, which were expected to load every emigrant with gold, was ſuch as could not tempt common labourers or artizans. It was not, as in North America, by the cultivation of cheap and fertile land, or the gaining of high wages, that the adventurer in Peru and Mexico expected to enrich himſelf. All kinds of

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of ordinary toil were deſpiſed in thoſe native regions of the precious metals. Conqueſt or plunder, and mining, were the only ways in which the Spaniſh emigrants would condeſcend to acquire wealth. The two claſſes of people, then, whom ſuch proſpects could draw to America, were the nobles and ſoldiers of fortune, and the men of conſiderable property. Both of theſe claſſes, of courſe, carried over in their train a few of the lower and more induſtrious orders of the community; but this blank in the valuable part of the population would be eaſily and ſpeedily ſupplied. All the conqueſts of the Spaniſh in America were rapidly effected. It required but a handful of men either to make or to retain them. The ſpirit of gold-finding was of longer duration, and more extenſive influence. But neither the one nor the other of theſe temptations could draw over many, beſides the nobles and hidalgos, who deigned in the colonies to exert a little regular induſtry, and to gratify their ſpirit of adventure; while in Spain their lives had been devoted to indolence or field ſports, and their adventurous ſpirit had only tended to ſupport the evils of war, or the follies of chivalry.

But the drain of emigration thus cauſed by the colonies, has not only been confined to one part of the Spaniſh population; it has been confined

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fined to the population in one part of Spain. The natives of maritime provinces naturally take a part in thoſe adventures, of which the ſcene is laid at a great diſtance from home. The inhabitants of inland diſtricts ſeldom ſhift about, even to the contiguous provinces, and ſcarcely ever think of trying their fortune beyond ſeas. * The policy of the Spaniſh court, too, by confining for many ages the American trade to a ſingle town, and afterwards to one town in each province, has tended to confine the emigration ſtill farther. The parts of Spain which have ſupplied America with hands, have chiefly, if not entirely, been the trading towns engaged in colonial commerce; Corunna, Bilboa, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, Carthagena, and Barcelona. Yet theſe are unqueſtionably the moſt flouriſhing and populous cities of the peninſula; nor can we in anywiſe ſuſpect that they have increaſed at the expence of the ſurrounding diſtricts, for the produce and labour of which they furniſh ſo conſtant a demand.

It would be impoſſible to calculate, with tolerable preciſion, the amount of the emigration which has at different times taken place to America from the provinces of the mother country: yet from the *data* in our poſſeſſion, it is not poſſible to eſtimate this very high. In

* Sect. I.

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the *firſt* place, we are told by Spaniſh hiſtorians, that the rage for emigration to America was ſo much abated in a ſhort time after the diſcovery, chiefly by the ruin of many who had flocked thither at firſt, that in the year 1550 there were not above fifteen thouſand Spaniards in all the New World. *Secondly*, Dr Franklin, in 1751, calculated that the population of North America was one million of Engliſh inhabitants; and that not above eighty thouſand had been brought from the mother country, during the period which had elapſed from the firſt ſettlement. *

If we adopt Dr Robertſon's eſtimate of the population of Spaniſh America in 1777, we ſhall have five hundred thouſand for the number of the Spaniards, both Creoles and Chapetones, and one million for the number of the mixed breed in New Spain: and as he ſtates the whole population of Peru and Mexico, excluſive of the Indians, at three millions, ſuppoſing the ſame proportion of one third here alſo to be Spaniards, we have one million of Spaniards in all Mexico and Peru. Paraguay and Chili, contain very few Europeans; and indeed the latter is probably comprehended under Peru in the foregoing eſtimate. † The new kingdom of

* Thoughts on the Peopling of New Countries, § 22.

† Hiſtory of America, vol. II. p. 496.

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of Grenada is alſo thinly peopled; and if we allow all the iſlands and other ſettlements, not enumerated in Dr Robertſon's eſtimate, to contain five hundred thouſand Spaniards, we ſurely much exceed the truth. If then, of this one million five hundred thouſand Spaniards we were to take two twenty-fifth parts, (according to Franklin's proportion), we ſhould conclude, that not above one hundred and twenty thouſand had ever emigrated from Old to New Spain. Suppoſing, however, that the progreſs of population in North America has been much more rapid than in the Spaniſh ſettlements—allowing that it is above four times greater in proportion to the increaſe by acceſſion of new hands, we have ſtill only five hundred thouſand for the amount of the numbers who have emigrated to the Spaniſh colonies, during a period of three centuries. Had all theſe perſons belonged to every rank in life—to the induſtrious and ſkilful as well as idle and diſſipated orders of the community; and had this blank in the Spaniſh population been made during one war, or within a ſingle year, as by peſtilence and famine, inſtead of being ſpread over three hundred years, can any one believe that the remaining four millions and a half of inhabitants would not have been ſufficient to repair the loſs of wealth and numbers in a few ſhort ſeaſons? Thoſe

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who have read the hiſtory either of China or Indoſtan, muſt be convinced that an induſtrious people can eaſily repair far greater loſſes, though theſe happen as ſuddenly as I have now ſuppoſed. But ſuch a trifling number of inhabitants, ſubtracted from the maſs of the Spaniſh population, during ſo long a period as has elapſed ſince the diſcovery of the colonies, can evidently produce no bad effect whatever upon the reſources of the parent ſtate. Beſides, it ſhould be recollected that a conſiderable part of the emigrants return again to the mother country, in conſequence of the circumſtances which I have already pointed out, as peculiar to the Spaniſh and Portugueze ſettlements. * Thoſe, too, who leave the peninſula altogether, contribute to encourage its induſtry, and promote its population, at leaſt as much as if they removed from the country to the towns. This muſt happen in every community; but more eſpecially in Spain, where thoſe chiefly emigrate to the colonies who would have been idle and uſeleſs at home.

The ſuppoſed effects of the colonies, then, in draining the Spaniſh population, are wholly inadequate to account for the decline of the Spaniſh reſources, and the ſlow progreſs of the Spaniſh population. We muſt ſtill look for ſome

* Sect. I.

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ſome other cauſes to explain this political phenomenon.

To imagine that the capital which has been drawn to the colonial agriculture and mining, can have impoveriſhed the mother country in any conſiderable degree, is as chimerical as to ſuppoſe that the colonial emigration can have drained her population. It is indeed true, that mining projects are in general the moſt hazardous, and therefore upon the whole the moſt expenſive employments of ſtock. But ſurely, if all the ſtock, employed in the mines of the New World, be diminiſhed by the immenſe returns which have been received from thence, it will be difficult to eſtimate the balance at ſo great a ſum as would juſtify us in aſcribing to this loſs the evils complained of. The greater part of the capitals employed in excavating the mines of Mexico and Peru, have been amaſſed in the colonies; and moſt of thoſe which have been transferred from the mother country, and veſted in colonial ſpeculations, would have been ſunk in the extenſive and unproductive luxuries of the country gentleman or the court grandee. We may form ſome judgment of the loſs experienced by the Spaniſh agriculture and manufactures, in conſequence of the mining projects of the capitaliſts who have removed to the colonies, if we conſider how unprofitably the remaining capitaliſts have continued to employ their ſtock at

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home. Whatever may have been the amount of the ſtock transferred, and ſacrificed to the mining projects of the colonies, the ſame ſpirit of adventure, the ſame induſtry, and the ſame ſkill muſt have continued to direct the ſtockholders who remained at home, as if no capital had ever been removed; or rather, if the ſhifting was great, a variety of additional temptations would be preſented to animate the exertions of thoſe capitaliſts who did not join the crowd. Their property would be more valuable, the premiums of employment would be higher, the blank occaſioned by the ſtock withdrawn would leave various lines of profitable employment empty; and if men had been at all inclined to gain, they would ſoon have filled up this blank, by the accumulation of profits on the capital that remained. Suppoſing all the capital employed in the unprofitable but tempting ſpeculations of the colonies, to have been loſt without any recompenſe, the capital which remained was ſurely ſufficient to carry on the improvement of Spain. The extent of the loſs never could be very great. The rage for gold-finding did not ruin large numbers after the firſt heat had ſubſided; and, at all times ſubſequent to the period of the conqueſt, thoſe perſons who have engaged in the lottery of the mines have been Coloniſts, not Spaniards; and the colonies, not the mother country, have been

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been the ſufferers by the poſſeſſion of mines. A pronenefs to ſpeculation of any ſort has never, ſince the firſt years of the American diſcovery, much diſtinguiſhed that people; nor can we ſuppoſe that if no Spaniards had ever emigrated to Mexico and Peru, the love of adventure would have been retained in the peninſula. It is to other cauſes than the emigration either of inhabitants or of capitals, that we muſt aſcribe the depopulation, the indolence, and the poverty of Spain.

3. Perhaps the moſt remarkable events that ſtrike us in the hiſtory of Spain, are the various ſudden and extenſive ſhocks which the population has, at different times, received. But in conſidering the permanent effects of theſe upon the ſtability or progreſs of the nation, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh between ſuch as have happened from natural cauſes, and ſuch as have been brought about by political folly or oppreſſion. It will be found that the former occaſioned blanks which could eaſily have been filled up, had not the evil been extended in a different direction, as well as a more fatal degree by the latter. Few countries, indeed, have ſuffered more from epidemical and contagious diſeaſes than Spain. The plague which raged during three years in the middle of the fourteenth century, carried off two thirds of the

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whole population of the peninſula. About three centuries afterwards, two hundred thouſand perſons periſhed in the ſouthern provinces, which are indeed ſcarcely ever free from intermittent and putrid fevers. Famine has repeatedly ravaged the country; and the evils of dearth have often been turned into the horrors of famine by the abſurd laws which, until the middle of the eighteenth century, hampered, or rather deſtroyed the internal commerce of grain. But all theſe cauſes, even the laſt, which is infinitely the moſt important, becauſe the moſt conſtant and general, would of themſelves have been inadequate to check the improvement, or haſten the downfal of the ſtate. Long after the deſolations of the great plague, Spain was the moſt powerful and wealthy country of Europe. The ſubſequent topical loſſes of population, were wholly inadequate to change her place in the ſyſtem; and the reſtrictions upon the internal commerce of grain, however ruinous, * were not peculiar to Spain. Indeed they

* We may form ſome notion of the evils occaſioned by this abſurd policy, from a fact related in the travels of Mr Willoughby, about the middle of the ſeventeenth century. He tells us, that in the courſe of a ſingle day's journey (twenty miles), the price of bread was frequently trebled. *Harris's Collection, vol. II. p.* 702. The ſame traveller relates,

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they were relaxed, and then aboliſhed, ſooner in Spain than in France. The great and ſudden loſſes, however, which the population of the country experienced from the cruelty and folly of her princes, deſerve to be enumerated among the cauſes of her decline.

The deſcendants of the Gothic nations in the peninſula did not addict themſelves to the arts of peaceful induſtry. After the Arabian conqueſt, the ſkill, the elegance, and the perſevering labour of the oriental nations, was ſpread over the conquered province, and raiſed its refinement and opulence to a height which no other European nation, for many ages, attained. The ſplendid deſcriptions of the elegance and luxury that reigned over all Spain during this happy period, and the magnificent accounts of the population and ſtrength of the kingdom, though perhaps ſomewhat exaggerated, nevertheleſs deciſively evince the degree of improvement for which the country was indebted to the Mooriſh conquerors. During the Saracen dynaſty, however, and ſtill more after its downfal, the induſtry and ſkill of the nation was confined to the inhabitants of

lates, that a riot having happened in Madrid on account of dearth, the communication was opened with the neighbouring provinces, and the price inſtantly fell below the ordinary rate. *Id. ibid.*

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of the Mooriſh race. They monopolized all the branches of manufacture, and all the finer arts. The internal trade of the kingdom, the buſineſs of circulating its commodities, together with the greater part of the foreign commerce, was in the hands of another ſtranger race—the Jews. The Gothic and Roman, or, as they are called, the Spaniſh inhabitants of the peninſula, devoted before the Saracen invaſion to the barbariſm and military purſuits of the feudal times, were held by their conquerors in a ſtate of ignominious ſubjection, and employed only in the duties of mercenary warfare, or the moſt ſervile occupations of peace. After they had ſucceeded in overthrowing the Mooriſh power, they deemed the ſkilful and induſtrious vocations of thoſe men inglorious toils or irkſome reſtraints; and they applied themſelves ſtill leſs to the pedlar occupations of a race ſtill more deſpiſed.

The cruel and inſane policy of Ferdinand, then, who, in gratitude to God for the ſucceſſes of his arms, expelled from his dominions the whole tribe of Iſrael; the ſtill more bloody and impolitic meaſures of his ſucceſſor, who, about a century afterwards, drove out all the Mooriſh race; and the conſtant perſecutions and rebellions of thoſe two claſſes during the interval between the great and general expulſions, produced exactly the

the effect of ſuddenly rooting out from the kingdom all the induſtry and ſkill which had raiſed it to ſuch a pitch of opulence and glory. The number of the Jews who were in one year (1492) butchered or driven out, is reckoned by ſome authors at eight hundred thouſand perſons; by others at eight hundred thouſand families: and the number of the Moors driven away by the edict of 1609, cannot be computed at leſs than a million. The beſt informed writers ſeem to agree, that at thoſe two periods, and by the various auxiliary meaſures adopted with the ſame views during the interval, between two and three millions of perſons were totally loſt to the monarchy. The policy of Portugal keeping exact pace with that of Spain, refuſed an aſylum to the perſecuted nations, and at once prevented every corner of the peninſula from continuing to reap the benefits of their ingenuity and labour. Now,

It is not ſo much the numbers, as the qualifications of theſe two or three millions of men, that we are to conſider. The calamity did not fall, like famine and peſtilence, upon all the people equally, but upon one peculiar tribe or claſs. Spain did not loſe from her population a certain aliquot part; ſhe at once loſt almoſt the whole of the moſt valuable part. She loſt not a great part of her

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her blood; but almoſt the whole of that organ which ſecretes the valuable parts of the blood. She loſt the merchants and pedlars—the artizans, manufacturers, and huſbandmen. She loſt the labouring and ſkilful order of the community—the two induſtrious and ingenious *caſtes*.

Some of both claſſes, indeed, remained ſcattered over the peninſula, but in ſuch a ſtate of oppreſſion and perſecution as muſt effectually have damped every effort of genius and application. The effects of the edicts, then, were not confined to the two or three millions totally expelled or butchered; they extended alſo to the remainder of thoſe numerous claſſes who continued in the country, and whoſe exertions were ſyſtematically paralyzed by the cruel bigotry of the new government.

We have no mode of forming an accurate eſtimate of the immediate conſequences of the Jewiſh and Moriſco perſecutions. But it is enough to compare the wealth and population of the principal Spaniſh towns before and after thoſe fatal events. We cannot doubt to what cauſe ſo marked a difference muſt be aſcribed. The great proportion, too, of idle perſons to the whole uſeful population of modern Spain, may give us ſome idea of the loſs which ſhe ſuſtained by the expulſion of all the induſtry

induſtry and ſkill of the country. By the enumeration of 1768, there were above one million two hundred thouſand idle gentlemen, nobles, and religious perſons, with their domeſtics, and two millions two hundred thouſand of labourers, artiſts, and manufacturers of all ſorts.

To this day, the agriculture of the fine provinces on the Mediterranean, the moſt delightful and fertile territory in Europe, where the Moors chiefly were ſettled, where they diſplayed the powers of induſtry and the lights of civilization, is carried on, not by the indolent and ignorant inhabitants, but by the natives of the northern provinces, which did not ſuffer ſo much by the perſecution. All over the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees, a multitude of foreigners, chiefly French, reſident for a time, are occupied in the purſuits of agriculture and the more trifling arts; and, in moſt of the ſea-port towns, a great proportion of the trade is in the hands of ſtrangers *.

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* Bourgoing, Tableau de l'Eſpagne Moderne, tom. I. p. 169.—Townſend's Travels, II. 212. 216. III. 74.—Swinburne's Travels, p. 168. 218. & 286. 4to. edit.—Mirabeau, Monarchie Pruſſienne, tom. I. p. 23. (note).—Boëtticher's Statiſt. Tab. No. XVIII.—Dillon's Travels, p. 132. 8vo. edit.—Willoughby, apud Harris's Collection, II. 704.—Murphy's Portugal, p. 222.—Southey's Letters, p. 180.—Tucker on Trade, p. 26.—Commerce (Encyc. Method.) III. 95.—Econ. Polit. & Diplom. (ibid.) II. 315.

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4. I have already mentioned one ſpecies of impolitic reſtraint which has certainly contributed much to check the improvement of Spain, although it is not peculiar to the political hiſtory of that country—the reſtrictions upon the internal circulation of grain. To this may be added the abſurd regulations of Philip II. appointing the Magiſtrates all over the provinces of Caſtile to fix the prices of every commodity. Before his time, the old law of Alonzo had only regulated the prices of manufactures. But there are other circumſtances, of ſtill greater conſequence, peculiar to the œconomy of Spain. It is ſufficient to mention the ſingular ſtate of the finances, and the mode of collecting the revenue, equally impolitic and unjuſt, which has long prevailed in that kingdom.

The principal ſources of the national income, are the general and the provincial revenues. Of the different branches which compoſe theſe diviſions, there is ſcarcely a ſingle one that is not in its nature ruinous to the trade, manufactures, and agriculture of the country, as well as to the comfort and happineſs of the whole people. The chief branch of the general revenues, for inſtance, is the *almajorifaſgo*, or univerſal impoſt upon exportation and imports. This duty varies in almoſt every province. In Catalonia,

Catalonia, it is only four *per cent.*; in Navarre, it is five *per cent.* on imports, and three and a half on exports; in the greater number of provinces, it may be averaged at fifteen *per cent.* It has been ſucceſſively augmented when it ought to have been relaxed; it is gathered by a multitude of perſons, whoſe ſalaries are ſo inadequate that they muſt be ſupported by corrupt meaſures; it is laid on with exemplary inequality; and, after vexing and haraſſing the whole trade of the kingdom, it produced to the government, before the reforms, a net revenue of only four hundred thouſand pounds Sterling by farm.

But the provincial revenue is infinitely more oppreſſive and detrimental. I ſhall only ſpecify the three principal branches—the *millones*, *ſervices*, and *alcavala*.

The *millones* is an exciſe upon almoſt all the prime neceſſaries of life, eſtabliſhed by Philip II. in 1590. It is collected either by an expenſive multitude of officers, or ſtill more oppreſſively, though at leſs coſt, by the method of *encabezamientos*. This conſiſts in agreements or compoſitions made by the different municipalities with the government, and fulfilled by the moſt arbitrary aſſeſſment or diviſion of the burthens. The magiſtrates of the diſtrict eſtabliſh public magazines, at which all the taxed commodities

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commodities muſt be purchaſed; and thoſe who are found to have in their poſſeſſion any ſuch articles not obtained from the magazines, are haraſſed with the moſt oppreſſive proſecutions. This is a tax of which the vexations muſt, from their nature, fall chiefly upon the lower ranks of the people.

The *ſervices*, firſt laid on by Philip III, are taxes in the ſtyle of a capitation, impoſed upon the commoners only, and fixed in the moſt arbitrary manner by the magiſtrate of the diſtrict, according to his eſtimate of each individual's wealth.

But of all the impoſts levied in this or any other country, the famous one known by the name of *alcavala y cientos*, is the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive. It is a heavy duty upon every contract of ſale which takes place, whatever be the nature or value of the commodity transferred by the bargain. This eminently injurious burthen falls more immediately upon every ſpecies of induſtry, than any other that the wit of ſtateſmen has ever deviſed. It would perhaps be impoſſible to invent a more effectual and compendious method of ſtunting the growth of national opulence, and of deſtroying the comforts of buſineſs and private life. The alcavala was firſt known in the fourteenth century, and amounted then to a twentieth part of the value of the goods ſold.

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It was ſoon after raiſed to a tenth; and, in the ſeventeenth century, it received four ſeveral additions, amounting in all to a twenty-fifth. The total amount of the impoſt, then, is fourteen *per cent.*; but various grants of privileges and exemptions to different provinces, have varied the weight of the burthen: and the average is ſaid to be ſix or ſeven *per cent.* The expence of collecting this ruinous and palpably abſurd tax, is enormous; and the diſcretionary powers neceſſarily entruſted to the gatherers, are in the higheſt degree oppreſſive. Its fatal conſequences to trade, manufactures, and agriculture, may be perceived in the flouriſhing ſtate of Catalonia, and the provinces of Arragon, which, by means of a moderate compoſition, have been free from the alcavala, ſince the reign of Philip V.

Theſe provincial taxes and duties, together with all the others that compoſe this claſs, did not produce, in the middle of the eighteenth century, during the exiſtence of the farms, above nine hundred thouſand pounds Sterling of clear revenue; and the number of the farmers, with their ſervants, exceeded one hundred thouſand.

Beſides the revenues, general and provincial, the Royal monopolies preſent a moſt deſtructive check to the induſtry and comfort of

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the nation, without producing any profit to the Crown. Theſe ruinous and oppreſſive ſchemes are indeed known in other countries as well as in Spain. Ruſſia, for example, and ſtill more Pruſſia, are ſubject to this financial curſe in an eminent degree; but Spain far exceeds even Pruſſia in the evils of a ſyſtem equally ſhort-ſighted and vexatious.

Brandy, cards, lead, ſaltpetre, ſulphur, gunpowder, ſealing wax, quickſilver, but above all, ſalt and tobacco, are comprehended in the circle of the Crown's rigorous monopoly. The extent of theſe grievances may be imagined from the extent of the conſequence which always follows from ſuch laws—illicit trade. In the foreſts of the ſouthern provinces, the ſmugglers travel in bodies of ſeveral hundreds, well armed and mounted, ſometimes provided with a field-piece. When tobacco, by means of the monopoly, was ſuddenly raiſed in price, the numbers of the illicit traders in the article, increaſed twenty fold; and the officers employed to collect the duty on this commodity alone, were increaſed eighteen thouſand in number (beſides the military, whoſe aſſiſtance they received), all ſo ill paid, that it was abſolutely impoſſible for them to live without bribery. *

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* Memoires concernant les Impoſitions & les Droits, tom. I. p. 455. et ſeqq. 4to.—Bourgoing, Tableau de l'Eſpagne

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All theſe oppreſſive and unproductive kinds of revenue, have fallen upon the people chiefly ſince the reign of Charles V. Moſt of them were impoſed during the reign of Philip II. The alcavala was augmented four times during the ſeventeenth century. Many of the monopolies were unknown, and none of them were oppreſſive, in the beſt days of the monarchy. Although the greateſt of thoſe evils, the original alcavala, exiſted then, it was probably neither enforced with much ſeverity, nor calculated to produce fatal effects during the infancy of commerce. At any rate, the induſtry and art of the Saracens prevented its tendency from being ſo fatal as it immediately became when that induſtry and ſkill, together with the aſſiduous labour of the Jews, was torn from the community.

It happened unfortunately for Spain, that the greater part of the evils which we have

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l'Eſpagne Moderne, tom. II. p. 1. & ſeqq.—Campomanes, Educ. Popular. App. I. p. 347. 418. & IV. 64.—Smith's Wealth of Nations, book V. chap. II.—Townſend's Travels, II. 168. & ſeqq. 219. 283.; III. 47. 52.—Ferbonnois, Conſiderations ſur les Finances de l'Eſpagne, p. 30. et ſeqq. —Finances (Encyc. Method.) II. 67.

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been conſidering, began to be felt about the ſame time, and that, to their influence was added, the injurious effects of the moſt impolitic ſyſtem of government which ever curſed a civilized nation—the adminiſtration of Philip the Second. His long and expenſive wars, more particularly the conteſt which he carried on for ſo many years with the Low Countries, and his violent and imprudent meaſures of domeſtic policy, although at a happier period of Spaniſh hiſtory they might not have exerciſed a laſting influence upon the national proſperity, were ſufficient to aggravate the other more extenſive calamities with which they concurred, and to render the burthenſome ſyſtem of finance to which they gave riſe, the ſource of irretrievable ruin to the fortunes of Spain. The connexion of the Spaniſh with the Auſtrian dominions, indeed, was for two centuries a union moſt injurious to the former. So laſting an evil might almoſt be ranked among the radical cauſes of the decline which the affairs of Spain have undergone. At the end of the Auſtrian dynaſty, the Netherlands were juſtly and forcibly compared by a celebrated orator, well verſed in Spaniſh politics, to a fiſtulous wound in the body of the monarchy, conſtantly drawing off the alimentary juices which the ſyſtem ſecreted

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creted. * And although no other cauſe of change could have been pointed out, the event could ſcarcely have been deemed anomalous, after ſo many inſtances have occurred of nations experiencing a total reverſe of fortune, when the ſeat of their government, or the attention and care of their rulers, was removed to ſome new quarter, and when that which was formerly the body of the empire, became a ſubordinate appendage, or its intereſts a ſecondary conſideration with the rulers.

5. The circumſtances which I have enumerated, began to operate almoſt altogether at the period of the greateſt proſperity to which Spain has ever reached; and they unqueſtionably have brought about the ſingular reverſe of fortune which ſhe has ſince exhibited. But there are ſeveral other circumſtances highly deſerving of attention, as peculiar to this country, and calculated, in a very great degree, to retard her improvement, although they began to operate a conſiderable time before the age of Charles V. and Philip II.; for theſe cauſes, though in themſelves inadequate to produce the ruin of the nation, certainly contributed to render the others fatal.

* Fletcher of Salton's Diſcourſe concerning the Affairs of Spain.

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The effects of the great plague in thinning the population of the country, do not, as I have already remarked, deſerve much attention. But that calamity prepared the way for certain political evils, the influence of which is ſeverely felt at this day. When a vaſt proportion of the inhabitants were ſuddenly ſwept away, and a great part of the villages wholly depopulated, the ſurvivors obtained poſſeſſion of great, and, to them, uſeleſs ſhares of waſte land. The common paſture grounds of ſeveral villages and towns were united under the domain of one village or town, and became public inalienable property. Hence, the great extent of commons all over the fineſt provinces of the peninſula. Many towns in Andaluſia poſſeſs circuits of eighteen leagues, or lands of two hundred thouſand acres, almoſt all in paſture or waſte, and almoſt all capable of the higheſt cultivation. Villages, with territories of fourteen leagues in circumference, are nothing uncommon in many other parts of the kingdom. About the ſame period, the grandees obtained enormous grants of land: Theſe, conſolidated by intermarriages, and ſecured in the ſame families by rigid entails, form great hereditary ſcenes of deſolation, diverſified by a few ſplendid manſions thinly ſcattered over the extenſive waſte.

The

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The depopulation cauſed by the plague, afforded to the numerous and wealthy proprietors of flocks an opportunity of obtaining the celebrated code of laws, known by the name of '*Meſta;*' a grant of privileges the moſt inconſiſtent with the common principles of juſtice, of any that the partial and impolitic liberality of princes ever laviſhed upon favoured orders of ſubjects. Ancient uſage, derived in all probability from paſtoral times, had ſanctioned the claim to theſe deſtructive indulgences; and at the very time when legal meaſures ought to have aboliſhed the cuſtom, the Royal authority recogniſed, and rendered it perpetual. The proprietors of flocks in the northern provinces have, by this law, an undoubted right to drive them through the kingdoms of Caſtile and Leon to the provinces of Eſtremadura and Andaluſia for winter paſture. On their way, theſe flocks have the free uſe of all the common or unencloſed lands, which we have juſt ſeen are very extenſive, ; and no encloſures can be made in the two tracks through which they paſs, without leaving a ſpace of ninety yards wide for their accommodation. Nay, even in the beſt cultivated diſtricts, their paſture is fixed at a very low price; they have the uſe of all the olive grounds, and the ſhepherds have certain privileges of wood-cutting.

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The numbers of the ſheep have varied at different times: they amounted in the ſixteenth century to ſeven millions: at preſent, they are about five millions. All theſe animals, with above twenty-five thouſand attendants, the ſame number of dogs, and a conſiderable number of horſes, during forty days, twice a year, ravage, by law, the fineſt provinces of Spain. The conſequences of ſuch a grievous calamity are diſtinctly obſervable in the contraſt which the provinces exempt from its influence exhibit to thoſe where it ſubſiſts. Eſtremadura, which contains two thouſand ſquare leagues of the fineſt land, and could eaſily ſupport a population of two millions, had not (when Uſtaritz wrote) above two hundred and forty thouſand inhabitants; while Gallicia, which contains only ſixteen hundred ſquare leagues of very inferior territory, ſupported a population of one million. In the times of the Saracens, Eſtremadura was a perfect garden, enjoying at once all the advantages of ſkilful cultivation, and protection from the ravages of the Merino flocks. At the preſent day, all the provinces which are ſubject to the *meſta*, Leon, Caſtile, Eſtremadura, and Andaluſia, preſent a diſmal picture of its conſequences; and the agriculture of Spain is chiefly confined to thoſe diſtricts where the want of this grand evil counterbalances

terbalances all the natural disadvantages of unfavourable climate and bad soil. Catalonia, the most industrious, wealthy, and cultivated part of the whole peninsula, is neither subject to the *alcavala*; nor the law of Philip II. for the regulation of prices; nor the evils arising from the restraints under which landlords labour in other provinces, and from the insecurity of tenants; nor, finally, to the *mesta*. *

Such have been the effects of this barbarous relique of the pastoral state; effects which all men of sense in Spain have clearly perceived, and which many great writers and wits, from Cervantes to Campomanes, have forcibly exposed to the government. The evil, however, is strongly supported by the great families and convents. Nothing else could have maintained its existence even in Spain; and in no other civilized country would even such support have been effectual.

6. The system of law and police has been worse in Spain than in any civilized nation of modern Europe. The security of property is less

* Ustaritz Teoria y Pratica.—Bourgoing, Tableau, I. 89. II. 276. & III. 268.—Swinburne's Travels, p. 286. 424. 4to.—Townsend's Travels, II. 61. 227. 284.; III. 328.—Dillon's Travels, p. 48. to 66.—Econ. Polit. & Diplom. (Encyc. Method.) II. 317.—Southey's Letters, p. 180.

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leſs firmly eſtabliſhed; the corruption of judicatures more frequent; the privileges of municipal magiſtrates more extenſive and more incompatible with freedom either of perſon or trade *. In no part of Europe have the injurious privileges of the nobles and landed proprietors remained ſo long in force; in no part are the important officers of juſtice ſo neceſſarily corruptible from their ſtation; and in no part are the criminal laws ſo careleſsly executed, even after the judge has done his duty †.

In compariſon of theſe evils, the deſpotic nature of the government, and the tyrannical privileges of the Inquiſition, are ſcarcely deſerving of notice. The monaſtic inſtitutions themſelves, to which ſo much has been aſcribed, are inadequate to produce the hundredth part of the evil which muſt neceſſarily flow to the national induſtry and wealth from any one of the fundamental defects which I have now pointed out in the ſyſtem. Theſe are evils to which all Europe was at one time ſubjected. In Spain, they have maintained their ground longer than any where elſe. The effects of this difference,

* The offices of the magiſtrates, in many of the chief towns, are hereditary.

† It is no uncommon thing to ſee a capital convict marry, and have a family in priſon, after ſentence of death has been paſſed upon him.

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ence, together with the other peculiarities which I have enumerated, may eaſily be traced in the inferior wealth, induſtry, and population of the peninſula. *

I think we may fairly conclude from theſe details, in the firſt place, that the conqueſt of America, and the acquiſition of colonial diminions, has exerted no detrimental influence upon the proſperity of Spain; and in the ſecond place, that the decline of this ancient and highly-favoured country can be eaſily accounted for, by attending to the events of her domeſtic ſtory; events utterly unconnected with the fates of the diſtant provinces. To ſeek in the colonies for cauſes of national decay, when at home we meet with ſuch a ſyſtem of finance as the *alcavala*, *millones*, and *monopolies;* ſuch a ſyſtem of policy as that which expelled from the community all the valuable and uſeful part of the population, appointed magiſtrates to fix the price of all the produce of labour, and turned ſome of the fineſt provinces into waſte lands, in order to fatten the flocks of a few rich proprietors; and ſuch a ſyſtem of government and police as the Auſtrian monarchs encouraged—argues a ſtrange partiality for remote and roundabout explanation. To deny that the benefits of the colonial poſſeſſions have mitigated thoſe bad effects, which the domeſtic policy

* Note U.

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licy of the ſtate was by its nature ſo well calculated to produce, and have prevented Spain from loſing all pretenſions to a place of any conſideration in the European ſyſtem, would demonſtrate a prejudiced ignorance both of colonial and European hiſtory.

The natural advantages of the Spaniſh colonial empire have indeed been abridged by every means which imagination could ſuggeſt. A policy has been adopted with reſpect to the colonies, if poſſible more iniquitous and abſurd than that plan of domeſtic adminiſtration which we have been contemplating; and various injurious conſequences have been made to flow from thoſe rich dominions, ſufficient in a great degree to counterbalance the benefits, which not even Spaniſh policy could altogether annihilate. We are now to conſider the manner in which the mother country has contrived to receive as little advantage as poſſible from the fineſt colonial dominions that were ever poſſeſſed by any ſtate; and we ſhall find, that the evils which have been ſuppoſed to reſult from the acquiſition of thoſe dominions, are ſtrictly imputable to nothing but the ſyſtem of management adopted by the Spaniſh rulers.

1. In common with all the other proprietors of colonial territories, the Spaniſh monarchs have

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have uniformly aimed at confining to their own ſubjects the whole benefits of commercial intercourſe with thoſe poſſeſſions. But they have gone a great deal farther in the ſyſtem of monopoly than any of their neighbours. They have confined the colonial trade to particular claſſes of their own ſubjects, both in the mother country and in the colonies.

Immediately after the firſt conqueſts were completed in America, the Emperor Charles allowed all his Caſtilian ſubjects to fit out veſſels for trade with the new poſſeſſions from the chief ports of the kingdom, provided they returned to the port of Seville, under the penalties of death and confiſcation. It is unneceſſary to inveſtigate the grounds of ſo abſurd and impolitic a reſtriction. The natural conſequences of its operation are abundantly evident. Seville immediately became the only emporium of American trade, and even the permiſſion to clear out for the colonies from other ports was in a ſhort time withdrawn. The opulence of the favoured city ſoon increaſed to ſo great a pitch, that the perſonal influence of its wealthy inhabitants was ſufficient to prevent any new arrangement from taking place, until the river, becoming unfit for large veſſels, the monopoly, formerly enjoyed by Seville, was transferred in 1720, with all its attendant

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ant circumſtances of commercial ſplendour, to the city of Cadiz.

But the reſtrictive ſpirit of the Spaniſh councils in matters of trade, did not end here. When the conceſſion of excluſive privileges has raiſed up in any ſtate a peculiar body of men, whoſe intereſts are oppoſite to thoſe of their fellow citizens, the duration of this evil tends only to increaſe its magnitude. The monopoliſts are conſtantly endeavouring to enlarge their privileges, and to draw the circle cloſer to which thoſe privileges extend, while the wealth already acquired generally renders their influence ſufficient to inſure the ſucceſs of their united endeavours. Thus, after the Cabinet of Madrid had enriched the inhabitants of Seville by a monopoly of the colonial trade, the way was paved for confining the emoluments of this traffic to a ſmall claſs of thoſe inhabitants. The wealthieſt of the mercantile houſes engaged in ſupplying America with European commodities, would naturally deſire that this ſupply ſhould be as ſcanty as poſſible, in order that the prices might be as high as poſſible, and the union of views and plans as complete. The crown, too, having always derived a direct revenue from the heavy impoſts on the colony trade, was intereſted in confining the extent of the exportations, that

that the duties might be more eaſily levied. It was thought to have an intereſt in making the ſame amount of duties fall upon a ſmall ſupply of goods, that the coloniſts might be made to pay the whole.

The number of the galleons or veſſels fitted out for the ſupply of Peru, Chili, and Terra Firma, was twenty-ſeven. They ſailed only once a year for Portobello. The flota deſtined for the ſupply of Mexico and the northern provinces, conſiſted of about twenty-three ſhips, and ſailed once in three years to Vera Cruz. No perſon was permitted to load goods in either of theſe fleets, without licenſe from the *Caſa de Contrataçion*, or Houſe of Commerce, eſtabliſhed at Seville in the beginning of the ſixteenth century, and inveſted, not only with high judicial authority in all matters relating to the American trade, but alſo with the power of regulating the extent, aſſortment, and diſtribution of the periodical cargoes. No perſon was permitted to land any goods from the returning fleets, without a ſimilar licenſe granted by the ſame Board. Neither the galleons nor the flota could carry any foreigner to the colonies, nor even any Spaniard, without expreſs permiſſion. None of the veſſels were allowed to break bulk before their arrival at the fixed ports of deſtination. The flota dared not

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to touch at any place in its paſſage to Vera Cruz, nor the galleons in their paſſage to Carthagena, which they were obliged to make in their route to Portobello. The King's duties were levied in the form of direct cuſtoms upon the goods exported, or of fees and dues for the licenſes. Of the former, the moſt abſurd was an impoſt eſtabliſhed in 1720, and known by the name of *palmeo*. It was a ſubſtitute for the duty of twenty *per cent.* on the value of exports formerly raiſed with great rigour; and it conſiſted of a tonnage tax or impoſt upon the bulk of the commodities ſhipped, independent of their nature and value.

Another tax, of a nature ſingularly capricious and arbitrary, was the *indulto*, or duty upon the imported produce of the colonies. It was fixed anew by the government every time the fleets returned from America, and was adjuſted by an eſtimate formed of the value of the cargoes, each veſſel ſending from the rendezvous at the Havannah, during the time that the fleets were waiting for convoy, an account of the goods with which ſhe was laden. It is evident that all theſe regulations gave a few wealthy monopoliſts the whole profits of the American commerce, and enabled them to fix the prices at which all European commodities ſhould be ſold to the coloniſts. The crown, too,

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too, thus poſſeſſed the power of regulating both the colonial market of European goods, and the Spaniſh market of colonial produce; for every tax impoſed on the monopoliſts was immediately laid on the price of the goods exported and imported.

In this ſituation did the American trade continue, from the conqueſt till the middle of the eighteenth century. Seville and Cadiz alone, or rather a few rich merchants in thoſe cities, profited by the oppreſſions of the coloniſts, and amaſſed ſuch wealth as formed a ſtriking contraſt to the poverty of their countrymen, both in Europe and the colonies.

The ſame concurrence of ignorance and local intereſts which modelled the colonial trade into ſo pernicious a form, extended its effects to the diſtribution of the ſupply in America; and the reſtrictions impoſed upon the mother country were eaſy and liberal, compared with the fetters to which the colonies were ſubjected. Not only were they prohibited, under capital penalties, from holding any communication whatever with foreigners, or with Spaniſh veſſels not comprehended in the new periodical fleets; they were not allowed even to trade with one another. Peru could receive no ſupplies from Mexico or Terra Firma from the iſlands. The triennial ſupply of the flota could

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alone be diſtributed over the northern colonies. The annual ſupply of the galleons was peculiarly appropriated to the ſettlements in the South. No Spaniſh trader could interfere with the interior traffic of the colonies; nor could any coloniſt ſend his veſſels, or embark his goods to Spain on his own account. The Spaniſh and colonial merchants were only permitted to meet at the ſtated periods in three points of the continent—Carthagena, Portobello, and Vera Cruz, and at Havanna, the rendezvous of all the expeditions previous to their return.

The induſtry of Spain, it is probable, could eaſily ſupply all the demands of the colonies in the earlier part of the ſixteenth century; and the high profits of the colonial trade naturally drew every exertion of labour and ſkill into thoſe channels which belonged to the American provinces. When the effects of the reſtrictive ſyſtem began to be felt, a check was of courſe given to all the efforts which the colonial demand had called forth. At the ſame time, the various cauſes which I have already enumerated, as chiefly preparing the decline of Spain, concurred to curb the induſtry of the community; and the ſupply which the growing demands of the colonies required, could no longer be obtained in the mother country. Had the American

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American trade been left open to all Spain, there can be no doubt that its advantages would have tended greatly to counteract the effects of the domeſtic oppreſſions under which the country laboured. The reſtrictions, by checking the induſtry at firſt excited, during a period when other checks were daily multiplied by the wants and impolicy of the government, prevented the increaſe of Spaniſh ſupply, which the neceſſary increaſe of colonial demand required, in ſpite of all the endeavours of the monopoliſts, and conſtrained the colonies to depend on foreign ſupplies for ſatisfying the greater part of their wants. This was exactly what the government wiſhed beyond every thing to avoid; and while the ability of the mother country to furniſh the neceſſary goods was diminiſhing every day, the councils of the ſtate were conſtantly occupied with deviſing meaſures for the excluſion of foreigners from all ſhare even in the indirect emoluments of the colonial trade. In order to effect this, a variety of new and ſtrict regulations againſt the importation of foreign goods were perpetually added to the prohibitory laws; for, unleſs the importation of ſuch goods into the mother country was prevented, it was impoſſible to prevent their being re-exported to the colonies. As, however, all ſuch reſtrictions only increaſed the inability of Spain to furniſh the

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commodities required, it was neceſſary that the ſupply of the colonies ſhould be ſtill more limited than the intereſts of the monopoliſts would have required. Hence, the growth of the colonies received a new check; but ſtill it was requiſite that ſome foreign goods ſhould be ſent to South America. All theſe, therefore, were obliged to paſs through the hands of the Seville, and afterwards of the Cadiz merchants, firſt loaded with the duties of importation, then with the export duties, and, after all, in a quantity infinitely too ſmall for the occaſion. The only profits of Spain upon this trade, being the commiſſion and freight, with the King's duties; the Government, from abſurd views of national advantage, uſed the power which it conſtantly retained over this trade, in raiſing thoſe duties, contracting the ſupply, and favouring every endeavour of the monopoliſts to levy their profits upon the ſmalleſt poſſible exportation.

From this ruinous ſyſtem have flowed conſequences eminently injurious, both to the colonies and the mother country. Its immediate effects may be diſtinctly traced, in the exorbitant prices of all European articles in the Spaniſh colonies, the cheapneſs of all colonial produce in the country of its growth, and its dearneſs in the parent ſtate. When Don Ant. d'Ulloa was in South America, the pound of iron ſold at Quito

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Quito for about four ſhillings and ſixpence, and the pound of ſteel for about ſix ſhillings and ninepence Sterling. Towards the end of laſt century, the tobacco of Varinas ſold in Spain at four times its price in America, and, in other parts of Europe, at ſeven times that price. The groſs profits upon other goods bought at Vera Cruz, were one hundred and ſeventy-five *per cent.* in the mother country, and two hundred and fifty *per cent.* abroad.

The enormous increaſe of contraband operations in every department of the colonial trade, was another inevitable conſequence of the tyrannical ſyſtem adopted by the Spaniſh government. When Spain could only furniſh the twentieth part of the commodities required by her colonies, it became the intereſt, both of the coloniſts, and of thoſe foreigners who ſupplied the remaining nineteen twentieths, to ſmuggle over as much as poſſible of this great proportion, in order to avoid the monopoly poſſeſſed by the Spaniſh merchants, and the duties impoſed by the Crown. It became the intereſt of all the Spaniſh ſubjects, except the monopoliſts, to ſmuggle as much as poſſible of the ſmall proportion drawn from Spain; and the ſcantineſs of the ſupply afforded by the monopoliſts, made it the intereſt of the Spaniards, of foreigners, and of the coloniſts, to make up, by ſmug-

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gling, as great a proportion as poſſible of the deficiency. The enormous prices exacted for exports, and the high profits made upon imports by the monopoliſts, held out temptations ſufficiently ſtrong, to overcome the influence of all the penal laws which were perpetually added to the criminal code, with a view to prevent the contraband traffic. The extent of the evil thus in ſome meaſure operated its own remedy; and the ſupply of the colonies was in a certain degree accommodated to the demand, though ſtill at a price raiſed both by the high riſk, and the compariſon of great profits yielded to the regular traders. Almoſt all the benefits of this contraband trade centred in foreign nations. The mutual convenience or neceſſities of the colonies and thoſe traders, gave riſe to a ſyſtem of confidence, which at once proves the extent of the illicit trade, and the impolicy of the Spaniſh laws. The great expence which government incurred in attempting to prevent this traffic, was rendered fruitleſs, by the vaſt extent of the regions where it was carried on, as well as the powers of bribery which ſo beneficial a ſpeculation conferred upon thoſe engaged in it. Every reſource of executive and legiſlative power was tried in vain: the ſpiritual thunders were even threatened. Still the ſmuggling increaſed. The Engliſh alone were ſuppoſed

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poſed to enjoy as large a ſhare of the Spaniſh colonial commerce in the illicit way, as the authoriſed traders of the mother country; and the periodical ſupplies from the privileged port, inſtead of being, as formerly, far inferior to the demand, were now reduced to leſs than a ſixth part of their former amount, by the competition of the contraband traders.

So palpable an evil ſeems at laſt to have rouſed the attention of government, after all the principles of juſtice and ſound policy had repeatedly failed to excite any notice. When the commerce of Cadiz was transferred from Seville to Cadiz, one improvement had taken place in the method of taxing the exported goods. The *palmeo* had been ſubſtituted for the former duty of twenty *per cent*; and this new impoſt, however unequal and abſurd in its nature, (as I have already remarked), was, upon the whole, leſs burthenſome. But, in 1740, an important innovation was introduced into the colonial trade—the permiſſion of regiſter ſhips, or ſeparate equipments, deſtined for the ſupply of the American ſettlements, undertaken by individuals not concerned in the periodical fleets, and free to communicate with various ports of the colonies, formerly debarred from all direct intercourſe with

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the mother country. This was the firſt ſymptom of wiſdom in the Spaniſh mercantile policy; and nothing in the whole hiſtory of commercial affairs better deſerves our attention, than the ſlow and ſmall ſteps by which the government has developed this ſpirit of reformation.

At firſt, the regiſter ſhips were only allowed to ſail from, and return to the port of Cadiz. It was not till eight years afterwards, that any equipments of this ſort were permitted in the other Spaniſh ports. So great a change, however gradually effected, could not fail to be ſenſibly felt in the city whoſe monopoly was thus infringed. Numerous failures were the immediate conſequence; and the government, returning to its uſual cautious ſyſtem, inſtantly abandoned the innovation, and reſtored to the favoured port the whole intercourſe with America. The ſcheme of regiſter ſhips was evidently attended with many of the diſadvantages that had rendered the old plan of the galleons and flota ſo pernicious to the ſtate, and ſo deſtructive even of its own exiſtence. Theſe veſſels were large, and few in number: they were fitted out from a ſingle port; and the government, by making the adventurers pay high for their licenſe, impoſed a heavy duty upon the exports which they conveyed.

veyed. Accordingly, the contraband, though conſiderably checked by the advantages which this reform extended to the colonies, as well as to the traders of the mother country, was ſtill kept up by the limited nature of the improvement, and continued to baffle every effort of the Spaniſh councils.

But the trial which had been made between the years 1748 and 1754, and which had ſo much alarmed the monopoliſts, by preparing both this claſs of perſons, and the government, with the nation at large, for a farther relaxation in the reſtrictive laws, enabled the enlightened ſtateſmen, who, during the latter part of the eighteenth century, guided the movements of the Spaniſh government, to purſue the only practicable method of preventing the illicit commerce.

The year 1764, a memorable æra in the commercial annals of Spain, opened with the inſtitution of a ſyſtem of communication between the mother country and her colonies, which had hitherto been ſo much wanted, that Spain was actually indebted to foreign countries for intelligence about her own provincial affairs. The regular packet-boats, now firſt eſtabliſhed, were deſtined to ſail from Corugna, with letters, to the moſt important ſtations in Spaniſh America, and were permitted to carry on a conſiderable traffic at the ſame

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ſame time. Their cargoes, however, were limited in extent; they could only load with Spaniſh produce; and they were obliged to ſail from and return to the port of Corugna. The grand obſtacle, however, being overcome, of encroaching upon the rights of the Cadiz traders, a more important extenſion of the change was quickly introduced. In the following year, the commerce of the windward colonies *, that is, of the Spaniſh Weſt Indian iſlands, was laid open to almoſt all the principal ports in Spain. From theſe, every Spaniſh ſubject was permitted to trade in whatever manner he pleaſed with the Spaniſh Antilles, and to return to any port of the mother country. The *tonelada* and *palmeo* were commuted into a duty of ſix *per cent.* on the value of the exports, and the uſual duties on importation. No licenſe or warrant whatever, but the common cuſtomhouſe clearances, was preſcribed. In 1768, the colony of Louiſiana was included in the former grant; and, in 1770, it was extended to Yacatan and Campeachy.

Theſe

* The words of the edict are, '*Barlo Vento*,' which has by many been miſtaken for the Windward Iſlands of Trinidad and Margarite; whereas it clearly means all the colonies to windward of the Continent. *Vide* Campomanes, Educ. Pop. tom. II. p. 37.

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Theſe conceſſions, although ſtill imperfect, were evidently the dictates of a new ſyſtem of political views; and it may be remarked, that their defects bear the marks of all the partial or moderate ſyſtems of monopoly *. The trade to the iſlands is confined to certain towns in the different quarters of Spain—a limitation rather ſuperfluous than detrimental, ſince it is not eaſy to imagine how more than one ſea-port ſhould be neceſſary for fitting out the diſtant voyages of each province, at leaſt in the preſent ſtate of the Spaniſh reſources.

In 1766, the whole cotton trade of America was thrown open to the province of Catalonia, duty free; in 1772, the ſame liberty was granted to the other provinces alſo; and, in 1774, the importation of all the chief Weſt Indian ſtaples, duty free, was permitted to certain enumerated towns of the peninſula. The ordinance of 1765 was, in 1778, extended firſt to Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres, and ſoon after to Santa Fè and Guatimala; additions were alſo made, in this laſt edict, to the number of the towns permitted to trade with America; and the colonial ports included in the grant, amounted to no leſs than twenty-eight. The ſame memorable law granted various abatements of duties to veſſels laden with Spaniſh

* See Sect. II. Part II.

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Spaniſh produce; to Spaniſh manufacturers; to colonial goods; and particularly to the precious metals, which, with the contradictory abſurdity peculiar to the old ſyſtem, had been taxed to an intolerable amount on their entrance into the mother country.

It is aſtoniſhing that, after ſuch ſtrides had been made towards the complete eſtabliſhment of a commercial freedom, ſimilar to that enjoyed by the other European ſtates, a pauſe ſhould have ſucceeded before the province of Mexico (the only exception which now remained) was comprehended in the new arrangement. Galvez, the miniſter for Indian affairs, appears to have dreaded the ſudden extenſion of the free trade laws to this vaſt colony; and however much we may be inclined to ſuſpect him of prejudice or ignorance upon general ſubjects, his dauntleſs character frees him from any imputation of timid or cautious policy, as his intimate acquaintance with the internal ſtate of Mexico and the northern provinces, challenges conſiderable deference for his judgment upon this weighty matter. It was not until the year 1788, that he thought himſelf juſtified in removing the barrier which ſeparated the northern colonies from the mother country; and the whole colonial affairs of Spain have, ſince that period, continued to reſemble thoſe of the

the moſt enlightened nations in modern Europe. *

2. The colonial policy of Spain preſents us with examples of other reſtrictions upon trade beſides thoſe which are peculiar to the ſyſtem. During the earlier part of the eighteenth century, a company was formed, with the privilege of carrying on the trade of the fertile and extenſive province of Caraccas with the mother country, and with Trinidad and Guiana. A few years afterwards, the province of Maracaibo was added to the grant, and the privileges of the company were rendered excluſive. The Guipuſcoa, or Caraccas corporation, however, as its formation was anomalous in the Spaniſh ſyſtem, ſo it differed in many particulars from the other inſtitutions of a ſimilar nature, which have at different times been created by the mercantile policy of modern ſtates. The Company poſſeſſed no political authority whatever, and had to encounter,

* Burke's European ſettlements, Part III. chap. V. & XVI.—Harris's Collection, vol. II. p. 373. *& ſeqq.*—Bourgoing, Tableau de l'Eſpagne Moderne, tom. II. p. 167. *et ſeqq.*—Robertſon's America, Book VIII.—Campomanes, Induſtria Popular. P. XXVI.—Campomanes, Educaçion Popular, I. 430. 435. 443. 450.; II. 150. 166. & 167.; (Note 16.) 37. 54. 91. & 145.—Ricard, III. 609. *et ſeqq.*—Townſend's Travels, vol. II. p. 384.—Commerce (Encyc. Method.) I.

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counter, in matters of trade, a competition from the privilge enjoyed by the Canary iſlands of ſending a large regiſter ſhip yearly to the Caraccas, and from the free intercourſe with the Company's provinces, permitted to the colony of New Spain. But it is only as compared with other more injurious inſtitutions, that the Guipuſcoa Corporation deſerves praiſe; and it is only as affording ſome alleviation of the ſtricter monopoly, previouſly eſtabliſhed in the Spaniſh colonies, that the effects of the monopoly can be accounted beneficial to the provinces included in the Company's charter.

As this traffic was confined to the two ports of St Sebaſtian and Cadiz, or rather to the latter of theſe, ſince all the veſſels were obliged to return thither; as it did not enjoy all the benefits of excluſive privileges; as, without any of the emoluments attached to political ſovereignty, the Company were bound to defray the moſt expenſive charges of the Spaniſh colonial government, and the coſt of checking contraband trade; the inſtitution ſhared the fate of all other mercantile corporations. The ſervants employed in Europe and America, grew rich at the expence both of the copartners and the public; the diminution of profits was from time to time counteracted by extenſion of privileges; until, in the year 1785,

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1785, the Company's capital was abſorbed in a new eſtabliſhment, formed about this time, under the name of the Philippine Company, with a ſtock of one million two hundred thouſand pounds Sterling, for managing the commerce between America and the Philippine Iſlands, and between the Philippines and Old Spain.

At firſt, ſeveral diſaſtrous occurrences brought the new eſtabliſhment to the brink of ruin. Even during more propitious years, it had to ſtruggle with various diſadvantages, beſides thoſe which are eſſentially inherent in all ſuch plans. Thus, the monopoly was interrupted by a permiſſion to all Spaniſh merchants to import Indian muſlins; and the ſtuffs imported by the Company, were charged with duties above double of thoſe paid by the ſame articles, of ſuperior quality, in other countries. A great branch of ſmuggling was thus encouraged with other nations; and a profitable part of the Company's traffic was directly given up to other hands.

The profits of the Philippine Company on the firſt lucky adventure, were ſo high, as to enſure a ſtill more formidable competition from contraband traders. The cargoes of 1787 roſe in price full fifty *per cent.* after their arrival at Cadiz. The proſpects of ſuch gains raiſed the price of the actions; and in 1792, they were at par,

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par, after having ſold at one time for half the prime coſt. But ſtill, the utmoſt boaſt of the directors has been, that the clear profits of late years are ſufficient to balance the firſt loſſes of the trade, and to leave ſome overplus gain. The ſtate of the accounts and dividends is ſufficient to render even this boaſt ſuſpicious. The original capital was eight millions of piaſtres (*peſo fuerte* or *duro*), that is, a hundred and ſixty millions of reals vellon. It is pretended, that the total gain of the Company on this ſtock, from the firſt inſtitution to the end of 1795, that is, during eleven years, amounted to nearly twenty-two millions of reals vellon; which is only a yearly profit of one and one fourth *per cent.* Nor did any of this ſmall profit accrue to the ſtockholders until the year 1793, when the firſt dividend of five *per cent.* was made. Another dividend of five *per cent.* was added in 1795, and a third, to the ſame amount, was iſſued in 1796. From which we may conclude, that the Company gained during 1796; and perhaps, too, that, like all declining companies, they enlarged their dividends beyond what prudence juſtified. This at leaſt we know, that the exiſtence of the inſtitution was ſo frail, as to require of late years extraordinary ſupport from government. This was granted in the form of a permiſſion to purchaſe Indian ſtuffs, in the foreign markets of Europe, to a certain amount, and

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and import them into Spain: in other words, a corporation, formed for the Indian trade, loſt ſo much by its excluſive privileges, that it was ſupported by ſuch an extenſion of theſe, as expreſsly acknowledged its inability even to make the moſt of the Indian trade.

There can be little doubt that the Philippine Company will ſpeedily ſhare the fate of all thoſe of which we have hitherto contemplated the hiſtory, if indeed this event has not already taken place. The friends of the concern were anxious to ſet off the great ſucceſſes of 1793, 1795, and 1796, againſt the firſt loſſes; to ſtate the latter as accidental, and the former as the probable and ordinary courſe of their tranſactions. But if the origin of the eſtabliſhment was marked with great loſſes, the future ſucceſs of the trade is ſure of meeting with other obſtacles hitherto little felt. The competition of private capitals and foreign companies by contraband trade—the expences of defending the monopoly againſt ſuch attacks—the dilapidations of ſervants—the probable ruin of the tea trade, which in Spain cannot be conſiderable, and in foreign markets is in abler and richer hands:—theſe unavoidable evils (if they have not already accompliſhed it) will, in all probability, bring on the ruin of the Company, before the wiſdom of the Spaniſh government ſhall ſee fit to annul the charter. At any rate, if we were to take the four years of

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higheſt proſperity as a fair criterion of the benefits derived from the trade (which they clearly are not), we ſhould only find a profit of three and three fourths *per cent.* for the whole return; a much ſmaller gain than any which the worſt branches of the free Spaniſh trades of ſlow return ever afford.

The only other inſtance of a Spaniſh colonial Company, with which I am acquainted, is that of the Barcelona merchants, incorporated by charter in 1755, with the liberty of trading to St Domingo, Porto-Rico, and Marguerite. As the whole Weſt Indian trade was at this period confined to Cadiz, we may conceive how heavy the reſtrictions impoſed upon this new Company muſt have been, when they counteracted all the proſpects of gain preſented by this ſhare in the ancient monopoly, and prevented any uſe from ever being made of the privilege.

The project for altering the Honduras trade in 1714, was rather of the nature of a common contract, than an incorporative plan; and its failure followed the firſt attempt to carry it into execution. *

The

* Bourgoing, Tableau, tom. I. p. 28.; II. 231. & ſeqq.—Real ceduta, 25. Sept. 1728, & 21. June 1752.—Campomanes, Induſtrie Popular. tom. I. p. 158. & ſeqq.—Uſtaritz, Teoria y Pratica, cap. XXXIV.—Townſend's Travels, vol. II. p. 374.

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The Company of Cuba is fundamentally diſtinguiſhed from every other inſtitution of this kind with which we are acquainted, by the circumſtance of its being entirely a colonial inſtitution. The aſſociation was formed in 1735, with a capital of about two hundred thouſand pounds Sterling, and was endowed with excluſive privileges; but although it had factors at Cadiz, it belonged to Cuba. The malverſations of the officers in that colony ſo completely ruined the Company, that, in 1760, they were forced to give up all further operations.

The eſtabliſhment of excluſive companies, ſeems, as I have already remarked, contrary to the whole tenor and ſpirit of the Spaniſh colonial policy. The beſt informed Spaniards conſider the exiſtence of thoſe inſtitutions as dangerous in a monarchical government. Uſtaritz, particularly, argues from this general conſideration, againſt the adoption of ſuch expedients in the kingdoms of the peninſula *. We may, indeed, impute the circumſtance of their never having found admittance there, rather to the jealouſy of the Caſtilian monarchs, and the attention always paid by them to colonial affairs, than to any views of commercial

* Teoria y Pratica, cap. XXXVIII. & XXXIX.—Econ. Polit. (Encyc. Method.) I. 742.; II. 311.—Ricard, III. 607. & ſeqq.

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policy, or any ſentiments of tenderneſs towards their ſubjects in the diſtant provinces. All the companies which have maintained their exiſtence, with any degree of proſperity, in the other ſtates of Europe, have owed their ſucceſs chiefly to the powers of government entruſted to them. In Spain, it would have been inconſiſtent with every part of the national policy, to have inveſted a private copartnery with political authority over provinces of the empire. The ſole management of all the colonies belongs to the Council of the Indies, inſtituted by the Emperor Charles ſoon after the conqueſt of the New World, and inveſted with a controul over thoſe diſtant branches of the ſtate, ſubject only to the voice of the Monarch, who preſides at its deliberations, but is almoſt always directed by its advice. The provincial government is entirely in the hands of officers appointed by the Crown, and accountable only to their maſter and the Council. Even the ſole property of the lands is held, by the colonial law of Spain, to be veſted in the Monarch, of perſonal right. To him every vacated grant reverts: from him, with advice of the Council, all donations proceed. The eccleſiaſtical power is entirely ſubordinate and dependent. The Pope himſelf has no reſpect paid to his name in Spaniſh America.

3.

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3. The immediate conſequences of the narrow and abſurd views which regulated the Spaniſh government in its colonial meaſures, were, that the mother country received little or no benefit from the commerce of its diſtant poſſeſſions; and that the progreſs of thoſe provinces, in cultivation and improvement of every kind, was extremely ſlow. The atrocious cruelties of the firſt Spaniſh conquerors, ſoon reduced the Indians to a very ſmall number of moſt oppreſſed ſlaves. * The projects of mining abſorbed a great proportion of the capital which a wiſe government would have endeavoured by all means to turn from ſuch ruinous ſpeculations towards the culture of the ſoil. The monopolies, together with the various heavy taxes and duties impoſed upon colonial goods, exactly after the model of the Spaniſh finance ſyſtem, checked all uſeful induſtry, and kept, in a ſtate of want and miſery, the ſettlements, deſtined by nature to enjoy the greateſt degree of affluence. For two centuries, Spain did not gain more by the poſſeſſion of the Weſt Indies, than Britain or France now receive from the ſmalleſt of their iſlands; and the continental colonies, though by far the moſt extenſive, and naturally the

* Note V.

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moſt valuable, yielded the ſmalleſt returns, languiſhed in the moſt ſluggiſh inactivity, and enjoyed the faireſt poſitive advantages of any colonies in the whole world. As an inſtance of theſe things, we may remark, that Cuba, which is by nature fit for the ſupply of all Europe with the great Weſt Indian ſtaples, did not nearly ſupply enough of ſugar for the conſumption of the mother country. And Spain, poſſeſſing in Veneruela, the country where cacao is produced in greateſt perfection and abundance, received from that colony, through foreign nations, her ſupply of an article, which, of all colonial productions, Spaniſh habits render the moſt requiſite. The general reſtrictions impoſed upon colonial trade, by the ſingular ſpecies of monopoly eſtabliſhed in the mother country, and the burthens to which the colonial taxes ſubjected all the efforts of the inhabitants, affected in general the progreſs of every Spaniſh colony. But the iſlands, from the peculiar nature of their culture, were ſubject to other drawbacks, ſtill more immediately and ſenſibly felt. The abſolute neceſſity of negro ſlaves in thoſe ſettlements where the Weſt Indian ſtaples are to be cultivated, although it ſo far prevailed over all arguments of natural juſtice, as to render the ſlave trade a fundamental branch of the Spaniſh colonial policy, yet

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yet did not open the eyes of government to that free permiſſion of the traffic, which a regard for conſiſtency preſcribed. The reſtrictions impoſed upon the African trade, were evidently ſuggeſted by nothing like a regard for the rights of the negroes, or the ultimate and paramount intereſts of the colonies. They were drawn from the ſame ſource to which we muſt aſcribe all the commercial regulations of Spain; a favour to one claſs of ſubjects, and a jealouſy of benefiting foreign nations by the reciprocal advantages of thoſe branches of commerce which the Spaniards themſelves could not carry on. With all the wiſh in the world to promote the ſlavery of the negroes by means of Spaniſh traders, particularly by means of a certain claſs of Spaniſh traders, the Council of the Indies cramped that intercourſe with foreign ſlave traders, which the cultivation of the iſlands required, and confined the right of importing negroes to a certain part of the mother country. Then, political circumſtances induced the government to transfer the benefits of this traffic to a claſs of merchants in France, who continued to enjoy a monopoly of the African trade with the Spaniſh colonies; and the Government, at the ſame time, by way of reſtricting this privilege, which neceſſity had extorted, reſtricted the extent of

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the trade, or, in other words, rendered the monopoly ſtill more ruinous than ever to the Weſt Indian ſettlements. By the treaty of Utrecht, the Aſſiento was transferred to Britain, given again to a company, and accompanied with ſimilar reſtrictions.

The Spaniſh war, cauſed in a great meaſure by the contraband trade which the Engliſh contrived to mingle with the Aſſiento importation, put an end to this ſingular ſpecies of foreign monopoly; and the ſlave traffic was conferred by the government excluſively to a private company, whoſe entrepôt was at Porto-Rico. This copartnery ſupplied Cuba and Trinidad (the iſlands moſt in want of hands) with no more than from two thouſand five hundred to three thouſand ſlaves a year, while Carthagena and Portobello (for the ſupply of the Continent) received only half that number. The contract expiring in 1780, Government wiſhed to encourage a more regular trade with Africa; and actually obtained from Portugal two ſmall iſlands on the coaſt. But want of proper veſſels and ſurgeons, ignorance of this difficult branch of traffic, and a total deficiency in thoſe articles which are neceſſary for the negro market, with all the reſtrictions of the Spaniſh laws upon importation, prevented any good effects from attending theſe endeavours. The Spaniſh colonies

nies were again forced to depend upon foreign ſupplies; and Government, again, unwilling that a mutual benefit ſhould be conferred upon ſtrangers, took the ſupply into its own hands, and entered into contract with a Britiſh mercantile houſe for a yearly number of three thouſand ſlaves. The Philippine company, too, imported, by means of Britiſh veſſels, a ſupply of nearly four thouſand for one year into Buenos Ayres. At laſt Government diſcovered, that commerce is in its eſſence a mutual benefit; that kings and miniſters are not ſuch good merchants as private men; that no law can compel a Spaniard, any more than another perſon, to become ſuddenly ſkilful and experienced in a particular buſineſs; and that, in order to cultivate the colonies of Spain, the Britiſh ſlave traders muſt neceſſarily be enriched. In 1789, the negro traffic with the iſlands and Caraccas was thrown open to Spaniards and foreigners for a certain time; and this period was prolonged by ſubſequent edicts, which alſo extended the privilege to the two ſouthern viceroyalties. A bounty was alſo proclaimed upon field negroes, and a capitation tax impoſed upon thoſe employed in domeſtic ſervice. At the ſame time, with a wonderful inconſiſtency, the importation of all dead ſtock, including tools and implements required in agriculture and the arts,

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arts, was expreſsly confined to Spaniſh traders and veſſels, as if negroes were at all different from other implements of induſtry, in a *commercial* point of view.

The effects of thoſe changes, and of the general freedom granted to colonial commerce, by the edicts which I formerly mentioned, have been immediate and extenſive upon the colonial reſources. The iſland of Cuba, in particular, the largeſt and moſt fertile of any in the new world, if not in the whole globe, has been making rapid advances towards that ſtate of opulence, for which its natural advantages are ſo eminently adapted. Its trade which, in 1765, ſcarcely employed ſix veſſels; in 1778, required above two hundred, and more than ſupplied the mother country with ſugar. In 1774, there ſailed from Cadiz alone to Cuba forty-one veſſels; and arrived from Cuba at Cadiz ſixty-one. During the period from 1765 to 1770, the cuſtoms at the Havannah had increaſed threefold; and the total value of the importations from the whole iſland had augmented five fold. An increaſe which ſhows at once the evils of the previous regimen, and the tendency of the Spaniſh colonies, as well as of the mother country, to rapid improvement, under a better ſyſtem of commercial policy. The improvement of St Domingo has alſo been very great; and that of Porto

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Porto Rico ſtill more conſiderable. The liberty of trade granted to Trinidad having been in every reſpect more extenſive than that which the other iſlands are permitted to enjoy, the improvement of the colony was proportionally rapid and aſtoniſhing. Within a few years, the ſugar plantations increaſed from twenty to above three hundred and ſixty; and all the other articles of Weſt Indian produce, which were formerly unknown in this quarter, have ſince been raiſed in conſiderable abundance.

The improvement of Caraccas from the inſtitution of the company, and the conſequent extenſion of its connexion with Europe, is equally ſtriking. The reſtraints under which the general monopolies of Seville and Cadiz formerly laid this rich and extenſive province, in common with all the Spaniſh colonies, not ſituated in the immediate vicinity of the three great emporiums, had ſo completely checked its commercial intercourſe with the mother country, that during ſixteen years not a ſingle veſſel arrived from thence in Spain; and during twenty years previous to the company's eſtabliſhment, only five ſhips ſailed from Spain to the province. Spain was of courſe ſupplied with cacao, the great ſtaple of the colony, entirely by foreigners. But ſince the year 1728, the direct importation of this article has been ſo copious, that its price has

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has fallen to one half. The quantity raiſed in Caraccas is double of the former produce; the number of its live ſtock is more than trebled; the cultivation of grain, &c. is increaſed nearly threefold; and the population has been greatly augmented. The privileges granted to the company, although very ruinous when compared with a free trade, were liberal, when compared with the former reſtrictions. The permiſſion granted to the company exactly increaſed the ſtock employed in the colonial trade by a million Sterling, the amount of the company's capital, and turned all the additional commerce, ſupported by this new ſtock, into the ſervice of the Caraccas alone; while the privilege, being not at firſt excluſive, could prevent very little of the former capital from being continued in the ſame employment, until the increaſe of the colony was ſo conſiderable, that the effects of the additional monopoly could not be felt.

Since the year 1765, too, the contraband trade has been almoſt entirely deſtroyed. At preſent, it exiſts only in an extent authoriſed by the connivance of the Spaniſh government from the neceſſities of the coloniſts. *

We may form a more general eſtimate of the conſequences which the new ſyſtem has produced

* Note W.

produced upon the colonial commerce of Spain, by attending to the total amount of the colonial exportations and importations of the privileged ports ſince the new regulations, and comparing this amount with that of the commerce carried on during the later periods of the monopoly, or, which is the ſame thing, by examining the progreſs of the colony trade during the firſt years of the free trade.

The exports to Spaniſh America in 1778 were made in a hundred and ſeventy ſhips, were worth about ſeventy-four millions of reals vellon, and paid above three and a half millions of duty. The imports from thence, in the ſame year, were made in a hundred and thirty ſhips, valued at ſeventy-four and a half millions, and paid nearly three millions duties.

In 1788, the value of the exports had riſen to above three hundred millions, and that of the imports to above eight hundred and four and a half millions. The duties upon both exports and imports exceeded fifty-five millions.

This rapid increaſe can be aſcribed to nothing but the effects of the free trade; and, notwithſtanding all the clamours raiſed by the Cadiz merchants, we find that the city was the firſt to enjoy the advantages of the change; for the imports of Cadiz from America in 1788 were three fourths of the whole colonial imports;

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ports; and the exports of Cadiz thither were conſiderably above two thirds of the whole colonial exports. This harmleſs conſequence of the new regulations to the town which enjoyed the monopoly for ſo many years, may in part be attributed to the extreme caution, and even tedious and timid ſlowneſs, with which the change was brought about; but much more to the wealth already heaped up in that town, and the greater experience of its merchants in the colony traffic. We may indeed be permitted to doubt if it was neceſſary to uſe ſo much caution in contriving to allow ſo many delays in executing the new arrangement. A ſudden ſhock to the employment of national capital is always to be avoided; and, no doubt, when one part of a nation has grown wealthy and important, out of all proportion to the reſt, a blow given to this quarter is to be dreaded; from the apprehenſion that it may ſhake the whole community. But the laying open of a trade, by the monopoly of which one branch of the ſtate had thriven, is ſeldom extremely dangerous, even when ſudden; for the very exiſtence of the monopoly muſt have enabled the favoured branch to acquire large capital and great experience, which will aſſuredly give it a preponderating weight in the new competition. The profits will be diminiſhed, and a few individuals ruined; but more

more ſtock will be actively employed, and greater exertions of induſtry and ſkill called forth. The whole profits on the trade will be increaſed; and the pre-eminence of this once favoured branch of the trading intereſt, will neceſſarily continue a long time—will neceſſarily be brought to its juſt level by very ſlow ſteps, although the trade ſhould be laid open on a ſudden, without the ſmalleſt warning or modification.

But, whatever may be our opinion upon the general caution exhibited in all the colonial meaſures of the Spaniſh government, we cannot heſitate to admit, that ſome of thoſe meaſures were not only demonſtrative of too rigid an adherence to the ancient ſpirit, but abſolutely contradictory and repugnant to the wiſer and more liberal intentions of the new eſtabliſhments. Of theſe I have already mentioned one or two inſtances immediately connected with the colonial trade and cultivation. I ſhall now add two more examples of the ſtrange mixture of illiberal and abſurd policy which, about the period of greateſt reform, ſeems to have prevailed in the views of the Spaniſh rulers.

In the *firſt* place, When ſteps were taken to aboliſh the *alcavala*, and other deſtructive branches of revenue in Old Spain, a meaſure of

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of reſtrictive policy was allowed to be attempted in America, which had nearly coſt the price of all the continental colonies. The endeavours of the Court to lay tobacco under a Royal monopoly in Peru, produced, about the cloſe of the American war, a rebellion, which was not quelled without incredible bloodſhed, and which, if it had laſted a few months longer, might have ſevered the ſouthern continent from its dependence on the Old World, at the ſame time that the northern colonies were eſtabliſhing their ſupremacy.

In the *ſecond* place, Although the chief object of the new laws was the abolition of the contraband trade, a tarif was publiſhed in 1782, raiſing almoſt all the duties payable by foreign merchandize imported into Spain. Now the foreign market is that to which the colonies muſt look for their chief ſupplies, until Spain has revived her European induſtry and ſkill. This impolitic meaſure, then, tended to an immediate and important augmentation of the colonial contraband trade, as well as of the European ſmuggling. *

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* Bourgoing, Tableau de l'Eſpagne Moderne, tom. II. p. 167. *et ſeqq.*—Robertſon's America, Book VIII.—Solorzano de Indianna Gubernatione, lib. IV. cap. VII.—Uſtaritz Teoria y Pratica, cap. XXXIX.

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4. No reſtriction impoſed in the mother country, with a reference to the colonies, is more abſurd; and few can be more hurtful, than the limitations upon the exportation of the precious metals. It is evidently to theſe reſtraints, and not to the poſſeſſion of the American mines, that we ſhould aſcribe the bad conſequences ſo often imputed to the Spaniſh and Portugueſe colonies, from the ſuppoſed tendency of the gold and ſilver trade to raiſe the price of labour in the peninſula, and ſubject the manufactures of the nation to a diſadvantageous competition in foreign markets. The taxes impoſed by Spain, and the abſolute prohibition impoſed by Portugal, upon the exportation of the metals, without enabling thoſe countries to retain a ſingle ingot more than they can afford to employ in currency and uſe, raiſes their value in other countries, by the expence attendant upon the riſk of ſmuggling, as well as by the obſtruction of the ſupply which would naturally go thither; and diminiſhes their value in the peninſula, where the channels of circulation and conſumption are kept always full. If the reſtrictive laws were aboliſhed, the level would be reſtored; and the only conſequence of Spain and Portugal poſſeſſing the mines would be, that theſe countries would poſſeſs an extremely

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ſmall ſuperioriority in cheapneſs of gold and ſilver—a ſuperiority proportioned to the expence of freight and inſurance upon the quantity of thoſe metals, which would be diffuſed over the reſt of Europe from the American mines, through the medium of the peninſula.

5. It is impoſſible to form an accurate idea of the important advantages which Spain derives from her colonies, without much fuller information than the jealouſy of the government, and the want of curioſity among the people, has allowed us to obtain with reſpect to the internal ſtate of the colonial ſyſtem, and the revenue derived from thence by the Crown. The various detached pieces of intelligence which have reached us upon theſe topics, are extremely contradictory; and, even though the different concluſions to be drawn from the facts, agreed with each other, the reſults applying to different periods, while the ſtate of the whole is daily changing, we ſhould be unable to derive any ſatisfactory account from the detail.* Of the following general inferences there can be, however, but little doubt.

In the *firſt* place, It appears that the Spaniſh colonies are more extenſive, and more rich, in various

* Note W.

various reſources, than thoſe of any other power.

Secondly, That the commercial regimen has always been ſuch as to obtain the feweſt poſſible benefits from ſuch fine dominions.

Thirdly, That the population has been rapidly increaſing in every quarter ſince the conqueſt, though not ſo rapidly as in the North American ſettlements.

Fourthly, That at this day Spain poſſeſſes a ſmall proportional black population, and a more numerous Indian and white population, than any other European power in the New World.

Fifthly, That the population is well blended together, the forces of the races balanced by manners and political inſtitutions, and the dangers of negro or Indian inſurrection removed to a great diſtance from the moſt important Spaniſh colonies.

Sixthly, That the dangers of ſeparation from the parent ſtate are not to be conſidered, ſo diſtant have they been rendered by wiſe meaſures of general policy. And,

Laſtly, That the improvements of the whole colonies, but particularly of the iſlands, have been keeping pace with the neceſſities under which Spain is laid, both in America and Europe, of extending and drawing forth her whole imperial reſources.

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The changes which have lately taken place, both in the continental and inſular dominions of Spain, deſerve conſiderable attention. Although the remaining territories of this power in the New World are far more than ſufficient to increaſe her reſources in an incalculable degree; and although the ſtates which have received the ſpoil are in every reſpect much more benefited than the plundered nation is injured by the compulſory transference of territory; yet it cannot be doubted, that the acquiſitions, both of France and England, are ſufficiently important to juſtify ſome apprehenſions for the conſequences to the colonial independence of Spain. The neighbourhood of Trinidad to the Continent, of St Domingo to Cuba, and of Louiſiana to Mexico, is an obvious conſideration of alarm. If Spain loſes her laſt footing in the Archipelago, now reduced to Cuba and one or two inconſiderable rocks, the conſequences muſt be the more ſerious, that ſhe will ceaſe to have any weight in the politics of the Weſt Indian ſyſtem. Almoſt all her ſtrength will be concentrated on the weſt coaſt of America; for the eaſt is uniformly ſo extremely unhealthy, that nothing but the attractions of the periodical fairs could ever have interrupted its natural ſtate of deſertion; and even this was only conſpicuous during

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ing a few days of every year. An event which ſhould in a manner cut off the intercourſe between the mother country and colonies, could ſcarcely be regarded as otherwiſe than fatal to the provincial relations of Spain. But the farther diſcuſſion of theſe topics belongs not to this branch of the ſubject.

While the views of the Spaniſh government have been daily becoming more liberal and more juſt in colonial affairs, and while the change has been uniformly attended with the happieſt effects upon this branch of the imperial concerns, a ſimilar revolution has gradually taken place in the domeſtic policy of the mother country. The views of the Bourbon princes have been directed in this, as well as in the more remote branches of their noble dominions, to ameliorate, by ſlow ſteps, the ruinous ſyſtem of adminiſtration eſtabliſhed by their predeceſſors of the Auſtrian line; and the effects of ſo important a change have been ſtriking and uniform upon the internal ſituation of the community. It is not my province to enlarge upon this topic; but, as a proof that the decline of Spain was wholly unconnected with her colonial relations, it is ſufficient to ſtate the financial reforms which have been projected, and in part executed, in the mother country, during the very period of greateſt colonial im-

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provement and prosperity. The plan of a single tax to be substituted for the *alcavala* and *millones*, and some of the other most ruinous branches of Spanish finance, took its rise at the very time when the plan of the free colonial trade was in agitation. The execution of the two schemes, and of the other subordinate measures connected with each part of the national policy, have nearly kept an uniform pace. While all parts of the empire have been incalculably benefited by the free trade with America, the most important, and by far the most oppressed parts of the mother country, have been relieved from those manifold burdens which had evidently been the cause of her decline; and every day now evinces the happy effects of a change in policy, no less just than it is expedient, and even necessary. It is surely a proof that the downfal of a country was not caused by its colonial possessions, but by some evil in the national policy common to all its branches, when we thus find that the æra of adversity was common to both the contiguous and remote provinces, and that the same circumstances which raised up the colonies, and increased their beneficial effects upon the wealth of the parent state, have elevated the parent state also, rescued her from inactive obscurity, and placed her in the career of general improvement.

provement, in which her neighbours are engaged in both quarters of the globe.

PART III.

OF THE COLONIAL POLICY OF PORTUGAL, DENMARK, AND SWEDEN.

THE circumſtances of Portugal, in many important particulars, cloſely reſemble thoſe of Spain. Many of the deductions and remarks contained in the Laſt Part of this Section, apply, without any variation, to the Portugueſe policy, both in the colonial and domeſtic departments of the ſtate. Without repeating theſe, I ſhall now conſider thoſe peculiarities which diſtinguiſh Portugal from Spain, and, for the moſt part alſo, from every other country.

By its relative ſituation, and moderate extent, Portugal forms a ſubordinate branch of the European commonwealth. It is obviouſly a natural part of the Spaniſh empire; and nothing but the weakneſs of Spain, together with another circumſtance peculiar to Portugal, could have prevented the whole peninſula from being

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united at this day under a Spaniſh monarch, aſſiſted by the force of his natural allies. That circumſtance is, the vaſt extent of the colonies over which, at all times, the Portugueſe dominion has extended, which, by their great reſources, have communicated to the mother country an importance altogether unnatural to her, and which, if regulated by a juſt ſyſtem of policy, would have enabled her to act a part among the moſt powerful ſtates of Europe. With reſpect to her colonial relations, Portugal, in ſome reſpects, reſembles Spain; in others, Holland; and in others, ſhe is in a ſituation very different from either.

Portugal reſembles Spain in the backwardneſs of all parts of the empire; the abundance of employment which the mother country might ſtill afford, both to induſtry, capital, and ſkill; the poſſibility of exiſting more independent, both of diſtant provinces and foreign powers, than ſhe has hitherto done; and the capacity of making a greater figure alone, than her colonies have ever yet enabled her to do. She reſembles Holland in the inferiority of her proper ſtaple agricultural reſources to thoſe of all her neighbours, and in the neceſſity under which that inferiority lays her, of cultivating ſome other mode of induſtry beſides agriculture, or of falling upon ſome means of extending

ing her limited territories. But ſhe certainly does not reſemble Holland, in beginning to obey the neceſſities of her ſituation, by firſt improving the nearer parts of her territory, or taking the moſt obvious means of ſupplying its deficiencies.

In ſome circumſtances, Portugal differs widely from both Spain and Holland; for ſhe unites a greater natural weakneſs than that of Holland, with a corrupt national character, and a ſyſtem of policy not much better than that of Spain. She has more natural diſadvantages than Holland, without any of the political remedies by which the Dutch obviated all thoſe evils; and nearly as many political drawbacks as Spain, without any of the natural advantages which have maintained the independence of Spain in ſpite of all her efforts to loſe it.

The extenſion of the Portugueſe territory by colonial eſtabliſhments, has in part ſupplied the want of natural barriers of defence, and in ſome degree counterbalanced the effects of bad domeſtic policy. Without doubt, if the Dutch had poſſeſſed the weſtern part of the peninſula, they would have accumulated greater wealth, and collected a larger population within their limits than the Portugueſe have done, within all the circle of their vaſt boundaries. Without any colonies or fiſheries, they would have attained

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attained a much higher rank in the European ſcale than the poſſeſſion of India and Brazil has ever forced on the Portugueſe, probably a higher rank than they themſelves have ever been able to ſeize by the force of all their induſtry and ſkill. But in the actual caſe of a feeble, impolitic, and degenerate people, inhabiting the country during the moſt important period of modern hiſtory, whatever may have been the cauſes of their impolicy and weakneſs, even admitting the colonies to have contributed their ſhare of national degeneracy, it cannot be denied that the moſt eſſential benefits have been derived from the diſtant to the contiguous provinces, and that the colonial poſſeſſions of Portugal have, much more than the weakneſs of her natural enemy, continued her independent exiſtence in Europe. While the Dutch, then, from want of land, were forced to employ themſelves in every branch of manufacturing and commercial induſtry, in order to ſupport a great population, the Portugueſe, in no want of land, turned their purſuits to foreign trade and conqueſt, from variety of taſtes, and from ambition. The Dutch wanted occupation for their talents, in order to gain ſubſiſtence; and having acquired ſtock, they wanted the means of employing it, in order to acquire greater wealth. The Portugueſe only

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only ſtood in need of extenſive territory for the purpoſes of defence. They wanted barriers againſt powerful neighbours; and having ſupplied this deficiency, by acquiring the weight which foreign conqueſts more quickly confer, than increaſe of domeſtic proſperity, their ambition grew with their poſſeſſions, like the avarice of the Dutch, and they became one of the moſt powerful people in the world. Holland had recourſe to the colonial policy. After reaching the higheſt pitch of domeſtic opulence, her colonies ſerved to retard, and may, if other cauſes do not intervene, altogether prevent the downfal which a ſtate naturally dependent could not fail to experience. Portugal began with colonial ſpeculations. They were the firſt efforts of her power. They were the earlieſt fruits of the talents which have ſo ſparingly appeared among her inhabitants.

In Europe ſhe has never made any conſpicuous figure. Had ſhe produced the ableſt leaders or ſtateſmen, they could only have raiſed their fame on the conqueſt or adminiſtration of diſtant territories, where the power of Spain and France did not interfere. Holland has preſented the ſpectacle of an overgrown wealth and population accumulated in a petty diſtrict of bad land. Spain has exhibited the greateſt inſtance on record of an empire overgrown

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overgrown in all its parts, and, if not unwieldy, at leaſt uſeleſsly extenſive in every quarter. Portugal has diſplayed a perpetual contraſt of natural advantages with political defects; the moſt ſtriking inſtance of overgrown power in diſtant regions; of diſproportion almoſt unnatural between the remote members and the body; of ambition gratified at the expence of both ſafety and wealth. The more moderate extent of the original dominions has, indeed, prevented them from experiencing the ſame neglect, which, for many ages, proved fatal to Spain; and the ſtruggles to which the diſtant provinces were ſo often expoſed, have rendered their inhabitants more active than their ſecure and confident neighbours. But, in moſt material particulars, the character of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe policy, both in Europe and the colonies, continued nearly the ſame, until, during the latter part of the eighteenth century, the improvements of the former in all reſpects outſtript thoſe of the latter ſyſtem.

Thus, in the nature of their colonial adminiſtration, and in the relation between colonial poſſeſſions, and the wealth of the parent ſtate, both Spain and Portugal agree ſo well, that they may be claſſed under the ſame extreme caſe, as forming a contraſt to Holland. But in the diſproportion of the colonial to the European

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ropean territories, and in the relations between the colonies and the power of the parent ſtate, Portugal is in a ſeparate predicament; an extreme caſe, forming a contraſt to every other ſtate—leaſt of all to Spain, moſt of all to the northern powers. We may therefore expect to find the moſt important effects produced upon the political circumſtances of Portugal, and no inconſiderable influence exerted alſo upon her national wealth, by the varying fates of her colonial ſyſtem. We ſhall ſee that evil conſequences have followed, not from the acquiſition, but from the loſs of her colonies; and that the only injuries which the Portugueſe can charge upon the colonial meaſures of their anceſtors, are the comparative loſſes ſuſtained in conſequence of the abuſes prevalent in the whole ſyſtem of their provincial policy.

1. During the ſixteenth century, the empire of Portugal was more extenſive than any over which the dominion of other ſtates has ever ſtretched; and the territories that compoſed it, though almoſt all held by the right of recent diſcovery and conqueſt, were not, like thoſe of Spain and Ruſſia, ſubdued and retained with eaſe; nor were they tracts of uſeleſs country, thinly peopled, poſſeſſed only of unimproved natural reſources, and inhabited by a few tribes of wandering

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wandering ſavages, mingled here and there with nations ſomewhat more civilized. The Portugeze conqueſts were with much difficulty gained from nations far advanced in refinement, capable of making a regular and formidable reſiſtance, conſtantly prepared to throw off the yoke ſpread over countries of which the various and abundant natural reſources had been ſo highly improved, as far to ſurpaſs thoſe of the conquerors in Europe. The extenſion of territory obtained from right of diſcovery, that is, ſeized from leſs civilized nations, was equal to the moſt opulent of the dominions poſſeſſed by Spain, and poſſeſſed by tribes much more warlike than the Mexicans or Peruvians. The extent of ſea-coaſt ſtudded with convenient ports, which bounded the eaſtern dominions of Portugal during this brilliant period, was of itſelf ſufficient to inſure the moſt important commercial advantages from their intercourſe with the metropolis. The whole weſtern coaſt of Africa, with the greater part of the eaſt coaſt and the Cape of Good Hope, was ſubject to the dominion of the Portugueze, and occupied at favourable intervals by their garriſons and factories. In like manner, they poſſeſſed the whole ſouthern coaſt of Aſia, together with as many of the Indian iſlands as they choſe to ſettle in, from the Gulph of Perſia to China and

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and Japan, where they had a few important commercial ſtations. This unparalleled extent of naval territory gave them the undiſputed command of all thoſe ſeas, and enabled them to carry into execution the ordinary ſchemes of the mercantile ſyſtem with uncommon rigour and ſucceſs, by ſtrictly confining all intercourſe with Aſia and Africa to their own European territories. The power which they poſſeſſed over the interior of thoſe vaſt and opulent regions, ſupported their commercial eſtabliſhments, and enabled them to gratify with unexampled licenſe that tyrannical ſpirit which has always, though in different degrees, ſignalized the intercourſe of European ſtates with the refined and amiable inhabitants of their Oriental provinces. Such, during the whole of the ſixteenth, and the greateſt portion of the ſeventeenth century, was the magnificent outline of the Portugueze empire in Africa and Aſia.

It may eaſily be imagined, that the poſſeſſion and excluſive commerce of ſuch rich and extenſive dominions, not only aggrandized the Portugueze name, but poured great wealth into all parts of the ſtate. They are indeed the only theatre upon which the valour or talents of this nation have ever acquired renown; and the ancient Indian trade bears as great a proportion to all the preſent commerce of Portugal,

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tugal, and all that ſhe ever poſſeſſed, as the Aſiatic trade bore to all the reſt of the Venetian commerce. The romantic deſcriptions of the Portugueze authors may be received with ſuſpicion, when we view the extent of the glory which they ſo profuſely aſcribe to their countrymen in Indoſtan; and we may even queſtion thoſe pictures of the rich reſources of the Eaſtern empire. But the teſtimony of other nations, their rivals and enemies, is ſufficient to prove, that the achievements and wealth of the nation in thoſe provinces were greatly ſuperior to any of which it can boaſt elſewhere; and the remains of the Portugueze dominions in Africa, where at this day fifteen kings are tributary to the Court of Liſbon, together with the glittering fragments of the Aſiatic empire, corrupted by bad policy as well as diſmembered by foreign conqueſt, may convince us of the important relations which the provincial wealth and power of this nation muſt have formerly borne to its whole reſources. One conſideration may, indeed, ſuffice to demonſtrate the importance of her Eaſt Indian poſſeſſions to Portugal during the ſixteenth century. They threw into her hands all the commerce of Aſia, which, long before the diſcovery of the Cape paſſage, had formed one of the greateſt trades carried on between any two parts of the world; had

had enriched and refined the whole European empire of Rome, and raiſed the petty republic of Venice to a degree of power formidable to all the great nations of the Continent. The ſame commerce, divided among ſeveral ſtates, though prevented, by their erroneous plans both of provincial government and mercantile policy, from making great progreſs ſince the downfal of the Portugueſe dominions, has ſenſibly enriched all thoſe nations, and continues to form a very conſiderable part of their extended trade. The fine provinces of the peninſula and the iſlands, are now indeed much more fully explored, and better ſubdued. They contain a greater mixture of Europeans, and are more under the influence of ſyſtematic diſcipline. But when we conſider the ſtate of dependence and miſery in which they have been kept by conſtant miſrule, and the worſt poſſible ſyſtem of mercantile law, we ſhall not be diſpoſed to think their reſources more flouriſhing than they were in the days of Albuquerque and Caſtro, or to believe that the beſt ſchemes of policy could now derive from them more eſſential benefits to the commercial affairs of England, France, and Holland, than thoſe great captains might have obtained for the Portugueſe trade, by following an equally wiſe line of political conduct. A ſingle fact related by

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the beſt Engliſh authors, and received from very unqueſtionable authority, is ſufficient to demonſtrate the extent of the trade actually carried on by the Portugueze in their Aſiatic ſettlements, ſome time after their Eaſtern empire had begun to decline from the competition of the Engliſh and Dutch. In the year 1611, the Engliſh Company's ſervants, in one of their voyages to Surat, ſaw a ſingle Portugueſe merchant fleet, conſiſting of two hundred and forty ſail bound for Camboy, and deſtined only for the commerce of the northern and moſt trifling ſettlements. *

The attention which ſo extenſive and ſplendid a dominion, capable of communicating ſuch important commercial benefits, received from the metropolis, may eaſily be imagined. The African and Aſiatic provinces, however, muſt be conſidered as conquered territories, held in ſubjection by a few handfuls of troops and ſquadrons of ſhips, not as colonies peopled by emigrants from the mother country, or by a race in which thoſe emigrants and their deſcendants bore a conſiderable proportion. The policy of Portugal was of a nature very little adapted to introduce any extenſive intercourſe between the ports of the empire; and at any rate, the Eaſtern ſettlements were already extremely populous.

* Anderſon's Hiſtory of Commerce, II. 245. 263.

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pulous. The nominal poſſeſſion of vaſt dominions was preferred to the real incorporation of as much as the force of the central government could ſuſtain and hold together. The treaſure and blood of the metropolis was waſted in wars with the native powers, and the relations of commerce were on every occaſion poſtponed for thoſe of conqueſt and dominion. The conſequences of theſe circumſtances have been fatal to the Portugueſe dominion in the Eaſt. Held by the moſt brittle of all tenures (the ſame violent meaſures upon which it was founded), this empire yielded to the fate of war, and has, like all conqueſts made by a diſtant and inconſiderable ſtate, been transferred to other powers ſuperior in policy and ſtrength.

The Portugueſe trade with India, although rigorouſly confined to the ſubjects of the mother country, was never put into the hands of an excluſive Company incorporated by charter, except during a ſhort time about the year 1731, when the experiment was tried with little ſucceſs. The Sovereign always retained the direction of this valuable traffic in his own hands; and, of courſe, miſmanaged every branch of it as much as can poſſibly be conceived. He granted, from time to time, privileges of fitting out veſſels, in a certain limited manner, to private copartneries

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and individuals, who thus enjoyed a monopoly of the ſupplies required both by the Aſiatic and European provinces. In general, the monopoly has been veſted immediately in the Crown, until the year 1752, when it was ſaid to be aboliſhed; but various important articles ſtill continued ſubject to the Royal privileges, and could only be bought in India and ſold in Europe on the King's account. For many years paſt, it has been a matter of great indifference what became of the Eaſt Indian trade. From the ſplendid preeminence which it once poſſeſſed over every other branch of European commerce, it has ſunk to a few annual voyages, in conſequence of the reduction of the Portugueſe empire in the Eaſt, and the bad management of the trade and ſettlements that ſtill remain. The wiſdom of government has ſuggeſted no better expedient for reviving it, than new excluſive grants to mercantile adventurers in Europe, and the eſtabliſhment of an excluſive company in Goa (the chief Eaſt Indian ſettlement), for the management of the whole trade with China.

Theſe prepoſterous arrangements have actually taken place ſince the year 1752, when a conviction of the evils ariſing from monopolizing policy, induced the Sovereign to abandon ſeveral

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of his excluſive rights, and to pretend that the East Indian commerce was thrown open. * SECT. III.

2. While the Portugueſe conqueſts were rapidly ſucceeding each other in the Eaſt, the diſcovery of Brazil, and the acquiſition of that vaſt region, opened a field of exertion in the Weſt, leſs ſplendid, indeed, but capable of producing more ſecure and valuable fruits, than the great theatre on which the Albuquerques and Caſtros were reaping an immortal name for their country. For ſome years, as might be expected, a territory inhabited by ſavage tribes, remarkable only for its extent and fertility, wanting, to all appearance, the precious commodities which rendered New Spain and Indoſtan objects of national avarice, and requiring exertions of regular, peaceable induſtry to improve its reſources, offered no temptations to the ſpirit of private adventure, or the ambition of the Portugueſe Government. During this period of Aſiatic conqueſts, Brazil was ſlowly

* Dumourier, Etat preſent du Royaume de Portugal, liv. II. chap. 2.—Anderſon's Hiſtory of Commerce, II. 4. 16. 59. 62. 88. 164. 245. 262.; III. 175.—Murphy's State of Portugal, chap. XX.—Hiſtory of the Portugueſe Empire in the Eaſt Indies (apud Harris) I. 663. & ſeqq.—Econ. Polit. & Diplom. (Encyc. Method.) III. 677.

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peopled by malefactors, and by thoſe whom the perſecuting ſyſtem of the times drove from the mother country. Among the unfortunate perſons ſacrificed to the cruel bigotry of the Inquiſition, were a great body of Jews, who carried over with them to the colony the induſtry and ſkill by which they had enriched and ſtrengthened the European dominions of Portugal. Under their cultivation, the natural wealth of ſo fruitful a territory could not fail to develope itſelf; and the attention of the Government was by degrees attracted to this new and promiſing ſource of national opulence. The great abundance of land gave riſe in this, as in many other American colonies, to a ſyſtem of diviſion, only harmleſs at the beginning of the ſettlement, and productive of the ſame laſting obſtructions to improvement, which the feudal reſtrictions upon the commerce of landed property have created in all the countries of Europe. All the Portugueſe ſubjects who choſe to ſettle in Brazil, were permitted to ſubdue large tracts of territory, and to hold them as fiefs of the Crown, with abſolute power over the natives whom they had conquered, and with all the prerogatives of royalty, except capital juriſdiction, coinage and tithes, which were conſtantly reſerved to the Sovereign. Theſe great territorial lords thus acquired an authority,

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rity, nearly abſolute, over domains frequently extending forty or fifty leagues along the ſea coaſt; and generally leaſed out parts of their poſſeſſions to ſubvaſſals for terms of two and three lives. However detrimental ſuch an arrangement was calculated to prove in the long-run, it had the immediate effect of attracting to the colony a number of adventurers and opulent perſons from the mother country. The whole territory, now known by the name of Brazil, was rapidly ſubdued; and the cultivation of various uſeful articles, particularly the woods peculiar to that part of the world, proceeded with conſiderable ſucceſs. The demand for ſugar ſoon gave riſe to the importation of negroes from the oppoſite coaſt of Africa; and the ſhortneſs of the paſſage from thence, together with the extent of the Portugueſe ſettlements in that quarter, enabled the coloniſts to avail themſelves of this method of improvement, with a facility unknown in other parts of the New World.

The importance of the colony daily augmented, and its traffic with the parent ſtate would have proved a mutual benefit of incalculable extent, had not the narrow policy, peculiar to the Peninſula, confined it to a few ports in each part of the empire. Annual fleets from Lisbon and Oporto alone were permitted to carry on

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this rich commerce, under regulations ſimilar to thoſe of the Spaniſh flotas and galleons. Four emporiums, Olinda, St Salvador, Paraiba, and Rio Janeiro, were appointed for the deſtination of thoſe ſquadrons, and the ſupply of the whole colony. In other reſpects, the ſyſtem of adminiſtration has always been preferable to that of Spaniſh America, although the Crown has poſſeſſed the ſame abſolute power over all the colonial reſources, and monopolized a great proportion of the produce.

The conqueſt by Holland, during the earlier part of the ſeventeenth century, produced no unfavourable conſequences to the ſettlement; and the reſtoration of the Portugueſe power was attended with no internal change. But

The eighteenth century opened with a diſcovery of gold and diamond mines; and the attention of the Government to provincial affairs was now unfortunately redoubled. The colonial hiſtory of Portugal ſince that period has been ſingularly anomalous and inconſiſtent. Companies have ariſen, endowed with various excluſive privileges formerly enjoyed by the Crown. In ſome caſes, the Sovereign has reſumed his original rights. Other inſtitutions of this deſcription have owed their origin to abſurd plans of improving the colonies. Of theſe, ſome have quickly failed, from bad management

nagement and accidental misfortunes: ſome have been aboliſhed by the interference of Government. On the other hand, we can ſcarcely aſcribe to this interference the praiſe of political wiſdom, when we conſider how many pernicious regulations have, during the very ſame period, been adopted with reſpect to the internal government of the colonies, and their connexion with the parent ſtate. The companies into whoſe hands the trade of the three northern captainſhips was delivered about the middle of the eighteenth century, have by no means produced the ſalutary effects juſtly attributed to the Spaniſh Company of the Caraccas. Far from increaſing the intercourſe with Europe, thoſe hurtful privileges have, in this caſe, almoſt deſtroyed it. As an inſtance of the conſequence ariſing from ſuch plans, we need only remark, that the trade of Para, which previous to 1755 (the date of the eſtabliſhment of the Paraibean Company) employed thirteen or fourteen veſſels, immediately after that Company began their operations, fell to ſo low an ebb, as only to require four or five. We can attribute the difference between this and the change produced by the Spaniſh corporation on the trade of Veneruela, only to the totally different circumſtances of the two provinces: the one altogether unpeopled, and in the loweſt ſtate of cultivation;

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tivation; the other by no means inferior to the beſt provinces of Spaniſh America, either in wealth or population: the former ſcantily ſupplied under the old ſyſtem of galleons; the latter enjoying as much benefit as that ſyſtem could beſtow, from the circumſtances of geographical poſition, and the leſs rigid nature of the Portugueſe monopoly.

It is truly ſingular, that the worſt of all contrivances which the mercantile ſyſtem has produced, ſhould have found favour in the cabinet of Liſbon, at a time when its councils were directed by the only enlightened politicians that ever appeared in Portugal, and when even Spain was following the example of all other nations, by extending the limits of commercial freedom. But the new companies for the trade of Brazil were formed upon a plan, involving ſome contradictions ſtill more curious than thoſe general abſurdities which give riſe to all ſuch ſchemes of public trade. The ſtock of each corporation was divided, as uſual, into actions: but the law authoriſed the members, or their directors, to fix annually the prices of thoſe actions; and at thoſe prices the actions were to be ſold during the whole year. In order to give this ridiculous regulation ſome effect, the actions were declared a legal tender of payment, according to the rates of payment annually ſettled;

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tled; but Government refuſed to take them at all in payment of loans or taxes. It is needleſs to remark, that ſuch childiſh laws could only ſerve to bring the Government and the Corporation into diſrepute, and incumber trade with difficulties; that after the firſt iſſuing of the edict, all bargains would be made with expreſs exceptions againſt the Company's paper, or with a ſettlement of the rate at which the paper ſhould be received; and that the market price would always be wholly independent of the prices fixed by the iſſuers. It was not in the government of the colonies alone, that the conduct of Portugal appeared inexplicable during the period immediately ſucceeding the calamitous events of 1755. The European adminiſtration was attended with circumſtances equally unaccountable. At a time when every forbearance and tenderneſs on the part of Government was required to alleviate the miſeries of the people, an edict was publiſhed, ordaining one third part of all the vines in the kingdom to be plucked up, and the ground ſown with grain. Another law was enacted, obliging every retail trader to ſhut up his ſhop, if he could not prove that half his capital belonged to himſelf. The exportation of ſpecie was ſtrictly prohibited. The laws againſt importation of certain kinds of foreign merchandiſe were

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were executed with the moſt cruel rigour. The whole wine trade of Oporto was given up, into the hands of an excluſive company; and the ſtaple produce of the country, but eſpecially the chief commerce of the ſecond city in the kingdom was thus ſacrificed to an iniquitous partiality in favour of a trifling body of wealthy individuals, or a prejudice, almoſt inſane, againſt the nation which had generouſly ſupported the unhappy capital of the country under its calamities, and had for half a century preſerved the independence of the Crown. The cruelty with which all attempts to reſiſt or avert thoſe odious laws were uniformly treated, furniſhes a proof that the Government was actuated by principles leſs excuſeable than even ignorance and imbecility of mind. It will remain for poſterity to marvel at the name which Pombal has acquired, after having preſided over the Portugueſe councils, when the edicts of 1755, 1756, and 1759, carried confuſion and diſmay into every part of the empire.

The companies of Para, Fernambuca, and Maragnon, however, after the downfal of that miniſter, did not laſt long: they have ceaſed to exiſt above twenty years, after producing incalculable miſchiefs to both the mother country and the colony during an equal period of time. What arrangements of colonial com-

merce

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merce have been ſubſtituted in the place of the new monopoly ſyſtem, I do not know. It is probable, that the whole American colonies enjoy a conſiderably greater portion of commercial freedom than formerly; for Pombal's unaccountable plan was, to throw all the parts of the trade which were before free, into the hands of companies; and to aboliſh the reſtraints of flotas, &c. under which the other parts laboured. It is moſt probable that the Portugueze colonial trade is at preſent in the intermediate ſtate through which the Spaniſh colony trade paſſed from the plan of ſtated expeditions, to the new and more liberal ſyſtem. Liſbon and Oporto, probably, are ſtill the favoured ports; but, from theſe, regiſter ſhips are in all likelihood ſent to any part of Brazil, unleſs, in the rage for aboliſhing every meaſure of Pombal's adminiſtration, the flotas were reſtored. Of this, at leaſt, we are certain, that the royal monopolies exiſt in their full force, and obſtruct the growth, as well as the circulation, of the moſt valuable ſtaple produce which Brazil ſupplies.

Some regulations of internal colonial police, however, deſerve more praiſe than can in general be aſcribed to Pombal's œconomical meaſures. It was his object to exalt the Indians as much as poſſible, and to aboliſh the preference

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ence always beſtowed upon the negro ſlaves, by every prudent arrangement. An ordinance to this effect was publiſhed during the adminiſtration of Pombal's brother. And when we conſider the dangerous proportion of negroes in Brazil, † their licentious lives, and the ſtill more profligate ſtate of ſociety among the whites, we ſhall be inclined to admit that this deviation from the ancient maxims of Portugueze and Spaniſh policy is juſtified by prudence, as well as recommended by humanity. It is not probable, however, that any ſenſible effects have as yet been produced by this edict. It only ſerves, among many other inſtances, to prove how little of ſyſtem or general plan there has been in the whole colonial and domeſtic policy of Portugal during the period when other nations were continually introducing regularity and arrangement into their œconomical meaſures. *

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† Note X.

* Burke's Europ. Settl. part IV. chap. III. IV. V. —Cunha de Continho Enſajo, &c. part I. chap. 8. & 9. —Dumourier, Etat preſent, liv. II. chap. III. & IV. & Concluſion, Liv. IV. chap. V.—Raynal, Hiſt. Phil. et Pol. III. &c.—Murphy's State of Portugal, chap. XV. —Hiſtory of Brazil, (apud Harris) II. 166. & ſeqq.— Ricard, III. 649. et ſeqq.—Econ. Polit. et Dipl. I. 396. et ſeqq.—Report of Com. 1789. part VI.—Anecdotti de Pombal, tom. I.—Arnould, Syſteme Marit. et Pol. chap. II.

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3. We have thus ſeen, that Portugal, like Spain, has ſtudied, as it were, to derive the leaſt poſſible benefit from her colonial empire. But it will ſtill appear evident, how greatly the mother country muſt have been influenced by the fates which that empire experienced, if we attend to the critical periods when the different revolutions took place. At the death of King Sebaſtian, Portugal had attained to the higheſt pitch of glory that ſhe had ever reached, and the greateſt degree of ſolid commercial proſperity that ſhe had ever poſſeſſed. The ſubjugation to Spain, which immediately followed the calamitous defeat at Alaziquiver, threw the whole reſources of the ſtate into the hands of weak and deſpotic princes, who ruined, by miſrule of every ſort, their own hereditary dominions, and treated their new province with a cruelty and injuſtice altogether unexampled in the hiſtory of modern Europe. The reign of the three Philips over Portugal, was marked by every meaſure that could work the ruin of a flouriſhing country. An inſane ſpirit of national hatred preſided over the councils of theſe infatuated tyrants, who were actuated by the ſame motives towards the natural rivals of Spain, after they had become their own ſubjects, as if the two countries had ſtill belonged to different crowns.

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To all the vexations which harafſed, and the burthens which oppreſſed the Portugueſe at home, during this calamitous period, was added the loſs of Brazil, occaſioned by the wilful and wanton jealouſy of its new maſter; and regretted by him, when too late, only to furniſh a pretext for draining the mother country, to ſupply vain attempts at a reconqueſt.

Under the preſſure of ſo many diſaſters, the trade of Portugal, and its internal induſtry, were only ſupported by the African and Eaſt Indian ſettlements, which ſtill remained entire. But unfortunately, about the period when the Dutch were expelled from Brazil, and that valuable colony reſtored to the new dynaſty of Braganza, almoſt all the Eaſt Indian and African conqueſts were rapidly loſt, and the mother country plunged into a war of twenty-eight years with her powerful and inveterate neighbour. We may here remark the difference between the tenures by which conquered provinces and colonial eſtabliſhments are held. After the American ſettlements, peopled in part by the Portugueze and their deſcendants, had been loſt to Holland in conſequence of the worſt ſyſtem of government and œconomy with which any ſtate was ever afflicted, a change of meaſures rendered the reconqueſt eaſy, becauſe the natives had been transferred

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to a foreign yoke, and eagerly ſeconded every attempt to reunite them with their parent ſtate. But when the Eaſt Indian and African provinces were ſeized, it was not poſſible to regain them by the ſame means. The conquered countries were held, as they had been obtained, by the ſword; and the inhabitants, far from preferring the continuance of the firſt yoke, were glad to ſee any change effected, which would, at leaſt, vary, if not alleviate their oppreſſions. All the capital, induſtry and ſkill employed directly in colonial poſſeſſions, or in lines of occupation ſubſervient to colonial trade, is ſecurely and profitably veſted, and depends little on the chance of war. But a nation ought never to employ much of its ſtock in the agriculture or manufactures of conquered provinces, or to direct a large ſhare of domeſtic induſtry into thoſe channels which are excluſively ſubſervient to the ſupply of ſuch ſettlements, from the ſame principles of caution that regulate a private trader in the employment of his ſtock or labour, and prevent him from ſtaking any conſiderable part of either upon hazardous adventures, notwithſtanding the chance of immenſe gains. Both the nation and the individual may prudently take the chance of making thoſe profits upon ſuch part of their capital as they can loſe without being ruined. Almoſt all the Aſiatic poſſeſſions of the

BOOK I. European powers partake rather of the nature of conquered provinces, than colonies. In many of them, however, the plan of colonization has been partially introduced—moſt of all in the Engliſh and Dutch ſettlements—leaſt of all in thoſe of the Portugueſe.

Portugal then experienced an irretrievable loſs in the ruin of her rich Eaſt Indian commerce, and the diminution of the traffic formerly carried on with Africa. The reſtoration of Brazil was not ſufficient to repair ſo grievous an injury. The trade with that colony was far inferior to the Eaſt Indian trade; the temporary poſſeſſion of which had diverted the capital and induſtry of the mother country into channels which were now for ever cloſed. The advantages of the new government were counterbalanced, partly by the evils of the *acclamaçion* war, and partly by the impolitic meaſures of the Braganza family. During the remainder of the ſeventeenth, and part of the eighteenth century, Portugal continued in that courſe of decline which the Indian commerce had retarded, or perhaps concealed, while the tyranny of Spain was exerciſed over the European territories. That decline, then, may be dated from the death of Sebaſtian, when the country ceaſed to poſſeſs her former extended empire, and only retained, at different times, different branches of her foreign dominions.

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tions. After all, the decline of Portugal is not ſo general as that of Spain. The only part of the Portugueſe proſperity which has been lopped off, is the benefit derived from Aſia and Africa. During all the misfortunes to which the ſtate has, for two centuries, been ſubjected, the population has increaſed with conſiderable rapidity; and notwithſtanding the moſt complicated ſyſtem of finance, to which any nation is ſubjected *, the revenues have, of late years, been greatly augmented, and conſiderable reforms have been introduced into the mode of management. A better ſyſtem of colonial and domeſtic policy would, without doubt, render Portugal capable of once more aſſuming a high rank among the European powers, with the large and fertile dominions which ſhe ſtill poſſeſſes.

The importance of Brazil to the mother country may eaſily be eſtimated by a few ſimple conſiderations. That colony is better governed and peopled than any of the Spaniſh dominions; its poſition is more compact, and its force more concentrated. Its proximity to Africa, and connexion with the Portugueſe ſettlements there, give the coloniſts an advantage not enjoyed by thoſe of Spain, the greateſt facility of increaſing their cultivation by means of negroes, while the

* Memoires concernant les droits, tom. 1.

BOOK I. admixture of the Indian race, and the firm alliance of the moſt warlike tribes, renders the uſe of this advantage as ſafe to the colony, as the ſmaller proportion of the negroes is to Spaniſh America. The weakneſs of the mother country, is thus, in ſome degree, balanced by her colonial reſources in the neighbourhood of the diſtant provinces of her natural enemy.

But farther, the poſſeſſion of Brazil gives Portugal no inconſiderable weight in the continental politics, by procuring for her the alliance of thoſe maritime powers who are nearly intereſted in the South American trade, and who only obtain acceſs to it through the medium of the mother country. So long as war continues to affect the intercourſe of private trades in hoſtile ſtates, we may expect to ſee the relations of amity carefully preſerved between Great Britain and Portugal; and as long as political conſiderations influence the European cabinets to grant favourable treaties and privileges of commerce, and to impoſe prohibitions upon mercantile intercourſe, we may be aſſured that the intereſts of Great Britain will induce her to ſuccour the ſtate which poſſeſſes Brazil, leſt its ſubjugation ſhould throw impediments in the way of the South American traffic.

Laſtly, the poſſeſſion of this noble colony, beſides yielding a conſiderable clear revenue to the mother

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mother country, (above one-fourth of the whole national income), is the ſource of a great proportion of her whole commerce. The imports from thence are nearly equal to the whole imports from the other countries of Europe. What an immenſe part, then, of the whole national wealth, is derived from ſo extenſive a home trade! How few commercial countries in the world are compoſed of contiguous provinces, between which the intercourſe is ſo important, in compariſon of the whole foreign intercourſe of the ſtate! Beſides all the internal traffic of both the European and American branches of the Portugueſe empire, the mutual trade of theſe two branches is almoſt as great as the trade of both together with all foreign countries. *

The remarks which I have to offer upon the colonial policy of Sweden and Denmark, muſt, of neceſſity, be very few. This is a ſubject of very trifling importance: and it only derives intereſt from ſhewing how ridiculouſly the ſame ſyſtem of monopoly that we have been contemplating in France and Spain, has been followed by the ſtates where ſuch ſchemes were moſt pre-

* Murphy's State of Portugal, chap. XII. XVII.—Dumourier, Etat, Liv. IV. chap. V.—Econ. Polit. (Encyc. Method.) I. 412.—Boetticher's Statiſt. Tables, No. XI.

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posterous and unnatural. It shews us, too, the opposite side of the picture which we have been contemplating; for the colonies of Sweden and Denmark are too insignificant to influence, in any considerable degree, the prosperity of the parent states, and bear a less proportion to the whole imperial resources, than those of any other nation.

The exclusive companies, which, for a long series of years, monopolized all the colonial trade both of Denmark and Sweden, were necessarily more hurtful, in proportion to their magnitude, to the prosperity of those countries, than the exclusive companies, which have at various times been established in more opulent states. These institutions arose from a desire, on the part of government, to acquire foreign dominions, when the contiguous provinces were desolate for want of cultivation, and to encourage the more distant branches of trade; when only a very small number of capitals fit for such speculations had been acquired, and when all those capitals could not nearly fill up the channels of domestic industry, and of the nearer foreign trades. The consequence of the monopolies has been, the attraction of a great deal more of the small national capital to the East India trade, than would have gone thither naturally; and the exclusion of a small part of that capital which

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which would have gone to the Weſt India trade and cultivation. The whole effects have been unimportant, only becauſe the Aſiatic and American concerns of the two nations have been always extremely limited: but in proportion to the extent of the colonial poſſeſſions, and the magnitude of the corporations entruſted with the management of them, the conſequences of the excluſive ſyſtem, partly in attracting and partly in repelling the capital and induſtry of the mother countries, have been the more ſtrongly felt, both by the colonies and the parent ſtates, as the parent ſtates are much poorer and leſs advanced in commerce and cultivation, than any of the other colonial powers. For the ſame reaſon, thoſe excluſive companies of Denmark and Sweden furniſh ſtill more ſtriking inſtances of the natural imbecility and evils of ſuch inſtitutions, than any which we have hitherto contemplated, or ſhall meet with in the remaining part of this Section.

1. About the beginning of the ſeventeenth century, Denmark acquired a few ſmall ſettlements on the coaſts of Coromandel; and in 1616, theſe were given up to an Eaſt India company, endued not only with the excluſive privilege of trading to the Eaſt, but clothed alſo with the powers of civil and military adminiſtra-

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tion. In 1634, this corporation owed the government a ſum nearly equal to the value of all its poſſeſſions: it was then diſſolved, and another ſubſtituted in its place, with ſimilar privileges. After a few years of conſiderable proſperity, this company alſo rapidly declined; and in 1686, a third inſtitution was tried for the ſame purpoſes. This too failed in about twenty-three years, and the project was tried for the fourth time in 1732. From the charters which all theſe companies enjoyed, it is abundantly evident, that the remark of Uſtaritz, formerly* alluded to, has no foundation in fact; and that in the moſt deſpotic countries with which we are acquainted, companies have been eſtabliſhed with a delegation of ſome of the ſovereign power over the diſtant provinces. But although the jealouſy of the Daniſh princes towards ſuch corporations, is far from being remarkable; the ill adaptation of the Daniſh mercantile reſources, for ſupporting any trading companies of this deſcription, rendered all the conceſſions of prerogative unable to preſerve the exiſtence of members ſo unnatural to the conſtitution of the community. New and more ample grants were neceſſary; and the laſt eſtabliſhment, in 1732, was accompanied with theſe, in an unlimited meaſure

* Part II.

meaſure of royal bounty. The new company was to trade, without any reſtrictions, to all the parts of the world that lie eaſt of the Cape; with this trade no other Daniſh ſubject was permitted to interfere; and the competition of all foreigners, either in the Daniſh poſſeſſions abroad, or in the markets of the mother country, was ſtrictly prohibited by poſitive laws. The Eaſt Indian ſettlements were delivered over to the company, in full poſſeſſion and ſovereignty, with all the rights attached to property and dominion; they were not bound to render any account to government of their proceedings, nor to ſell their cargoes in any particular markets; they might, if they found it profitable, trade entirely with foreign ſtates, and never bring home a ton of colonial produce to the mother country; finally, they were exempted from the uſe of ſtamp paper in any of their tranſactions, and were not obliged to pay government any premium for the charter, or to make any compoſition for ſuch extenſive privileges, except a trifling per centage of one and a half on their ſales in Denmark, and one on their ſales abroad; which laſt duty, it is very evident, could never be exacted. The poſſeſſion of theſe powers, as might be expected, preſerved the exiſtence of the corporation, and increaſed the profits of the ſtock-holder, at the expence of the country and the Indian ſettlements. In 1772, the

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BOOK I. the charter expired, and was renewed under reſtrictions which, while it proved ruinous to the proſperity of the company, evinced how much the gains of the monopoliſts had attracted the views of ſpeculators towards the leaſt advantageous of all the Daniſh traffics. The China trade remained upon its former footing of a ſtrict monopoly; but the Indian commerce was thrown open to all Daniſh ſubjects, on the payment of four and a half per cent. to the company. The poſſeſſion and government of the ſettlement, however, remained in the company's hands, and enabled them to check the competition of private trades; nor was it until the year 1777, when the King purchaſed the rights of the company, that the private trade began to flouriſh. The price paid for this property ſhews how little the concern was flouriſhing; it amounted only to 170,000 Rix dollars*, or between one third and one fourth of the value of a ſingle year's importation under the charter of 1732, at an average of the firſt thirteen years. When the charter was renewed in 1792, for twenty years, the private trade was rendered ſtill more free; all Daniſh ſubjects, and all foreigners, were permitted to trade with the Indian ſettlements, upon receiving paſſports, either from Copenhagen or the Aſiatic ſeats of government, and

* L. 34,000 ſterling.

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and upon condition of returning to Copenhagen with the cargoes; a ſingular mixture of free and excluſive arrangement; partly reſembling the ancient, partly the modern policy of Spain, and partaking both of the Eaſt and Weſt Indian policy of the more enlightened European powers.

The liberty granted to private traders has had the effect of attracting to the Indian commerce, ſeveral capitals both foreign and Daniſh, tempted, in all probability, by the facility with which the traders can combine among themſelves, and with the Company, to regulate the market. The whole private trade is nearly equal to the trade carried on upon the Company's account; and one third, or one fourth of the capital which ſupports it, belongs to the country.

The commercial proſperity of both Denmark and Sweden, is always affected, in the higheſt degree, by the relations of peace or war ſubſiſting between the great mercantile States of the Continent. Like the Hollanders, in the earlier period of their hiſtory, and at different periods of their ſubſequent decline, the natives of the Northern kingdoms always endeavour to profit by the diſſenſions of their neighbours, and preſerve neutrality as much as poſſible, conſiſtently with the moſt relaxed ideas of national honour. In all the wars of the laſt century, particularly thoſe in which the Dutch were engaged as principals,

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cipals, the Danes and Swedes, but particularly the former, obtained a large ſhare of the carrying trade of Europe. And the colonial commerce of thoſe States received its ſhare of the general increaſe. The American war contributed ſo much to the proſperity of the Daniſh Eaſt India Company, that the actions ſold in 1782, at 18 to 1900 R. D. the prime coſt having been 500. In that year, the dividends were as high as cent per cent on the original purchaſe money; and in the ſubſequent peace, they fell to forty or fifty per cent. and the price ſunk in proportion, being only 700 R. D. in 1788, and 420 to 440 (conſiderably below par,) in 1790. The average gain from 1783 to 1790, was about 9½ per cent. upon the original price—or, taking 800 R. D. as the medium market price, 6 per cent.; a greater profit than any other Eaſt India Company has made; and only aſcribeable to the extenſive privileges of the corporation, the reſtrictions on foreign importation, and the ſmall competition of capitals in the Daniſh market for the Company's ſtock.*

The Weſt Indian policy of Denmark, altho' much extolled by almoſt all writers, has not been

* Voyage de deux François, I. 250.—Catteau, Tableau des Etats Danois. I. 75.—II. 329, & ſeq.—Commerce (Encyc. Method.) I. 699.

been so remarkable for uncommon liberality of views, as its East Indian administration. In 1735, the three West Indian islands which had been acquired, partly by right of occupancy, and partly by purchase, during the half century immediately preceding, were given up to an exclusive company in full property and sovereignty. The manifold abuses of the administration soon excited so much discontent, both in the colonies and among the merchants of the mother country, that the King (1755) purchased the whole rights of the exportation for a sum not exceeding half a million of R. D. and laid open the trade to all his subjects, under conditions which varied from time to time, until, in 1777, the Spanish method was followed as it had been in regulating the Asiatic commerce; and all vessels from the colonies to the mother country were obliged to land their goods at Copenhagen. This restriction, together with the wish of rich individuals to profit by the American war, soon led to a complete restoration of the former system; and a West India company was again established. Their gains, during that contest, were extravagant, amounting frequently to a hundred per cent. in one year. But the prosperity of the institution ended with the war; and, in 1785, the actions were given up to Government. Since that time the system has been more wise and

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BOOK I. and liberal, although it is ſtill extremely anomalous, and, upon the whole, inferior to that of Holland, France, and Britain. All returns from Santa Cruz, (the value of which is ten times greater than the joint value of the other two iſlands,) muſt be made, either to Copenhagen, or to ſome other town that has the privilege of erecting ſugar refineries: and this privilege is not enjoyed by ſome of the chief trading towns in the realm—as Altona, and, I believe, all the Norwegian ports—which are, evidently, better calculated for the colonial trade than the capital itſelf. The value of the other two islands being utterly inſignificant, in an agricultural point of view, they are permitted to enjoy a free trade, not only with the mother country, but alſo with foreigners, under certain limits. Since 1793, too, the free exportation of cotton from Santa Cruz, has been permitted, on payment of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty.

The whole produce of theſe ſettlements is inconſiderable, when compared with the rich returns of the Britiſh, French, and Dutch colonies. But, to a country ſituated like Denmark, requiring every ſtimulus to induſtry, and extremely deficient in improved land, even this ſmall exportation is no trifling matter. The chief of the Daniſh merchants and planters would, indeed, be better employed in extending their

their European trade, and cultivating the extenſive waſtes of Norway, Jutland, and even Holſtein, the granary of the kingdom. But, in eſtimating the value of the colonies, we muſt attend to the quantity of capital fixed in them, and not transferable to the mother country; and, in computing the importance of the colony trade, we muſt conſider the ſmall probability there is that men will turn their capital and labour towards the employment moſt profitable to the country, even if the Daniſh colonies were ſuddenly ſunk in the ſea, while other ſettlements of the ſame kind remain open to their ſpeculations, peopled, as it happens, by the natural countrymen of the Santa Cruz and St. Thomas planters and merchants. The Weſt Indian trade being compoſed partly of returns from the Daniſh colonies, partly of the carrying trade with other ſettlements, varies according to the relations that happen to ſubſiſt between the neighbouring powers. In 1754, it employed only ſeven ſhips, as the company then exiſted, and the whole of Europe was at peace. In 1782, it employed 246, in 1783, only 91; and in 1793, between fifty and ſixty. Theſe veſſels being from 80 to 120 tons burthen, the whole tonnage employed in the colonial trade, bears a great proportion to the tonnage employed in ſome of the moſt extenſive and profitable of the other home trades, viz.

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viz. thoſe between the contiguous provinces. It is more than double the Iceland and Greenland tonnage, and nearly one-fourth of the tonnage employed in the trade between Norway and the capital.

The revenues of the whole colonies are trifling, and not more than equal to the expence of the eſtabliſhments. The adminiſtration of Weſt Indian affairs is in the hands of the Chamber of Cuſtoms; and the ſuperintendance of Eaſt Indian government is committed to a Board appointed for the purpoſe on the expiration of the preſent Company's firſt charter; and reſembling, I believe, in its functions, the Engliſh board of controul. In all the ſettlements there are governors, with ſeparate commanders of the troops, and councils of adminiſtration *.

2. Trifling as the colonial poſſeſſions of Denmark are, they far exceed in extent and value thoſe of Sweden; the only colonial power whoſe foreign dominion is intirely confined to the Weſt Indies. The Eaſt India trade which is now very trifling, has always been in the hands of an excluſive

* Voyage de deux François, I. 252, & ſeq.—Catteau, Tableau, I. 78, 85, 97, 113, 223, 236.—II. 318, & ſeq.—Burke's European Settlements, p. 4. Chap. VII.—Smith's Wealth of Nations, book IV. Chap. VII.

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cluſive company; but the ſtate has never acquired any poſſeſſions in Aſia, a circumſtance which has probably a favourable influence on the proſperity of the inſtitution. In the earlier part of the ſeventeenth century, when the wiſe and vigorous adminiſtration of Guſtavus Adolphus imparted new energy to all the operations of induſtry and the ſpirit of adventure; part of the ſcanty population of Sweden emigrated to North America, and ſettled on the banks of the Delaware. The particular hiſtory of this colony is as obſcure as it is unimportant: we know, however, that the ſettlement, although placed under the management of a company, attracted little or no attention from the mother country, and was in fact given up without any other notice than a ſlight repreſentation from the Swediſh reſident in Holland to the Dutch, who, in the year 1655, incorporated it with their own continental colony; to which, when thus increaſed, they gave the name of Nova Belgia *.

From this period the Swedes poſſeſſed no colony whatever, excepting one on the trifling ſtations on the gold coaſt, until the year 1784, when as an equivalent for ſome commercial privileges in the Baltic, they obtained from France the only colony in their poſſeſſion, the Iſland of

* Thurloe's State Papers, apud Anderſon, II. 433.

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St Bartholomew. The conſequence of this acquiſition was a Weſt India company, founded in in 1786, with the excluſive privilege of trading to the Weſt Indies, including the new colony. There is ſomething peculiar in the conſtitution of this privilege, and indeed in the whole arrangement of the inſtitution. All the Swediſh ſubjects are permitted to become ſubſcribers to the ſtock, which of conſequence is not limited like that of all the other colonial companies in Europe. The benefit acquired by ſubſcription, is the right of trading to the countries comprehended in the charter, and of uſing the company's warehouſes. So far the corporation reſembles the various regulated companies which have at different times been formed in Great Britain and other countries. But in this reſpect it ſeems alſo to reſemble a joint-ſtock company; that independent of the private trade, the common fund is uſed in joint ſpeculations. Theſe, we may obſerve, muſt inevitably be ſpeedily ſtopt by the competition of the private traders, whoſe intereſt in the common concern is very ſubordinate, unleſs the number of capitals drawn into this traffic be very limited. Farther, the directors of the company are choſen not by the ſubſcribers, but by the crown; but no premium is paid for the charter, nor any yearly tribute or duty whatever; and, what is not the leaſt ſingular mixture in the compoſition

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compoſition of this body, all the veſſels engaged in the trade muſt both ſail from, and return to Stockholm or Gottenburg. This ſpecies of reſtriction, is more conſiſtent with the general ſpirit of the Swediſh mercantile law, than with the economy of Spain, Portugal or Denmark, where it has alſo been adopted for many ages. Beſides, the law, analogous to the Engliſh Navigation act, firſt paſſed in 1724, and revived and confirmed by the famous bill of 1772, the ancient policy of the kingdom limited the freedom of foreign commerce in a manner perfectly unknown in any other part of Europe. The privilege of paſſing the Sound was confined to the traders of a few ſea-port towns, including of courſe Stockholm and Gottenburg. Previous to the year 1756, the whole province of Finland was included in this reſtriction, and its veſſels thus confined to the Baltic and the two gulfs; and to this day the number of ſtaple towns, as they are called, or ports which can trade beyond thoſe ſeas, is very limited. No addition could be more natural to ſuch a ſyſtem of reſtraints than the limitation which I have mentioned, of the Weſt Indian trade to certain favoured ports.

The whole commerce of Sweden with the Weſt Indies is trifling, in proportion to the ſmall extent of colony, and the duration of peace a-

BOOK among the neighbouring ſettlements. The value of the goods imported from thence in the year 1785, did not exceed 13,400l. ſterling; and, admitting that the excluſive care of the government, and induſtry of the planters have rendered the ſettlement doubly productive ſince the ceſſion, a produce worth 27,000l. is ſo contemptible, that we ſhould not have regarded the colony from whence it is obtained, had not the peculiarities of the policy which regulates its mercantile connexion with the mother country appeared to deſerve ſome notice *.

PART IV.

OF THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

THE peculiar circumſtances of all the European powers whoſe colonial policy I have already explained, place them in ſuch predicaments with reſpect to their colonies, as may be fairly reckoned to form extreme caſes. It was, therefore, neceſſary to enter fully into a detail of their colonial relations, for the purpoſe of ſhewing

* Catteau, Tableau de la Suede, tom. II. P. 76.—Voyage de deux Francois, II. 436.—Anderſon's Hiſtory, III. 378.—Econ. Pol. dip. (Encyc. method), IV. 281.

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ing how the peculiarities in their ſituation tended, either ſtrikingly to illuſtrate, or to modify the practical application of thoſe general principles, which it was the object of the foregoing ſections to eſtabliſh. Without minute diſcuſſions of this kind, no inferences from political theories to the conduct of human affairs, can be uſeful or ſafe. The details, too, into which I have entered, are ſo far eſſential to the ſupport of the general principles themſelves, that they furniſh a ſufficient explanation of many apparent anomalies in the theory ſuggeſted by the exiſtence of extreme caſes. Thus the nature of the Dutch colonial ſyſtem affords various ſtrong illuſtrations of the poſitions formerly laid down; while an examination of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe policy removes many objections that might otherwiſe have been urged againſt the validity of thoſe poſitions.

But, as the general principles in every ſubject of this kind naturally refer to the medium or moſt ordinary caſes, it becomes unneceſſary to enter fully into their application to ſuch combinations of circumſtances: as every one of the arguments, maintained in the firſt and ſecond ſections of this preſent inquiry, bear an immediate relation to the colonial ſyſtems of England and France, the application was naturally made in explaining thoſe arguments. Almoſt all the il-

BOOK I. lustrations which I intend to give, were drawn from the actual relations subsisting between the two great maritime powers and their foreign settlements, either in the former period of their history, or at the present time. The details too, which compose this branch of the subject, though multifarious and complicated beyond those of the other branches, are, in general, much better known, as they have been given to the world with extreme accuracy and minuteness, by various authors; and since the maxims which I have attempted to explain, furnish the means of arranging this mass of information, the reader will easily finish the application of the general principles to the facts, in so far as I have been obliged to leave it incomplete. Without entering, therefore, into a minute description, either of the French or British colonial system, which would be partly a repetition, and partly superfluous, I shall employ the remaining portion of this book, in offering a few remarks upon some things that have been much misrepresented, and in exhibiting such general statements as may enable us to form an estimate of the comparative advantages derived by France and Britain, from their colonial possessions.

1. The events which have, during the last twelve years, taken place in the West Indian colonies

lonies of France, deſerve ſome conſideration in a preliminary point of view. The tendency of thoſe unparalleled changes has been, to effect a temporary diſſolution of the federal ſyſtem; and it is the decided opinion of many practical, as well as ſpeculative politicians, that conſequences may be apprehended from the ſhock, immediately fatal to the ancient order of things in the French Weſt Indies. In eſtimating the preſent importance of theſe colonies to their mother country, it is neceſſary to conſider whether the continuance of their connexion with her is likely to be ſhort and uncertain. And this inquiry becomes neceſſary alſo in a general point of view; becauſe, from the ſtructure of the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, a recurrence of the ſame events may be, with ſome reaſon, apprehended; and becauſe, (as we ſhall afterwards ſee,) the fate of all the other Weſt Indian colonies is intimately connected with that of the French power in Guadaloupe and St. Domingo. In conſidering the probable effects of the recent ſtruggles in the French Iſlands, our attention is naturally directed to the character of the Negroes, and the circumſtances in which they are placed. If men, in a rude ſtate, are remarkable for the violence of their paſſions, they are, at leaſt, as much diſtinguiſhed by unſteadineſs of purpoſe. Devoid of that ſelf-command which controuls the firſt ebulli-

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tions of rage, and directs the ſtrength of the mind and the body to the attainment of one object, they are incapable of long continued exertions, whether of feeling or of power; and the ſtorm, quickly raiſed to violence, ſoon expends its fury. Theirs is not that cool, determined, paſſive courage which awaits the hoſtile attack, and ſubmits to immediate annoyance, that its well-timed exertions may be fatal and deciſive. The fury which impels them is a momentary convulſion of courage—if the firſt onſet is reſiſted, a more laſting convulſion of fear ſucceeds. Thus fickle and inconſtant in each particular attempt, it would be ſtrange if the character of their minds ſhould be changed by a repetition of the ſame exploits. When, indeed, the authority which more cultivated men have acquired over theſe barbarous tribes is once overthrown, it may be more difficult to re-eſtabliſh, than it formerly was to preſerve ſubordination. But this is very much the caſe of all thoſe changes which have ever convulſed human ſociety. The terror of the Negro for the white man, is not, as ſome ingenious writers have ſuppoſed, * a peculiar feeling—it is founded upon principles which extend to all kinds of authority, and lays the foundation of every ſpecies of regular ſubjection.

* See particularly "Criſis of the Sugar Colonies." Paſſim.

jection. The opinion that a change is dangerous; that conformity to certain eſtabliſhed principles is a duty, not becauſe theſe are well founded, but becauſe they exiſt; that ſubmiſſion to certain orders of men is neceſſary, not becauſe they have the natural right to power, but becauſe they have, in paſt times, been poſſeſſed of it; this mere opinion—this habit of thinking is, in every ſociety, the maſter principle which maintains the exiſting order of things, and renders the majority, who could not fail to profit by any change, and who, if united, could in a moment bring any change about, ſubſervient to that ſyſtem in which accident has placed them. But, if there is in the human mind, a foundation for ſuch habits, their influence in reſtoring regularity to the fabric, which temporary cauſes have deranged, muſt be very powerful, though certainly leſs effectual than their tendency to prevent all violent diſorder. If the difference of degree, in the ſubjection of the Negroes, has increaſed the terror of attempting to ſhake it off, and trained their minds to a more awful regard for the privileges of the ſuperior claſs, we may be well aſſured, that any ſudden deviation from ſuch habits, cannot be laſting; that the principles of ſubmiſſion remain, and that the original impreſſion will return with its accuſtomed force, as ſoon

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as the firſt impulſe of rebellion, violent becauſe unnatural, ſhall have ſubſided.

Men who have been long accuſtomed to ſervitude and dependence, are unfit for liberty ſuddenly acquired. They may employ the firſt moments of their emancipation in the unbridled revelry of freedom; and, for ſome time at leaſt, may look with horror to a renewal of their bondage. But that ſtate of licentiouſneſs, which at a diſtance appeared the perfection of happineſs, is found, on a nearer ſurvey, to have its ſorrows and its cares; and, by being for a while poſſeſſed, loſes half its charms. Nor are we to ſuppoſe, that the mind of the African is of ſo peculiar a ſtructure as to receive unmingled ſatisfaction from a retroſpect of all the cruelties in which the firſt vollies of his licentious rage delighted to revel. Like the mobs of more civilized communities, the rebellious ſlaves in the Weſt Indies expiate, by the feelings of remorſe, the ſanguinary exceſſes of their revolutionary phrenzies. Although, at firſt, the leaders of ſuch mobs can only command by conforming themſelves to the prevailing ſpirit, and by yielding to the torrent which they cannot reſiſt; in the interval of quiet that ſucceeds, they are implicitly obeyed, and the evils of the paſt tumults prepare the multitude for abject ſubmiſſion. Thus, to any rapid and violent change in the ſitu-

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ation of a ſociety whoſe advancement towards liberty has not been ſufficiently prepared by a train of previous events, a retrograde motion generally ſucceeds for the preſent, as ſoon as the firſt tumult has ſubſided. But if the progreſs of the ſociety was totally checked before the change, the liberty ſuddenly imparted muſt degenerate into licentiouſneſs and confuſion; and the reſtoration of any regular government whatever, will, in all likelihood, be immediately followed by a total relapſe into the former ſtate of inactivity. In the revolutions which have convulſed France, as well as in the changes, ſcarcely more lamentable, which have produced a new order of things among her barbarous ſubjects in the colonies, the exceſſes of lawleſs anarchy prepared the way for uſurpations and dynaſties ſtill more deſpotic than the ancient ſyſtem. The full accompliſhment of this event ſeems already to have happened in the mother country; let us ſee if it is not faſt approaching alſo in the colonies. SECT. III.

Whatever enormities may have been committed, in particular plantations of St. Domingo, againſt the white inhabitants, it is evident that a complete alienation from the mother country never took place. The French ſtill retained a footing in the iſland. Touſſaint and Rigaud alike pretended to act under the authority of government; a proof rather of the aſcendancy which

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which the French have retained over the minds of the negroes and mulattoes, than of the fear which their leaders had of oppoſition from Europe. When the negroes had finally ſubdued the mulattoes, they found that the yoke of their European maſters was only exchanged for the yoke of the chief, whom they had enabled to conquer; under his ſyſtem of military diſcipline they found themſelves forced, as formerly, to labour on particular plantations. The French expedition arrives; all the powers of European intrigue are put in motion; the negro generals are divided by the ſkilful management of their former maſters; all open reſiſtance is borne down, by the ſuperior tactics and diſcipline of the whites; the troops which had hitherto been victorious are ſcattered, and their leaders contumeliously diſplaced. All this might have been eaſily foretold; but it is not likely that the conqueſt will ſtop here. Symptoms may be expected ſoon to appear, of that "nameleſs dread" of a white man, which was formerly the chief ſecurity of maſters. Admitting this feeling to be of the moſt peculiar and delicate nature, are there no inſtances of ſuch ſpells being reſtored after ſome ſudden interruption? Is the human mind ſo eaſily weaned from the influence of early prejudice? Or is the principle in queſtion likely

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likely to ceaſe, after events have taken place which render it more natural than ever?

In ſpite of all the profound veneration for the Sultan's name, which habit and religion inſtil into the conſtitution of the Eaſtern nations, violent inſurrections not unfrequently break out; the head of the obnoxious vizir is thrown to the mob, and the mandates of deſpotiſm ſoon regain their omnipotence. Surely the power that makes a man kiſs the axe which is lifted to deſtroy him, depends upon ſome nameleſs ideal terror, equal to any that can be aſcribed to the ſlave ſyſtem; yet we find that the ſpell, whatever it is, ſurvives an interruption. The ſubjects of Montezuma cheerfully devoted their lives in his ſervice, while they trembled at his name. Exaſperated by a ſudden impulſe of fury, they dared to lift their hands againſt his ſacred head; but no ſooner had he fallen, than deep remorſe took poſſeſſion of their breaſts; the ideal dread of the prince returned, and the power of his ſucceſſor was abſolute over the minds of the people by whoſe hands Montezuma had fallen. All the natives of the New World were impreſſed with a belief, that the Spaniards were a race of ſuperior beings; every diminution of their numbers in battle, undeceived, for a while, thoſe ſimple enemies; but their final ſucceſs rooted the

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the ſuperſtitious notion, perhaps more deeply than if they never had been oppoſed.

But to come ſtill nearer to the caſe in queſtion—Although no inſtance ever before occurred of negro inſurrection carried to ſuch extremities as thoſe which marked the conteſts of St Domingo, many examples have unhappily been diſplayed in all the European colonies, of general and violent revolts, quelled by the vigour and the policy of the civilized inhabitants. In the Britiſh Weſt Indies we ſhall only mention, the formidable inſurrection of 1760, which appeared to have ſpread over a great part of Jamaica, and which was marked by all the indiſcriminate cruelty of negro warfare—the general conſpiracy of the negroes of St Chriſtopher's in 1768, and of Nevis in 1761; both detected on the eve of execution, and the inſurrections in the ceded Iſlands in the year 1795. All theſe rebellions, however, were trifling when compared to the regular warfare which the inſurgents carried on in Surinam, firſt in 1761, and afterwards in 1772; or the ſtill more formidable regular rebellion of the Indians, aſſiſted by the negroes, which about the ſame time threatened the empire of Portugal in South America. Something of the ſame ſort took place in the Spaniſh colonies of South America, nearly at the ſame time. The conſtant ſtate of warfare in which the Maroons of Dutch Guiana

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iana have remained with the whites for above a century, has cauſed the colony to be ſurrounded with a regular cordon of troops, and chain of military poſts. Various inſurrections have diſturbed the peace of the ſettlement. Sometimes the negroes have been completely ſucceſsful, as in the year 1763, when the colony of Berbice was wholly in their poſſeſſion; until, weary of a ſtate of unbridled licentiouſneſs, unnatural even to the moſt ſavage tribes, and ſatiated with the poſſeſſion of an independence foreign to their habits, they ſubmitted voluntarily to their old maſters, and quietly returned to their former labours. In all theſe inſtances, the yoke was either thrown off, and afterwards reſtored, or it was maintained by a diſcovery of conſpiracies to break it, matured to the very point of execution. It is evident that if the authority of the Europeans over their ſlaves in America were formed entirely upon a myſterious feeling of dread, to which every interruption is fatal; the inſurrections juſt now mentioned, could never have been ſubdued, nor the conſpiracies prevented, without extirpating all the negroes engaged in them. The ſpell appears, indeed, not to be ſo eaſily diſſolved as ſome deſponding politicians have apprehended. Founded in the circumſtances of their ſituation, although it may for a while be violently ſuſpended, it will return with the ſucceeding moments of repoſe

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It would appear that there is no medium in the enterprise which now occupies the colonial councils of France; a partial success is scarcely to be wished: if a considerable part of the negroes retain their independence by force, it will not be possible to keep them under subjection; or to prevent those who are free, from turning their arms at every opportunity against the Europeans with all the advantages of their habits and constitutions; and if, as appears already to be the case, the whole black population are reduced to nominal submission, they will form a separate order

der of men, needy and oppreſſed; once habituated to idleneſs and licentiouſneſs; poſſeſſed of legal rights, but unfit for the enjoyment of any important privileges; a diſtinct and ſubordinate claſs in a community, which their numbers could overwhelm; ignorant of the wants that render the lower orders induſtrious in civilized ſtates; fit only for thoſe exertions which fear excites, and that ſubjection which is maintained by the laſh and the chain. The neceſſities of their ſituation, then, muſt induce the French in St Domingo and Guadaloupe, ſtrenuouſly to attempt the completion of the negro ſubjugation, if they wiſh to retain the poſſeſſion of their Weſt Indian colonies.

In eſtimating their chance of ſucceſs, much has been thoughtleſsly ſaid upon the peculiar difficulties of ſubduing men armed with all the motives and deſires of rebellious ſlaves. But let it be remembered, that if, in one point of view, the taſk is arduous; on the other hand, the colonial government meets the difficulties of its ſituation, in the ſuppoſed criſis, with reſources far more powerful than thoſe of the beſt arrayed ſyſtem of military deſpotiſm which ever was pointed to cruſh an ordinary revolt. The negroes are already, we have ſuppoſed, by the ſuperiority of European policy, reduced to the ſtate of free labourers diſtributed over the plantations. Let the government but give the ſignal

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for purſuing any of thoſe meaſures which muſt be followed with a certain degree of care and management, in order to convert the labourer into the ſlave; the ordinance is executed, not by mercenary troops, nor marechauſſée, nor national guards, but by the proprietors of the ſoil, who are in the firſt inſtance to reap the whole benefit of the change. The inſurgents are divided and intimidated; they are watched by men whoſe lives and fortunes are ſtaked upon the maintenance of peace, the ſuppreſſion of liberty. Inſtead of the ſchemes of one commander, baſhaw, or conſul, influencing ſome by threats, and gaining others by bribes, to keep down a ſpirit which he alone is intereſted in cruſhing, the French Weſt Indian colonies preſent the view of a government, and every one of its agents, from the general to the drum-boy, all ſyſtematically occupied with the ſame deſign; conſtantly prompted, by the moſt powerful motives, to deviſe means for its execution; and guided in their attempts by the moſt intimate acquaintance with the ſubject. Before ſuch a combination, it is eaſy to conceive how quickly the limited freedom of the negroes will fall; and how ſoon we ſhall be again able to ſay of the Weſt Indian agriculture, '*Nunc eadem arva vincti pedes, damnatae manus, inſcripti vultus exercent.*' *

When

* Pliny.

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When we conſider, then, the circumſtances of the iſlands, we cannot entertain any great dread of the French colonial ſyſtem being near its end. It will in all probability be ſpeedily re-eſtabliſhed, although on a foundation much leſs ſecure, and with various marks of inferiority to the general ſtability of the Britiſh colonial empire.

2. The devaſtations which were committed, almoſt without interruption, during the firſt years of the rebellion, and thoſe loſſes which the reſtoration of the yoke muſt neceſſarily occaſion, conſtitute another circumſtance in which the value of the French colonies may be admitted to fall greatly ſhort of the value of the Britiſh ſettlements. We may remark, that, even during the moſt flouriſhing periods of the French colonies, their cultivation depended upon a much more extenſive ſyſtem of credit than the agriculture of the Britiſh colonies requires. This ariſes partly from the ſuperior temptations which the more fertile and extenſive lands of the former hold out to ſpeculations; partly from the greater deficiency of capital, both among the coloniſts and their creditors; but chiefly from the defects in the French laws reſpecting the recovery of debts. The French colonies, indeed, exhibit, in this point of view, one of

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the moſt ſingular ſpectacles of contradiction and apparent inconſiſtency that can be imagined, to baffle the ſpeculative legiſlator or politician. Though the planters exiſt upon credit, to ſuch an extent, that their debts before the revolution were reckoned at the value of two whole years produce of the iſlands, the ſecurity of the creditor was more precarious than in any commercial country with which we are acquainted. Unleſs in ſome ſpecial caſes (as claims of the Crown, and bill debts), the perſon of the debtor could not be attached; his ſtock could not be diſtrained without a ſale of the eſtate; and, in order to affect the eſtate, a litigation ſo complicated, tedious and expenſive, was neceſſary, that the creditor ſeldom or never obtained payment by theſe means. * Hence, the profits of the creditor were enormous; and the greateſt premiums were paid for ready money in all tranſactions of trade. We are informed that in the purchaſe of ſlaves, an abatement of twenty *per cent.* was not at all uncommon for caſh. † The only reſource of the oppreſſed debtor, on the other hand, was a new loan. But as the loan of money or any other article of value eaſily tranſportable, would, in theſe circumſtances, have been attended

* Laborie's Coffee Planter, Append. III. 42.—Malouet, Mem. ſur les Col. Tom. IV. p. 130.

† Id. ibid. 137.

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ed with great temptation to the one party, and riſk to the other, all new aſſiſtance was given in negroes; which enabled the planter to procure ſome additional returns, to realize a little for himſelf; and to leave the eſtate, with all its perpetual and increaſing incumbrances, to another who ſucceeded him in difficulties and toils. * Thus, a very ſingular conſequence reſulted from the nature of the French colonial law. The very circumſtances which we might have thought fatal to credit, the difficulty of forcing repayment, continually multiplied the debts which the planters contracted with their European correſpondents. It is eaſy to imagine how much more frail the agricultural ſyſtem of thoſe colonies muſt have been rendered by the calamitous events of later times. The vaſt extent of the loſſes occaſioned by the rebellion and the naval war, and the accumulated intereſt of old debts during a period when ſcarcely any returns were obtained, muſt render credit more neceſſary, and more expenſive than ever. We may indeed conceive ſome idea of the complicated difficulties under which the French planters labour, by attending to the propoſals which ſome of the moſt enlightened of their numbers have made to the Government, with a view to procure aſſiſt-

* Malouet, Tom IV. p. 134.

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ance. I ſhall only mention the project of M. Malouet himſelf, one of the chief ſufferers in the cauſe, and perhaps the beſt informed of the French writers upon colonial affairs. He conſiders a deduction from the total amount of each debt, or a ſuſpenſion of all intereſt during a term of years, as the only remedy for the difficulties of the caſe, and that this meaſure is dictated by urgent neceſſity. *

But, not to mention the extreme injuſtice of making the creditor, who had only a ſtipulated and certain profit, ſhare the riſks of the planter who enjoyed all the benefit of the overplus gains and exceſſive returns; and of obliging the creditors, rather than any other inhabitants of the mother country, to indemnify the coloniſts; it is clear that ſuch a meaſure would produce the immediate effect of tearing up by the roots every ſugar cane in the iſlands: for who would be bold, or rather fooliſh enough, to venture his money in farther loans, when the government had aboliſhed all the gains due to the former loans, or had cut down the principal itſelf? As well might a miniſter of finance attempt to contract for a public loan at the ſame time that he announced a ſuſpenſion of intereſt upon the national debt, or an acquittance of the whole obligations

* Mem. ſur les Col. IV. Introd. & V. 300. & ſeqq.

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tions under which Government had formerly been laid, by a payment of ten ſhillings in the pound.

It is by public aids, not by compulſory deductions from previous claims, that the mother country muſt attempt the reſtoration of the ruined colonies. The faith of the debtor muſt remain entire. An *arreté* from Paris may protect him from the law upon a partial payment, or in ſpite of a refuſal of all payment to his creditors; but the power of the Government cannot reconcile contradictions, and make breach of faith a ground of new confidence. Now, any aſſiſtance which the Government can afford, will only enable the planters to go on. They muſt ſtill be for ſome time in a ſituation infinitely more deſperate than before the revolution; borrowing money at higher intereſt, and forced to extract more labour from their ſlaves. Some correction of the colonial laws may indeed be expected; but many of their chief imperfections ariſe from the nature of the Weſt Indian eſtabliſhments; and the effects muſt always continue while the planters and their creditors are in need of ſtock.

In this reſpect, therefore, as well as in the general ſecurity of the ſyſtem, the French colonies are inferior to the Britiſh.

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3. In every other reſpect, that is to ſay, in all the circumſtances of their ſituation prior to 1790, except the want of capital, the French colonies are greatly ſuperior to thoſe of Great Britain. And indeed, the changes in the colonial balance which have taken place during the late war, give France an acceſſion of territory and population ſufficient in ſome degree to compenſate the fatal effects of the negro inſurrection.

The extent of the French Weſt Indian dominions was always much greater than that of the Britiſh. The diſpoſition of the territory, too, is more advantageous: it is not divided into ſuch a multitude of ſmall iſlands, but portioned into a few large ones, ſtrong by nature, rich in natural reſources, and ſcattered at commodious diſtances over the whole of the Caraibean chain. The mere advantages of their poſition are ſo various and important, that if the Weſt Indian empires of the two nations were poſſeſſed by independent ſtates, no balance whatever could ſubſiſt between their reſpective powers.

The extent and advantageous diſtribution of territory, however, are not the only circumſtances in which the colonial ſyſtem of France is decidedly ſuperior to that of England. The land in the French colonies, particularly in St

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St Domingo, is vaſtly more fertile than any of the ſoil in the Britiſh iſlands, except the ſmall iſland of St Chriſtopher's. The average annual produce of an acre in this laſt iſland, is two hogſheads of ſugar of ſixteen hundred weight. In Jamaica, the average is not above half a hogſhead. St Domingo abounds in the fine brick mould which in Jamaica is ſo ſcantily ſpread over a few narrow diſtricts, and of which a ſingle acre has been known to yield the enormous return of two tons and a half of ſugar. The average produce of all the ſugar lands in St Domingo, from the great plenty of this rich ſoil, is above a hogſhead and a half of ſixteen hundred weight per acre: * that is, the average fertility of St Domingo is above three times greater than that of Jamaica. Accordingly, the French planters have always been able to bring their ſugars to market at a much lower price than the Britiſh, notwithſtanding the additional expence, both in the prime coſt of the ſlaves, and in the freight of the commodities to Europe. The proportion of French and Britiſh muſcovado ſugars, in 1784, was averaged at that of five to ſeven. The cauſe of ſo great a difference became an object of particular inquiry with the committee of

* The exact average is 2712, varying between 2437 and 3074.

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of 1789. The result of their most careful investigation proved that the difference of price arose from the superior quality of the land in St Domingo, and that the same number of negroes yielded considerably more in the French than in the British plantations. But the tendency of this superior fertility is, not to save the importation of slaves; on the contrary, it operates as a stimulus to projectors, and even to extravagance of speculation.

From all these advantages, in point of extent and quality of soil, resulted the decided superiority of the French islands in cultivation and produce. The progress of colonial improvement was much more rapid during the years immediately preceding the revolution, than any thing of the same kind in the history of colonization. In the period of ten years, the negro population and total produce of St Domingo had almost doubled. This negro colony has attracted at all times so much attention, that ample materials have been laid before the public, from which we may form our estimates of its progressive resources. But the other colonies appear also to have been making very great advances during the same period, although we are not possessed of any complete information upon this matter. As the importance of these settlements is very great, from the large proportion

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tion which they bear to the whole French colonies, though no authors have paid attention to their progreſs ſince the time when M. Neckar publiſhed his work on finance, I ſhall enter into a few details upon this ſubject, for the purpoſe of forming an eſtimate of the preſent ſtate of the French Windward iſlands, and their progreſs during the period previous to the revolution.

About the year 1779, the whole average imported produce of the French Weſt Indian colonies was eſtimated at one hundred millions *livres tournois*. * In the year 1779, according to Neckar, the negro population amounted to about four hundred and thirty-eight thouſand. † This gives the proportion of one negro to two hundred and twenty-eight livres ſix ſous.

In 1791, according to the official accounts, this proportion for St Domingo was one negro to two hundred and ninety-four livres ten ſous. ‡ The returns made by the chambers of commerce to M. Neckar in 1788, make the proportion for the whole iſlands one to three hundred livres, § and for St Domingo one to three hundred and one livres three ſous, which may be

* Robinet, Dict. ſous Art. *Colonies*.

† Adminiſtration des Finances, tom. III. cap. 13.

‡ Rapport à l'Aſſemblée Legiſlative.

§ Barré St Venant, p. 103.

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be reckoned the ſame with the laſt ſtatement, allowing for the difference of years. In 1789, according to Laborie, the ſlaves in St Domingo were five hundred thouſand, * and the exported produce about one hundred and twenty-ſeven millions, † which gives one negro to two hundred and fifty-four livres. In 1790, according to Edwards, the proportion was one negro to two hundred and fifty livres. ‡ Let us take the medium of theſe three ſtatements, and we ſhall have the proportion of one negro to two hundred and ſixty-ſix livres; which is too much, as the official returns make no allowance for the ſlaves kept back, in order to avoid taxes: But, increaſing the official return in a mean proportion between the allowance of Laborie, and that which Edwards ſeems to have made, we get the numbers, in 1791, equal to five hundred and ten thouſand, and the proportion one negro to two hundred and ſixty-two livres fourteen ſous. Let us take the medium of thoſe three, and we have one negro to two hundred and fifty-five livres ſix ſous.

Now, according to the '*Memoire ſur le Commerce de la France et de ſes Colonies*,' the average annual import is two hundred millions of livres

* Coffee Planter. Append. IV. 4.

† Id. ibid. VI. 9.

‡ Hiſtorical Survey of St Domingo, chap. IX.

livres from all the colonies; which is evidently the ſame with the Reports of the Chambers to M. Neckar; for they make the total one hundred and ninety-eight millions eight hundred and ſixty-ſix thouſand. † M. Arnould * makes it one hundred and eighty-five millions. Taking the medium, and deducting one hundred and twenty-ſeven millions for St Domingo, there remain ſixty-five millions, which, according to our firſt calculation of proportion, gives two hundred and eighty-four thouſand three hundred and thirty for the number of the negroes in the Windward iſlands and Cayenne. This indicates an increaſe in the negro population of theſe iſlands, from the date of M. Neckar's work, of nearly ninety-ſix thouſand, or nearly in the proportion of 1 to 1.47. But, in fact, the increaſe has been greater, from the following circumſtances. The average of St Domingo is different from the general average. The former is 255.6 to one negro; the latter only 228.6 to one negro. This difference ariſes from the ſuperior excellence of the ſoil in St Domingo, and the nature of the culture. Of the whole hundred and eighty-five millions imported in 1789, according to Arnould, from all

† Barré St Venant, p. 102.

* Balance du Commerce, Part. II. § 4.

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all the iſlands, one hundred and thirty-four were the great ſtaples, coffee and ſugar. But of the hundred and twenty-ſeven millions average import from St Domingo, according to Laborie, about one hundred and ſix are the great ſtaples. More ſugar and coffee, then, is cultivated in St Domingo, than, according to the average of the whole iſlands, in the proportion of 1.37 to 1.19; and conſequently, more in St Domingo than in the Windward iſlands, in the proportion of 1.96 to 1.37. But the great ſtaples require fewer negroes than the minor produce. Hence, the ſame average export from the Windward iſlands ſhews that they have a greater number of negroes; and accordingly, inſtead of one negro to every 225.6 of exported produce, as at St Domingo, or to every 228.6, as in the general average, we muſt reckon only one negro to every hundred and ninety-two livres; which raiſes the negro population of the Windward iſlands to three hundred and thirty-eight thouſand five hundred and forty-one; an increaſe of about one hundred and fifty thouſand ſince the year 1779, or nearly in the ratio of 1 to 1.7.

Now, it will be obſerved, that this computation is ſtill under the truth. For the ſame number of negroes will only give the ſame exportable produce when the rate of increaſe is equable.

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quable. If this rate is accelerated, the number of negroes will bear a greater proportion; if retarded, a leſs proportion, to the value of the exports; becauſe, in the one caſe, there will be more lands in an incipient ſtate of culture than in the other, and, of conſequence, more ſlaves whoſe labour has not attained its full proportion of profit. That the improvement of all the iſlands was accelerated, there can be no doubt: therefore we may conclude, that the proportion of 1 to 1.7 is too low, and that the numbers in the Windward ſettlements were nearly doubled during the interval between 1779 and the French Revolution. This concluſion, it may further be obſerved, is agreeable to the general opinion expreſſed by Edwards * and Morſe †. The inference is contrary to the ſtatements of the Chamber, in their reports to Neckar; but it is moſt probable that the numbers were inaccurately collected in the Windward iſlands, and ſtill more careleſsly reported. This ſuſpicion is greatly ſtrengthened, by the evident errors which abound in almoſt all the ſtatements given (in the Report) of the foreign colonial reſources. But we have ſome other *data* whereby theſe concluſions may be confirmed, or

* Britiſh Weſt Indies, B. VI. c. 1.

† American Gazetteer, Art. *Weſt Indies*.

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or corrected if inaccurate. Immediately before the peace of Paris, at which time the attention of France began to be directed towards the improvement of her Weſt Indian dominions, the Windward iſlands were in the poſſeſſion of Great Britain.

By official documents, it appears that the average imports from Martinique and Guadaloupe, for the years 1762 and 1763, amounted to ſeven hundred and ſeventy-nine thouſand ſixty-ſix pounds Sterling †: and Tobago, in 1776, exported about twenty thouſand pounds Sterling: it was then reckoned equal to St Lucia by M. Neckar. ‡ Suppoſing, then, that in 1763 the exports of St Lucia and Cayenne together were only equal to twenty thouſand nine hundred and thirty-four pounds, we have the export of the whole French Windward iſlands equal to nineteen millions two hundred thouſand livres tournois, anſwering to a negro population of a hundred thouſand. In 1779, this had increaſ- in the ratio of 1 to 1.88, and during the next ten years in the accelerated ratio of 1 to 1.7; being a total increaſe, during twenty-ſix years, in the ratio of 1 to 3.38, or of 1 to 3.28, excluſive

* Whitworth's Tables, p. 87, 88.—Report of Com. 1789, Part IV.

‡ Admin. des Finances, tom. III. c. 13.

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cluſive of the colony ceded by the peace of Verſailles.

In the year 1796, Great Britain was again in poſſeſſion of all the French Windward iſlands, except Guadaloupe; and her imports from thoſe Weſt Indian conqueſts, in that year, were made in thirty-four thouſand ſix hundred and twenty-two tons, which anſwers to one million eighty-nine thouſand pounds value Sterling, according to the proportion of 1797, ‡ which can only include the French iſlands, as the Dutch had not been long enough ſettled. This value, equal to twenty-ſix millions one hundred and thirty-ſix thouſand livres tournois, anſwer to the number of one hundred and thirty-ſix thouſand one hundred and twenty-five negroes; which makes the negro population of Martinico one hundred and five thouſand, allowing that Tobago and St Lucia bear the ſame proportion to each other and to Martinico which they bore in Necker's time. This iſland, then, from 1763 to 1796, had increaſed in the ratio of 1 to 2.65.

In taking the exports of the conquered iſlands as a ſtandard of abſolute population, a greater allowance muſt be made for contraband, than in calculating from the exported produce

‡ Public Accounts, H. of C.

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of an old poſſeſſion. But at preſent, we have only been comparing the relative population at different periods, by the ſame teſt; and hence we may conclude, with ſufficient accuracy, that the increaſe of negroes in Martinico, down to the French revolution, was in the proportion of 1 to 2.28, allowing for the increaſe between 1789 and 1796. But this is much below the total proportion of the French Windward iſlands during the ſame period; and the reaſon is evident. In 1766, a dreadful hurricane laid that fine iſland entirely waſte; and it did not recover from this calamity, if we may believe M. Arnould, * for more than twenty years. The increaſe of Guadaloupe and the other iſlands, therefore, muſt have been proportionally more rapid, to make up the average rate; and there can be little doubt, that before ſlavery was aboliſhed in the former iſland, its black population had much more than doubled ſince the year 1779.

The hiſtory of the African trade affords the laſt means of approximation to which we ſhall reſort.

The average export of negroes from Africa by the French, at the period of the revolution, was at leaſt thirty thouſand. † The report of the

* Balance du Commerce, Part. II. § 4.

† Arnould, Balance du Commerce, Part. II. § 5.

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the Committee 1789, indeed, gives it at twenty thouſand. But this is clearly too low; for, according to minute accounts of the African trade, collected by Edwards on the ſpot, the importation into St Domingo alone, employed ninety-eight French veſſels from Africa in the year 1788, and amounted to twenty-nine thouſand five hundred and ſix negroes. * In 1787, it exceeded thirty thouſand eight hundred; and according to Laborie, † the importation of 1789 in French Guineamen, was twenty-ſeven thouſand two hundred and twelve: hence, the average import for St Domingo alone was about twenty-nine thouſand.

The average export of Great Britain is, by the ſtatement of the Liverpool merchants, in the Report of the Committee 1789, eſtimated at thirty-eight thouſand; which is in all probability too low. The opinion of the French traders, mentioned in the ſame Report, is, that the Britiſh carry over forty thouſand to their Weſt India iſlands, and re-export two thirds of that number. ‡ Edwards ſtates the re-exportation at one fifth of the importation, during the period of one hundred and ſix years, end-

* Hiſtorical Survey, &c. Appendix.

† Coffee-Planter, &c. Append. III. 3.

‡ Part VI.

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ing 1786. But, during far the greater part of this period, the foreign Weſt Indies were not in a ſituation that demanded great ſupplies; and they obtained all the neceſſary hands by private contracts. Before the American war, the French had their ſlaves delivered on the coaſt of Africa. The Spaniards obtained their proportion by the *Aſſiento*, firſt with France, then with Britain. Edwards gives the re-exportation from the Britiſh Weſt Indies, for the years 1784, 1785, 1786, and 1787, at ſomewhat below five thouſand; and the average importation for the ſame years at ſomewhat above twenty thouſand.‡ Out of the thirty-eight thouſand, then, which Great Britain exports from Africa, three thouſand are carried to the foreign Weſt Indies. In order to appreciate the proportion of thoſe which go to the French Windward iſlands, we may obſerve, that Portugal imports all her own negroes, and neither receives any from us, nor re-exports any herſelf. The only direct importation to the Spaniſh colonies in Britiſh veſſels, conſiſted of about three thouſand *per annum* by a Liverpool houſe; and, during one or two years, from three thouſand to four thouſand by the Philippine Company. * If we reckon the whole at eighteen thouſand *per annum*,

‡ Hiſtory of Britiſh Weſt Indies, B. IV. Chap. II.

* Sect. III. Part II.

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num, including re-exportation, we certainly take the outſide. The two thouſand imported by the Danes moſt probably ſupplied both their own ſmall poſſeſſions, and the Swediſh iſland St Bartholomew. If we admit that three thouſand were carried in Britiſh veſſels to the Dutch colonies, we allow an annual importation of ſeven thouſand to thoſe ſettlements, (including their own four thouſand), which was ſurely more than they actually received, conſidering that their whole ſtock did not exceed fifty thouſand. † Indeed, for ſeveral years, the importation of ſlaves in foreign veſſels, was altogether prohibited, to the ruin of the plantations.

On the moſt moderate computation, therefore, we may conſider ten thouſand as the number imported by Britiſh veſſels into the French iſlands; and ſince St Domingo was wholly ſupplied by French Guineamen, the entry of foreign ſlave veſſels being wholly prohibited, while an exception in favour of ſlave ſhips was made in the Windward iſlands, ten thouſand is the leaſt importation that we can aſſign to theſe. After ſlavery was aboliſhed in Guadaloupe and Cayenne, the demand for negroes from Britiſh traders was diminiſhed. Accordingly, we find that the average Britiſh tonnage

† Sect. III. Part I.

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employed in the African trade in 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796, was reduced from thirty-three thouſand to twenty-one thouſand. But the cultivation of the conquered iſlands by ſlaves continued; and the conquered Dutch colonies were about this time opened to Britiſh capital. The new demand ſoon revived the African trade, which, in the period from 1797 to 1800 incluſive, employed about thirty-eight thouſand tons. Nor had this increaſe any connexion with a change in the direct African trade; for, in the former period, the average imports from thence occupied between five and ſix thouſand tons; in the latter, they employed only between one and two thouſand. Neither can the difference be aſcribed to the increaſed culture in our own iſlands; for, in the four years ending 1798, (allowing two years for the variation in the African trade to appear), the average official value of Weſt Indian importation was four millions four hundred and eighty thouſand pounds, and the tonnage, employed, one hundred and thirty thouſand; whereas the average official value for 1799 and 1800 was no more than five millions five hundred thouſand, and the tonnage only one hundred and ſeventy thouſand, inſtead of ſeven millions eight hundred thouſand pounds; and two hundred and forty-ſeven thouſand tons, the proportion of

increaſe

increaſe in the African importations; allowing nothing for the decreaſe of the direct African trade, and the conſequent proportional augmentation of the ſlave trade: and it will be remarked, that the exportable produce of the conquered colonies had increaſed in a very large degree.

We may therefore conclude, that the fluctuations of the African trade afford a ſufficiently accurate criterion whereby to judge of the progreſs of the French Windward colonies. From this, as well as from all the other means of determining the rate of that progreſs, it appears to have been nearly as rapid as the improvement of the great Leeward Iſland during the ſame period.

The event of the late war has given to the colonial reſources of France an augmentation ſtill more ſudden, and, in the end, infinitely more important, than that rapid increaſe of culture which we have juſt now been conſidering. To mention only the conſolidation of the whole of St Domingo under the French dominion, nothing can be conceived more advantageous to the wealth of the whole empire. A vaſt field is opened for the employment of capital, at the very time when all the ancient poſſeſſions of France in the iſland were nearly cultivated to the uttermoſt extent of their capacity. Some of the diſtricts

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of the Spaniſh diviſion are, if poſſible, more fruitful than thoſe of the Weſtern quarter. The rivers are larger, and more eaſily navigable; the communication with Europe is eaſier; the varieties of ſoil and produce are greater. By the transference, an end is put to the deſertion of ſlaves, a conſequence of the diviſion of territory. Above all, an acquiſition is made of a large body of white ſubjects, without any conſiderable mixture of ſlaves; and an opportunity is afforded to the haraſſed and ruined planters, of emigrating to the remote parts of the ſame colony, and (without wholly abandoning the iſland) of avoiding thoſe ſcenes among which many of them can no longer wiſh to live. Great as theſe advantages are, it may be obſerved, that they are accompanied by one drawback. The ſecurity of the colonial ſubordination is more likely to be affected than formerly, both by the diſcontents of Europeans, and the rebellion of the ſlaves. It will be more eaſily affected by the diſcontents of the European coloniſts, becauſe a large and difficult country is much more eaſily defended than a ſtripe of land on the coaſt; and becauſe the whole coloniſts will be united, and in ſome degree blended together, by the operations of ſimilar laws and governments: ſo that they will oppoſe to the parent ſtate, in the event of a miſunderſtanding,

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ing, a much more compact body of rebels than the two colonies could have done in their ſeparate ſtate, even admitting them to have concurred in throwing off their allegiance.

The ſubordination of the iſland will be more eaſily affected by the negro ſlaves; becauſe, in all probability, the neighbourhood of more quiet ſcenes, where the ſlaves are few in number, and peaceful in their diſpoſitions, as well as the temptations of cheap and fertile land, will be ſufficiently ſtrong to draw away a much greater ſhare of the white population from the old colony, than would otherwiſe have left it and emigrated to Europe or the foreign poſſeſſions.

But, farther, the other circumſtances which we have juſt now conſidered, although they demonſtrate the progreſs of the French colonies in opulence to have been more rapid than the improvement of the Britiſh ſettlements, yet prove that the internal ſecurity of the former has been diminiſhing in a proportional degree. The cultivation of the ſlave colonies, indeed, cannot be ſuddenly augmented, without an increaſe of the weakneſs inſeparable from all colonies peopled by a mixed population. Of this we ſhall afterwards ſpeak more fully. At preſent it is enough to remark, that, in eſtimating the relative importance of the two colonial

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lonial ſyſtems to their reſpective mother countries, we ought chiefly to conſider the comparative amount of the wealth and induſtry belonging to thoſe ſyſtems. The motions of the ſtate on which thoſe colonies depend, will always be regulated by the value of the colonies as property, and by the proportion which the advantages derived from them bear to the other reſources of the community. According to the extent of that value and that proportion, the deſire of the mother country to provide for the ſafety of the colonial ſyſtem, and to counteract the tendency of internal evils, will generally be fixed.

The preſent ſtate of the French colonies, and their relative importance to the mother country, cannot be determined with accuracy. We may form a general eſtimate of this, by attending to what we know of their ſituation before the late violent changes. From the details into which I have entered, it does not appear too high a calculation, to eſtimate the whole negro population of the French ſlave colonies, before the rebellion, at eight hundred thouſand, and the free population at ſixty-five thouſand. The produce exported by theſe coloniſts was worth about eight millions three hundred thouſand pounds Sterling, and occupied one hundred and ſixty-four thouſand and eighty-one

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one tons of ſhipping, navigated by thirty-three thouſand four hundred men. The importation of the colonies was worth nearly four millions one hundred thouſand pounds.

The negro population of the Britiſh Weſt Indies, at the ſame period, amounted to four hundred and ſixty-five thouſand, and the free population to eighty thouſand; the whole exports were worth five millions two hundred thouſand pounds Sterling; and this traffic employed one hundred and forty-eight thouſand one hundred and ſeventy-ſix tons, diſtributed into ſix hundred and eighty-nine veſſels, navigated by thirteen thouſand nine hundred and thirty-ſix ſeamen. Of this immenſe exportation, the part which arrived in Britain and Ireland paid one million eight hundred thouſand pounds in groſs duties. The imports into the colonies from the mother country were valued at one million nine hundred thouſand pounds. Such was the decided ſuperiority of the French over the Britiſh colonies before the revolution. The proportion which the French colony trade bore to the whole French trade, was alſo much greater than that which the Britiſh colony trade bore to the whole Britiſh trade: for the whole value of exports from France was ſeventeen millions three hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, while the Britiſh exports

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exports were valued at twenty-ſeven millions pounds. The tonnage of the commercial navy of France was four hundred and ſixty-four thouſand one hundred and twenty-two; that of the Britiſh commercial navy one million five hundred and eighty-nine thouſand. The ſeamen employed in the former, amounted to ſixty-ſix thouſand three hundred; thoſe employed in the latter, to one hundred and nineteen thouſand.

We ſee, then, that in every view the French American colonies were much more eſſential to the mother country than the Engliſh. I have not mentioned the deficiency of the French in Eaſt Indian territory; becauſe, though this unqueſtionably renders the Weſt Indian poſſeſſions more neceſſary, yet the different extents of the mother country may nearly balance this additional circumſtance of ſuperiority. The neceſſity under which France muſt now feel herſelf placed, of reſtoring her navy, which has no nurſery at all comparable to her colony trade, unqueſtionably renders the reſtoration of tranquillity to her Weſt Indian dominions one of the moſt important objects of national attention. In proſecuting this object, it is enough for the Government to know what the colonies once yielded. However great the defalcation may be which late changes

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changes have occaſioned, it becomes thoſe who are entruſted with the management of the imperial concerns, to look back and unite all their efforts to reſtore the former ſtate of colonial proſperity. Neither France nor England have gained as much by their colonies, as both powers now would gain were they to begin their colonial operations anew. But no ſtates have ever ruled their diſtant ſettlements with ſo much mildneſs and equity; none have committed ſo few capital blunders; none have ſo ſoon corrected the errors of that ſhort-ſighted policy, which in all ages has preſided over the firſt plantation and early government of colonies. The mode of governing and trading by excluſive companies, or ſea-port towns, ſo deſtructive to all the colonies of Spain and Portugal, and ſo hurtful even in the leſs illiberal political ſyſtem of the Dutch, never ſubſiſted ſo long, as to produce any very ſerious evils either to the French or Engliſh colonies in the New World. The Weſt Indian Company of France has been aboliſhed for more than a century; and none of the Britiſh colonies, except thoſe on the continent, were ever ſubjected to this ſpecies of management; nor were even thoſe committed to the care of monopolizing corporations, except for a very few years at their firſt eſtabliſhment. All the illiberality and

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which was laid out in the colony upon works of utility and embelliſhment, muſt be added an average remittance of five hundred and eighty-five thouſand made to the treaſury of the mother country from the depoſites; that is, the entrepôt fund, conſignment money, and invalid fund, not including the ſeamens fund. * Perhaps it would not be too high an eſtimate to reckon the whole colonial ſurplus at two millions currency, or nearly one million three hundred and ninety thouſand livres tournois. This ſurplus might eaſily have been augmented; for the *octroi* upon exported produce, which was the whole tax paid in the colony by the exporters, did not amount to three *per cent.* on the value. The account of colonial finance given by Mr Burke, is extremely inaccurate. † The colonial expences of St Domingo are ſtated by Mr Edwards at fifty thouſand pounds, evidently through the miſtake of a cypher. ‡

The clear revenue drawn from colonial produce imported into France (*droit du domaine d'Occident*) yielded, by farm, in 1758, (during the adminiſtration of M. de Boullongue), two millions of livres, although during war. || The ſame

* Laborie, Append. V. 16. & 2.—Wimpffen, Let. XXVIII.

† European Settlements, Part IV. chap. VI.

‡ Hiſtorical Survey, &c. chap. I.

|| Etat des Finances de France, 1758, chap. I.

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ſame farm, during the adminiſtration of M. Turgôt, yielded to the Crown three millions two hundred and fifty-ſeven thouſand eight hundred and ſeventeen livres; and the whole American colonies required an expenditure of four millions four hundred thouſand.* But, during the adminiſtration of Mr Neckar, this farm yielded, by the *compte rendu* of 1781, four millions one hundred thouſand; and, by the Report of the *Clef du Compte des Caiſſes*, &c. in 1788, the average for the years 1781, 1782, and 1783, was four millions four hundred and fifty-nine thouſand four hundred and twenty-ſix.† The ordinary expence of the department of marine and colonies, at the ſame time, was twenty-nine millions two hundred thouſand.‡ In Turgôt's adminiſtration, the ſame expence amounted to thirty-three millions, including certain extraordinaries: ‖ ſo that it had not increaſed during the interval. Of this thirty-three millions, the Weſt Indian colonies received four millions four hundred thouſand. It is not likely, then, that they received more in 1781, after the expenſive project of Cayenne had been abandoned. This leaves a ſurplus of near ſixty thouſand livres;

* Etat des Revenues et Depenſes. 1775. Par Turgôt.

† Neckar, Nouvelles Eclairciſſemens, p. 56.

‡ Compte Rendu par Neckar, 1781.

‖ Etat, &c. Par Turgôt.

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which was laid out in the colony upon works of utility and embelliſhment, muſt be added an average remittance of five hundred and eighty-five thouſand made to the treaſury of the mother country from the depoſites; that is, the entrepôt fund, conſignment money, and invalid fund, not including the ſeamens fund. * Perhaps it would not be too high an eſtimate to reckon the whole colonial ſurplus at two millions currency, or nearly one million three hundred and ninety thouſand livres tournois. This ſurplus might eaſily have been augmented; for the *octroi* upon exported produce, which was the whole tax paid in the colony by the exporters, did not amount to three *per cent.* on the value. The account of colonial finance given by Mr Burke, is extremely inaccurate. † The colonial expences of St Domingo are ſtated by Mr Edwards at fifty thouſand pounds, evidently through the miſtake of a cypher. ‡

The clear revenue drawn from colonial produce imported into France (*droit du domaine d'Occident*) yielded, by farm, in 1758, (during the adminiſtration of M. de Boullongue), two millions of livres, although during war. ‖ The ſame

* Laborie, Append. V. 16. & 2.—Wimpffen, Let. XXVIII.

† European Settlements, Part IV. chap. VI.

‡ Hiſtorical Survey, &c. chap. I.

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|| Etat, &c. Par Turgôt.

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which, added to one million three hundred and ninety thouſand, the ſurplus of St Domingo alone, muſt have more than ſufficed to pay off, in two years, the whole debt of the *domaine d'Occident:* for the intereſt on this debt amounted, under the Abbé Terray's adminiſtration, to no more than one hundred and eighty-nine thouſand. Beſides, we muſt recollect the various abuſes which exiſted in all the revenue departments of France under the old government, and the enormous profits made by the farms. A reform in this particular might have greatly augmented the revenue from the colonies; and other reforms, equally neceſſary, would have diminiſhed the colonial expenditure.

The whole expence of the civil government in the Britiſh North American colonies, previous to the Revolution, did not amount to eighty thouſand pounds Sterling; which was paid by the produce of their own taxes. The military eſtabliſhment, the garriſons, and the forts, in the old colonies, coſt the mother country nothing. 'They were governed,' ſays Franklin, 'at the expence only of a little pen, 'ink and paper; they were led by a thread.'* In time of war, they contributed their ſhare, and ſometimes more than their ſhare, to the extra-

* Examination before the Houſe of Commons, 1766.

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extraordinary expences of the ſtate. During the Seven-years war, they raiſed, clothed, and paid twenty-five thouſand men, at an expence of many millions. They were reimburſed indeed; but only for ſo much as they were judged to have paid beyond their proportion. Pennſylvania had expended half a milllon, and received only ſixty thouſand pounds from Parliament. *

The eſtabliſhments of Canada, Nova Scotia, and the other northern colonies, as might naturally be expected, have hitherto coſt ſomething to the mother country. Their civil expences paid by the Britiſh exchequer amounted, in 1800, to twenty-three thouſand five hundred and twenty pounds, excluſive of Quebec; and their garriſons, for the ſame year, coſt ſix thouſand three hundred. The maintenance of the troops upon their preſent footing, is about two hundred thouſand pounds; and in time of war it amounted to the ſame: ſo that the whole expenditure is about two hundred and thirty thouſand pounds Sterling; to compenſate which, there are conſiderable colonial funds. †

The revenue of the Britiſh Weſt Indies is by no means ſo ſimple as that of the French; partly

* Franklin's Examination before the H. of Com. 1766.

† Report of Committee of Finances, 1798, vol. III. —Public Accounts, 1801.

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partly from the greater ſubdiviſion of the territory, and partly from the greater prevalence of the fiſcal ſpirit in our colonial policy. I ſhall endeavour, as clearly as I am able, to exhibit a ſhort view of this branch of our finances, after premiſing, that the accounts laid before Parliament are very far from furniſhing a diſtinct ſtatement of the ſubject.

(1.) The expence of the Jamaica civil eſtabliſhment is altogether defrayed by colonial taxes. The contingent charges amounted, in 1788, to twenty-two thouſand one hundred and forty-two pounds currency; and eight thouſand pounds currency is alſo ſettled yearly upon the Crown by the revenue act 1728. Out of this, the governor receives two thouſand five hundred pounds. For raiſing theſe ſupplies, the ways and means amounted to one hundred and twenty-two thouſand four hundred pounds of annual votes, and twelve thouſand pounds of perpetual revenue. Beſides the civil expences and income to the Crown, this iſland contributes a large ſum to the pay of the troops and the garriſon expences. In 1788, this amounted to fifty-two thouſand eight hundred and ſixty-nine pounds, including the Maroon eſtabliſhment, which is ſtrictly a charge of

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of a military nature. A ſurplus of forty-ſeven thouſand eight hundred and eighty-nine pounds currency remained for the extinction of a debt not exceeding one hundred and eighty thouſand pounds. A part of this ſurplus being applied to pay the intereſt at ſix *per cent.*, above thirty-ſeven thouſand pounds would remain; which, added to four thouſand pounds, the permanent ſurplus would form a ſinking fund, more than ſufficient to clear every incumbrance in leſs than four years.

But, during the late wars, Jamaica has paid a great proportion of the extraordinary expences of its military eſtabliſhment. It has raiſed and paid part of the Weſt Indian regiments; it has defrayed the whole expence of part of the Britiſh forces quartered there, an article which, in 1800, amounted to eighty-four thouſand three hundred and ſeven pounds ſterling. If to this we add the fifty-two thouſand eight hundred and ſixty-nine pounds currency paid for the ordinary military eſtabliſhment, and the five thouſand five hundred pounds currency ſurplus of perpetual revenue, after paying the governor's ſalary, we ſhall find that Jamaica, beſides defraying the whole expence of its civil eſtabliſhment, and thus giving ſalaries to a variety of officers appointed by the Crown out of the ſubjects of the mother country, afforded to Go-

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vernment, in the year 1800, a revenue of about one hundred and twenty-ſix thouſand pounds ſterling, towards its defence againſt the common enemy of both the colonies and the mother country, and maintained, over and above, its own militia and black forces.

(2.) Barbadoes and the Leeward Charaibean iſlands are ſubject to the duty of four and a half *per cent.* ſtipulated to be paid in ſpecie upon all their exported produce. The revenue ariſing from this impoſition forms the four and a half *per cent.* fund, out of which part of the civil expences of thoſe iſlands are paid by Great Britain, the reſt being defrayed by direct taxes in the iſlands themſelves. The ſtipulations of the act of Aſſembly in Barbadoes, September 1663, have been diſregarded, and ſpecific taxes have been levied to defray thoſe expences which Government had become bound to make good out of the four and a half *per cent.* fund. In 1730, the ſum of five thouſand pounds ſterling was raiſed; and between 1745 and 1748, the ſum of nineteen thouſand four hundred and forty pounds was levied for the repair of forts. Some authors have ſtated that thirty thouſand pounds were raiſed at one ſtroke for this purpoſe. *

There

* European Settlements, Part VI. c. 9.

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There is no regular military eſtabliſhment, I believe, in any of the Leeward Charaibean iſlands, except St Chriſtopher and Antigua; which, beſides raiſing forces of their own, contribute additional pay to the King's troops. The four and a half *per cent.* fund is much more than ſufficient to pay all that part of the civil expences of Barbadoes and the Leeward Iſlands, which falls on the Government of the mother country. Its net produce for the year ending 5. April 1801, is ſtated in the public accounts at nineteen thouſand five hundred and thirty-one pounds ſterling †; and the expences of Barbadoes and the Leeward Iſlands, with the charges of collecting it there, amount to ſeven thouſand one hundred and ſeventy-three pounds, including the commutation which is called Lord Kinnoul's *penſion*, with as much propriety as the holders of long annuities might be denominated penſioners. There is however a large defalcation in this fund. The produce of the duty in Barbadoes alone was eſtimated at from eight thouſand to ten thouſand pounds in 1684, and a commutation of ſix thouſand pounds net was at that time refuſed. The official value of exported produce from Barbadoes and the Leeward Charaibean Iſlands in 1787, was, according to the Inſpector-general's report, two millions

† Public Accounts, 1801.

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lions twenty-three thouſand three hundred and ſeventeen pounds. From the average official value of imports for 1798, 1799, and 1800, as ſtated to the Houſe of Commons by his Majeſty's Miniſters in the debates on the late peace, it appears that the total exportation of Weſt Indian produce has conſiderably increaſed ſince 1788; and yet the net produce of four and a half *per cent.* upon above two millions ſterling, for the year ending April 1801, was conſiderably under twenty thouſand pounds ſterling. In whatever way this produce was valued, the frauds committed on the revenue, both by collectors and contributors, muſt have been enormous. An impoſition of ſhameful extent is indeed avowed in the accounts of the fund for twenty-one years ending 1734. For it appears that, during this period, the money collected was three hundred and twenty-ſix thouſand five hundred and twenty-nine pounds, of which no more than one hundred and forty thouſand thirty-two pounds was paid into the Exchequer, eighty thouſand pounds having been retained in the iſlands under the name of expence of collection, and one hundred and five thouſand pounds in fees, duties, &c. upon the produce ſent over to Britain, as the terms of the act 1663, requiring payment in ſpecie, are not in force. After all, I am inclined to

ſuſpect

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ſuſpect, that the net produce of this duty, in the only year for which I have an account (the year ending April 1801), is conſiderably below the uſual amount; for the ordinary charges upon the fund amount to more than double the net produce of that year, being in all above forty-one thouſand pounds; and yet there is no reaſon to ſuppoſe that the fund is in debt, from any of the accounts which I have had an opportunity of inſpecting.

Of this charge (forty-one thouſand pounds), only ſeven thouſand one hundred and ſeventy-three pounds is for the civil government of Barbadoes and the Leeward Iſlands; the reſt is applied to defray that part of the civil expences of the other iſlands which falls on the Government of the mother country, and to pay various penſions and other grants wholly unconnected with the colonies. Mr Burke * inveighs warmly againſt the diverſion of the fund from the ſervices of the iſland where it is raiſed; forgetting how little it ſignifies either to the mother country or the colonies, whether the money paid by themſelves or by the other ſubjects of the empire is ſpent among them. It is a ſingular coincidence, that Mr Burke himſelf ſhould have lived to ſhare largely in this very fund, without any other claims upon the colonies

* European Settlements, Part VI. c. 9.

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nies than thoſe ſervices which he rendered to the whole body of the Britiſh dominions. The well merited reward of his labours is one of the penſions for imperial purpoſes charged upon the four and a half *per cent.* fund.

The revenue ariſing from the duty, in Barbadoes and the Leeward Iſlands, is beyond compariſon the moſt injurious to the ſubject, in proportion to the benefit it produces to Government, of any that I remember to have ſeen recorded in the hiſtory of taxation. It both takes more and keeps more out of the pockets of the people, in proportion to what it brings into the treaſury, than any other impoſition with which I am acquainted. The planters complain that it abſorbs one tenth of their net profits, and that with this burden they have to ſupport in all markets the competition of the other Britiſh iſlands which are exempted from the duty; and, in ſome markets, the competition of the French iſlands alſo, which enjoy ſo many additional advantages. They are therefore under the ſame diſadvantages which would effectually ruin one diſtrict in England paying tythe, were it ſurrounded by other diſtricts either lying under no ſuch incumbrance, or compounding for a ſmall *modus*.

Accordingly, all thoſe iſlands have gradually declined, inſtead of advancing in improvement

ment like the reſt; and this, notwithſtanding many natural advantages which they poſſeſs. It would unqueſtionably be a wiſe policy to effect a commutation of this grievous duty. The iſlands would moſt willingly levy it in ſuch a manner as to make it increaſe with that advancement of cultivation which muſt immediately follow ſo ſalutary a reform. Perhaps, if this commutation ſhould not be adopted, the mother country as well as the colonies would gain conſiderably, by lowering the duty from four and a half to two or two and a half *per cent.*; and a ſtill farther profit might be ſecured, by introducing a better ſyſtem of management and collection.

(3.) The ceded iſlands were never ſubject to the four and a half *per cent.* duty. An attempt was made by Government to extend this buthen to them immediately after the peace of Paris; but the queſtion was fully diſcuſſed before the Court of King's Bench in the caſe of Grenada. The colony prevailed; and the ſame judgment was held to free the other ſettlements, Dominica, St Vincent, and Tobago then a Britiſh iſland †. The Crown, therefore, draws no direct revenue from theſe colonies; but

† Cowper's Reports, Michaelmas Term, 14. Geo. III.

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but the inhabitants contribute in a large proportion to the public expenditure, particularly if we conſider the very recent eſtabliſhment of the ſettlements.

Grenada provides to its governor a ſalary nearly equal to that which he receives from the exchequer of the mother country, and raiſes the whole of the money ſtipends paid to the clergy. The Crown, indeed, pays part of the governor's ſalary, with that of the lieutenant-governor and the agent. This expence, in all amounting to two thouſand one hundred and ſixty-four pounds Sterling, is charged to the four and a half *per cent.* fund; but it muſt be remembered, that, by the proclamation of March 1764, purchaſers of the Crown lands were invited. We may infer, therefore, that a conſiderable ſum was raiſed, as the land is all extremely fertile; and, in 1776, above ſeventy-two thouſand acres, out of eighty thouſand, paid taxes. The military eſtabliſhment generally conſiſts of five hundred regulars and three companies of King's blacks, the militia; and the attached negroes and mulattoes are ſupported by the inhabitants.

St Vincents pays the governor half his ſalary, namely one thouſand pounds Sterling: the remainder, as well as the expence of a regiment, an artillery company, and a black corps, is defrayed

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frayed by Government. But the produce of the ſales of lands, in 1764, was one hundred and ſixty-two thouſand eight hundred and fifty-four pounds Sterling, beſides grants of at leaſt an equal value to individuals, who muſt have had claims of ſome kind upon Government, and were thus ſatisfied, without any expence to the Imperial revenue. The Crown, therefore, gained by this iſland about three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds Sterling, which, if left as a colonial fund, would have more than paid all that part of the ordinary civil and military expences not defrayed by the coloniſts.

The iſland of Dominica pays the governor nearly as much ſalary as he receives from the Crown. The military eſtabliſhment has generally been very trifling: in the American war, it had only one hundred regulars. But if the unqueſtionable importance of its poſition between the French Windward and Leeward Charaibean iſlands ſhould render it an object of more attention, the neceſſary increaſe of its force muſt be placed to the general account of the Weſt Indies. There is, however, in the quit-rents paid by the French inhabitants under the leaſes, and in the produce of the ſales 1764, an ample fund for defraying all theſe expences. The ſales produced three hundred and twelve thouſand ninety-two pounds Sterling, and the rents

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rents ſhould amount to between nine thouſand and ten thouſand pounds *per annum*. An income of twenty-nine thouſand pounds is more than ſufficient to defray all the expences of the government and army; as well thoſe paid out of the four and a half *per cent.* fund, as thoſe raiſed by taxes, or advanced by the Crown.

The whole expence of forts in the three ceded iſlands, together with Jamaica and Tobago, is only two thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty-five pounds, even in time of war. It is evident, then, that beſides the ſurpluſage of the four and a half *per cent.* fund, the internal reſources of the ceded iſlands, which are free from the duty, will, if properly managed, more than ſupport the civil and military eſtabliſhments, and yield the Crown a clear revenue.

(4.) With regard to the Bahamas and Bermudas, the expence of their civil eſtabliſhment is I believe chiefly paid by Great Britain, and amounts to about one thouſand three hundred and fifty pounds Sterling, paid out of the four and a half *per cent.* fund, beſides four thouſand ſix hundred and eighty pounds by ſpecial grant. There are no troops at preſent there but a Weſt Indian regiment. The ſale of the Crown lands in Trinidad will much more than defray all the expences of that iſland, and the Bahamas and Bermudas.

From

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From the whole it appears, that the civil eſtabliſhment of all the Britiſh colonies in the Weſt Indies draws from the treaſury of the mother country nineteen thouſand eight hundred and thirty-eight pounds Sterling; and that the treaſury receives from them a revenue of ſeventy-three thouſand ſeven hundred and fourteen pounds, excluſive of the Crown lands in Grenada and Trinidad. This revenue might be increaſed to ninety thouſand pounds at leaſt, by reforms which would promote the proſperity of a valuable part of the Weſt Indian territory; and it is ſurely not eſtimating the ſales in Grenada and Trinidad too high, to compute, that, after paying all the expences of civil government in the latter, they may yield a clear addition of twenty thouſand pounds Sterling to the revenue, leaving a yearly fund of above ninety thouſand pounds towards defraying the expences of the military eſtabliſhment. Beſides the black regiment, and thoſe forts in Barbadoes, &c. which the colonial governments ſupport, the preſent war eſtabliſhment coſts Government about two hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds *per annum*, of which Jamaica pays nearly ſixty-four thouſand pounds over and above the iſland allowance of the whole troops. This reduces the total expence to two hundred and ſix thouſand pounds, and the whole balance to about one

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one hundred and ſixteen thouſand pounds; the amount of the charge againſt the mother country for defending that part of her empire, in the firſt year of an inſecure peace, in a ſeaſon of unparalleled difficulty and danger, when the combination of unexampled circumſtances renders the aſſiſtance of a far larger part of the national force neceſſary to the colonies than could ever be required in ordinary times.

The ſtatements into which I have now entered, require no commentary. They prove how completely erroneous thoſe vague aſſertions are, which aſcribe nothing but expence to the maintenance of colonial relations; and they ſhow, that even the colonies which bring the ſmalleſt direct revenue into the coffers of the mother country, contribute much more to their own ſeparate government and defence, than many of the contiguous diſtricts. I have enlarged the more upon this branch of the French and Britiſh colonial policy, becauſe the ſubject has never before, ſo far as I know, been placed in a clear point of view, and becauſe it affords the ſtrongeſt illuſtration of many of the principles laid down in the Firſt Section of this Book. Every one is ready to admit, that the expence of thoſe colonies which contain the gold, ſilver, and diamond mines, does not fall a burthen upon the revenue of the mother country. But the enemies

enemies of colonial eſtabliſhments have drawn moſt of their arguments on this topic from a general and declamatory view of thoſe colonies, in which direct revenue has with the greateſt wiſdom been made a ſubordinate object. On the other hand, they have declaimed againſt the commercial importance of ſuch ſettlements, from general appeals to the hiſtory of nations, which, with a leſs enlightened policy, have neglected the colonial trade, and only endeavoured to enrich themſelves by tributes and rents. The beſt mode of examining ſuch aſſertions, was to deſcribe the influence of the colonial ſyſtem upon the commerce and agriculture of Spain and Portugal, and to explain the colonial finances of Great Britain and France.

I have purpoſely omitted entering into that wide field of inquiry which is preſented by the Aſiatic policy of thoſe two powers. It would form, of itſelf, the ſubject of a ſeparate work, conſiſting rather of a detail of facts, which may eaſily be arranged by the principles laid down in the two firſt Sections of this Inquiry, and by the examples given in the Firſt Part of the preſent Section, where thoſe principles were exemplified in the colonial policy of the United Provinces.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A. *p.* 24.

THE treaties between Carthage and Rome are ſufficiently curious and intereſting, to merit much greater attention than they have received from political writers. This ſubject has indeed been chiefly left to the labours of the antiquary; and accordingly we do not enjoy the advantage of contemplating it in that ſtrong and uſeful light in which the talents and general views of ſpeculative politicians would have placed it.

In a work publiſhed 1777, anonymouſly, (but, I underſtand, the avowed production of Profeſſor Barron, of St Andrews in Scotland), under the title of a '*Hiſtory of the* '*Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity*,'—thoſe treaties have been conſidered with much learning and acuteneſs,—(chap. I. ſect. II.) But, beſides many other occaſions of regret, which the author's brevity, and the unfortunate caſt of his general plan, leave to the impartial reader, we have to lament that he did not diſcuſs the ſubject of thoſe treaties more fully. In particular, he has not remarked the ſingular difference between the ancient and modern method of ruling the colonial commerce, which I have pointed out in the text.

M. de St Croix, who has inveſtigated the whole ſubject of ancient colonies with the greateſt minuteneſs, (*De l'etat & du ſort des colonies des anciens peuples*), has committed

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the error uſual to antiquaries, of often directing the attention to the leaſt intereſting objects of examination. He neither ſettles the diſputed points of the queſtion, nor leads us by his ſtatements to any general idea of the ſubject. He ſcarcely beſtows upon the moſt important monument of ancient mercantile policy, half a page *(p. 43. edit. 1779.)* of the ſixty-four which he devotes to the hiſtory of the Carthaginian trade. It is needleſs to add, that he omits any ſuch remark as the one offered in the text, evidently ſuggeſted by a peruſal of Polybius's own ſtatement.

The narrative of this acute and philoſophical hiſtorian deſerves the utmoſt attention. I ſhall only direct my reader to his writings, by taking notice of one or two particulars.

1. Some doubts have ariſen with reſpect to the date of the firſt treaty. It is, however, remarkable, that Polybius mentions ſeveral circumſtances, any one of which is ſufficient to fix it, and all of which, combined, place the thing beyond doubt. He ſays, the treaty was made in the conſulſhip of Brutus and Horatius, the firſt conſuls after the expulſion of the kings, in the year of the conſecration of Jupiter Capitolinus's temple; and twenty-eight years before Xerxes came into Greece, *(Hiſt. lib. III.)* It has been ſuggeſted, that there is an evident miſtake, at leaſt in one of the circumſtances mentioned as a date—the conſulſhip, ſince Livy ſtates that Brutus was ſole conſul, and that Horatius was only ſubſtituted to him at his death. Mr Gibbon *(Eſſai ſur l'Etude de la Litterature, chap. XXVII. XXVIII. XXIX.)* ingeniouſly gets rid of this objection; but it appears probable that Polybius may have meant to ſpecify the year in which both Horatius and Brutus were conſuls—the year, viz. in which the latter died, and was ſucceeded by the former. At any rate, there are dates enough left, if this were given up; although, no doubt, it would be fair to ar-

give

gue even againſt Livy's teſtimony, when Polybius is ſo poſitive and minute in his ſtatement. The words uſed by this author afford a ſanction to the hypotheſis. He ſays, Γινονται τοιγαρουν συνθηκαι Ρωμαιοις και Καρχηδονιοις πρωται, κατα Λευκιον Ιουνιον Βρουτον, και Μαρκον Ωρατιον, τους πρωτους καταστηναι υπατους μετα την των Βασιλεων καταλυσιν. *p.* 176. *edit. Caſaub.*

It has next been ſaid, that the Romans had no veſſels in thoſe days; and the old ſtory of the Carthaginian ſhip driven aſhore, and uſed as a model by the Romans, is quoted as proof of this. But who can believe that ſtory, who conſiders the difficulty of acquiring a naval force? Who can imagine, that immediately upon ſeeing the Carthaginian wreck, the Romans were inſpired with ſuch naval ſkill, ſuch a love of the ſeafaring life, ſuch knowledge of naval architecture, as enabled them, in their very firſt outſet, to conquer the beſt ſailors in the world in a naval war? Nothing more can be meant by this tradition, than that the Romans, previous to the period in queſtion, had no very large ſhips. That they had coaſters and ſmall craft, none can doubt. It is ſingular that Polybius ſhould have been ſo far miſled by the national vanity peculiar to Rome, as to countenance this ſtory, (*Lib. I. cap.* 20.); more eſpecially as it is directly contradicted by the treaties which he quotes afterwards, (*Lib. III. cap.* 22.)

That he may be relied upon for the ſubſtance of the treaties, we cannot entertain a doubt, if we attend to his own words. He tells us, that Philomis had written in his hiſtory a tract upon the Roman and Carthaginian diſputes, giving the blame entirely to the Romans, and referring to a treaty between the two ſtates; the exiſtence of which treaty Polybius denies, and ſtates the reaſons that ſupport his aſſertion. He remarks, that many old men, and ſkilful politicians, were in his day ignorant that the treaty, which he gives as the firſt, exiſted. He ſtates that it was contained with the others, in the Ædilian archives, at the temple of

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Jupiter Capitolinus, all engraved on brazen tables. He obſerves, that from the language being obſelete, he had ſome difficulty in tranſlating it, and that he endeavours to give the ſenſe as literally and faithfully as poſſible. No fact in ancient hiſtory appears to be better authenticated than the tenor of theſe curious documents. The following are ſome of the moſt remarkable clauſes referred to in the text.

In the firſt treaty, which Caſaubon, after Aſorius, dates in A. U. C. 402. p. 1047—Τοις δε κατ' εμποριαν παραγινομενοις, μηδεν εσω τελος, πλην επι κηρυκι η γραμματει.—Εαν Ρωμαιων τις εις Σικελιαν παραγιγνηται, ης Καρχηδονιοι επαρχουσιν, ισα εσω τα Ρωμαιων παντα. *p.* 177.

In the ſecond treaty—Του καλου Ακρωτηριου, Μαστιας, Ταρσηιου, μη ληιζεσθαι επ' εκεινα Ρωμαιους, μηδε εμπορευεσθαι, μηδε πολιν κτιζειν.—Αν εκ τινος χωρας ης Καρχηδονιοι επαρχουσι, υδωρ η εφοδια λαβη ο Ρωμαιος, μεχα τουτων των εφοδιων μη αδικειτω μηδενα, προς ους ειρηνη και φιλια εστι Καρχηδονιοις.—Εν Σαρδονι και Λιβυη μηδεις Ρωμαιων μηδ' εμπορευεσθω, μηδε πολιν κτιζειτω. ει μη εως του εφοδια λαβειν, η πλοιον επισκευασαι. εαν δε χειμων καταναγκη, εν πενθ' ημεραις αποπλεχειτω. εν Σικελια ης Καρχηδονιοι επαρχουσι, και εν Καρχηδονι παντα και ποιειτω, και πωλειτω, οσα και τω πολιτη εξεστιν. ωσαυτως δε και ο Καρχηδονιος ποιειτω εν Ρωμη. *p.* 179. 180.

NOTE B. *p.* 49.

ALL other writers agree in this account of the characteriſtic features of the Weſt Indian Society; and it may be obſerved, that thoſe pictures of it which I particularly preſent to my readers, are taken from the French colonies, where the reſidence of the planters has always been much more univerſal than in the Britiſh and Dutch ſettlements. Of the proprietors in other colonies not above one fifth reſide: of the French

French colonial proprietors not above a tenth are ſuppoſed to live in the mother country.—*Robinet, Dict. Univ. II.* 393.

The teſtimony of the author from whom the excellent article, *St Domingo*, in the Encyc. Method. (Econ. Polit. & Dip.) is taken, may be added. His ideas are nearly the ſame with M. Malouet's. 'Il n'y a ni nobles, ni bourgeois, 'ni rentiers. Elles n'offrent que des atteliers propres aux 'denrées que le ſol produit, & aux différents travaux qu'el-'les exigent. On n'y voit que des commiſſionnaires, des 'aubergiſtes & des aventuriers, s'agitant pour trouver un 'poſte qui les nourriſſe, & acceptant le premier qui ſe pré-'ſente. Chacun ſe hâte de s'enrichir, pour s'éloigner d'un 'ſéjour où l'on vit ſans diſtinctions, ſans honneurs, ſans 'plaiſirs, & ſans autre aiguillon que celui de l'intérêt. Per-'ſonne ne s'arrête là avec le deſſein d'y vivre & d'y mourir. 'Les regards ſont attachés ſur l'Europe; & la principale 'jouiſſance qu'y procure l'accroiſſement des richeſſes, con-'ſiſte dans l'eſpoir plus ou moins éloigné de les rapporter 'parmi les ſiens dans notre hémiſphère.'—*tom II. p.* 140.—See, too, *Raynal, Hiſt. Phil. & Pol. &c. tom. V. p.* 118. *edit.* 1777. The account given by Baron Wimpffen is exactly in the ſame ſpirit with that of Malouet, (*Letters on St Domingo, No. XVIII.*)

NOTE C. *p.* 49.

THE ſtrange proportions of both ages and ſexes in the Weſt Indian population, may be eaſily perceived from the numbers of the inhabitants capable of bearing arms in all the iſlands.

In any community of the natural and ordinary ſtructure, the uſual proportion of perſons fit for bearing arms, that is,

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of males between fixteen and fixty, is one in four: Sir W. Petty, indeed, reckons the proportion at fomewhat leſs, (*Political Anatomy of Ireland, chap. VII.*) Now, in Jamaica, in the years 1791 and 1792, the militia conſiſted of ſix thouſand two hundred and eighty-three men actually enrolled and effective, although the whole white population only amounted to twenty-one thouſand one hundred and fifty-five ſouls. The whole whites able to bear arms are evidently not comprehended in the militia. In Grenada two thirds of the whole white population are militiamen. In St Domingo the number of whites fit to bear arms (in 1764) was nearly nine thouſand. The whole white population never exceeded thirty thouſand, and at that period was conſiderably leſs. It may be remarked, that the proportion of females in the French ſettlements is greater than in the Engliſh; and that the number of perſons having white families is alſo larger.

NOTE D. *p.* 97.

THE whole hiſtory of foreign commerce is full of the moſt glaring inſtances of ſuch impolicy. It is ſufficient to mention the multitude of treaties at various times, made by the different maritime powers, with Holland, granting the Dutch merchants excluſive privileges of trade in their dominions. The treaties with Denmark, for example, are ſo ſtrictly in favour of the Dutch, and ſo evidently dictated by views of national jealouſy and predilection, rather than by any regard to commercial intereſts, that one is inclined to think they muſt have been the work of Dutchmen, and not of Danes. One of the expreſs ſtipulations of the treaty 1453, between Denmark and Holland, granting certain commercial rights

to

to the latter, is a condition that the Dutch merchants ſhall import no Engliſh goods into the Daniſh dominions.

Sweden, at the very period when ſhe moſt ſtood in need of free and equal trade with all foreigners, from having no commerce of her own, firſt gave the Hans towns, and then the Engliſh and Dutch, a monopoly of her ſupply and exportation.

The Dutch themſelves have often granted ſimilar excluſive privileges to foreign merchants; but generally with the immediate view of obtaining ſtill greater conceſſions in return. During the firſt half of the ſeventeenth century, no fewer than nine commercial treaties were made by the Dutch with France, ſtipulating mutual privileges of excluſive trade, or confirming thoſe eſtabliſhed by the treaty 1596.

The celebrated treaty 1703, between Britain and Portugal, was dictated on both parts by political animoſity; the animoſity of England againſt France, and of Portugal againſt both France and Spain. The advantages of the treaty, with reſpect to the mutual relations of the two parties, are reciprocal, as we ſhall afterwards have occaſion to remark; but both parties have loſt an immenſe abſolute advantage, which the extenſion of the ſame privileges to other nations would have conferred.

In general, it may be expected that no commercial treaty, evidently diſadvantageous to one party, and gainful to another, will long ſubſiſt in modern times. But a compact may long remain in force from political conſiderations, which is very unequal, without being groſsly ſo: and ſimilar motives may produce mercantile conceſſions, which are in reality, though not apparently, advantageous only to one of the parties.

NOTE E. *p.* 114.

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THE ſtatements in the text will derive ſome illuſtration from the following facts.—The county of Glouceſter is the diſtrict of England, in which the labourers are moſt equally divided between agriculture and commerce or manufactures. In the former, forty-nine thouſand four hundred and twenty are engaged; in the latter, forty-nine thouſand ſix hundred and forty-five. In Lancaſhire, the diſproportion is conſiderable; two hundred and ſixty-nine thouſand two hundred and fifty-nine are employed in trade and manufactures, fifty-two thouſand and eighteen in agriculture. But in Middleſex, the diſproportion is much greater; the numbers being one hundred and ſixty-two thouſand two hundred and ſixty, and thirteen thouſand four hundred and ſeventeen. In Surrey, the diſproportion is greateſt; forty-two thouſand eight hundred and ſixty-five are employed in trade and manufactures, only two thouſand ſeven hundred and forty-ſix in agriculture. Hereford is the county where moſt are employed in agriculture; the proportion of theſe to traders and manufacturers, is that of thirty-one thouſand two hundred and ſixty-one, to eight thouſand five hundred and eighty-eight. In Wales, we meet with much greater proportions of agriculturiſts. In Radnor, the number of theſe is eight thouſand ſix hundred and twenty; the number of traders and manfacturers only eight hundred and eighty-nine. In Scotland, the county of Renfrew contains twenty-one thouſand ſeven hundred and forty-ſix, devoted to trade and manufactures, and only three thouſand eight hundred and ninety-four engaged in agriculture. Inverneſs contains thirty-four thouſand and ſixty-eight of the latter claſs, and only

three

three thouſand eight hundred and ſixty-four of the former. —*Vide Public Returns under the Population Act.*

It is eaſy to perceive from which of thoſe diſtricts the Britiſh army muſt be recruited and augmented. The chief magiſtrate of Glaſgow, for 1793 and 1794, reckoned that, during his continuance in office, there were raiſed for the army above ten thouſand men in that town. Theſe certainly came from Renfrew, as well as Lanerkſhire.

The details given by Mirabeau on the Pruſſian population *(Mon. Pruſſ. tom. I.)*; and thoſe which he inſerts with reſpect to the ſyſtem of recruiting the army *(tom. III.)*, add many illuſtrations upon this ſubject.—See alſo '*Obſervations ſur les Armies de ſa Maj. Pruſſienne.*'

NOTE F. *p.* 125.

THE frank and unaffected manner in which Frederick II. ſtates his views upon the origin of the different conteſts in which he was engaged, is worthy of ſome praiſe. After mentioning the cauſes of war, which he probably publiſhed in his manifeſtoes, he always adds a ſketch of the numbers of his armies, and the ſtate of his treaſures; with a notice of the allies upon whom he could reckon, from conſidering the mutual rivalry and enmities of his neighbours.—See *Hiſt. de Mon Temps, chap. I. & II.—Hiſt. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, chap. I.*

This mode of viewing the relative ſituation of France and England, is diſtinctly expreſſed in the following paſſage, where he alludes to the probable conduct of thoſe two powers in the affairs of the Bavarian ſucceſſion: 'D'ailleurs, 'il etoit impoſſible que le roi manquât d'alliés. La rivalité 'que ſubſiſtoit entre la France et l'Angleterre aſſuroit ne-

'ceſſairement

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'ceſſairement au roi une de ces deux puiſſances.'—(*Hiſt. de Mon Temps, tom. I. p.* 127. Edit. 1788.)

This is given as the ſtatement of thoſe reaſons and views which regulated the king's conduct, in undertaking the conqueſt of Sileſia.

NOTE G. *p.* 127.

THE conduct of France, during the American war, is diſcuſſed by various eminent political writers. That the higheſt authorities, both among theſe, and among the French ſtateſmen of the times, have been uniformly on the ſide of neutrality, I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſhow.—*See Vol. II. p.* 295. *and Note* N n.

NOTE I. *p.* 143.

IT is by no means neceſſary for ſupporting the reaſonings contained in this ſection, that I ſhould enter into a diſcuſſion of the general doctrines maintained by the œconomiſts. But, beſides the apparent fallacy in their fundamental principles, which I have ventured to point out in the text, I ſhall add one or two remarks, with reſpect to their manner of viewing the diſtribution of wealth, and the different qualities of labour.

The diſtinction between productive and unproductive labour, ſeems, at firſt ſight, to be founded in the nature of things; and when we obſerve, without much attention, the uſe which is made of theſe terms in the writings of the œconomiſts, we are inclined to conclude, that the ideas thus conveyed

conveyed owe their origin to a very ſimple and natural, though not a very important conſideration; or one from whence much uſeful light can be derived, viz. that man cannot, unaſſiſted by the operations of nature, increaſe the portion of matter upon which he exerts his induſtry. But when we examine the caſe a little more minutely, we find that, in fact, the applications of this undoubted truth, to that claſſification in which the theory conſiſts, are by no means accurate or complete. The moſt ordinary inſtance of contraſt, between the labourer who increaſes the quantity of grain in the univerſe, and him who varies the form of that grain, may at firſt deceive us; but a multitude of examples might be given, which clearly prove the general diſtinction to be unfounded; and we, then, begin to perceive that, in all caſes, it is really as fanciful. Let us take the inſtance of a brick manufacture. Here we have a proceſs, by which no new particles are added to the ſubject formerly in exiſtence. The land from which this return is obtained is not uſed, but deprived of its exiſtence as ſoil, and turned into a uſeful commodity. We cannot, therefore, call the obtaining of the materials ſubſervient to the manufacture an operation of agriculture, like the obtaining of wheat for the uſe of a mill: and it is clearly not what the œconomiſts denominate productive labour; becauſe it conſiſts entirely in ſubdividing, and new-moulding, by tools, a ſubſtance formerly exiſting. It is therefore unproductive and manufacturing labour. So is the operation of the furnace, as much as the formation of gold and ſilver by the fire and hammer into utenſils. The whole operation, then, by which bricks are procured, is, according to the ſtrict language of the œconomiſts, a manufacture, and is entitled to the appellation of unproductive. But if we attend to the effects of this operation, we ſhall find them to be exactly ſimilar to thoſe of agricultural induſtry: the uſeleſs particles of ſoil are ſo treated, as to become highly uſeful; they are endued, by the

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the induſtry of the workman, with thoſe properties which fit them for ſupplying the neceſſities of man, viz. his want of ſhelter. The proceſs, by the aſſiſtance of which labour produces this effect, is exactly the proceſs which aſſiſts the farmer: the power of heat enables the manufacturer to produce ſhelter, and the farmer to produce food. The materials on which both work are the ſame—the ſoil. This appears in the one caſe to be deſtroyed, in the other to remain entire; but nothing can be more fallacious than ſuch a diſtinction. The labours of the brick-maker ſeparate part of the land from the ſubſtratum, unite it with other bodies, and ſubject it to various natural proceſſes, until a ſubſtance is obtained poſſeſſed of new properties. The labour of the farmer alſo ſeparates a portion of the ſoil from the ſubſtratum, viz. the ſalts, carbonaceous matter, &c.; unites theſe with other ſubſtances, as water, and airs of different kinds; and ſubjects thoſe portions of matter to various proceſſes, until a body is obtained poſſeſſed of new properties. The bricks are worn down by uſe, and their *debris* return to the fund from which they were drawn. The grain is conſumed, that is, ſubjected to various proceſſes in the animal ſyſtem, which bring it by a circle back to the earth, from whence it ſprung. The circumſtance which has manifeſtly miſled the œconomiſts is, the clearneſs with which we think we can perceive increaſe of matter or creation, in the operations of the farmer; whereas, in fact, he only, by the aſſiſtance of other portions of matter, and the operations of nature, forms new compounds of bodies previouſly exiſting. Juſt ſo does the brick-maker. Neither of them create—they merely combine and model. Nor is there any difference between the argument here maintained, and that which manifeſtly ſuggeſts itſelf on all the other branches of manufacturing induſtry.

NOTE K. *p.* 169.

IN comparing the returns of the colony trade with thoſe of the other branches of commerce, I have chiefly taken, as examples, the two great branches of European trade belonging to the Baltic and the Mediterranean; becauſe theſe are the kinds of traffic which have been, by all writers on this ſubject, adopted as the medium of compariſon. It is clear, however, that the arguments apply equally to the other kinds of foreign commerce.

Much error has ariſen in political diſcuſſions, from not attending to the limits of a very accurate and juſt propoſition—that a low rate of profits is attended with real advantage to the wealth of a nation. The truth is, that the low rate is a ſymptom, as well as a cauſe of commercial proſperity; and its certainty as a ſymptom, is much more general than as a cauſe. For if, with a high rate of profits, there can be combined that unremitting induſtry which competition of capitals, and a low rate of gain uniformly excites; and if the high profits can be made upon as much ſtock as the competition would bring into the line of low profit, it is very evident that the national ſtock will be ſo much the more increaſed, as the rate of gain is higher.

The compariſon between the colony trade and European trade, in this point of view, is accurately demonſtrative of the advantages poſſeſſed by the former. We are not arguing with reſpect to the extent of capital employed in either; for we ſhall immediately afterwards find, that this depends on peculiar circumſtances. But admitting that a certain portion of the national ſtock is devoted to the colony trade, and another equal portion to the nearer trade, the whole gain

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gain on the former portion is greater than the whole gain on the latter; always conſidering, that the capital replaced in the colonies is a home capital, and taking it for granted, that the returns from the foreign traffic are only twice as quick as thoſe from the colony trade. A great gain on a ſmall ſtock is certainly of leſs importance than a moderate gain on a large ſtock. But, the ſtocks being equal, the moſt gainful traffic is evidently moſt beneficial to the country, as well as to the individuals. We ſhall afterwards conſider the circumſtances that naturally, and independent of colonial relations, diſtribute the national ſtock, and determine the extent of its ſeveral portions.

NOTE L. *p.* 185.

THE difference between real and official value muſt of courſe vary in almoſt every article. The general ſtatement in the text, is, however, ſufficiently correct.

Authors are by no means agreed upon the details of this ſubject.

The original prices of 1697 are ſtill adhered to in making up the Cuſtomhouſe reports; and it is agreed on all hands, that the great majority of exported and imported articles have riſen very much ſince thoſe rates of price were fixed. But it ſeems equally clear, that ſome articles, chiefly of importation, have very much fallen in price. Many of theſe are Weſt Indian products—mahogany, rum, and, above all, coffee, which is rated at about three times its current price. From the returns, in conſequence of the convoy duty, made by the inſpector-general, (an officer, to whoſe labours the political œconomiſt owes more obligations than

than it is eaſy to expreſs), it appears that the *declared* value of Britiſh exported manufactures exceeded their *official* value ſeventy-one *per cent.*, and the real value muſt have been ſomewhat greater. In 1799 and 1800, the real value of re-exported produce falls ſhort of the official value, chiefly from the quantity of coffee, and other high-rated colonial goods exported. Mr Edwards (*Hiſt. of Weſt Indies, paſſim*) eſtimates the official value of Weſt Indian produce at one third below its real value. It would appear that this is a great deal too much, when we conſider the quantity of coffee and rum which is imported from the colonies. The official value of foreign manufactures imported, muſt of courſe fall nearly as much ſhort of the current prices as the official value of Britiſh exports. Almoſt all the diminution of price ſeems to fall upon articles of colonial produce, which were ſcantily ſupplied in the laſt century. I have enumerated ſome of theſe. The ſame liſt comprehends, alſo, rice, ſaltpetre, and ſilks, which form the principal of the remaining articles.

NOTE M. *p.* 206.

A very clear and accurate account of the diſtinctions between different trading corporations is given by Dr Smith, in the *Wealth of Nations, book V. chap. I.* The reader will there find, alſo, a minute ſketch of the moſt remarkable regulated and joint-ſtock companies that have been formed in England; and the cleareſt demonſtration of the impolicy of ſuch inſtitutions, more eſpecially if endued with excluſive privileges.

In the Third Section of this Inquiry, the reader will find various confirmations of the ſame truth, from the conſtant experience of foreign nations. I have alſo endeavoured to exhibit ſome general views of the natural progreſs of ſuch

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institutions; and it is not unintereſting, or uninſtructive, to obſerve with what ſingular uniformity the ſame progreſs has marked the hiſtory of all nations in this branch of commercial polity. See, particularly, Part I. and II. of that Section, and the concluſion of Part III.

The article, '*Compagnies*,' vol. I. of the Treatiſe on Commerce, in the *Encyclopedie Methodique*, contains ſome valuable information on the ſame ſubject, more eſpecially on the hiſtory of the French Eaſt and Weſt India Companies. I refer the reader to this part of the article, and to the Index of Anderſon's *Hiſtory of Commerce*, not only for additional proofs, if any are neceſſary, of the poſitions contained in the text, but for ſuch illuſtrations as are purpoſely omitted in the Fourth part of the Third Section.

The dictionaries of Savari and Robinet, from which a great part of the treatiſe in the *Encyclopedie* is taken; and Ricard's *Traité General du Commerce*, particularly the third volume, deſerve to be conſulted by thoſe who would enter with great minuteneſs into this very intereſting and amuſing ſubject. There is, perhaps, no branch of political hiſtory that furniſhes ſo many deep and important general reflections; and none of thoſe writers who are commonly called hiſtorians give us any light upon the matter.

NOTE N. *p.* 270.

ALL nations have at different times adopted a policy ſimilar to that which dictated the navigation act, and chiefly with the ſame views. The edicts of France upon this ſubject have been the leaſt unwiſe, and the neareſt to the meaſures of England in their good conſequences. The navigation law of Sweden has been the moſt prepoſterous, and productive of the greateſt injury; becauſe it was the moſt unnatural, and tended to anticipate events placed at the greateſt diſtance.

In

NOTE N.

In Portugal, a propoſal of ſingular abſurdity has lately been made, by a perſon of ſome rank in the American colony, and tolerably well acquainted with the Portugueze colonial commerce, Cunha de Coutinho, biſhop of Fernambuco. The chief object of his diſcourſe is to recommend ſuch meaſures as may increaſe the Portugueze navy, by favouring the colonial fiſheries, and imitating the Engliſh navigation act. The errors of this author's reaſonings are pointed out with ſufficient preciſion by the tranſlator of the work into Engliſh, in the notes which he has added. The original work is printed at Liſbon, with the title of *Enſajo Economico Subre o Commercio de Portugal e Suas Colonias*; and the tranſlation was publiſhed in London 1801.—See particularly, Part I. chap. II.

NOTE O. *p.* 272.

THE following paſſage in the *Wealth of Nations* may perhaps juſtify the remarks contained in the text—remarks which may be extended to many other writers of leſs note, and even to ſome other parts of Dr Smith's writings, particularly to ſeveral of his ſpeculations (as well as Mr Hume's) on the ſubjects of circulation and credit.

'The monopoly of the colony trade beſides, by forcing 'towards it a much greater proportion of the capital of 'Great Britain than what would naturally have gone to it, 'ſeems to have broken altogether that natural balance which 'would otherwiſe have taken place among all the different 'branches of Britiſh induſtry. The induſtry of Great Bri'tain, inſtead of being accommodated to a great number of 'ſmall markets, has been principally ſuited to one great 'market. Her commerce, inſtead of running in a great 'number of ſmall channels, has been taught to run principal'ly in one great channel. But the whole ſyſtem of her in-

NOTES AND ILLUST.

'duſtry and commerce has thereby been rendered leſs ſecure; 'the whole ſtate of her body politic leſs healthful, than it 'otherwiſe would have been. In her preſent condition, 'Great Britain reſembles one of thoſe unwholeſome bodies 'in which ſome of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, 'upon that account, are liable to many dangerous diſorders 'ſcarce incident to thoſe in which all the parts are more pro-'perly proportioned. A ſmall ſtop in that great blood-'veſſel, which has been artificially ſwelled beyond its natural 'dimenſions, and through which an unnatural proportion of 'the induſtry and commerce of the country has been forced 'to circulate, is very likely to bring on the moſt dangerous 'diſorders upon the whole body politic. The expectation 'of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has ſtruck the 'people of Great Britain with more terror than they ever 'felt for a Spaniſh armada, or a French invaſion. It was 'this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered 'the repeal of the ſtamp act, among the merchants at leaſt, 'a popular meaſure. In the total excluſion from the colony 'market, was it to laſt only for a few years, the greater 'part of our merchants uſed to fancy that they foreſaw an 'entire ſtop to their trade; the greater part of our maſter 'manufacturers, the entire ruin of their buſineſs; and the 'greater part of our workmen, an end of their employment. 'A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, 'though likely too to occaſion ſome ſtop or interruption in 'the employments of ſome of all theſe different orders of 'people, is foreſeen, however, without any ſuch general e-'motion. The blood of which the circulation is ſtopt in 'ſome of the ſmaller veſſels, eaſily diſgorges itſelf into the 'greater, without occaſioning any dangerous diſorder; but, 'when it is ſtopt in any of the greater veſſels, convulſions, 'apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable 'conſequences. If but one of thoſe overgrown manufactures, 'which, by means either of bounties or of the monopoly of 'the home and colony markets, have been artificially raiſed

'up

'up to an unnatural height, finds ſome ſmall ſtop or interruption in its employment, it frequently occaſions a mutiny and diſorder alarming to government, and embarraſſing even to the deliberations of the legiſlature. How great, therefore, would be the diſorder and confuſion, it was thought, which muſt neceſſarily be occaſioned by a ſudden and entire ſtop in the employment of ſo great a proportion of our principal manufacturers?'—*vol. II. p.* 424. 425. & 426.

NOTE P. *p.* 283.

WE actually find a ſtriking analogy between the naval carrying trade, as engroſſed by the Dutch, and the inland carrying trade of different parts of the world, as engroſſed by particular nations or tribes. The whole commerce of the interior of Africa muſt neceſſarily be carried on by caravans. The buſineſs of conducting journies through deſerts, which inſulate the various cultivable ſpots of that continent, requires peculiar talents and habits: accordingly, the circulation of the commodities that form the ſubjects of commerce in thoſe parts, has become a peculiar branch of employment, and occupied the attention of one nation more than all the reſt. We are informed by Mr Horneman, that the carrying trade of the interior of North Africa is entirely in the hands of the Tibbo and Tuarick; that between the interior and Cairo is engroſſed by the Angilans; and that between the interior and Tripoli is in the hands of the Lochna. Theſe tribes devote their lives to the wayfaring line and the objects immediately connected with it, as the Dutch have done to the ſeafaring line, ſhip-building, and fiſheries.—(*Journal of F. Horneman's Travels.*)

This excellent traveller has pointed out the effects of their peculiar way of life on the characters and habits of the different carrying tribes.

NOTE S. *p.* 365.

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THE author of the *Voyage à Cayenne*, &c. ſtates the negro population of Dutch Guiana at ninety thouſand ſlaves, and twenty-ſix thouſand Maroons, p. 226. 230. Malouet flatly denies that the Maroons are ſo numerous; but as his ſtatements are intended to ſupport a ſtrong opinion with which he was impreſſed, againſt cultivating the French colony in Guiana by means of the Maroons, we ſhould take his aſſertions with ſome allowance. The author of the Treatiſe on Political Economy (in the Encyc. Method.) gives fifty thouſand for the number of the Maroons, tom. IV. p. 299. He adds, that in the colony of Berbice, there are only two hundred and fifty whites, and ſeven thouſand negro ſlaves. Ricard (tom. III.) gives the ſame ſtatement with reſpect to Berbice. The Treatiſe *Geographie* (Encyc. Meth.) ſtates the whole ſlave population of Surinam at ſixty thouſand. Tom. III. p. 308.

Morſe (*Amer. Gazetteer*, p. 153.) gives the population of whites in Dutch Guiana at three thouſand two hundred, the negro ſlaves at forty-three thouſand. I am inclined to doubt the general accuracy of this author's ſtatements of population; becauſe he greatly exceeds every other writer, and becauſe, on ſome occaſions, I find he has copied *verbatim* from very old books. See his Account of the Dutch Iſlands, p. 127. which is taken *verbatim* from *Burke*.

NOTE T. *p.* 379.

ALMOST all general writers on Spaniſh affairs come under this deſcription. The Marquis d'Argenſon, without any heſitation, aſcribes the ruin of Spain chiefly to her colonial relations.

Dr

Dr Robertſon (*Hiſt. of America*, II. 399.) has the following ſtatement in the ſame ſpirit:

'Thus the poſſeſſions of Spain in America have not 'proved a ſource of population and of wealth to her, in the 'ſame manner as thoſe of other nations. In the countries 'of Europe, where the ſpirit of induſtry ſubſiſts in full vi-'gour, every perſon ſettled in ſuch colonies, as are ſimilar 'in their ſituation to thoſe of Spain, is ſuppoſed to give em-'ployment to three or four at home in ſupplying his wants. '[Child on Trade and Colonies.] But wherever the 'mother country cannot afford this ſupply, every emigrant 'may be conſidered as a citizen loſt to the community, and 'ſtrangers muſt reap all the benefit of anſwering his de-'mands.'

This paſſage requires no commentary. Where great names have treated ſo careleſsly a ſubject of ſo much more importance than difficulty, we may be allowed to ſtate with ſome confidence the facts which they ſeem to have neglected, and the obvious arguments which they ſeem to have omitted. As to the obſervation laſt quoted; nothing can be clearer than that the emigrants from Spain afford in the colonies the ſame aſſiſtance to thoſe who remain at home, as if they had remained at home themſelves—nay, as their numbers muſt multiply much more rapidly at the end of a given time, the whole home market will be more extended in conſequence of the emigration.

NOTE U. *p.* 411.

I HAVE purpoſely omitted the conſideration of ſome very glaring evils in the political ſituation of Spain, becauſe they appear to be rather of a ſecondary nature, than general and primary cauſes of decline. The enormous extent of eccleſiaſtical charity ſeems to be the chief of theſe, and, from its effects, it almoſt deſerves to be conſidered in a more general

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point of view. Mr Townſend's whole travels are full of accounts of this public nuiſance, which cannot fail to aſtoniſh every reader. I have, however, ſtated the radical cauſes which gave riſe on the one hand to the demand for charity, and on the other to the capacity acquired by the church of ſatisfying this demand. Like all evils in the political ſyſtem, the charity profuſely beſtowed has increaſed the other evil which gave riſe to it, viz. the poverty and idleneſs of the people. The princely fortunes of the monaſteries and dignitaries of the church, ariſing chiefly from ancient grants of land obtained during the depopulated ſtate of the kingdom, formed perhaps the only part of the fact which can be ſaid to have been peculiar to Spain.

NOTE V. *p.* 437.

IT may be amuſing to my readers to obſerve the effects of national prejudice, upon a mind of the greateſt ſtrength and liberality, in the following paſſages of Campomanes.

'El autor de los eſtablecimientos de los europeos, ha 'prodigado muchas fábulas de eſta naturaleza, contra la 'humanidad de los eſpagnoles. Y ſi ſe hubieſe tomado la 'fatiga de leer nueſtras memorias, habria tenido que admirar, 'mas que cenſurar.

'Si ſe ha de inferir el trato de los eſpagnoles con los 'Indios, por el que dan á ſus eſclavos, es fácil demoſtrar, 'que exceden á las demás naciones en humanidad; y es çoſa 'que eſtá á la viſta de todos.

'Si de alguno ſe puede afirmar, que procedió con ſeve'ridad, fué Ambroſio Alfinger en la Tierra-firme, Alemán 'que paſó con licencia de Carlos I; y eſte es el único, 'que puede ſer motejado de crueldad.'—*Educ. Popul. II. p.* 172. *Note.*

NOTE

NOTE W. *p.* 444. 450.

IF the reader attends to the following comparative ſtatement of authorities, he will probably admit the juſtice of the remark in the text.

Dr Robertſon eſtimates the numbers of the Spaniards, and the mixed race in Peru and Mexico, at three millions; and ſeems to think that the Spaniards are about half as numerous as the negroes and mixed races together.—(*Hiſt. of America, II.* 496.)

Dr Smith (*Wealth of Nations, Book IV. chap. VI.*) ſays, that Brazil has more white inhabitants than any other American colony; and that it contains nine hundred thouſand.

Morſe ſtates the population of the Spaniſh part of St Domingo at one hundred and ten thouſand free inhabitants, and fifteen thouſand ſlaves.—(*Amer. Gaz.*)

Edwards gives the whole number of inhabitants at about eighteen thouſand.—(*Hiſt. Survey, &c. chap. XII.*)

The Report of the Chambers of Commerce to M. Necker ſtates twenty-two thouſand to be the number of the free inhabitants, and four thouſand that of the ſlaves. Moreau de St Mery, and Bourgoing, eſtimate the population at one hundred thouſand free men, and fifteen thouſand ſlaves.

The ſame Report makes the free population of Cuba one hundred and ſeventy thouſand; of Port Rico, ſeventy-five thouſand: and the ſlave population of the former, thirty thouſand; of the latter, ſix thouſand. Some accounts of Cuba make the whole population amount to one hundred and ſeventy-one thouſand; of which, above twenty-eight thouſand were ſaid to be ſlaves.—(*Econ. Pol. & Dip.* (*Encyc. Meth.*) *tom. I. p.* 742.) Ricard gives the whole population at ſeventy-two thouſand.—*III.* 671.

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NOTE X.

NOTES AND ILLUST.

The accounts of Porto Rico are ſtill more various. Some authors ſtate its negro population at fifty thouſand.

The accounts of the revenue of the Spaniſh colonies are ſtill more contradictory, as the reader may ſee, by referring to the authorities above quoted, and to Harris's Collection.

NOTE X. *p.* 478.

THE accounts of the Portugueze colonies are much more inconſiſtent than thoſe of the Spaniſh, and our knowledge of them, in every reſpect, leſs extenſive.

END OF VOLUME FIRST.

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